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Dutch social security law has changed during the last decades. Values of 
equality and solidarity, which traditionally underpin social security law, 
are slowly being replaced by the value of individual responsibility. This 
transformation is embodied in the Life Course Arrangement, an individual 
savings scheme for (new) social risks that was introduced in Dutch social 
security law in 2006. In 2013 this arrangement will be replaced by the Vitality 
Arrangement. How can the establishment of the idea of individual savings 
schemes in traditional collective social security law be explained? And is it 
possible to criticize those changes without reverting to some notion of justice?
The introduction of the Life Course Arrangement serves as a paradigmatic 
case for this study. Based on a (juridical) discourse analysis of a selection of 
(policy) texts and interviews with key actors involved in the policy process, 
this study shows that the establishment of the idea of individual savings 
schemes in traditional Dutch collective social security law was, amongst 
other things, the result of the introduction of the new signifiers ‘life course’ 
and ‘life course perspective’ in the social security discourse. These signifiers 
made people see things in a different way and constructed a new space of 
representation that enabled the reconciliation of formerly opposite views. 
For example, the new discourse that emerged was structured around the 
fantasy that increased labor market participation and more time for care 
and/or leisure are reconcilable. The study also shows how the Life Course 
Arrangement emerged in an atmosphere of antagonism and disagreement. 
Yet, due to a strong aging society narrative the idea of individual savings 
schemes was able to survive in Dutch social security law. The introduction 
of the Life Course Arrangement is criticized for ignoring the voices of those 
who joined the earlier ‘life course discourse coalition’ and for constructing 
a self responsible life planner as a new governable subject. The study argues 
that this subject must be distinguished from the ethical subject who strives for 
a genuine access to freedom practices. The insights gained in this study can 
both improve the methodological development of research that is based on 
discourse theory and incite policymakers and social lawyers to rethink recent 
social security reforms.
This is a volume in the series of the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate 
School of Leiden University. This study was conducted within the framework 
of the research programme Reform of Social Legislation.
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Preface
Dutch social security law has changed during the last decades. Values of 
equality and solidarity, which traditionally underpin social security law, 
are slowly being replaced by the value of individual responsibility. This 
transformation is embodied in the Life Course Arrangement, an individual 
savings scheme for (new) social risks, which will be replaced by the Vitality 
Arrangement in 2013. How can the establishment of the idea of individual 
savings schemes in Dutch collective social security law be explained? And 
is it possible to criticize those changes without reverting to some notion 
of justice? This book seeks to answer these questions through a collection of 
papers and (theoretical) chapters. 
One of the main purposes of the Life Course Arrangement was to enable 
workers to combine paid work with other activities during their life course. 
Above all the Life Course Arrangement was aimed at relieving the busy 
‘rush hour of life’, a period when workers are caring for their (small) chil-
dren as well as their elderly parents and are working on a successful con-
tinuation of their career all at the same time. In fact, I found myself in the 
middle of my own ‘rush hour of life’ when I studied Labor Law and subse-
quently conducted my PhD research. Yet, I enjoyed this busy period doing 
research and writing papers. I am grateful to the Department of Social Law 
at Leiden University for giving me the opportunity to carry out this research 
project. I especially want to thank my supervisors, Guus Heerma van Voss 
from Leiden University and David Howarth from Essex University, and my 
colleagues of the research program ‘Reforming Social Security’, funded by 
the Stichting Instituut Gak, for their support and constructive comments on 
my work.
I also would like to thank my partner, Nurit, without whom I never would 
have started and finished this PhD study. My son Lenny, who is now six 
years old, will probably only remember that we were playing soccer, 
watching soccer, and buying soccer balls and soccer shirts in the years 
before he turned seven. So, I guess my ‘rush hour of life’ will not leave him 
traumatized.
I hope that you will enjoy reading this thesis.
Anja Eleveld
Leiden, June 2012

1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction to the central question of this study
Social security law, which lies at the heart of the Dutch welfare state, has 
changed during the last decades. These changes can also be characterized as 
a slow transformation from a system informed by notions of equality and 
solidarity to a system that is increasingly influenced by the values of free-
dom of choice and individual responsibility (Jaspers 2001; Noordam 1996, 
1998, 2007; Trommel and Van der Veen 1999; Van Oorschot 2002; Van Gestel, 
et al. 2010; Van der Veen 2001).
A short history of the Dutch welfare state illuminates this value shift 
The contours of the Dutch welfare state appear for the first time in the influ-
ential Van Rhijn report from 1945. This report argues in favor of a reformed 
system of social security that ensures a decent life for the entire population 
(Van Rhijn Committee 1945: 7). In the years that follow, a collective system 
is built up that aspires to cover all possible collective risks. This system fits 
in well with the paternalistic welfare state discourse that is popular at the 
time. According to this discourse, social security should take care of the 
citizens ‘from cradle to grave’, a basic principle which is hardly ever chal-
lenged during the first decades after 1955 (Noordam 1998 and 2007).
In the mid-1970s, with the social security system ‘completed’, the Nether-
lands are struck by the (world) economic crisis, which results in a crisis of the 
social security system. In response to this crisis, the social security discourse 
increasingly emphasizes individual risk responsibilities. Another shift in 
the discourse concerns the framing of the crisis. Instead of attributing the 
crisis of the welfare state to external economic factors, the debate is increas-
ingly determined by arguments referring to the widespread improper use 
of social benefits and the unmanageable costs of the welfare state. In addi-
tion, as a result of European demands regarding equal treatment of men and 
women, so-called bread winner facilities are abolished in favor of more indi-
vidualized facilities that endorse equal treatment of men and women (Asscher-
Vonk 2001; Jaspers 2001; Noordam 1996 and 2007; Van der Veen 2001).
The report by the Buurmeijer Committee (1993) marks a new shift in 
the social security discourse. It reveals how the organization of unemploy-
ment and disability schemes has not led to the reintegration of unemployed 
and disabled workers into paid employment but has, in fact, encouraged 
welfare dependency. The report advocates the introduction of market proc-
esses in the social security system. Correspondingly, within the discourse, 
social security is increasingly approached in terms of economic incentives 
and disincentives and less in terms of rights and obligations. This impli-
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cates that citizens are no longer perceived as passive consumers of govern-
mental policies, but as active, calculating subjects who carefully weigh 
what strategy promises most profits (Noordam 1996, 2007; Van Gestel, et al. 
2009; Trommel and Van der Veen 1999). 
The individualization of social risks that started in the 1980 continues 
after 2000 when new social security reforms are introduced. For example, the 
2004 Dutch Work and Welfare act (WWB) places far more emphasis on work 
than on welfare benefits, compared to the preceding National Assistance Act 
(AWB), Another novelty in social security law which reflects the aforemen-
tioned value shift concerns the Life Course Arrangement (LCA ), an individu-
al savings arrangement in social security law that is introduced in 2006.1 The 
LCA involves the right for individual workers to save part of their wages in 
a fiscally favorable way in order to finance full or part-time unpaid leave.2
1 The LCA differs in many respects from classical social security arrangements. Therefore, 
defi ning LCA as a social security arrangement will require some further explanation. 
Strictly defi ned, social security law is confi ned to income protection under public law 
(Noordam 2006). A broader defi nition of social security law includes all kinds of arrange-
ments, both public and private, that entail solidarity based transfers of income, such as 
sickness insurance, study allowances and rent subsidies (see for instance SVB 2004). This 
book follows the criteria that have been formulated by Heerma van Voss and Klosse 
(2007) and Vonk (2004). Based on social law literature, jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice and ILO Committee Reports and Recommendations, Heerma van Voss 
and Klosse conclude that public social security is not necessarily organized in public law. 
However, they note that the government must set some safeguards with regard to public 
law. To Heerma van Voss and Klosse this implies that second and third pillar arrange-
ments that are also organized in private law, such as the LCA , may very well be consid-
ered social security law. Still, strictly speaking the LCA falls outside their defi nition of 
social security law, because the LCA is not exclusively related to one of the nine essential 
elements of social security as defi ned in ILO treaty 102 and in Regulation 1408/71 (medi-
cal care, sickness benefi t, unemployment benefi t, old age benefi t, employment injury 
benefi t, family benefi t, maternity benefi t, invalidity benefi t and survivor’s benefi t). The 
LCA , then, also covers the new risk of employability , i.e. to be suffi ciently educated 
and trained to keep up with the requirements of the labor market. Therefore, this study 
extends the defi nition of social security law of Heerma van Voss with the criteria formu-
lated by Vonk (2004), according to whom social security law is essentially related to clas-
sical social insurance risks. Whereas rent subsidies are excluded from the defi nition, this 
defi nition includes costs that are not covered in ILO treaty 102 and Regulation 1408/71, 
such as costs for education. Drawing on the defi ntions provided by Heerma van Voss 
and Klosse and Vonk we can thus conclude that the LCA is an instrument of social securi-
ty law, because the LCA (a) covers the (new) risks of care and employability; (b) involves 
a transfer of money within tax law; and (c) includes public safeguards in public law. 
2 The LCA is not the fi rst public arrangement that facilitates the fi nancing of leave. In 
1998 the government introduced an arrangement that facilitated career breaks (loop-
baanonderbrekingsregeling, Wet Finlo). However, since an employee had to meet a lot 
of requirements before she was entitled to this type of leave financing, only a few 
employees utilized this arrangement. Consequently, the arrangement was withdrawn 
in 2006. In addition, employees could already save part of their wages in a fi scally facil-
itated way in the ‘leave savings account’ (verlofspaarregeling), albeit on a smaller scale 
than in the LCA . This arrangement, which was also withdrawn in 2006, could be con-
sidered a forerunner to the LCA .
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According to the explanatory memorandum of the law propos-
al, the LCA ’s main objective is to deal with the need for combining 
work and other activities and for spreading out these activities dur-
ing the course of one’s lifetime.3 Other parliamentary documents men-
tion the stimulation of female labor participation as a second impor-
tant purpose of the LCA .4 The LCA is further justified as fitting in 
with a policy that promotes individual needs and responsibilities.5
The LCA differs from traditional social security arrangements in at 
least three important ways. First of all, instead of redistributing income 
between poor and rich citizens, workers with higher incomes tend to be 
favored over workers with low incomes. This is due to the structure of the 
fiscal facilitation of savings under the LCA (Caminada and Goudswaard 
2006).6 Secondly, in the form in which it was introduced in 2006 the indi-
vidual savings instrument does not cover ‘old risks ’ such as unemploy-
ment and disability, except for the risk of old age. Instead, the LCA is tai-
lored to ‘new risks ’ such as the risk of having to combine paid work with 
care and the risk of having a level of education and training that is too low 
with respect to current labor market requirements. Thirdly, the LCA may 
also be used for reasons that have nothing to do with social risks whatso-
ever, as the worker is allowed to use the savings for the financing of leave 
for personal leisure pursuits, such as traveling or painting. The LCA thus 
also facilitates differences in lifestyle choice.7
In the years following the LCA ’s introduction, different proposals have 
been put forward with the objective of extending the personal and material 
scope of application of the LCA . Of these, proposals to extend the personal 
scope to the self-employed and to permit using the savings for funding the 
3 PP 2003-04, 29 760 No. 3, p. 14.
4 PP 2006-07, No. 18, p. 295; PP 2006-07, 30 800 XV, No. 9, p. 15; PP 2004-05, 28 000 Chap-
ter XV, No. 2, p. 15; PP 2003-04, 29 210 and 29208, No. 94, p. 11.
5 PP 2003-04, 29 760 No. 3, p. 15.
6 Furthermore, prior to the introduction of the LCA it has been argued that the LCA 
would tend to increase the inequalities between women and men. That is, whereas 
women would probably use the funds to fi nance parental leave and/or care leave, at 
the end of their working career men would have more money left in their savings 
account to enjoy an early retirement (Bovenberg 2003; Keuzekamp 2004; Koopmans 
2007; Koopmans, Plantenga and Vlasblom 2005; Roman, 2006; Vermeeren-Keijzers).
7 Compare in this respect Nagel’s categories of inequalities: (1) discrimination; (2) social 
background inequality; (3); natural endowment inequality ; (4) differences in effort and 
lifestyle choice. Whereas Dutch social security law after WW II initially sought to 
include the fi rst three categories, with the introduction of LCA the most libertarian form 
of equality policies, the accommodation of differences in effort and lifestyle choice (cat-
egory 4), is also addressed (Nagel, 1991).
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periods in between jobs have been the most salient ones.8 These proposals are 
to some extent incorporated in the ‘vitality arrangement ’, which will replace 
the LCA in 2013.9 Compared to the LCA , these proposals reflect a rupture 
with traditional social security law to an even greater extent. After all, instead 
of endorsing the values that have traditionally informed social law, such as 
protecting the employee and reducing inequalities (Betten et al. 1997; Zekic 
2011), these proposals tend to facilitate the self responsible life planner .10
The question can be raised as to how to asses these changes that appar-
ently erode the basic values of social law. Should we just accept the trans-
formation of the underlying values of social security law as an inescapable 
effect of modernity in which constraints of traditional society are being 
replaced by the freedom-seeking self reflective individual (Giddens 
1991)?11 Or is it possible to formulate a critique? For example, instead of 
viewing the introduction of the LCA as an inevitable product of modern 
society a Foucauldian perspective would demonstrate an interesting para-
dox. That is, notwithstanding the fact that the modern society discourse 
8 The most important ones are the governmental coalition agreement of 7 February 2007 
(‘Samen werken, samenleven’), the Labor Participation Committee (2008) and the 
Labor Foundation (2008). The proposal for a vitality arrangement is the most recent 
addition to this list (Parliamentary documents 2010-11 29 544, No. 329 and 2011-12, 33 
003, No. 3, Stb 2011 639).
9 Stb 2011 639. Workers who have, by the end of 2011, saved over €3000,- in the LCA may 
continue saving in their life course account.
10 Similar proposals can be found in the social-legal welfare state literature from this peri-
od. On the one hand, this literature endorses Giddens ’ idea of the investment state 
(1998), which focuses on instruments that facilitate the combination of paid work with 
other useful activities such as unpaid care activities and training. On the other hand, 
this literature emphasizes the importance of protection and solidarity (Supiot 2001; 
Schmid 2006; Esping-Anderson 2006; Barnard et al. 2001).
11 As Giddens further argues, due to processes of detraditionalization, individualization 
and globalization former ‘external risks ’ become ‘manufactured risks ’. That is, instead 
of being a matter of faith, risk is increasingly viewed as the outcome of human action 
(1994, 1998, 1999). In my opinion, Giddens’ leap from sociological theory to a normative 
statement such as ‘no rights without responsibilities’ (1998: 65) is problematic. Yet, dur-
ing the period around the introduction of the LCA , this argument in favor of the ‘invest-
ment state ’ has also been used in the Dutch literature on the future of the social security 
system. In this regard, see for example Engelen, Hemelrijk and Trommel (2007), Ester, 
Muffels and Schippers (2006), Goudswaard (2005) and Van der Veen (2004). Moreover, 
as will be further explained in part II of the book, Giddens’ concept of manufactured 
risks has been a source of inspiration for the development of the idea of individual sav-
ings arrangements in the social security system. Nonetheless, the meaning of ‘manufac-
tured risk’ as it has been used by Leynse (2001a) and Leynse and others (2002) must be 
distinguished from Giddens’ interpretation. For example, whereas according to the 
Dutch literature having children is a ‘manufactured risk’, which implies that, at least in 
principle, the responsibilities of child care belong to the parents only, Giddens’ argu-
ment that ‘the protection and care of children is the single most important thread that 
should guide family policy’ refers instead to a ‘shared responsibility for child care (..) 
among parents and non-parents’ (1998: 94-95).
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suggests that freedom-seeking, self reflective citizens experience more free-
dom than in the old days, nowadays citizens are more constrained because 
they are increasingly compelled to behave as a rational responsible life 
planner (Foucault 2008). This latter perspective has been further elaborated 
on in ‘governmentality studies’ that critically asses the neoliberal turn that 
has taken root in Western societies since the 1980s (Burchell et al. 1991; M. 
Dean 1999 and 2007; Lemke 2001; O’Malley 2004; Rose ; 1999; Rose and 
Miller 1992; Rose et al. 2006; Rose and Valverde 1998).12
The emerging ruptures within the existing collective system are also 
puzzling when it regards the well-known new institutionalist claim that 
welfare state institutions tend to remain stable during long periods of time. 
While these institutional arrangements alter gradually over the course of 
time, adapting themselves to new circumstances, big ruptures within the 
traditional institutions occur only incidentally. This trend is reinforced in 
countries with strong corporatist structures , such as the Netherlands (Heme-
rijck and Visser 1997; Kuipers 2004; Van Gestel et al. 2010; Pierson 2000).13
This study aims to provide an answer to both preliminary questions: (1) 
how to be critical and (2) how to explain the emerging ruptures in the tradi-
tional system of collective social security law. With respect to the first ques-
tion, a number of Dutch social law scholars hold that social law is intrin-
sically related to normativity (Asscher-Vonk 2009; Jaspers 2008; Noordam 
2007; Klosse 2003; Pieters 1998; Pennings 2009; Rood 1998; F.J.H.M. Van der 
Ven 1966; J.J.M. Van der Ven 1966; Van Esveld 1966 and Wilthagen 2003). 
This raises the question if justice can function as a normative yardstick for 
the evaluation of social law reform. Chapter 4 rejects this type of evalua-
tion, mainly because (conventional) concepts of justice as well as democratic 
theory turn out to be based on a specific (Kantian) concept of personhood , 
according to which people can rationally agree on justice criteria, thereby 
excluding the possibility of contestation. Indeed, as will be argued through-
12 In addition to the critique that is formulated in governmentality literature, Giddens ’ 
ideas on the modern self refl ective citizen and Beck’s related work on the risk society 
(1992) has also been criticized in literature that objects to the dominance of rational 
choice theory in social policy. According to these criticisms, citizens are likely to under-
estimate their risks (see for instance Sen 1977). It is therefore argued that compulsion 
will be required if market systems are to serve the traditional equity concerns of wel-
fare. In this regard, see for example Taylor-Gooby (1999), Anderson (2000), Elliot (2002), 
Steele (2004) and Schmid (2006). The picture of the citizen as a choice loving consumer-
ist has also been challenged in Dutch literature. See for example Hoff and Vrooman 
(2002), Huiskamp et al. (2006), Hurenkamp and Kremer (2005) and The Netherlands 
Institute for Social Research (2004). These criticisms have strengthened the position of 
those who argue in favor of the deployment of behavioral economics in the fi eld of 
social policy (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). The relationship between the latter alternative 
for rational choice accounts of market behavior and Foucault’s analysis of neoliberal 
governmentality will be further examined in chapter 10.
13 It should be noted that according to some respondents in this research, the supporters 
of the LCA regarded this arrangement as the start of a grand social security reform.
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out this book, Rawlsian and Habermasian conceptions of justice and dem-
ocratic legitimacy tend to overemphasize the role of rational argument at 
the cost of attention for affect , rhetoric and passions . The rejection of con-
ceptions of justice or democratic legitimacy as normative yardsticks does 
not imply, though, that this study endorses a positivist view of a fact-value 
separation of law. Instead, as in legal pragmatics , the law is considered to 
be a practice devoted to the realization of certain values or ideals (Taeke-
ma 2003; Van der Burg and Taekema 2004) that are not to be perceived as 
external truth claims (Taekema 2006).14 Yet, this study deviates from legal 
pragmatism as it is based on a poststructuralist discourse theoretical ontol-
ogy , which considers power relations to be constitutive of social practices, 
including law practices. The consequences of this ontology for the concept 
of law will be further discussed in chapter 4.
Rooting the study in post-structuralism means that this study acknowl-
edges the radical contingency of objectivity (structures, subjects and 
discourses ).15 In addition, a Kantian based sharp distinction between theo-
retical reason (knowledge) and practical reason (morality) , which we see in 
positivist studies, is abandoned (Glynos and Howarth 2007:8). This implies, 
as the next chapters will show, that the preliminary normative and empiri-
cal question cannot be separated.
Regarding the earlier observations and basing this study in poststructural-
ist theory, the hypothesis can now be put forward that the establishment of 
the idea of individual savings schemes in the traditional collective Dutch 
social security system can be explained by the rise of new hegemonic dis-
courses that increasingly compel citizens to behave themselves as self 
responsible life planners. In order to investigate this hypothesis the study 
will be guided by the following central question:
How can the establishment of the idea of individual savings systems within 
the Dutch traditional collective system of public social security law be criti-
cally explained?
14 As Van der Burg asserts, ideals cannot be fully realized, they partly transcend contin-
gent, historical formulations. Ideals combine three elements:
1. Unlike norms, an ideal is not a direct action guide.
2. An ideal is future oriented and at the same time grounded in reality. It is an image of 
the future state of affairs that is worthwhile and not irrational to strive for.
3. An ideal is often vague and cannot be completely grasped in a description or fully 
realized; it partly transcends every attempt to formulate and realize it (1997: 25).
15 It should be noted that researchers normally do not explain their ontology. Usually, as 
in positivist analysis, it is taken for granted that it is possible to observe some regulari-
ties between observable phenomena. In contrast, in this research we explain the post-
structuralist ontological assumptions. Also see section 2.1.2. 
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1.2 Introduction to the sub questions
The central question, it is divided into 4 sub questions.
Sub question 1
In order to answer the central question, this research that is rooted in post-
structuralism needs a methodological framework. Therefore, before start-
ing with the empirical research, this study has to answer a first theoretical 
question:
1. How can a poststructuralist model for critical explanation of changes in 
Dutch social security law be designed? 
Sub question 2
This study intends to evaluate the introduction of the LCA on the basis of a 
poststructuralist theory, which means that a justice based evaluation is 
rejected beforehand. Nevertheless, it is quite common practice to comment 
on (changes in) social security law in terms of justice. Therefore, this 
research first investigates the possibility of justice based evaluations:
2.  How can social law be evaluated using justice based criteria?
Sub question 3
The third sub question responds to the empirical part of the central ques-
tion. The introduction of the LCA will be taken as a paradigmatic example 
of the establishment of the (idea) of individual savings arrangements in 
social security law. This results in the first empirical question:
3.  How can the establishment of the Life Course Arrangement be critically 
explained? 
Sub question 4
The hypothesis reveals that the critical dimension in this study, amongst 
others, involves a critical approach to the implicit working of individual 
savings schemes, namely that the individual is increasingly pushed to 
behave herself as a self responsible life planner. Therefore, the second 
empirical question involves a governmentality perspective on the estab-
lishment of individual savings accounts:
4. How does the Life Course Arrangement function as a new governmental 
technology in the perspective of (neoliberal) governmentality?
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1.3 Overview of the chapters
The study is divided in five parts, each consisting of one or more chapters. 
This introduction provides a short overview of these chapters.
Part I: Theory and methodology
Part I responds to both theoretical questions (sub questions 1 and 2). This 
part consists of three chapters. Chapter 2 answers the first theoretical ques-
tion as it examines different poststructuralist and post-positivist explana-
tory concepts for social and policy change. Chapter 3 and the first part of 
chapter 4 examine to what extent political philosophy can provide justice 
based criteria for the evaluation of social law reform. As such they respond 
to the second theoretical question. The last part of chapter 4 is dedicated to 
the first theoretical question as it offers some poststructuralist alternatives 
for critique. This chapter also presents a critical poststructuralist explana-
tory framework that combines the different poststructuralist en post-posi-
tivst approaches that were examined in chapter 2 and chapter 4. Finally, 
this chapter further introduces  the empirical chapters.
Part II: The emergence of new ideas in the policy discourse
Part II responds to the first empirical question (sub question 3) and exam-
ines how the idea of ‘life course’ or ‘the life course perspective’ started to 
dominate the policy discourse as a prelude to the establishment of the LCA. 
This part consists of three chapters. Chapter 5 examines the influence of 
rhetoric and affect on the emergence of a new perspective on social security 
law. Chapter 6 reveals how a coalition could emerge between diverging 
parties that all sustained this new perspective. Chapter 7 addresses a par-
ticular policy field in which the ‘life course perspective’ emerged, namely 
emancipation policy.
Part III: The establishment of the Life Course Arrangement
Part III also responds to the first empirical question (sub question 3). How-
ever, instead of analyzing the discursive changes that preceded the rise of 
the LCA, this part examines the (introduction of the) LCA as a new instru-
ment of social security law. Chapter 8, which studies the emergence of the 
LCA as the outcome of a process of disagreement, compromise and resist-
ance, puts the emphasis on the policy processes. Chapter 9, conversely, 
explains the juridical characteristics of the LCA, comparing the emergence 
and the juridical characteristics of the LCA with those of its Belgian coun-
terpart, the time credit scheme.
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Part IV: Governmentality and the construction of the new worker
Part IV responds to the second empirical question (sub question 4). This 
part critically considers, from a governmentality perspective, how the ‘new 
worker’ was presented in the discourses that accompanied the emergence 
of the LCA. Chapter 10 compares the life course discourse with the nine-
teenth century poor law discourse as two forms of liberal government that 
represent two different but comparable configurations of ‘freedom’ and 
‘security’.
Part V: Main findings, conclusion and outlook
Part V contains one concluding chapter. In chapter 11 all research questions 
are answered in a persuasive narrative.

Part I
Theory and 
Methodology

This chapter examines poststructuralist and post-positivist explanatory 
concepts for social and policy change. The emphasis is put on the concepts 
that Glynos and Howarth have developed for their explanatory model, 
Logics of Critical Explanation (LCE). which can, thus far, be considered the 
most comprehensive attempt to construct an explanatory framework on 
the basis of poststructuralists discourse theory . 1 This model is innovative 
because it overcomes the fallacies of positivist explanatory models that try 
to subsume singular cases under universal laws or causal mechanisms, 
without falling back on the relativism of hermeneutics . In addition, as will 
be demonstrated in chapter 4, LCE offers a critical explanation without pre-
supposing fixed standards of justice .2  This chapter is structured as follows. 
Section 2.1 starts with discussing the basic concepts of LCE. This section 
shows, amongst other things, that notwithstanding the positive contribu-
tion of LCE to the development of a poststructuralist based research strate-
gy, this model limits itself to an abstract analysis at the level of nations/
states. In other words, LCE lacks more concrete concepts for the purpose of 
policy analysis (Glynos et al. 2009). Section 2.2 therefore considers some 
other analytical approaches. This section also examines the extent to which 
the discussed approaches are compatible with LCE. Section 2.3 provides an 
introduction to chapters 3 and 4 which address the fourth analytical step in 
LCE: critique.
2.1 Logics of Critical Explanation
This section provides an overview of LCE as presented by Glynos and 
Howarth (2007), starting with the epistemological contours of LCE (2.1.1). 
This is followed by an explanation of the ontology of LCE (2.1.2), the rela-
tionship between practices and logics (2.1.3) and the LCE research frame-
work (2.1.4).
1 Other less elaborated upon attempts concern Howarth et al. (2000) and Norval (1996) 
and Howarth and Torfi ng (2005).
2 See chapter 3.
2 Poststructuralist and post-positivist 
approaches to policy analysis
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2.1.1 A post-positivist paradigm of explanation
LCE is based on a ‘post-positivist paradigm of explanation’ (Glynos and 
Howarth 2007: 18), which means that the mode of reasoning that is used in 
LCE differs from research that is conducted in natural sciences and social 
sciences that adhere to the positivist paradigm. In this latter mode of rea-
soning, deduction assumes ‘a prominent role within the context of justifica-
tion, that is, with respect to the testing, verification, falsifications, formali-
zation and presentation of theories’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 21). Thus, a 
theory is accepted as long as the falsifiable hypotheses are not disproved by 
the observed facts. In addition, within the positivist mode of reasoning, 
explanations and predictions are not easily distinguished, as Glynos and 
Howarth argue: ‘[e]xplaining x is predicting x after it has actually hap-
pened (…) Predicting x is explaining it before it has actually happened’ 
(Hanson1972:41 cited by Glynos and Howarth 2007: 22).
However, positivist natural science also involves a distinct form of rea-
soning that is to be found in the context of discovery. For Glynos and 
Howarth , this mode of reasoning can neither be described as an inductive 
nor as a deductive form of reasoning but instead as a retroductive form of reason-
ing. This retroductive form of reasoning takes the following form:
1. a ‘surprising, anomalous, or wondrous phenomenon’ is observed (P)
2. (P) is explicable if hypothesis (H) were true
3. so there is a good reason that (H) is true
(2007: 26). 3
The scheme shows that in retroductive reasoning ‘the hypothesis is not 
inferred until its content is already present in the explanation of P’ 
(2007:26). According to Glynos and Howarth , this form of reasoning is the 
only possible form of reasoning within social sciences.
Retroductive reasoning within social sciences is distinct from retroductive 
reasoning within natural sciences, though. In contrast to social sciences, 
‘natural science presupposes that a retroductively inferred hypothesis has 
already been accepted as part of its theory’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 27). 
Thus, within natural science the context of justification produces a hypothe-
sis that is inferred in the context of discovery. It is this sharp separation 
between the context of justification (causal explanation/accepting a hypoth-
esis) and the context of discovery (theory construction/ positing a hypothe-
sis) that cannot be upheld in social sciences, according to Glynos and 
Howarth . Retroduction has to take a different form within social sciences, 
because within this discipline there is no ‘constitutive link’ between expla-
3 This is a form of reasoning that is based on the work of Aristotle and has been further 
developed in pragmatism (Peirce: 1934).
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nation and prediction. After all, in contrast to the natural world, the social 
world is an open system within which it is not possible to conduct closed 
experiments (2007: 31). This also explains why social sciences have no pre-
dictive value.
As an alternative to the positivist picture of retroductive reasoning, Gly-
nos and Howarth propose an explanatory framework in which both con-
texts are merged:
‘our logic of explanation begins with something we encounter in the present – an anoma-
lous phenomenon that needs to be rendered intelligible (..). This active process of prob-
lematization [italics added by the author] involves the constitution of a problem (..) which 
invariably results in the transformation of our initial perceptions and understanding. 
Work is then started on furnishing an explanation that can render the recalcitrant phe-
nomenon more intelligible. This process is understood in terms of the logic of retroduc-
tive explanation and theory construction, which involves a to-and-fro movement 
between the phenomena investigated and the various explanations that are proffered. In 
this way, an initially chaotic set of concepts, logics, empirical data, self-interpretations, 
and so on, at varying levels of abstraction, are welded together, so as to produce an 
account which, if it removes our initial confusion, can constitute a legitimate candidate 
for truth or falsity’ (2007: 33-34).
Hence, in contrast to a positivist mode of explanation, which accepts a 
hypothesis only as a valid explanation if its predictions are confirmed, Gly-
nos and Howarth argue that an explanatory model can only accept an 
account as a valid explanation if ‘it produces insights and greater illumina-
tion according to criteria which can be publicly articulated’ (2007: 39). They 
distinguish ‘three dialectical moments in social science practice’: (1) the 
moment of problematization; (2) the moment of retroductive explanation, 
in which the analyst goes back and forth between the phenomena investi-
gated and the various explanations, and (3) the moment of persuasion 
(2007: 38). These moments are further developed within the context of the 
LCE framework in section 4.1.4.
2.1.2 Ontology
LCE is based upon Laclau and Mouffe ’s discourse theory . The ontological 
presumptions of their discourse theory can be clarified by the Heideggeri-
an distinction between the ‘ontical’ and the ‘ontological ’. Whereas the ‘onti-
cal’ refers to a particular domain or phenomenon, the ‘ontological ’ refers to 
‘the categorical pre-conditions for such objects and their investiga-
tion’(2007: 108). To understand Laclau and Mouffe ’s discourse theory, this 
section briefly examines the linguistics theories of de Saussure and Derrida 
on which it is based. Subsequently, some basic discourse theoretical con-
cepts are explained. The final part of the section addresses the concept of 
subjectivity within discourse theory.
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According to de Saussure, the meaning of words (signs) is made up of a 
combination of specific sounds (signifier) and concepts (signified). Despite 
the fact that the relationship between the concept and the sound is com-
pletely arbitrary, de Saussure does not, like Wittgenstein in his early work, 
assume that the function of the signs is simply to name objects in the world. 
Nor does he believe, like Wittgenstein in his later work, that the meaning of 
signs is dependent upon their specific use in certain contexts. According to 
de Saussure, meaning and signification occur within the system of lan-
guage itself. Thus, the meaning of the sign is determined by its relationship 
with or differences from other signs. Derrida radicalizes de Saussure’s lan-
guage theory to the extent that he deems that with regard to language use 
these signs may be posited in different relationships to each other, which 
means that a concept will always implicate other terms: each term leaves 
‘traces’ in related terms. Therefore, meaning is never fully present and 
enclosed within rigid boundaries. Stated otherwise, meaning is diffuse, 
‘disseminated’ and open ended; it is in flux.4
Based on this approach to language theory, Laclau and Mouffe have 
built their discourse theory which we will now examine. According to 
Laclau and Mouffe , a discourse temporarily stops the instability in the 
meaning of the signs, without definitively fixating their meaning. In the 
case where a number of signs within a discourse acquire their meaning 
from their relationship to the same privileged moment, Laclau and Mouffe 
call this privileged sign a nodal point. Thus, the meaning of signifiers may 
alter as a result of the emergence of a new nodal point. This conceptualiza-
tion of discourse reveals that Laclau and Mouffe perceive the social as a 
meaningful construct in which meaning can never be permanently fixed 
(1985: 110-111). Based on these assumptions discourse is the ‘structured 
totality’ that results from an ‘articulatory practice ’, or the practice in which 
a relationship is established ‘among elements such that their identity is 
modified’ (1985: 105). It attempts to transform ‘elements’, or signs whose 
meanings have not yet been fixed, into ‘moments’ or signs whose meanings 
are temporarily fixed.
How do temporarily fixed signs acquire new meaning? Or, in other 
words, how do they explain the transformation of discourse? To account 
for change, Laclau and Mouffe introduce the concept of dislocation . Exam-
ples of dislocationary moments concern the effects of an economic crisis, 
commodification or globalization (Laclau , 1990: 52-65). To Laclau and 
Mouffe , the experience of a dislocationary event causes subjects to ‘see’ the 
4 Derrida contrasts this language concept with the so-called metaphysics of the presence 
or logo centrism, which refers to the Western obsession to grasp the truth by naming it 
using the right terminology. In this process, a theory is built around rigid boundaries 
and binary oppositions. Derrida (1992) argues that these oppositions are temporary and 
always consist of a dominant term and an opposed term that is rather derivative and 
secondary to the fi rst term.
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contingent basis of sedimented social practices. They suddenly realize that 
the way of doing things could have been different (1985: 125). Dislocation-
ary events do not necessarily generate change, though. Glynos and 
Howarth state that after the experience of a dislocationary event either the 
social or the political dimension of existing practices comes to the foreground. 
In the case wherein the social dimension is foregrounded, a brief glimpse of 
the contingent basis of social practices does not result in political contestation 
and existing social practices are further sustained. If, in contrast, the politi-
cal dimension is foregrounded, the norms underlying social practices are 
challenged through political contestation (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 121-
124). Thus, the original political institution of these ‘sedimented practices is 
‘activated’ and former nodal points acquire the status of floating signifiers, 
which are eventually stabilized in a changed social context.5
Finally, we will examine the way in which LCE conceptualizes subjec-
tivity. According to poststructuralist discourse theory , the subject is created 
in discourse and is therefore decentered. For this reason, poststructuralist 
discourse theory is generally suspected of reducing the subject to a passive 
effect of structures. However, by including Lacan ’s psycho-analytical theo-
ry, discourse theory and LCE seek to circumvent this critique. For instance, 
Glynos and Howarth assert that political contestation only takes place to the 
extent that the subject experiences a lack of identity, which drives the sub-
ject to identify with new signifiers. In this process, the subject seeks to 
invest the floating signifiers with new meaning. In some instances of political 
contestation, a certain signifier which represents one particular demand 
assumes the role of an empty signifier (Laclau 1996: 36-46, 2005:44) and 
absorbs, or universalizes, a broad range of other demands. Hence, the emp-
ty signifier is described as a signifier that is emptied of its determined con-
tent and can, for this reason, account for the unity of society. For example, 
during processes of contestation the signifier ‘justice ’ or ‘democracy’ can be 
transformed into an empty signifier, absorbing different particular 
demands. In addition, staying faithful to Lacan ’s theory, Glynos and 
Howarth emphasize that the drive of subjects to identify with new (empty) 
signifiers should not be regarded conscious acts, but must be understood 
as ‘modes of enjoyment ’,6 which are often structured around a narrative 
‘that covers over or conceals the subject’s lack by providing an image of 
fullness, wholeness or harmony, on the one hand, while conjuring up 
threats and obstacles to its realization on the other’ (2007: 130).
The ontology of LCE thus explains how, at the ontological level of analy-
sis, change and stability of social practices must be understood. Based on this 
ontology the next section elaborates on LCE’s basic explanatory categories.
5 Laclau and Mouffe also claim that a new hegemonic articulation only takes place in the pres-
ence of antagonistic forces and if the frontiers that separate them are instable (1985: 136).
6 See chapter 3.
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2.1.3 Practices, discourses and logics
LCE relies on three basic units that explain social change and permanence: 
social logics , political logics and fantasmatic logics . This section illuminates 
these basic units of explanation. For a good understanding of processes 
that involve the transformation and stabilization of practices, however, it is 
necessary to devote a few words to the concept of practices in advance.
Glynos and Howarth define practices as the ‘ongoing routinized form of 
human and societal reproduction (…)’, such as catching a bus in the morn-
ing (2007: 104). A regime of practices has a structuring function, in the sense 
that it orders a system of social practices (2007: 106). For Glynos and 
Howarth , logics explain (a regime of) practices in a threefold way. Firstly, 
the logic indicates the ‘essence’ of the practice. Secondly, it describes the 
rules of the practices, though not in a transcendental way. Thirdly, it points 
out which kind of entities or what kind of ontological dimension is 
involved in the practice. In short, ‘the logic of a practice comprises the rules 
or grammar of the practice, as well as the conditions which make the prac-
tice both possible and vulnerable’(2007: 136).
The concept of social logics is closely related to concepts such as ‘regimes 
of 'practices’ and ‘discourse’. Social logics characterize a particular social prac-
tice or regime that can be analyzed on the contextual level. They consist of 
‘a system of rules drawing a horizon within which some objects are repre-
sented while others are excluded’ (2007: 139). Social logics, however, do not 
describe a unified discourse. Instead, the concept refers to a ‘regularity in 
dispersion’ (2007: 139; Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 105). This means that social 
logics consist of rules that describe both the ‘patterns’ and the ‘open-ended-
ness’ of regimes of practices and discourses (2007: 139). For example, in the 
Netherlands in the 1970s and the 1980s the dominant (male) work practices 
could be characterized by the logics of ‘40-40-40’, implying that in Dutch 
society the average (male) worker worked 40 hours a week, 40 weeks a 
year and 40 years for the same boss until his retirement.
Whereas social logics characterize current regimes of practices, the other 
two logics, political and fantasmatic logics , give rise to these practices and 
are, therefore, situated on a quasi transcendental level. Political logics refer 
to the emergence and formation of a practice, and also to the possible de-
institutionalization or contestation of certain practices. They are in play in 
situations where the political dimension of social relations is foregrounded 
(2007:143). Political logics consist of the operation of two logics of significa-
tion: the logics of equivalence and the logics of difference . Both logics of signifi-
cation are derived from de Saussure’s distinction between two relations in 
language, that is, the associative (or substitutive) and the syntagmatic (or 
combinatory) (2007: 106). Logics of equivalence emphasize the process in 
which ‘two or more elements are substituted for each other with reference 
to a common negation or threat’ (2007:144). Therefore logics of equivalence 
create an ontological relationship between different demands. For example, 
19Poststructuralist and post-positivist approaches to policy analysis
the introduction of the LCA was preceded by a massive demonstration in 
2004 in which different groups collectively protested against the 
Balkenende administration. As will be argued in chapter 8, during this con-
flict a common front was established against the perceived opponent (the 
Balkenende administration), which nullified the internal differences 
between the participating groups. Logics of difference , on the other hand, 
seek to keep different elements separate and autonomous. For example, as 
will be demonstrated in the same chapter, due to the working of the logics of 
difference, which involved a deal between the government and the labor 
unions, the established chain of equivalences dissolved. Thereby it pre-
pared the ground for some minor institutional changes. These examples 
show that both logics of equivalence and logics of difference can generate 
change. However, whereas a logic of equivalence attempts to constitute an 
antagonistic relationship, a logic of difference seeks to break down these rela-
tions of antagonism , causing institutional change .
The logics of equivalence are closely related to Laclau and Mouffe ’s con-
cept of hegemony. As Howarth explains, on the one hand hegemony can be 
interpreted as the establishment of equivalent chains between different 
demands. On the other hand, hegemony can be understood as ‘a form of 
rule [that] speaks in general to the way in which subjects accept and con-
form to a particular regime, practice, or policy, even though they may have 
previously resisted or opposed them’ (2009: 320). For LCE both concepts of 
hegemony are essential to understand the relationship between the concepts 
of social, political and fantasmatic logics as categories for the analysis of social 
change and permanence.
The third explanatory category, fantasmatic logics , captures the process 
of how subjects are attached to a ‘particular call’. By covering up social con-
tingency, fantasmatic logics can both sustain existing social logics and deter-
mine the speed and direction of political logics . Glynos and Howarth make a 
distinction between the ‘beatific dimension of fantasy’ and the ‘horrific 
dimension of fantasy’. Whereas the beatific dimension of fantasy ‘promises 
a fullness-to-come once a named or implied obstacle is overcome’, the hor-
rific dimension of fantasy ‘foretells of disaster if the obstacle proves insur-
mountable’ (2007:147). As a rule of thumb, fantasmatic logics can be recog-
nized by how they find a way into both official and unofficial political 
practices (2007:148). For example, during the research one interviewee 
referred to the narrative that accompanied the reforms in the disability 
arrangements in the 1990s. According to this narrative , ‘disabled’ carpen-
ters earn lots of (black) money fixing up private homes in addition to their 
disability allowance. This narrative seems to have facilitated the retrench-
ment of disability arrangements. Another example of a fantasmatic narrative 
concerns the story on young mothers who receive disability benefits 
because they suffer from a Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI). According to this 
narrative, which was told about 10 years ago, these mothers were, above 
all, profiting from the system. The way the story was told reflected ambi-
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gious feelings towards these mothers. In the first place it was doubted if 
those mothers were really ill. Secondly, these mothers were pictured as 
clever women who managed to escape their fate of double tasking, i.e. hav-
ing a full-time job and taking care of their children at the same time. As 
such, these fantasmatic narratives seem to possess what Glynos and Howarth 
call ‘a kind of extreme oscillation between incompatible posi-
tions’(2007:148). Indeed, both narratives portray people living on disability 
allowances not only as frauds and (lazy) profiteers but also as calculating 
and smart people. Thus, these fantasmatic narratives are organized around a 
particular way we think that the Other takes our enjoyment away.7
In some instances fantasmatic logics are closely related to political logics . 
For example, the logics of equivalence may create ontological links between 
different demands through the construction of an ‘enemy within’, such as 
‘the Balkenende government’ in the aforementioned example. As a result, 
the 'nation' may be divided into two opposed camps. The construction of 
logics of difference , on the other hand, can be sustained by a narrative in 
which an ‘enemy without’ is created, such as ‘globalizing forces’ that take 
away the national identity. This narrative tends to solve internal divisons.
To summarize, LCE conceptualizes different logics that together explain 
the transformation and stability of practices. The next section examines how 
the interplay between those logics fit into the LCE research framework.
2.1.4 The LCE research framework
The three basic steps for research conducted within the LCE framework 
have already been elaborated upon in section 2.1.1: problematization, retro-
ductive explanation and persuasion. Glynos and Howarth have supplement-
ed these steps with a fourth category, critique, which will be addressed in 
chapters 3 and 4. The analytical steps are informed by the articulatory prac-
tice , which involves the way in which the analyst gathers her data and 
interprets them. Glynos and Howarth identify three features of articulatory 
practice . In the first place, articulation establishes a relationship between 
heterogeneous elements under a singular name. Secondly, articulation 
acknowledges that elements are contingent and are, therefore, ‘the primary 
ontological level of the constitution of the real’ (2007: 179). Thirdly, due to 
the articulatory practice , the identity of each element is modified. Hence, 
singularity, contingency and modification of elements are key aspects of 
the articulatory practice . This section examines the first three analytical 
steps.
7 See section 3.3.
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With respect to the first analytical step Glynos and Howarth draw 
upon Foucault ’s notion of problematization. This means that research starts 
with the problematization of certain practices that are taken for granted. This 
can be illustrated by the example of the Dutch social security discourse in 
the last decade. This discourse involved a shift from the goal of providing 
insurance against all possible risks to the management of new risks , such as 
the risk of care and the risk of education. Problematizing this shift requires 
the analyst to start with the question of why social policy is problematized 
in terms of governing new risks in the first place. We can thus pose ques-
tions such as:
1. How can these new practices (government of new risks) be character-
ized?
2. Where did these practices originate?
3. How and why are these new (regimes of) practices installed?
4. Why is there a lack of resistance from political subjects who embrace 
other values that underpin these new practices, such as solidarity and 
equality?
In the second step, the process of retroductive explanation, the analyst 
identifies the relevant social, political and fantasmatic logics. During this 
step, the analyst elaborates the questions that were posed before. That is, 
whereas social logics are mostly informed by the first two questions, the oth-
er two logics, political and fantasmatic logics, are instead informed by the 
third and fourth question. Retroduction thus provides an explanation of 
social change and permanence that is both context dependent (social logics) 
and context transcendent (political and fantasmatic logics):
‘Social logics are context-dependent constructions that are retroductively posited as a 
function of the rules and structures that inform practices and regimes. (…) By contrast, 
political and fantasmatic logics are formal constructs that enable us to account for orders 
and practices in a variety of historical contexts. However, except for informing the basis 
of our theoretical horizon, they do not predetermine our explanations and critical 
engagements’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 161, italics added).
Social logics should not be reduced to their empirical contexts, though. 
Under certain conditions they can also be applied across contexts.
‘The difference with the ‘hard’ concept of logic is not that social logics cannot move from 
context to context, only that one cannot do so unproblematically and without explicitly 
forging new links with the new context’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 140, italics added).
It should thus be considered under what conditions and to what extent the 
results of this study can be generalized to, for instance, changes in other 
fields of social security law or processes of social policy change in other 
countries.
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A retroductive explanation does, however not mark the end of the 
research. Then, ‘for interpretations to count they have as “candidates for 
truth and falsity” – to be regarded as potentially valid – they must first 
accord with the social onotologies and “regimes of truth” within which 
they operate’.8 Yet, in their design of the logics model, Glynos and Howarth 
challenge the current dominant regime of truth by rejecting ‘a narrow posi-
tivist understanding of verifications and falsifications which would pre-
suppose the possibility of theory independent empirical observa-
tions’(2007: 190). They deem that it is difficult to formulate meaningful 
criteria of validation in advance in social scientific research. For example, in 
the case where criteria such as ‘consistency’, ‘insight’ and ‘evidential sup-
port’ are used, it should be noted that these criteria vary from one context 
to another. Therefore Glynos and Howarth argue that the ‘ultimate “proof 
of the pudding” consists in the production of persuasive narratives’ 
(2007:191). Thus the research framework consists of problematization, retro-
ductive explanation, persuasion and critique. These analytical steps are part of 
the poststructuralists explanatory model that is presented in chapter 4. The 
remainder of this chapter considers how other approaches can add to this 
basic model.
2.2 Extension of the logics model
Notwithstanding the challenging research tools that Glynos and Howarth 
offer in their book, their design of the logics model also has some draw-
backs. In the first place, since a number of scholars have shown that policy 
change can be the result of a long process of incremental changes, the ques-
tion can be raised if policy change is only provoked by big dislocationary 
events. As section 4.2.2 shows, even within poststructuralist theory it has 
been argued that social change is not necessarily preceded by grand events. 
According to Norval , for example, small dislocations or the presence of 
exemplars also cause people to ‘see things’ in a different way.9 A second 
drawback of LCE concerns its sole focus on the macro level of (political) 
analysis, such as the formation of chains of equivalence and difference, which 
entail the analysis of processes at the level of the nation/state. It remains 
unclear if and how LCE can be applied at a lower level of policy analysis. A 
related problem concerns the analytical categories used by Glynos and 
Howarth . They focus mostly on abstract categories, such as discourse or the 
discursive, finite contingent ontological categories that explain how we 
8 As in the citation in section 4.1.1 Glynos and Howarth draw here on Foucault (1981). 
Pointing at the prevailing ‘regimes of truth and falsity’, Foucault indicates how mea-
sures of validations are determined by relations of power .
9 See section 3.2.3.
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understand the world.10 What we lack are more concrete, so-called middle 
range concepts and other analytical categories, which are more tailored to 
policy analysis (Glynos et al. 2009). Thus LCE is in need of less abstract con-
cepts and analytical categories with which we can analyze the incomplete 
contingent ontic phenomena. The following sections address different 
kinds of these more concrete concepts. These concepts concern, first of all, 
analytical categories that are developed in poststructuralist theory. Section 
4.2.2 presents Laclau’s and Norval’s approaches to rhetoric. Section 4.2.3 
examines analytical categories, which are developed within post-positivist 
policy analysis.
A final modification of LCE concerns its exclusive focus on political log-
ics as conditions of the possibility of (policy) change. The question can be 
raised if political contestation is always a necessary precondition for social 
change. The next section (4.2.1) argues that the work of Foucault suggests 
that change can also be the result of ‘internal processes’, such as the devel-
opment of new (governmental) technologies. This subsection therefore dis-
cusses how the simplified scheme social logics (1) – political logics – social 
logics (2) can be completed with Foucauldian insights into the internal 
dynamics of the social.
2.2.1 Foucault and genealogy
Retrospectively, Foucault argued that the aim of his historical research had 
been the establishment of the relationship between the subject and the 
games of truth, or the way in which human beings were made into subjects 
(2000c: 326). As a research method Foucault proposes the use of the 
Nietzschian method of genealogy. This section first considers how we can 
understand the genealogical method. Next, it examines the implications of 
10 Howarth ’s explanation of the differences between ‘the discursive’, by which he means 
the discourse as an ontological category, and ‘discourse’, by which he means a specifi c 
discourse, may further illuminate this difference between the ‘ontological ’ and the 
‘ontical’:
 ‘I shall take the discursive to be an ontological category – i.e. a categorical presupposi-
tion for our understanding of particular entities and social relations – whereby every 
object or any symbolic order is meaningful, that is, situated in a fi eld of signifi cant dif-
ferences and similarities. But equally in this approach, following thinkers like Hei-
degger, Lacan , and Derrida , it also means that such entities are incomplete and thus radi-
cally contingent. Each system is marked by a lack, and their meaning or objectivity 
depends on the way they are socially and politically constructed. By contrast, the con-
cept of discourse refers to particular systems of meaningful or articulatory practice . 
Thatcherism or New Labour in the UK, or the different forms of the apartheid system in 
South Africa, or the radical environmentalism associated with social movements in con-
temporary societies, are all discourses in this sense of the term. It follows from my ren-
dering of the discursive that these systems are fi nite and contingent constructions, 
which are constituted politically by the construction of social antagonisms and the cre-
ation of political frontiers’ (Howarth 2009: 313).
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the genealogical method for the study of processes of social change and the 
ontological fit between Foucault’s structuralism and LCE.
Foucault opposes genealogy to teleological history. Whereas in teleo-
logical history certain events are explained as being part of some achieved, 
glorified end, genealogy, ‘must record the singularity of events outside 
of any monotonous finality, it must seek them in the most unpromising 
places, in what we tend to feel is without history’ (1984a: 76). According to 
Foucault, then, in genealogical research, the study of the ‘origin’ of certain 
practices should not be understood in the meaning of ‘Ursprung’, as this 
word seeks to invest an essence in some events. The ‘secret’ is, he argues, 
that these events have no essence.11 ‘Origin’ should instead be understood 
as its German counterparts ‘Herkunft’ and ‘Entstehung’, which we find in 
the original Nietzschian text. ‘Herkunft’ corresponds to descent, or the exist-
ence of different traits, which instead of establishing a continuity addresses 
heterogeneity (1984a: 82). In addition, ‘Entstehung’ points at the moment of 
arising of certain practices. Hence, according to Foucault, genealogy is rad-
ically different from traditional history in that it seeks to reveal historical 
traces of qualities that have been thought to lack history. It is based on the 
specific discursive rules of formation of a specific practice, which Foucault 
calls the ‘conditions of possibility’ or ‘systems of formation’. These condi-
tions of the possibility explain the emergence of some practices while at the 
same time the emergence of other possibilities was foreclosed. Genealogy 
thus demonstrates how our present truths rest upon violence and injustice.
The method of genealogy implies, amongst other things, that the analy-
sis should be focused on the practices and technologies operating in the 
system (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 188). These practices should, however, 
not be perceived as deliberate outcomes of intentional actors. To repeat 
Foucault ’s famous phrase: ‘people know what they do; they frequently 
know why they do what they do; but what they do not know is what they 
do does’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 187). Hence, notwithstanding the fact 
that actors know what they do, without having hidden intentions, the dif-
ferent local actions are by no means coordinated. The focus of analysis 
should be ‘decipherment’ or the analysis of ‘what these practices are doing’ 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 122). That is, the role of the genealogist is to 
draw attention to the way in which dominant discourses conceal the emer-
gence and effects of the practices they sustain, by questioning over and 
over again what is postulated as self evident. As Foucault has shown in his 
historical work, genealogy can be helpful in particular for an analysis of the 
mode in which historical elements are inscribed and reactivated in present 
regimes of practices.
11 Even the concept of liberty does not reveal something about human nature, it was 
instead an invention of the ruling class, according to Foucault (1984a: 78).
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Thus, Foucault ’s genealogical work suggests, amongst other things, 
that instead of inferring political logics for the explanation of social change, 
social logics emerge and change as a result of complex strategic relation-
ships and technologies. He, for example, ascribes the emergence and trans-
formation of modern (liberal) governmental technologies to the invention 
of statistics and knowledge production that arose as a result of a ‘science of 
government’.12 The additional value of Foucault’s work for our poststruc-
turalist explanatory framework seems to lie in a genealogical study of 
social logics, posing the additional question of how social change can be 
generated by techniques and practices outside the realm of the political .13
If we want to extend LCE that is based on the work of Laclau and 
Mouffe with these Foucauldian insights it is necessary to compare the onto-
logical presumptions of both works. First of all, it is remarkable that, in 
contrast to Laclau and Mouffe , Foucault avoids making his ontological 
assumptions and analytical categories explicit. In fact, his explicit ontologi-
cal presumptions do not go further than the postulate that in the modern 
episteme the figure of ‘man’ has the ‘ambiguous position’ of being both ‘an 
object of knowledge and (…) a subject that knows’ (1970: 312).14 Foucault’s 
historical work nevertheless suggests an ontological division between dis-
cursive and non-discursive entities, which can be contrasted with the ontol-
ogy of discourse theory that does not assume this division.
The differences between the ontological assumptions of both approach-
es may be mitigated, though. First of all, it should be remembered that 
Foucault , like Laclau and Mouffe , adopts the idea of radical contingency. 
Secondly, as Howarth argues, ‘the genealogical approach resolves the sepa-
ration between linguistic and non-linguistic practices by rejecting the idea 
that discourses are simply autonomous systems of scientific statements and 
by stressing the power relations and political forces that form them’ (2002: 
129). Also Laclau and Mouffe do not perceive systems of social relations as 
purely linguistic phenomena. Instead, they assert that ‘the relational and 
12 See for example, Foucault ’s remarks on the rise of governmentality (2007: 102-104). Also 
note Foucault’s analysis of the emergence of the liberal welfare state in his lectures ‘ 
Birth of biopolitics’, where he argues that liberal welfare in the middle of the twentieth 
century could be characterized by its governmental technologies securing ‘spaces of 
freedom’ (2008:63). In addition, Ewald (1990) has demonstrated the importance of the 
invention of statistics for the emergence of liberal societies. According to him, the 
invention of statistics enabled the development ‘insurance’. For this reason, they can be 
viewed as the ‘conditions of the possibility’ of the liberal welfare state.
13 In this vein, also see the claim of Rose et al. that ‘the political ’ as a motor of social change 
can be discarded, because a ‘structure almost always implies (…) some underlying logic 
or social force that has to be overcome in order that the structures be breached or trans-
formed’ (2006: 100).
14 Therefore, Dreyfus and Rabinow comment: ‘Foucault (like later Heidegger) replaces 
ontology with a special kind of history that focuses on the cultural practices that have 
made us what we are’ (1983: 122).
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differential character of language can be extended to hold for all signifying 
or meaningful structures and practices’ (Howarth 2009: 312).15 Thirdly, in 
HSS, Laclau and Mouffe also understand (linguistic) discourses as having 
material characteristics that ‘pierce the entire material density of the mul-
tifarious institutions, rituals and practices through which a discursive for-
mation is structured’ (1985: 109). Howarth illustrates the material character 
of discourse with the example of Thatcherism, which not only consisted 
of ideas and policies but also of actions and practices, such as strong lead-
ership and entrepreneurship and attempts to transform institutions (2000: 
102).16 Indeed these arguments suggest that it is possible to incorporate 
Foucault’s insights on social change into the framework of LCE.
2.2.2 The exemplar and rhetoric: Aletta Norval and Ernesto Laclau
LCE adopts the idea by Laclau and Mouffe that social change can only be 
generated as a result of dislocationary events. This raises the question of how 
it is possible to explain policy changes that are not preceded by the occur-
rence of a major dislocationary event. In addition, LCE needs to be reworked 
in order to provide less abstract explanatory tools for policy analysis. The 
late work of Laclau and the work of Norval , another representative of the 
Essex school of discourse theory , offer some methodological suggestions in 
this respect.
According to Norval , the use of rhetoric can play an important role in 
transformation processes because rhetoric can make people see things in a 
different way: ‘If a grammar gives us the ability to word the world, a new 
grammar opens up fresh worlds in which different objects and projects may 
appear and old ones may be ruled out’ (2007: 129). To illustrate this point, 
Norval refers to Wittgenstein ’s example of the rabbit/duck picture. The 
moment in which a subject suddenly discovers a picture of a rabbit, which 
she earlier regarded as a picture of a duck, is what Norval calls aspect dawn-
ing ; unexpectedly, the subject has discovered a new aspect. This is a moment 
of surprise: now it is a rabbit! At the same time the subject notices that the 
picture has not changed, which implies that in the new perspective, conti-
nuity and discontinuity occur. This is what Norval calls aspect change : seeing 
the duck now differs from the moment before the rabbit was discovered. 
According to Norval , both moments – aspect dawning and aspect change –
are important for change. Translated to policy change , this means that poli-
cy change is conditioned upon a first moment of surprise in which the same 
15 Laclau and Mouffe , for example, assert that one does not deny the ‘falling of a brick’; 
the brick certainly exists. What is denied that the brick exists outside ‘any discursive 
context of emerging’ (1985: 108).
16 Therefore, Chouliriaki argues that, whereas Laclau and Mouffe refer to materialities 
outside the semiotic as truth-effects, their views come close to these of Foucault (2002: 
92-93).
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things are seen in a different way, and the rediscovery of this initial moment 
of surprise. Norval further argues that exemplars can play an important role 
in transformation processes, as they can both capture the dissatisfaction 
with how things are going (disidentification) and the possibility of doing 
things in a different way, providing new imaginaries (identification). In 
this respect aspect dawning and the constitution of an exemplar are closely 
related.17 Yet, the exemplar adds to the analysis of policy change because, 
unlike aspect dawning/change, exemplars refer to specific singular ‘images’, 
‘persons’, ‘names’ or ‘practices’ that ‘facilitate the glimpsing of a univer-
sal, of another way of doing things’. The exemplar, then, assumes the same 
function as dislocationary events with respect to social change. Norval thus 
shows that policy changes can be provoked by rather small dislocations.
In ‘Hegemony and Socialist Strategy’, Laclau and Mouffe also address 
the role of rhetorical tropes in the process of social change. According to 
them, rhetorical tropes such as synonymy, metonymy and metaphor are part of 
the primary terrain in which the social is constituted (1985: 110). The role of 
rhetoric in the process of social change has been further developed in 
Laclau ’s later work. Like Norval , Laclau emphasizes that rhetoric is more 
than mere persuasion. To him, rhetoric forms an ontological category that 
structures the social (2004). In this context, he introduces the rhetorical cate-
gory of catachresis , which he describes as ‘the use of a figural term when 
there is no literal term that can replace it (e.g. when we speak of a leg of a 
chair)’ (2004: 306). Since Laclau views discourse as a system of differences, 
unity can only emerge by assuming the representation of an impossible 
totality. According to him, the name of this impossible totality must be a 
catachretic name, because there is no other representation that can replace 
it. This new name creates something new, something that could not be 
articulated before. It constitutes a new chain of equivalences between distinct 
elements. Drawing on Zizek ’s argument that it is the name of the signifier 
that supports the identity of the subject, Laclau concludes that it is ulti-
mately the (catachretic) name of the object that brings about political unity 
(Zizek 1989: 94-95 cited by Laclau 2005:102-103). The catachretic act of nam-
ing may generate social change as catachresis involves ‘figurative’ or ‘imagi-
native’ reasoning that is essential for the production of ‘new spaces of rep-
resentation’ (myths), sustaining new discourses and new coalitions (1990: 
65, 2004: 307). This process of social change is intrinsically related to affect . 
Then, as Laclau argues, whilst the split subject constantly seeks new full-
ness ‘the name’ becomes the ‘rallying point of passionate attachments’. 
Therefore, ‘affect is required if signification is going to be possible at all’ 
(2005: 116).
17 This is what Norval stated at the Eleventh Essex Conference on Critical Political Theory, 
University of Essex (plenary session, June 16, 2011).
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Laclau ’s understanding of catachresis seems be of relevance for con-
crete studies of certain phenomena. For example, Griggs and Howarth 
have demonstrated that the catachretic act of naming may be useful for the 
understanding of the formation of coalitions between divisive groups that 
struggled to achieve expansion of Stansted Airport, London (Griggs and 
Howarth , 2006).18 In addition, Norval has shown how on a concrete level 
of analysis, both rhetoric and the figure of the exemplar can make people see 
things in a different way, giving rise to aspect dawning and eventually aspect 
change in the case wherein this new way of seeing is iterated in concrete 
practices. Hence, apart from the fact that the exemplar can generate ‘small’ 
dislocations, the exemplar may also sustain the subsequent political process-
es as it serves to keep open the gap between the signifier and the signified.
2.2.3 Post-positivist policy analysis
Post-positivist policy analysis may further contribute to our explanatory 
model, particularly concerning research that is conducted at a lower and 
more concrete level of analysis. Post-positivist policy analysis is a term for 
a broad range of analytical approaches in the field of policy analysis, which 
seeks to move beyond an ‘objectivist’ conception of reality. Scholars work-
ing within this field primarily object to the positivistic claim that policy 
problems can be approached in a technocratic, purely empiricist way. This 
section discusses some basic concepts of post-positivist analysis developed 
by scholars such as Donald Schön , Martin Rein and Deborah Stone . Special 
attention is paid to the work of Maarten Hajer . The last part of this section 
considers the fit between the concepts from post-positivist policy analysis 
and a poststructuralist explanatory framework that is based on LCE.
Interpretive frames
Schön and Rein (1977) have indicated the impact of a specific problem defi-
nition in the policy making process. According to them, the process of 
problematization is highly dependent upon the deployed policy frame , 
which connects salient features into a pattern that is coherent and easy to 
grasp. They select and highlight certain features of a policy problem, while 
they ignore other features. The specific art of problematization is often 
communicated in a policy narrative. In these narratives the policymakers tell 
what, according to them, is ‘going on in a specific field’; what the relevant 
18 According to Griggs and Howarth (2006), the catachretic act of naming the coalition 
that defended the expansion of the airport ‘Freedom to fl y’ brought into being a new 
object, namely a coalition demanding sustainable growth, a coalition that was com-
posed of very diverse groups. The act of naming thus provided the ideological means of 
forwarding a particular policy, namely a pre-growth expansion strategy. Howarth did, 
however, not incorporate the concepts 'cathacresis' and 'discourse coalition' in the logics 
model.
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facts are and how these facts should be interpreted; which problem must be 
solved; and what the expected consequences of intervention are. Usually 
facts and values are not clearly separated in these narratives . For post-posi-
tivists, then, storytelling is an important instrument to frame problems: the 
elements of a specific story are related with a particular way of looking at 
these elements. Policy narratives are often deployed as argumentative strat-
egies of policymakers (Fischer and Forrester 1993; Fischer 2003). The narra-
tives may appear in different forms. In a narrative of decline , attention is put 
on how things are getting worse and worse. A narrative of control, imstead. 
advances possibilities of interference. In a struggle over the basic storyline, 
policymakers purposefully deploy narratives of decline and control (Stone 
1988). To make their storylines more convincing, they use rhetorical devices 
such as synedoches (a small part of an issue represents the whole), metaphors 
(one concept is used to indicate something else), or symbols and emblems (a 
single word that points at the policy narrative or even replaces an entire 
policy narrative).
Because metaphors can condense complex things into one word, they 
are often used to communicate multifaceted problems to the public. In 
addition, the metaphor often expresses a normative stance, so as to reinforce 
a specific policy direction. To illustrate the normative working of the meta-
phor, Stone (1988) explains how the word ‘fragmentation’ in policy texts is 
enlisted to advocate a policy of reorganization. Thus, metaphors do not only 
describe the situation, they can also be prescriptive. Schön and Rein (1977) 
call these metaphors ‘generative metaphors ’. In policy documents numbers 
and statistics often act as a generative metaphor . They are basically used to 
tell a story: they indicate what activities are to be counted, what groups 
should be identified and what should be done with these groups. Numbers 
are therefore not mere objective representations of the world around us, but 
are subject to both strategic incentives and unconscious manipulation of 
the policymakers who choose what has to be counted, how it has to be 
counted and how we should interpret the outcomes (Stone 1988: 131-146).
Nevertheless, it remains unclear how in post-positivist policy analysis 
the use of data as a metaphor is related to interpretive frames , problematiza-
tions and policy narratives . In this regard, the suggestions of Brandwein 
(2006) prove to be fruitful.19 According to her, an interpretive frame consists 
of baseline categories of thought such as values , assumptions and beliefs, 
which can give rise to interpretive products such as narratives and problema-
tizations. Together, these elements form the interpretive frame in which cer-
tain aspects of a policy problem are highlighted while other features are 
ignored. On the one hand, separating the baseline categories of thought 
from their interpretive products brings the process of interpretation to the 
fore. On the other hand, Brandwein ’s model shows that policy narratives , 
19 Also see Linder (1995).
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problematizations and metaphors (the interpretive product) indicate on what 
values, assumptions and beliefs (baseline categories of thought) a policy is 
based. The interpretive frame thus consists of both interpretive products 
and the baseline categories of thought, which together prescribe what 
should be done. At the same time, however, policy narratives remain ambig-
uous. Consequently, people can agree on policy while they read different 
meanings in those narratives .
These insights into post-positivist policy analysis are interesting for our 
explanatory framework, because they provide concrete concepts such as 
policy frame , policy narrative and generative metaphor for the explanation of 
policy change .
Maarten Hajer : storylines and discourse coalitions 
Maarten Hajer ’s work, which can also be categorized as ‘post-positivist 
policy analysis ’, is interesting for this study for several reasons. In the first 
place, unlike the work of most of the other scholars engaged in post-posi-
tivist policy analysis, Hajer ’s work is rooted in post-structuralism . Second-
ly, Hajer has developed some middle range concepts such as storylines and 
discourse coalitions that are particularly useful for a more concrete analysis 
of policy change in multiparty and corporatist countries such as the Neth-
erlands, where political agreements often depend upon the formation of 
coalitions between different parties.
According to Hajer , policy change and permanence can be explained by 
how certain discourses are reproduced and transformed. He defines dis-
course as ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that is 
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices 
which gives meaning to physical and social realities’ (1995: 60). Change 
occurs as the (discursive) subject challenges and establishes new discours-
es. Policy practices should therefore be analyzed as argumentative practic-
es. That is, actors must be perceived as active actors, ‘selecting and adapt-
ing thoughts, mutating and creating them in the continued struggle for 
argumentative victory against rival thinkers’ (Billig 1989: 82 quoted by 
Hajer 1995: 54). The success of a certain discourse is largely dependent upon 
the way in which subjects, who are ‘entangled in webs of meaning’, are 
attracted to this discourse (1995: 56). Hajer therefore contends that the focus 
of analysis should be ‘on those discursive practices which (….) can be 
understood as the interdiscursive transfer points where actors exchange 
positional statements and where new discursive relationships and posi-
tions are created’ (1995: 60). According to him, social analysis is in need of 
so-called ‘middle-range concepts through which this interaction between 
discourses and the role of individual action can be analyzed in a ‘non-reduc-
tionist way’ (1995: 52).
The first middle-range concept that Hajer introduces concerns the sto-
ryline , which he describes as ‘a generative sort of narrative that allows actors 
to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific 
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physical or social phenomena’ (1995: 56). An important function of a sto-
ryline is that it can both simplify the various aspects of a complex problem 
and facilitate different groups to read their own narrative in this storyline. 
Consequently, a storyline not only suggests unity in a complex situation, it 
is also able to create unity among different groups. Despite the fact that the 
practice within which a storyline is uttered and the plausibility and accept-
ability of the argument are important factors determining the success of a 
storyline, its success depends above all on the discursive affinity between the 
actor and the storyline (1995:63). Discursive affinity increases to the extent 
that some elements of the storyline have a structure that is similar to the 
discursive position from which the subject acts. Discursive affinity also 
increases when some trust in the actor who utters the storyline already 
exists. In these instances, the actor does not need to understand the whole 
argument, she may also accept the argument because to her the argument 
‘sounds right’ (1995: 66-7).
The second important middle-range concept concerns the concept of 
discourse coalition, which Hajer defines as: ‘the ensemble of (1) a set of sto-
rylines ; (2) the actors who utter these storylines ; and (3) the practices in 
which this discursive activity is based’. A discourse coalition thus refers to ‘a 
group of actors that, in the context of an identifiable set of practices, shares 
the usage of a particular set of storylines over a particular period of time’ 
(2006:70). Hence, discourse coalitions are formed in the case where previous-
ly independent practices are actively related to each other. The formation of 
discourse coalitions is facilitated by the production of storylines that, 
according to Hajer , function as a glue binding the different parties and 
impose a quite arbitrary closure on an open debate. The emergence of a 
discourse coalition may eventually result in discourse structuration if ‘the cred-
ibility of actors in a given domain requires them to draw on the ideas, con-
cepts, and categories of a given discourse’ (1995:60). However, it is only if 
discourse structuration results in the construction of certain institutional 
arrangements in which the storylines are constantly reproduced that Hajer 
speaks of discourse institutionalization.20
Whereas within the framework of LCE, policy change can only be 
understood as resulting from occurrences at the macro level of analysis 
such as the emergence of massive populist movements, for example, the 
concepts of discourse coalition and storyline are particularly helpful in 
explaining policy change at a lower and more concrete level of analysis.
20 Hajer contrasts the concept of discourse coalition with the concept of ‘advocacy coali-
tions ’ developed by Sabatier (1987). According to Hajer , Sabatier fails to perceive indi-
vidual beliefs such as contradictory statements, which for that reason can sustain a dif-
ferent range of discourse coalitions . Secondly, Sabatier overlooks the fact that these 
beliefs may be altered because of the emergence of new discourses. Indeed, as Hajer 
contends, storylines are able to change the way in which actors understand their inter-
ests (1995: 68-72).
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Conceptual fit between concepts of post-positivist policy analysis and discourse 
theory 
How do these post-positivist concepts, narrative , storyline and discourse coa-
litions , fit in with a poststructuralist explanatory framework that is based 
on LCE?
First of all, it must be emphasized that, on the one hand, narratives and 
storylines may converge with the poststructuralist concept of discourse to the 
extent that discourse is interpreted as an ‘articulatory practice ’ that estab-
lishes relationships ‘among elements such that their identity is modified’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 105).21 In this case the narrative and storyline 
characterize social logics.
On the other hand, however, the concepts of narrative and storyline 
may refer to a certain type of articulatory practice that produces a specific 
kind of order between the elements, namely an order that persuades peo-
ple to draw certain conclusions. Thus, the conclusions can be inferred from 
the way the story or narrative is told. Because of this specific function, narra-
tives and storylines are capable of changing certain discourses . If they do so, 
they operate as rhetorical figures that change the way that we understand 
the world, as was explained in section 4.2.2. Hence, whereas Glynos and 
Howarth only elaborate on the fantasmatic narrative as a form of narrative 
that can generate change (as it sustains political logics ), the work of Hajer 
and other post-positivist policy analysts show how other (policy) narratives 
may also come to operate as generative metaphors that cause people to see 
things in a different way. Compare in this respect Stone ’s definition of the 
narrative of decline and narrative of control and the ‘horrific and beatific 
dimensions of fantasy’ that Glynos and Howarth use. It must be noted, 
however, that within the context of discourse theory , a positive identifica-
tion of an actor with a new discourse or storyline is not contingent upon ‘dis-
cursive affinity’. A positive identification requires, above all, an openness 
to newness.22
Also the concept of discourse coalition may concern both an articulatory 
practice (social logics) and a rhetorical figure (rhetorical logics). . In case the 
concept of discourse coalition is perceived (like the concept of storyline ) as an 
articulatory practice , it characterizes existing social logics . On the other 
hand, to the extent that unconscious identification processes in the forma-
tion of discourse coalitions are foregrounded, a discourse coalition operates 
like a rhetorical figure which constitutes social change. For example, in case a 
coalition between different actors is formed because the involved policy 
actors all identify with the fantasy that aging society threatens to eliminate 
21 Also see section 4.2.1. Note that discourse in this defi nition must be distinguished from 
discourse in the sense of ‘the discursive’ or the ‘conditions of the possibility’, which 
refer to the fi nite ways in which we make sense of the world.
22 Also see chapter 4.
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the Dutch Welfare state, the emerging discourse coalition operates as a rhe-
torical figure that may constitute social change.
The conceptual fit between post-positivist analysis and poststructural-
ist discourse theory with respect to concepts such as narrative and discourse 
coalition are not the only problems to be solved. To fit in with a poststruc-
turalist explanatory model, conceptual categories that are used in post-pos-
itivist policy analysis such as ‘structures’, ‘institutions’, ‘subjects’ and ‘ide-
as’ must be perceived as articulations of contingent discursive practices. This 
means that within discourse theory these discursive entities can never 
account for social change on their own. In any case, Hajer ’s concept of ide-
as seems to be perfectly compatible with discourse theory as, to Hajer , an 
idea is not to be viewed as an unchangeable belief system. With regard to 
the constitution of individuals, it should further be noted that Laclau and 
Mouffe ’s work bears more resemblance to post-positivist constructions of 
the subject than most people would believe. For one thing, Laclau and 
Mouffe do not argue that individual political actors do not matter or cannot 
make strategic decisions, but that whereas the subject is created in discourse, 
she does not act independently of existing discourses (1985: 115).23
In conclusion, in case structures, institutions and subjects are perceived as 
articulations of contingent discursive practices, the insights of post-positivist 
policy analysis are not necessarily incompatible with a poststructuralist 
explanatory framework that is based on LCE. The advantage of these 
approaches is that the explanatory concepts are not limited to changes at 
the macro level, such as the introduction of new political regimes, but that 
they add instead to the analysis of policies and practices at a lower level of 
analysis. In addition, because these concepts are less abstract than the con-
cepts used in LCE, they are useful for the analysis of concrete phenomena.
2.3 An introduction to critique
This chapter has examined several poststructuralist and post-positivist 
concepts for the analysis of (policy) change. Part of these concepts will be 
used for the poststructuralist explanatory model which is presented in 
chapter 4. This model is based upon four analytical steps of LCE, which 
were examined in this chapter. This chapter did not pay much attention at 
the fourth and last analytical step, critique, which is the main topic in the 
next two chapters. This section shortly introduces these chapters. 
23 Note that this notion of the subject also shows similarities with Hajer ’s notion of the 
subject as ‘entangled in webs of meaning’, which constrains the way the subject can 
think about reality.
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First of all, what is critique? As the first chapter argued this study 
rejects a sharp Kantian distinction between the domain of knowledge and 
the domain of morality, which is reflected in the positivist distinction 
between on the one hand facts and on the other hand critique and norma-
tive evaluations. Following Glynos and Howarth, I conceptualize critique 
first and foremost as a way to ‘highlight the constructed and political char-
acter of social objectivity (2007:11).
This chapter is, however, not followed immediately by poststructural-
ist interpretations of critique. Whereas in social law literature it is quite 
common practice to comment on (changes in) social security law in terms 
of justice, next chapters first examine some more conventional forms of 
normative evaluations. Another reason to start with examining these kind 
of normative evaluations is that poststructuralist theory has often been crit-
icized for its normative deficit. According to these criticisms, justice based 
theories should be preferred over ‘empty’ post-structuralism. Indeed, 
chapter 3 shows how conventional justice based political philosophy can 
improve normative argumentation in social law literature. Yet, the first part 
of chapter 4 discusses some important shortcomings of these kind of theo-
ries, which, as the latter part of the chapter shows, are covered in poststruc-
turalist critique. Chapter 4 thus defends the view that a poststructralist 
informed ethos should be preferred over other political philosophical nor-
mative evaluations.
Abstract
In this chapter I argue that normative questions in social law are in need of 
a more philosophical approach. This is particularly true for the evaluation 
of Work First projects. Therefore I propose to evaluate Work First projects 
from the perspective of the reciprocity principle as it is deployed in the 
work of John Rawls and Stuart White. While Rawls’ interpretation of the 
reciprocity principle seems to reject recent Dutch jurisprudence on a Work-
First arrangements, instead White’s approach affirms these arrangements, 
on the condition that a collective participation fund with individual draw-
ing rights is created. This particpation fund could be modeled on the Life 
Course Arrangement.
A Dutch version of this chapter has been published in Netherlands Journal of 
Legal Philosophy, Volume 41, issue 1, pp. 28-43, April 2012. The Dutch ver-
sion is available at www.bjutijdschriften.nl/tijdschrift/rechtsfilosofieen-
theorie/detail (Eleveld 2012a).
3 Labor obligation, justice and the 
foundations of social security law
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3.1 Introduction
Can a welfare recipient under the Dutch Work and Welfare Act (Wet Werk 
en Bijstand, WWB) be forced to perform simple horticultural work for five 
days a week? This question was addressed two years ago by the Central 
Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad van Beroep), the highest appeals court in 
the Netherlands in social security cases.1 Earlier, a similar matter had been 
brought before the Arnhem Court.2 Both cases revolved around the legal 
acceptability of so-called Work First projects in which welfare recipients are 
obliged to participate in supervised work to prepare them for a acquiring a 
regular job. At the heart of this legal question was, in fact, a more philo-
sophical question, that is: to what extent can we require an individual citi-
zen to do something in return for what she receives from the community? 
This contribution aims to further unravel the philosophical foundations of 
the judicial review. The anchor point for this study is the ruling of the Cen-
tral Appeals Tribunal in the aforementioned case.
In Anglo-Saxon countries, compulsory labor projects or Work First 
measures have a longer history.3 The introduction of these projects has been 
critically reviewed in international legal literature. In some cases the argu-
mentation was based on a thorough politico-philosophical reflection on the 
question whether or not the welfare recipient ‘must do something in return 
for the received benefits’.4 In Dutch-language legal literature this philo-
sophical approach is usually lacking. As argued by Danny Pieters (1998) in 
his 1986 inaugural lecture on work ethic in social security, this will be due 
partly to the fact that it requires jurists to cross the boundaries of their disci-
pline. Nonetheless, the question of justice is a matter that does have the 
attention of Dutch social lawyers. For instance, from the time that labor law 
began to set itself apart from general civil law, the intrinsic normative value 
of labor law or – within a broader context – social law has been a recurring 
theme in inaugural lectures on social law.5 However, these discourses are 
1 Central Appeals Tribunal 8 February 2010, LJN BL1093; RSV 2010, 79 with note by 
Bruggeman; AB 2010, 79 with note by Bröring; JWWB 2010, 64; NJB 2010, 410; NTM/
NJCM 2011, 325 with note by de Vries.
2 Arnhem Court 8 October 2008, LJN BF7284; JWWB 2008, 310 with note by Nacinovic; 
RSV 2009, 11 with note by Bruggeman; TRA 2009, 18 with note by Driessen.
3 For instance, so-called Workfare measures were introduced by the Clinton administra-
tion in 1996 (TANF) and by Blair in 1997. It should be noted, though, that the extent of 
these measures is often much greater than of the Dutch Work First projects.
4 Also see for example M.E. Gilman (2005) and A.L. Wax (2003).
5 Also see for example F.J.H.M. Van der Ven (1966), J.J.M. Van der Ven (1966), N.E.H. Van 
Esveld (1966), Pieters (1998), Klosse (2003), Wilthagen (2003), Noordam (2007), Vonk 
(2008), Jaspers (2008), Asscher-Vonk (2009), Pennings (2009).
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lacking a further reaching philosophical reflection on the role of justice 
within social law.6
For a substantiated discussion within social law on the philosophical 
foundations of the labor obligation that is established in the WWB, as 
argued above by Pieters, an interdisciplinary approach is inevitable. In this 
contribution we have chosen a philosophical consideration of the founda-
tions of the labor obligation under the WWB by confronting the arguments 
used in court rulings on the labor obligation with arguments from egalitar-
ian liberal political philosophy in which the concept of justice is strongly 
connected with the value of equality . This direction of thought seems most 
closely related to the widely supported socio-legal basic values of ‘employ-
ee protection’ and ‘inequality compensation’ (Zekic 2011).
In the past twenty years we have been witnessing an increased empha-
sis on individual responsibility within a variety of social security systems. 
This trend runs parallel to the rise of one specific movement within egali-
tarian liberalism , the so-called luck egalitarianism. Characteristic of this 
direction of thought is that a clear distinction is made between voluntary 
choices and ‘brute bad luck’. In general, the consequences of voluntary 
choices should not burden the community; in the end, each individual is 
responsible for her own success in life (Dworkin 2000; Pierik 1996). Does 
this also mean that citizens can be held responsible under all circumstances 
for acquiring an independent income, if need be by imposing a labor obli-
gation? Ronald Dworkin, one of the most important representatives of luck 
egalitarianism, answers this question using the construction of a hypotheti-
cal insurance market where people can bid on their desired social insur-
ance policy under fair conditions and based on equal purchasing power. 
He argues that buyers on a market such as this will try to find a reasonable 
balance between protection and affordability. Based on this assumption, 
according to Dworkin, people will not be quick to pick insurance that cov-
ers the risk of performing unpleasant work. They will be more inclined to 
purchase insurance policy where a certain type of labor (training) obliga-
tion can be imposed on the welfare recipient (2000: 320-350).
Nevertheless, quite a number of egalitarian liberal thinkers do not 
agree with the above hypothetical reasoning. Based on the generally shared 
point of departure that the modern welfare state derives its power from the 
reciprocity principle (Mau 2004), they are of the opinion that the acceptabil-
ity of the labor obligation should be tested against this principle. Seeing 
6 The lack of a well-founded discussion in social law literature on the basic values of 
social law is also acknowledged in social law literature, see for example F.M. Noordam 
(2007).
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that the reciprocity principle also forms the basis for the WWB, this paper 
has chosen to build on this approach.7
A disadvantage of the chosen approach is that other (politico-philo-
sophical) perspectives will receive less attention. For instance, the Work 
First principle can also be justified based on paternalistic grounds – a rea-
soning, by the way, that cannot be considered completely separate from an 
argumentation based on the reciprocity principle. The clarification of the 
WWB states, for instance, that the principle of work before welfare can 
break the transfer of welfare dependence between generations. Children 
are being set a better example through the new set-up of the welfare 
scheme, according to the clarification of the WWB. We often see paternalis-
tic considerations such as these with communitarian thinkers who believe 
that personal competences should not be assumed to be present or learned 
easily, but can be acquired with effort and only within a community (Dea-
con 2002; Etzioni 1997; Mead and Beem 2005b).
This contribution aims to tie in with dominant socio-legal literature, 
though. The socio-legal basic values of ‘employee protection’ and ‘inequal-
ity compensation’ are not so much inspired by paternalistic motives, but 
are based primarily on the unequal positions of employee and employer 
(Betten et al. 1997; Van der Heijden and Noordam 2001), which are princi-
ples that have more in common with egalitarian liberalism . Taking this 
framework of thinking as a point of departure, it will be investigated if wel-
fare recipients can be obliged to participate in learning and working 
projects based on the reciprocity principle.
The commonality of most contributions to the egalitarian liberal debate 
on the meaning of the reciprocity principle is that they either build on the 
work of John Rawls or use his work as a point of reference to present a new 
vision on reciprocity (Anderson 2004; Becker 2005; Bou-Habib and Olsaret-
ti 2004; Mckinnon 2003; Mead and Beem 2005a; Sangiovanni 2007; Smith 
2002; White 2003). Section 3 offers a review of the labor obligation in light 
of Rawls ’ view of the reciprocity principle. Impulses for renewal can be 
found in the work of Stuart White (2003). In the past few years, this egali-
tarian liberal philosopher has given further specification to Rawls ’ inter-
pretation of the reciprocity principle and integrated it with insights from 
other politico-philosophical directions. Section 4 elaborates on White ’s 
vision on a labor obligation. In section 5 it will be shown that an explora-
tion such as this can deepen the socio-legal discussion on social security 
reform.
7 The clarifi cation of the WWB states, for instance: ‘rights and obligations are two sides of 
the same coin. The right to welfare is always connected with the obligation to endeavor 
regaining independence from welfare. This means that the welfare amount should not 
only be based on the applicable welfare standard and the recipient’s available means, 
but also by the degree in which the imposed obligations are being met’ (PP, 2002-03, 
28 870, No. 3, p. 5).
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3.2 The legal review of Work First projects
The Dutch Work and Welfare Act, which was introduced in 2004, has given 
municipalities greater responsibility in the execution of welfare schemes. In 
comparison with the preceding National Assistance Act (ABW) more 
emphasis is placed on work than on welfare benefits. Characteristic of the 
WWB is that assistance in finding work is the primary objective. Only in 
case this goal is not achieved the citizen may be supported with income.8
The WWB states that the welfare recipient with a labor obligation is 
obliged to take on general socially accepted work. In this respect, educa-
tion, work experience or last salary are irrelevant. The recipient has the 
obligation to use a provision that is offered, including social activation that 
is geared towards employment. Moreover, the applicant must cooperate in 
an investigation into the possibilities of employment (art. 9 WWB). Many 
municipalities have based their reintegration policy on the Work First 
method, which usually means that the welfare recipient is obliged to work 
temporarily while retaining benefits. In practice, this method is used for all 
target groups and therefore not only for welfare recipients who also should 
be able to find a place in the job market relatively quickly without extra 
support. If people refuse to work, the municipality has the possibility to 
sanction them (art. 8 WWB jo. art. 18 WWB).
In February 2010 the Central Appeals Tribunal passed judgment in the 
case of a welfare recipient who refused to participate in a disciplinary 
project that regarded ‘closely supervised labor in greenhouses’. This 
project’s objective was to further develop the participants’ general skills as 
employees. In its ruling, the Tribunal first of all stated that the offered 
project increases the employment possibilities of the person involved and 
therefore can be considered a reintegration provision as defined in art. 9 
section 1, opening statement and section b of the WWB. Subsequently, the 
Tribunal tested the provision against the ban on forced and compulsory 
labor that is laid down in art. 4 ECHR. According to the Tribunal, there is 
no question of a violation of the ban on forced labor. This view was based 
on the fact that no physical pressure or any considerable psychological 
pressure was exercised. With regard to the question if the ban on compul-
sory labor was being violated, the Tribunal gave meaning to the circum-
stances of the case, which include in any case: (1) the nature, the place, the 
duration and the working hours of the labor to be performed in relation to 
the possibilities, the work experience and education, and the family situa-
tion of the person involved; (2) the period for which the involved person 
had been unemployed; (3) the answer to the question if and how the offered 
provision could contribute to achieving employment for the person 
involved; and (4) the severity of the sanction if the offered provision was 
8 PP 2002-03, 28 870, No. 3, p. 2-3.
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not accepted. The Tribunal’s final conclusion was that in this specific case 
the ban on compulsory labor had not been violated. Only when, consider-
ing all circumstances of the case, it can not (or no longer) be expected from 
a participant to perform the activities or work that he or she is instructed to 
do because of their excessive or disproportionately taxing nature and/or 
the total lack of perspective towards employment that they offer, one could 
call it a situation of compulsory labor, in the opinion of the Tribunal.
This ruling, just like the one in a previous case before the Arnhem court, 
shows that Work First projects will be permitted on the condition that they 
are geared to the individual situation and are not excessive or dispropor-
tionately taxing. Moreover, the provision should offer ‘some’ perspective of 
employment. Thus, under certain conditions a municipality has the right to 
impose compulsory Work First measures when executing welfare schemes 
under the WWB.9
3.3 John Rawls’ views on reciprocity 
Can the framework for review that is formulated by the Central Appeals 
Tribunal pass a Rawlsian test of fair reciprocity ? To answer this question, 
first of all we will look at Rawls’ principles of justice (Rawls 1971). Rawls 
asks himself what principles of justice people would agree on in a hypo-
thetical situation in which they are lacking knowledge about who they are 
themselves or who others are. He reaches the conclusion that behind this 
veil of ignorance they will decide on two basic principles. According to the 
first principle, each individual should have an equal right to the most 
extensive system of equal basic liberties. The second principle is that social 
and economic inequalities must be arranged in such a way that they are 
attached to positions and offices that are open to all. In addition, this sec-
ond principle refers to the difference principle that all social primary goods 
such as freedom, opportunities, income, well-being and the social bases of 
self-respect are divided equally, unless an unequal division of these goods 
will benefit the least advantaged. A person with more talents is thus stimu-
9 At the time of writing this article, the Dutch Senate has adopted a number of changes to 
the WWB, including the obligation of the welfare recipient to perform a ‘counter per-
formance according to capacity’. According to the clarifi cation, this counter perform-
ance does not have to be related to the achievement of paid employment. In view of the 
Tribunal’s ruling that is discussed here, the question arises how this obligation can be 
united with the ban on compulsory labor of art. 4 ECHR. After all, according to the Tri-
bunal compulsory labor is only allowed if the offered provision can contribute to 
achieving employment for the persons involved. Under referral to the exemption clause 
on the ban on compulsory labor that is included in section 3, section d of art. 4 ECHR, 
the Dutch government takes the position that a ‘counter performance according to 
capacity’ should be considered a normal civic duty and therefore cannot be deemed to 
be in confl ict with the ban on compulsory labor (PP, 2010-11, 32 815, No. 3, p. 15).
41Labor obligation, justice and the foundations of social security law
lated to increase her income on the condition that this contributes to the 
income of the least advantaged.
To underpin his principles of justice , unlike Dworkin , Rawls does not 
make a clear distinction between people who simply have had bad luck 
and people who have chosen on their own initiative to not undertake pro-
ductive activities. According to Rawls , differences in income and prosperi-
ty that are the result of differences in peoples’ efforts cannot be considered 
to be ‘earned’ differences exclusively, because the effort to work can also be 
affected by factors that are irrelevant from a moral perspective, such as dif-
ferences in natural ability or the social class in which one is born. Therefore, 
the introduction of an obligation to work in a social security system will 
have to be justified on other grounds.
How exactly does Rawls define reciprocity ?10 To answer this question, 
the first remark that could be made is that Rawls , in contrast to conserva-
tive thinkers such as Lawrence Becker and Lawrence Mead, does not 
assume a strict proportionality between what someone receives and what 
she has to do in return (Becker 1986; Mead 1986). In other words, Rawls is 
not unambiguous about the specific obligations that arise from the reci-
procity principle. His opinion on reciprocity is closely connected to his 
opinion on society as a ‘system of cooperation’. He thinks that what can be 
achieved through social collaboration can never be realized by individuals 
on their own, i.e. a better world for everyone (1971: 4). According to Rawls , 
the more advantaged people also recognize the need for collaboration. 
After all, without the cooperation of the least advantaged they will not be 
able to lead a satisfactory life. The more advantaged will not receive this 
cooperation for nothing, though. Apart from the fact that the conditions of 
the system must be reasonable (1971: 4, 103), everyone that is part of the 
collaboration needs to have the conviction that others, or at least a suffi-
cient number of people, will also contribute (1971: 261). Rawls ’ view of 
society as a ‘system of cooperation’ thus implies that the reciprocity princi-
ple should not be interpreted in the first place as a compulsory counter-
performance that unemployed people should deliver in exchange for their 
not earned share in the social product; the reciprocity principle is already 
incorporated in society as a system of cooperation. In other words, Rawls ’ 
view of society as a system of cooperation assumes the willing cooperation 
of all people for the benefit of the well-being of all people. Therefore, And-
rea Sangiovanni argues that this notion shows a ‘relational view of justice . 
This implies that the well-to-do citizen not only owes her well-being to the 
manner in which she utilizes her specific talents, but also to the legal sys-
10 This review puts the emphasis on the substantiation of the reciprocity principle. In 
Rawls ’ later works, the reciprocity principle is also related to procedural justice . 
According to this political interpretation of the reciprocity principle, the political debate 
requires citizens to put forward arguments that, within reason, are also acceptable to 
other citizens.
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tem in which she can express these talents: the talents, dedication and skills 
of the well-to-do citizen have only been able to produce social advantages 
thanks to the collaboration and contributions of other citizens to the crea-
tion of the institutional framework (2007: 7).
The reciprocity principle also finds expression in Rawls ’ second princi-
ple of justice, that includes the ‘difference principle ’ (1971: 102). According 
to Rawls , the difference principle requires that everyone is entitled to a 
minimum share of the total social product. The size of this minimum is not 
predetermined but will at least exceed the essential needs, since the differ-
ence principle specifically endeavors to maximize the prosperity of the least 
advantaged. Moreover, the level of the minimum needs to be high enough 
for the citizens to feel that they are truly a part of a political society with 
ideals and principles that they feel connected to. Only then will the idea of 
society as a joint enterprise be taken seriously (2001: 128-30). The reciproci-
ty principle as expressed in the difference principle thus primarily formu-
lates an obligation of the more advantaged towards the least advantaged.
Rawls is less clear with regard to the counter-performance that can be 
expected from the least advantaged. Throughout ‘A Theory of Justice’ he 
gives some indications concerning this counter-performance. As discussed 
above, citizens who live in a society that is a system of cooperation can only 
count on the willing collaboration of others if people are convinced that 
others will also do their part. In addition, Rawls talks about everyone’s 
‘natural duty’ to ‘comply with and to do our share in just institutions when 
they exist and apply to us’ (1971: 334).
The fact that Rawls provides no further specification of the natural reci-
procity duty has been fiercely criticized by luck egalitarians. The luck egali-
tarians fear that the least advantaged even might escape any reciprocal 
responsibility based on the difference principle (Arneson 1997; Dworkin 
2000). Rawls has tried to counter this criticism by adding spare time to the 
list of primary goods. In this regard he considers the additional eight hours 
of spare time a day that are available to the non-productive bon vivant, or 
‘Malibu surfer’, the equivalent of the entitlement to primary goods of the 
least advantaged who do have an eight hour workday. Or, as Rawls puts it, 
‘surfers must somehow support themselves’ (2001: 179). Can the conclu-
sion be drawn that the addition of spare time to the list of primary goods 
justifies a labor obligation in public welfare schemes after all? In literature, 
two arguments are put forward to support why a labor obligation does not 
correspond with Rawls ’ theory of justice. In the remainder of this section 
we will shed further light on these arguments.
First of all, let us look at the significance of one of the primary goods, 
‘the social bases of self-respect’ . According to Rawls , self-respect is neces-
sary to give meaning to a good life in a satisfactory way. In this regard, it is 
important that what we endeavor is respected by others as well. Thus, self-
respect implies explicit recognition by others: ‘all desire and activity 
becomes empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism’ if our 
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efforts are not respected by others, says Rawls (1971: 440). Therefore, he 
considers the social bases of self-respect to be the most important primary 
good (1971: 440, 546). Thereby it is important that someone does not derive 
her self-respect primarily from her income, but from the equal division of 
basic liberties in a just society (1971: 538-539). For this reason the first jus-
tice principle, which focuses on an equal division of basic liberties and 
rights, has absolute priority; ‘the precedence of liberty entails equality in 
the social bases of respect’, Rawls holds (1971: 546).
This raises the question how the social bases of self-respect , considered 
to be the elements of the basic structure that offer people the opportunity to 
acquire self-respect, relate to a labor obligation that is based on the reciproc-
ity principle. It is Catriona Mckinnon’s opinion that people’s self-respect is 
undermined by a labor obligation if the person who is obliged to do the labor 
and experiences little respect in that compulsory job also lacks the freedom 
to change jobs. She thinks that this will often be the case since a large part of 
the citizens on whom a labor obligation is imposed are not capable of finding 
work of their own accord. If these citizens do succeed in doing so, it will usu-
ally concern jobs at the lower end of the labor market. In addition, Mckinnon 
points to the fact that the person with the labor obligation can also derive 
respect outside of the work situation. However, she will be left with little 
spare time and have few financial resources to fill her spare time in a useful 
and respectful manner. Therefore, Mckinnon takes the position that in a just 
society the importance of self-respect requires that each citizen should be 
entitled to receive unconditional benefits, or a basic income (2003: 154).
Mckinnon’s argument leans heavily on the importance Rawls attaches 
to the equal division of basic liberties as the foundation for self-respect. Yet, 
it could be argued that paid employment will generally generate more self-
respect than being dependent on welfare (Anderson 2004: 245). However, 
this argument seems to ignore the specific nature of compulsory labor. 
After all, in most cases this type of work has little to do with performing 
meaningful activities; in contrast, it often creates an extra obstacle for access 
to useful and meaningful work (Birnbaum 2010). Rawls also doubts if paid 
employment positively influences people’s self-respect by definition and 
for that reason should always have preference over other types of partici-
pation in society. He argues, for instance that ‘no one need to be servilely 
dependent on others and made to choose between monotonous and rou-
tine occupations which are deadening to human thought and sensibility’. 
In Rawls ’ view, everyone must be enabled to participate in society by per-
forming ‘willing and meaningful work’ (1971: 529). By expressly connect-
ing the social basis of self-respect to an equal division of basic liberties, 
Rawls excludes in advance the possibility that the reciprocity principle can 
only be expressed in a compulsory labor obligation that offers those 
involved few prospects of meaningful and respectful work.
A second argument that is used in literature to dismiss a Rawlsian labor 
obligation is that such an obligation cannot be considered to be in agree-
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ment with the system of Rawls’ theory. His theory of justice , for instance, 
leaves no room for distinguishing between people who have excess spare 
time of their own volition or involuntarily, respectively. After all, in his theo-
ry of justice people’s preference to spend their day surfing instead of work-
ing is considered to be a factor that is irrelevant from a moral point of view, 
as are differences in one’s natural abilities or the social class in which one 
is born (Wax 2003). Moreover, an egalitarian theory of justice simply does 
not allow people to lay rightful claim to what they produce, because ine-
qualities that arise due to a difference in capacities are unjust by definition. 
This implies that the people with superior capacities cannot require from 
benefit recipients to do something in return (Bou-Habib and Olsaretti 2004; 
Van Parijs 1995). Furthermore, a labor obligation would violate the equality 
principle embraced by Rawls. An example to consider in this regard would 
be that of the lucky person who lives off the interest from his inheritance. It 
would be in conflict with the equality principle if this person, who does not 
make a productive contribution to society, would escape a labor obligation 
whereas this obligation to do labor is imposed on the less fortunate citizen 
who is dependent upon welfare benefits (King 1999; Segall 2005).11
3.4 Stuart White ’s alternative
Whereas Rawls does not concretely relate the reciprocity principle to a 
labor obligation, neither positively nor negatively, White (2003) attempts, 
taking the egalitarian liberal frame of thought as a point of departure, 
to link concrete an obligation to participate to the reciprocity principle. 
White ’s version of fair justice starts with the basic egalitarian claims: just 
like Rawls he considers society a community that is based on a collabora-
tion between free and equal citizens who want to live in accordance with 
their own perspective on a good life. White argues that the principle of 
reciprocity is at the root of this view of society as a community of mutual 
respect between equals. However, the reciprocity principle does not imply 
a strict proportionality between the contribution that a citizen makes to the 
community and what she receives in return. After all, Rawls also does not 
advocate strict proportionality, because people must be protected against 
‘brute bad luck’. Thus, he underscores Rawls ’ principle that a proportion-
al (reciprocal) contribution can only be expected on the condition that the 
basic institutions are just. White then stipulates a number of basis require-
ments of justice:
– citizens should not have to lead a life of poverty simply because they 
meet with more misfortune in their life than others;
11 Others therefore propose to also impose a labor obligation on rich heirs (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996).
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– each citizen should be sufficiently protected against economic vulnera-
bility and the exploitation and abuse that can be the result of an eco-
nomically vulnerable position;
– each citizen who is expected to work should have sufficient opportuni-
ties for self-realization in her work;
– inequality with regard to education opportunities and access to exter-
nal wealth must be limited as much as possible;
– citizens must be protected against discrimination (2003: 90-91).
Only if all of these conditions are being met can one expect from the citizen 
that she will make a productive contribution to society: the ‘basic work 
expectation’. This productive contribution does not necessarily have to 
involve paid labor. For that reason White talks about an obligation to par-
ticipate, which also includes unpaid care activities. Therefore, citizens that 
meet this participation obligation do not have to do paid work to fulfill the 
‘basic work expectation’.
An implication of this ‘basic work expectation’ is that certain groups of 
welfare recipients can be obliged to participate in projects such as Work 
First in return for receiving benefits. White poses, however, that it should 
not be allowed to generically implement this ‘basic work expectation’ 
because it would never be possible to completely meet the condition of just 
institutions. By definition an institution such as law of inheritance gener-
ates ‘brute bad luck inequalities’, for example, without the reciprocity 
requirement being met. Moreover, under the current institutional circum-
stances a portion of the citizens at the lower end of the labor market are not 
or hardly able to escape this vulnerable situation. These citizens also will 
not be able to work on their self-realization .
Based on these arguments, White contends that certain citizens should 
receive compensation. For example, citizens who find themselves in an 
economically vulnerable position through no fault of their own, must at 
least get the opportunity to refuse certain jobs at the lower end of the mar-
ket. An additional effect is that in that case these employees increase the 
pressure on the employers, which can help them to not only realize higher 
wages but possibly also an improvement of labor conditions. This might 
provide them with more opportunities for self-realization in their work. To 
achieve this, White makes a number of proposals that are inspired on the 
basic income proposed by libertarians. He rejects the idea of a full basic 
income as proposed by Van Parijs, because it would completely undermine 
the reciprocity principle. White ’s proposal concerns a partial basic income 
that is financed, amongst other things, through a higher inheritance tax for 
private persons. The basic allowance consists in first instance of a ‘partici-
pation account ’, in which contributions are deposited that are meant for 
specific goals such as education, starting a business, and maternity leave. 
In addition to the participation account, the basic allowance consists of a 
‘life account ’. Citizens can use it to (temporarily) supplement their income 
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in accordance with their own wishes. An important advantage of an 
account such as this, in White ’s view, is that it gives citizens a better negoti-
ating position with regard to certain forms of low-pay labor that have to be 
done under adverse or even harmful conditions.
Although White ’s view on reciprocity is unmistakably inspired by 
communitarianism , he stays faithful to Rawlsian egalitarianism. Instead of 
interpreting reciprocity as an equal trade-off between received benefits and 
the contribution of citizens to the community, he takes the position that citi-
zens only need to contribute according to their abilities. Thus, he adheres to 
the Rawlsian principle that talents are not earned.
3.5 Work First revisited
The Central Appeals Tribunal ruled that compulsory work activities are 
forbidden only if the activities are excessive or disproportional and/or any 
chances of employment are lacking. Whereas this judgment seems to be in 
agreement with Dworkin ’s hypothetical insurance market, it could be con-
cluded on the basis of the above discussion that the Tribunal’s ruling does 
not correspond with Rawls ’ interpretation of the reciprocity principle. 
Based on the reciprocity principle Rawls seems to stipulate more clearly 
defined obligations for the more advantaged than for the least advantaged, 
for instance. Furthermore, it has been argued that imposing a labor obliga-
tion on welfare recipients cannot be reconciled with the system of Rawls ’ 
theory of justice .
Let us assume that a labor obligation does not create conflict with the 
system of Rawls ’ theory. In that case, the allowability of a labor obligation 
as an expression of the reciprocity principle seems to be connected to the 
effect of the labor obligation on the self-respect of those involved. Although 
statements on this topic must be corroborated by further empirical studies, 
we can make some suggestions based on a number of assumptions and 
previous studies. First of all it seems plausible to assume that a person on 
welfare will experience less self-respect than a person doing paid work. It 
should be noted in this regard, though, that the self-respect experienced 
subjectively by welfare recipients is closely connected to the way in which 
the social security system is shaped. For instance, an increase in the number 
of conditions attached to entitlement to welfare benefits proves to nega-
tively affect the attitude towards welfare recipients and thus the self-
respect experienced by the welfare recipients (Rothstein 1998). Studies also 
show that Dutch Work First projects are successful with regard to the out-
flow of welfare recipients to paid employment (Sol et al. 2007; Borgers and 
Lemmens 2009), which might have a positive effect on clients’ self-respect. 
On the other hand, however, it turns out that clients of Work First projects, 
and specifically those who were unemployed for a prolonged period of 
time prior to participation in Work First projects, move continuously 
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between poorly paid jobs and a welfare situation (Bruttel and Sol 2006; H. 
Dean 2007; Kok and Houkes 2011).12 These citizens are permanently at the 
bottom of society and lack the means to independently realize their per-
sonal idea of a good life. In this case a lasting outflow to paid employment 
is never achieved. Consequently, neither the self-respect nor the social min-
imum will increase. This conclusion will most likely have even greater 
validity if there is a large supply of workers in combination with relatively 
few jobs. In that situation a labor obligation might harm people who (do) 
derive self-respect from paid employment.
So even if we discount the first argument, i.e. that a labor obligation is 
not in accordance with Rawls ’ theory of justice, the obligation of a welfare 
recipient to make an active contribution to society through labor participa-
tion should be rejected if such an obligation forms a (serious) violation of 
the self-respect experienced by the person in question. This means that the 
well-known ‘Malibu surfer’ who only derives self-respect from activities 
whose contribution to society is doubtful, just like other citizens with inter-
ests that are more relevant to society, should be able to claim a share in the 
collective product. Sanctions on not complying with the labor obligation 
should in no case result in lowering the welfare benefits to a level that is 
below what is necessary for a meaningful participation in society.
Stricter sanctions may only be imposed if we accept Rawls ’ addition of spare 
time to the list of primary goods, and also assume that a labor obligation gen-
erates more self-respect for a welfare recipient than ‘doing nothing’ and pos-
sibly even increases the social minimum. Only if this is the case can a generic 
labor obligation be justified on the basis of Rawls ’ theory. However, even if 
we take this position we must still reject the conditions set by the Tribunal, 
i.e. that compulsory labor should only be forbidden if it can be characterized 
as ‘excessive’ or ‘disproportionate’ and/or ‘is totally lacking any perspective 
of employment’. After all, these strict criteria seem to be incompatible with 
Rawls ’ own interpretation of ‘society as a system of cooperation’. Positively 
formulated criteria, such as ‘labor through which a positive contribution can 
be made to society’ or ‘work that contributes to the self-respect of the wel-
fare recipient’ and/or ‘outflow to labor that offers perspective for the future’ 
seem to be more in line with Rawls ’ view on fair reciprocity .
Things are different if we follow White ’s interpretation of the reciproc-
ity principle. According to him, a labor obligation that is imposed within 
the boundaries set by the ECHR is, under certain conditions, permitted. 
12 The recent literature study of Kok and Houkes (2011) shows that in Dutch cities such as 
Helmond and Meppel approximately 1 in 3 clients who fl owed out to employment via 
Work First fl owed back to welfare. H. Dean (2007) therefore concludes that ‘welfare-to-
work systems’ can be valuable for those who are ready for the labor market and capable 
of accessing the labor market themselves, but do not work well for those who arenot 
ready yet for the labor market and for those who are extra vulnerable.
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However, in that case citizens do need to be compensated in advance for 
the unequal circumstances in which they find themselves due to their 
unfair starting position. In addition, welfare recipients who perform care 
tasks should be exempt from a labor obligation. In order to compensate for 
the unavoidable inequalities White proposes, amongst other things, to 
introduce a collectively financed life account that provides temporary 
income to every adult. This enables the welfare recipient, at least temporar-
ily, to perform activities that positively affect her self-respect.
Although White has the circumstances in the United Kingdom in mind, 
seeing the above-mentioned study into the Dutch Work First programs 
White ’s body of thought seems to apply to the Dutch situation as well. The 
life course arrangement and the future vitality arrangement could serve as 
a model for a compensatory provision.13 Ideally, a life account such as this 
would hold an amount that would enable each citizen to support herself 
independently on a temporary basis, for instance for a maximum period of 
three years. It must be noted, by the way, that such a scheme would have to 
be financed collectively, unlike the individual life course arrangement and 
vitality arrangements. In addition to this scheme one could think of a par-
ticipation account similar to the one proposed by White , in which the gov-
ernment deposits amounts that are earmarked for specific purposes such as 
education, parenthood and entrepreneurship .
3.6 Concluding remarks
The political philosophical discussion about the relationship between reci-
procity and justice shows that the foundations of social law can be justified 
at a deeper level than has been the case so far. The analysis has brought to 
the fore that the labor obligation under the WWB that is accepted by the 
Central Appeals Tribunal does not pass Rawls ’ test of egalitarian liberal 
justice. On the other hand, a labor obligation can be defended if the argu-
ments are based on White ’s view of egalitarian liberal justice. A condition 
in that case, though, is that social institutions provide compensatory meas-
ures, such as a collectively financed vitality arrangement or a development 
account with (earmarked) withdrawal rights. Proposals to reform social 
security by introducing individual withdrawal rights on funds that are 
filled through collective and individual contributions have been put forth 
before by the so called Balie group (Leenders et al. 2005), Baris and Verhulp 
(2007) and the Labor Participation Committee (2008). A thorough philo-
sophical argumentation on the relationship between reciprocity and justice 
could contribute to the discussion on social law reform.
13 The vitality arrangement as the successor to the life course arrangement was announced 
by the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment in a letter dated July 4th 2011.
Whereas in social law literature it is quite common practice to comment on 
(changes in) social security law in terms of justice, chapter 3 examined the 
merits of a justice based evaluation of social law. It was argued that insights 
from political philosophy can improve normative argumentation in social 
law literature. For example, based on Stuart White ’s liberal egalitarian con-
cept of fair reciprocity a good case could be made for the introduction of a 
(partly) collectively financed Life Course Arrangement (LCA) in Dutch 
social security law. In other words, if our normative criteria for the evalua-
tion of law reform were derived from White ’s concept of fair reciprocity, an 
individual LCA would have been rejected in favor of a savings scheme that 
is financed on a collective basis. Does this mean that justice based evalua-
tions should be preferred over poststructuralist critique?
This chapter defends a poststructuralist approach to critique. For this 
purpose it will, first of all, be shown that evaluations that are based on cri-
teria that are developed within contemporary political philosophy are not 
without problems either (4.1) Next, this section argues that poststructural-
ist critique certainly offers viable alternatives (4.2). Based on these alterna-
tives section 4.3 designs a normative framework that is rooted in post-
structuralism. Finally, drawing on the arguments that were put forward in 
this first part of the book, section 4.4 introduces a poststructuralist explana-
tory framework for policy analysis. 
4.1 Contemporary political philosophy and social law 
evaluations
This section examines to what extent contemporary philosophy can pro-
vide us with criteria for the evaluation of social law reform. Subsection 4.1.1 
considers some problems with justice based evaluations in contemporary 
philosophy. Whereas this subsection argues that justice based evaluations 
run into the problem of moral disagreement, section 4.1.2 examines the pos-
sibilities of Jürgen Habermas’ procedural democratic theory. Section 4.1.3 
raises some internal points of critique with respect to his theory. This sec-
tion concludes that, despite the fact that argumentation in social law litera-
ture would benefit from the insights of contemporary political philosophy, 
neither justice concepts nor democratic theory provide commonly shared 
evaluative criteria.
4 A normative evaluation of social law 
and poststructuralist critique
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4.1.1 Problems of justice based evaluative criteria
Starting in the early twentieth century, when labor law set itself apart from 
civil law, Dutch lawyers have tended to stress the intrinsic relationship 
between social law and justice . According to them, social law consists of 
rules that protect and support economically vulnerable citizens and that 
compensate inequalities (Betten et al. 1997 and Zekic 2011). It has further 
been argued that these social legal norms are just by definition, because 
they reflect the morality of the society at a particular time and place (Klosse 
2003; Van Esveld 1966; Vonk 2008).1 Yet, these norms remain vague as they 
lack further philosophical reflection. Likewise, in recent international labor 
law literature one can hardly find any examples of elaborated theorization 
on the basis of which it would be possible to develop evaluative criteria of 
labor law reform (Busby 2011; Conoghan 1999 and Collins 1997). This sec-
tion therefore considers the extent to which normative arguments that are 
rooted in political philosophy can be useful for a normative evaluation of 
social law reform.
A thorough political philosophical argumentation in social law evalua-
tions was advocated in chapter 2. However, this chapter also reveals some 
problems. For example, John Rawls ’ concept of ‘reciprocity ’ seems to be 
insufficiently elaborated to evaluate social law reform. The same is true for 
the ‘difference principle ’, a central principle in Rawls ’ theory of justice 
according to which inequalities in income should be permitted as long as 
they improve the position of those who are least well off. It is, for instance, 
not clear to what extent the poor must be compensated for increased 
income inequalities caused by the introduction of the LCA . Indeed, apart 
from a few exceptions such as the work of Stuart White , most political phi-
losophers can be characterized by a ‘terrible lack of concreteness’ (Unger 
1986, 1987, cited by Bader and Engelen 2001: 12).2
Justice based criteria that are derived from political philosophy are 
problematic for other reasons as well. This can be illustrated by a fictional 
debate between two philosophers. The first philosopher adheres to a liberal 
oriented philosophy and we will call her ‘the liberal’. We call the other phi-
losopher ‘the socialist’, because she sticks to a socialist oriented philosophy. 
In their debate both philosophers firmly justify the institutions of the wel-
fare state by some kind of comprehensive philosophy. However, whereas 
the liberal stresses the virtues of individual freedom and encourages wel-
fare arrangements that prevent citizens to fall below a certain threshold, the 
1 In this regard, Dutch social lawyers seem to endorse a Hegelian view on the relation-
ship between justice and the law.
2 In the last few decades a number of philosophers and political scientists have sought to 
bridge the gap between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ or the ‘can’ and the ‘should’. See for 
example Goodin (2005), Legrand (1997), Marshall (1975), Mau (2004), Rothstein (1998), 
Taylor-Gooby (2004) and Titmus (1974).
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socialist argues for social security arrangements that promote equality and 
a sense of community (Miller 2003). This conversation illustrates how dif-
ferent substantive understandings of justice may obstruct the establish-
ment of commonly shared evaluative criteria for law reform. In other 
words, the aforementioned preference for a collective LCA will not neces-
sarily convince those who do not endorse White ’s philosophical points of 
departure.
In order to overcome the problem of moral disagreement, some politi-
cal philosophers have turned to ‘deliberative democratic theory ’.3 As Gutt-
mann and Thompson have argued, one way to live with moral disagree-
ment is democracy ‘that as far as possible respects the moral status of each 
of us’ (1996: 26).4 In fact, Rawls also turns to the merits of liberal democracy 
to overcome the problem of plurality concepts of the good. In his famous 
essay ‘Justice as fairness, political not metaphysical’ (1985), he argues that 
the original position in ' A Theory of Justice' is preconditioned upon a Kan-
tian concept of personhood , which is particularly enhanced by liberal dem-
ocratic society. Therefore, his concept of justice needs to be understood as a 
political concept. For Rawls , then, ‘political justice’ refers to the basic politi-
cal structure and is derived from fundamental ideas in the public culture of 
liberal democratic society, which affirms that people have a capacity for 
their own normative self-determination. Rawls further develops his ‘con-
stitutional democratic theory’ in ‘Political Liberalism’ (1993). He now holds 
that ‘justice as fairness’ must be conceived as just one liberal concept within 
a family of liberal justice concepts that all address a list of basic rights, liber-
ties and opportunities. What these liberal concepts of justice have in com-
mon is the fact that they ensure that citizens can make effective use of their 
basic freedoms as they engage in public reasoning on the common good. 
This means that they base their arguments ‘on principles, values and meth-
ods of reasoning and assessing evidence that are shared by the reasonable 
doctrines affirmed by reasonable citizens in a democratic society’(Freeman 
2000: 402). Thus, Rawls seeks to approximate justice in the face of moral 
pluralism.
Whereas Rawls draws on constitutional democratic theory that puts the 
emphasis on legitimate democratic institutions, other democratic theorists 
3 The problem of moral disagreement has also been recognized in international labor law 
literature. For example, Hepple has argued that ‘[t]he great ideals of social justice , 
equality and human rights to which all democrats subscribe, are powerful symbols 
against public and private poverty. But the labor legislation of the future, like that of the 
past, will be the outcome of processes of confl ict between different social groups and 
competing ideologies’ (1995: 304-305).
4 A few Dutch social lawyers have also endorsed this more procedural way of thinking 
with respect to social security law. They have increasingly recognized that citizens need 
to have a say in justice issues (Asscher Vonk 2009 and Noordam and Van der Heijden 
2001).
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have developed a procedural democratic theory to address the problem of 
moral disagreement that stresses the idea of citizen participation (Bohman 
and Rehg 1997; Elster 1998; Macedo 1999). Since the most well known of 
them is Jürgen Habermas , the next subsection addresses to what extent his 
democratic theory is able to provide adequate evaluative criteria for the 
evaluation of social law reform.
4.1.2 Jürgen Habermas: deliberative democratic theory
For Habermas , claims about the truth can only acquire universal validity 
through communication. Hence, the answer to a practical question such as 
‘What ought to be the content of a just system of social security?’ cannot 
simply be formulated by the philosopher. Instead, ‘it forces itself intuitively 
on anyone who is at all open to his reflective form of communicative action’ 
(1993: 1). The discourse principle attains a central position in Habermas’ 
theory of communication. According to the discourse principle, ‘just those 
action norms are valid to which all possible affected persons could agree as 
participants in rational discourses ’(1996:107). Habermas’ argument, which 
is based on the discourse principle, consists of two steps. In the first place 
he distinguishes two characteristics of human communication: consensus 
seeking and freedom from domination. These characteristics must be 
thought to be implicit in communicative reason, because otherwise the par-
ticipants would never have started a discussion in the first place. In a sec-
ond step he argues that if the conditions of the ‘ideal situation’ are fulfilled, 
language claims concerning the truth and normative rightness can acquire 
universal value. Among the conditions of an ‘ideal situation’ is the partici-
pation in the discussion on the basis of ‘freedom of access, equal rights to 
participate, truthfulness on the part of participants, absence of coercion in 
adopting positions and so on. If the participants genuinely want to con-
vince one another, they must make the pragmatic assumption that they 
allow their ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses to be influenced solely by the force of 
the better argument’(1993: 31).5 Communicative rationality should thus be 
distinguished from strategic rationality that is ruled by a rational choice 
model and can be found in bargaining and negotiations.
Habermas distinguishes three different discourses in which, for exam-
ple, questions such as how to assess social law can be answered. First of all, in 
the pragmatic discourse it is considered how a particular goal – for instance, 
no citizens should fall below a certain threshold – can be achieved by par-
ticular means, social insurance for example. The validity of those means 
derives from empirical knowledge. Instead, in an ethical discourse reason-
ing takes place within the horizon of a particular community. An ethical
5 Habermas also mentions the requirement of generality and transparence of the argu-
ments, goals and intentions.
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assessment of particular questions considers the common history and 
the common background of traditions in which a collective identity has 
been shaped. Participants engage in a rational discussion only within the 
‘unproblematic horizon of a concrete historical form of life’ (1993: 108). The 
ethical discourse thus assesses an Aristotelian concept of the good life. In 
our example this discourse could answer the questions ‘what ought to be 
the minimum standard of living in our country?’ and ‘on what conditions 
can citizens claim this minimum standard?’. Finally, the moral discourse 
is directed at the Kantian free will . The free will cannot be determined by 
life histories or personal identities, but is guided only by rational autono-
mous moral insights. As Habermas argues, ‘moral judgments must meet 
with agreement from the perspective of all those possibly affected and not, 
as with ethical questions, merely from the perspective of some individual’s 
or group’s self-understanding or worldview’ (1993: 151). Hence, only the 
outcome of the moral discourse can attain universal validity, such as a uni-
versally accepted minimum standard of living.
Habermas aims to translate this communicative rationality into law, which 
according to him results in legitimate law. This translation is, however, ham-
pered because of the tensions between ‘facts’ and ‘values ’. These involve, 
first of all, the tension between the law as a set of rules backed by coercive 
power on the one hand and the necessity of legitimate law on the other. 
Habermas argues that this tension originates in the discursive complexity of 
political decision making. He solves this tension by his explanation of the co-
originality of private and public autonomy. His argument goes as follows. 
Firstly, he maintains that rights should be viewed as conditions of legitimate 
lawmaking. Thus, basic rights have no existence of their own, they do not 
exist independently from the collaborative lawmaking process. Habermas 
proceeds by arguing that the concepts of private and public autonomy cor-
respond with the concepts of human rights and popular sovereignty and 
that these concepts are interconnected in different ways. For example, the 
idea of public sovereignty only makes sense if people see each other as indi-
viduals equipped with the right to decide their own destiny. These rights, 
however, only exist to the extent that agents attribute them to each other. 
In other words, citizens have to agree on the fact that these rights exist.6
6 Aboufl ia reconstructs Habermas ’ argument in the following way: ‘[f]or Habermas , rights 
are necessary for a discursively achieved political will-formation. The alternative would 
be to have the “will” of political actors shaped from above or by tradition. For Habermas 
rights, democracy, legitimacy and discourse are intimately linked. Without rights protect-
ing private “space”, democracy would be unrealizable because citizens could not form 
themselves as autonomous agents; and without democracy, law would not have the 
proper grounds for legitimacy; and without law that is legitimate rights would not be 
properly protected. And, of course, without public rights, discussion would not take 
place in a fashion that sustains democracy and legitimates the law’ (1999: 948).
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Habermas concludes that private and public autonomy reciprocally presup-
pose one another in such a way that neither one may claim primacy over the 
other.
Private and public autonomy are connected in Habermas ’ democratic 
principle. As Habermas argues, the discourse principle finds its way to the 
democratic principle when citizens institutionalize their communication – i.e. 
the pragmatic, ethical and moral discourses – in the lawmaking process.7 
Finally, participants decide in a legal discourse if the new norms fit in with 
the existing legal system. Habermas concludes that the law as a set of rules 
backed by coercive power can only be legitimately generated by communi-
cative power, in which the discourse principle acquires the legal shape of a 
democratic principle.
A second cause of tension between facts and norms involves the prob-
lem of complexity in modern society . The social differentiation and a plu-
rality of the concept of the good raise questions with respect to the legiti-
macy of law. After all, how can the democratic principle be effective in 
modern society without face to face interaction? According to Habermas, 
this problem may be solved by a ‘two track’ model of deliberative democ-
racy . In this model, political communication circulates from the bottom up 
and the top down throughout a multilevel system, from everyday talk in 
civil society through public discourse and mediated communication in the 
weak public sphere to the institutionalized discourses at the center of the 
political system. The public sphere is thus divided into two parts:
a. The center of the political system consists of the familiar institutions: 
parliaments, courts, administrative agencies, and government. Each 
branch can be described as a specialized deliberative arena. The corre-
sponding output (legislative decisions and political programs, rulings 
or verdicts, administrative measures and decrees, guidelines, and poli-
cies) results from different types of institutionalized deliberation and 
negotiation processes.
b. At the periphery of the political system the public sphere is rooted in 
networks for wild flows of messages (news, reports commentaries, 
talks, scenes and images; and shows and movies with an informative 
polemical, educational or entertaining content). These published opin-
ions are selected and shaped by mass media.
The deliberative model expects the political public sphere to ensure the for-
mation of a plurality of considered public opinions. Actors of civil society 
(journalists, politicians, advocates, experts and intellectuals) articulate 
7 Nonetheless, negotiation will be necessary to achieve compromises in situations where 
these discourses do not result in consensus. The procedural rules that have to be fol-
lowed in the negotiation process should be decided upon in moral discourses . Negotia-
tion is thus intrinsically connected with morality.
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political interests and confront the state with demands arising from the life 
worlds of various groups. With the legal backing of voting rights, such 
demands can be strengthened by threatening to withdraw legitimation. 
Votes are further shaped by the voices rising from both everyday talk and 
mediated communications (1996: 373-374 and 2006: 415-416). In short, Hab-
ermas ’ model of deliberative democracy can be defined as a ‘two track’ 
model consisting of a weak public sphere at the periphery and a strong 
public sphere within the formal institutions of government. The formal 
vote and the actual opinion and will formation of individual voters connect 
the weak public sphere with the strong public sphere. Thus, ‘not influence 
per se, but influence transformed into communicative power legitimates 
political decisions’(1996: 372).
4.1.3 The pros and cons of Habermas ’ theory for normative evaluations
Habermas introduces the democratic principle to explain the relationship 
between law and democracy. In doing this, he shows that law should not be 
confused with morality. Whereas ‘moral judgments must meet with agree-
ment from the perspective of all those possibly affected’, the democratic 
principle also involves ‘some individual’s or group’s self-understanding or 
worldview’(1993: 151). Indeed, to Habermas the moral discourse finds its 
way into law through the democratic principle. In this regard Habermas 
designs clear criteria for law reform, which basically express the view that 
only citizens themselves can be the authors of their own theory of law.8
Like Rawls , Habermas thus separates his concept of justice from the 
legitimacy of law. To him, the concrete content of justice depends on the 
outcome of a universal discourse that fulfills the conditions of a communica-
tive action. However, whereas universal consensus can only be achieved at 
a very high level of abstraction, the outcome of a Habermasian moral dis-
course cannot provide us with concrete criteria to evaluate piecemeal law 
reforms. In this respect, Habermas’ justice concept and Rawls’ justice based 
concepts face similar problems,
8 This view is not necessarily shared in legal studies. For example, Teubner (1998) argues 
in favor of a ‘refl exive law’ that, like Habermas’ democratic principle, takes the public 
into account. However, in contrast to Habermas, Teubner believes that the content of 
the law is ultimately determined based on juridical values and rules, i.e. he insists on a 
legal discourse as a kind of super discourse. In his reply to Teubner, Habermas notes: ‘if 
it is as Teubner contends, the judiciary could operate with a free hand inside a frame-
work of values, and if it had to reduce principles and policies, norms and values, to a 
common denominator and “balance” or “weigh” these against one another, then, legal 
discourses would assume the role of paternalistic proxy discourses for a political-ethi-
cal self-understanding taken over from the citizens’ (Habermas, 1998: 436). Habermas 
thus emphasizes that legitimate law involves that citizens are the authors of their own 
law.
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On the other hand, however, Habermas ’ democratic principle gener-
ates fairly concrete criteria to evaluate the legitimacy of the law, compared 
to those that we can derive from Rawls ’ concept of political justice. Indeed, 
based on Rawls’ political justice, decisions are considered legitimate if they 
emanate some form of liberal democratic political structure. Instead, Hab-
ermas has rooted his deliberative theory in moral theory, which prescribes 
that all (moral, ethical, pragmatic, and legal) discourses must fulfill condi-
tions of the ‘ideal situation’.9 Thus, law is only considered legitimate law if 
the conditions of the ideal speech situation are fulfilled during the lawmak-
ing process.
As a matter of fact, in the last few years a number of political scientists 
have sought to operationalize the conditions of the ideal speech situation. 
This kind of research has, first of all, focused upon the extent of the distor-
tion of the communicative discourse during the lawmaking process.10 In 
addition, some researchers have analyzed the degree of deliberation in the 
broader public sphere.11 However, despite the evaluative potential of Hab-
ermas’ approach to deliberative democratic theory , a number of delibera-
tive democratic theorists have contested his theory. They have argued, for 
instance, that Habermas’ deliberative democratic theory confuses the ideal 
model with reality, because his ideal model does not adequately address 
power relations that are characteristic of the real world.12 Above all, the 
9 For the legal discourse this is of course only true in an indirect way.
10 Steiner et al. (2004) developed the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) based on Habermas ’ 
discourse ethics. The unit of analysis is a speech, or ‘the public discourse by a particular 
individual delivered at a particular point in a debate’. The following elements are part 
of the DQI:<xsup>participation, level of justification, content of justifications and 
respect.
11 To my knowledge, research that has been conducted in the broader public sphere pri-
marily involves research on experimental debate groups in accordance with Habermas’ 
conditions of free speech that is also known as ‘deliberative polling ’ (Fishkin and 
Luskin 2005). In addition, some research has been conducted on internet forums (Jansen 
and Kies 2005). However, regarding this research it must be noted that it lacks a deci-
sion making moment, which is included in Habermas’ discourse model. In addition, in 
the UK one could observe some experiments on deliberative forums on the internet. 
These internet experiments, however, were not successful as the internet forum was 
used as an outlet for ill informed complaints. Because of the poor results produced by a 
broad open forum, a small-scale e-consultation was started. Still, this experiment did 
not bring about the desired dialogues between the participants. Moreover, the responsi-
ble offi cials and politicians hardly responded to the posted messages. As a result, the 
forum had virtually no impact on the process of political decision making (Coleman 
2002).
12 Bader (1994: 130-138), for example, argues that Habermas departs from the fi ction of a 
society without a state. Likewise, Apel holds that the existence of a state is a precondi-
tion for deliberative democracy: ‘[i]t is precisely the realization of the necessity of the 
power monopoly of the constitutional state which also shows that it is not possible to 
ground the law immediately by recourse to the primordial discourse principle’ (2002: 
23).
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democratic principle neglects the fact that strategic action and struggles are 
inherent to the political process.13 The remainder of this section considers 
the critique of three deliberative (or communicative) democratic theorists: 
Sheyla Benhabib, Iris Young and John Dryzek.
Benhabib has criticized Habermas ’ reliance on the Kantian concept of 
the autonomous, rational subject . She contends that Habermas does not 
pay enough attention to the standpoint of ‘the concrete other’, which she 
interprets as an individual identity exercising its autonomy within the 
unique social, historical and cultural circumstances into which it has been 
socialized. Benhabib argues that participants in the debate should embrace 
an ‘enlarged mentality’ (Arendt 1961: 220-221 cited by Benhabib 2002: 142). 
In addition, Young has proposed to extend rational deliberation with other 
forms of communication. Unlike Benhabib, however, Young rejects the par-
adigm of moral reasoning that is rooted in the ideal of impartiality. Accord-
ing to her, these rational procedural norms ultimately result in exclusion, 
because they abstract from private circumstances where desires, embodi-
ment and affect are foregrounded (1990: chapter 4). For Young, then, com-
municative democracy should also involve other modes of communica-
tion, such as different ways of expressing emotion , greeting, rhetoric , and 
storytelling (1996). Dryzek also acknowledges the impact of power rela-
tions on the communicative process. To him, voting is not the result of ‘dis-
persed subjectless communication’ that generates the public opinion. The 
public sphere must instead be viewed as ‘home to constellations of possi-
bly conflicting discourses ’. Like Young he holds that communication is not 
only determined by the force of the better argument, but also involves oth-
er ways of communication. Nonetheless, rational argumentation remains 
central in Dryzek’s approach to deliberative democracy, because in his 
opinion citizens can and should make ‘reflective choices’ between these 
discourses (2000: 75, 163-164 and 2001: 658-659).
In conclusion, despite the fact that argumentation in social law litera-
ture would benefit from justice based argumentations, contemporary polit-
ical philosophy, does not provide commonly shared justice based evalua-
tive criteria. To account for ‘the fact of moral pluralism’ both Habermas and 
Rawls have turned to democratic theory . However, whereas both Rawls ’ 
constitutive democratic theory and Habermas ’ procedural democratic the-
ory are based on a specific (Kantian) rational concept of personhood , their 
theories inevitably result in the exclusion of certain (categories of) citizens. 
13 Cohen has, for example, argued that ‘[e]xcept for the exceptional conditions in which 
associations break free from the institutionalized circuit of power , the system rules’ 
(1999: 410). Shapiro criticizes Habermas’ model in a similar way. His critique is aptly 
summarized by the title of an article published in 1999: ‘Enough of deliberation. Politics 
is about interest and power’. Bächtiger et al. have shown empirically that ‘power 
trumps discourse’ with regard to substantive outcomes (2005: 40).
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Some alternative democratic models do seem to include the role of power 
relations though. These models extend communicative practices to other 
non-rational forms such as ‘rhetoric ’, ‘affect ’ and ‘passion ’. These issues, 
which have been dealt with more thoroughly in poststructuralist theory, 
will be further examined in the next section.
4.2 Normativity and ethics in poststructuralist theory
Poststructuralist theory has often been criticized for its normative deficit. It 
has been claimed that poststructuralist theory, like postmodernism, limits 
itself to critique without offering viable positive alternatives. This section 
argues that poststructuralists do formulate a positive ethos that can be 
helpful for the evaluation of law reform. This positive ethos overcomes the 
failure of Rawlsian and Habermasian approaches to adequately address 
the impact of power relations on social practices. In addition, in contrast to 
these approaches, poststructuralists also consider the relationship between 
the ‘political’ and non-rational communicative practices such as ‘rhetoric ’, 
‘affect ’ and ‘passion ’ and the consequences of this relationship for the 
development of a positive ethos.
Subsections 4.2.1 to 4.2.3 examine different poststructuralist alterna-
tives to contemporary political philosophical accounts of normativity. 
These alternatives vary from striving for ethical freedom practices 
(Foucault 4.2.1) to the articulation of radical democracy (Laclau and Mouffe 
4.2.2) and the formulation of a democratic ethos of engagement (Connolly 
and Norval 4.2.3). Section 4.2.4 compares the examined poststructuralist 
approaches with the normative and ethical critique as formulated in Gly-
nos and Howarth’s 'Logics of critical explanation'(2007).
4.2.1 Michel Foucault: the ethical subject
Like the work of other poststructuralist thinkers Foucault ’s work has often 
been perceived as a critique on modernity without offering a positive alter-
native. This section examines the extent to which Foucault ’s critique com-
prises positive elements.
Foucault ’s comments on Kant’s essay ‘What is enlightenment’ provide 
a first introduction to a Foucauldian critique. Foucault states that in this 
essay ‘Kant in fact describes enlightenment as the moment when humanity 
is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any author-
ity’ (1997b: 104). He further holds that this ‘attitude of modernity’ entails 
‘a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by 
certain people (…) what the Greek called ethos’ (1997b: 105). To Foucault , 
then, enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements but ‘the per-
manent reactivation of an attitude that is of a philosophical ethos that could 
be described as a permanent critique of our historical era’ (1997b: 109). 
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By reformulating Kant’s enlightenment as an ethos, Foucault discards what 
he calls the ‘blackmail of Enlightenment’, or the view that one can only be 
inside or outside the realm of rationality. Instead, he proposes a historical 
approach that is oriented to ‘the ‘contemporary limits of the necessary’, that 
is towards what is not or no longer indispensable for the constitution of 
ourselves as autonomous subjects’ (1997b: 109). This ‘limit attitude’ dis-
tinguishes Foucault from Kant, as it poses the critical question of how our 
present regimes of truth came into being, thereby opening up the possibility 
of new truths (1984a: 81). Thus Foucault ’s ‘ethos’ implies, first of all, a criti-
cal attitude towards our present truth regimes.
Foucault ’s critical historical work is mostly informed by the establish-
ment of the relationship between the subject and the games of truth or, in 
other words, the way in which human beings were made into subjects. He 
makes a distinction between two meanings of the word subject: ‘subject 
to someone else by control’ and ‘tied to his own identity by a conscience 
or self-knowledge’ (2000c: 331). With the first meaning Foucault refers to 
‘the objectivizing of the subject’ in what he calls ‘dividing practices’ (2000c: 
326). In these practices individuals are made into subjects by processes of 
power and knowledge, such as disciplinary practices. According to the 
second meaning, individuals transform themselves into subjects through 
technologies of the self. For Foucault , both meanings of the word ‘subject’ 
suggest a form of power that ‘subjugates and makes subject to’ (2000c: 331). 
Nevertheless, as will be explained later in this section, the second mean-
ing of the word subject might also form a starting point for a new positive 
ethos.
In order to understand the double implication of the practice where 
individuals turn themselves into subjects through technologies of the self, 
we should have a look at Foucault ’s concept of government that is central in 
his later work. Whereas in his early and middle work Foucault contends 
that the government of subjects entails coercive forms of dominations, in 
his late work he holds that the government of the subject instead concerns 
complex rational techniques of control:
‘I insisted (…) too much on the techniques of domination. What we can call discipline is 
something really important (…), but is only one aspect of the art of governing people in 
our society. We should not understand the exercise of power as pure violence or strict 
coercion. Power consists in complex relations: these relations involve a set of rational 
techniques’ (1997c: 154-155).
According to Foucault , power is not confined to violence and coercion; 
power is everywhere. It is not possible to imagine societies without ‘strate-
gies by which individuals try to direct the conduct and control the conduct of 
others’ [italics added by the author] (1997a: 298). These characteristics of 
power are captured in the concept of government, which entails:
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1. That power relations must not only be understood in terms of violence 
and struggle, but as ‘the way in which the conduct of individuals or of 
groups might be directed – the government of children, of souls of com-
munities, of families, of the sick’ (2000c: 341).14
2. That next to sovereignty and discipline a novel form of power can be 
depicted, namely ‘governmentality ’, which Foucault describes as ‘the 
ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this specific, albeit 
very complex, power that has the populations as its target, political 
economy as its major form of knowledge, and the apparatuses of secu-
rity as its essential technical instrument’ (2007: 108).
3. That power also involves the contactpoint where the ‘techniques of the 
self are integrated into structures of coercion and domination’ (1997c: 
154).
4. That the existence of power relations presupposes an autonomous indi-
vidual, otherwise the government of conduct is not possible. Hence, 
relations of power can always be reversed through acts of resistance 
(2000b: 324).
With (1) Foucault makes the aforementioned point that power relations not 
only involve violent behavior, but also concern the non-violent ‘govern-
ment of the conduct’. He argues that under new forms of liberal govern-
ment the conduct of individuals is not only governed by the ‘old’ forms of 
power, sovereignty and the disciplines, but also by the production of 
knowledge, rationalities, strategies and techniques (2). In his lectures on 
‘Biopolitics’(2008), for example, Foucault depicts the liberal autonomous 
self-responsible citizen as a configuration of neoliberal constellations of 
power and knowledge.15 Therefore, the government of the subject must be 
understood as the contactpoint where the ‘techniques of the self are inte-
grated into structures of coercion and domination’(3).16
The final remark, concerning the presupposition of an autonomous 
individual (4), is perhaps the most interesting one. According to Foucault , 
the existence of the free individual is a precondition for the formation of the 
subject. In other words, political rationalities and technologies are only able 
14 Also see Foucault (2007: 122).
15 In addition, see part four of the book.
16 Agamben argues, however, that it remains unclear in the work of Foucault where these 
‘two faces of power converge’. According to him, ‘the two analyses of power cannot be 
separated (..) the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original -if 
concealed - nucleus of sovereign power’ (1995: 5-6). In addition, contrary to Foucault, 
Agamben asserts that it is not so much the government of men in all of its aspects that 
characterizes modern politics, but that ‘the realm of bare life – which is originally situ-
ated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the politi-
cal real, and (…) enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction’ (1995: 9).
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to steer the conduct of individuals if individuals are free. Hence, it is not 
possible to govern the conduct of enslaved people. This presupposition 
also implies that relations of power can be reversed through acts of resist-
ance. In fact, the concept of ‘government’ or ‘governmentality ’ reveals the 
potential of a positive ethos into Foucault ’s body of thought because it both 
seems to accept the possibility of the existence of techniques of the self, 
which are not integrated into structures of coercion and domination, and 
presupposes the possibility of a reversal of power relations. As Foucault 
himself notices: ‘I believe that the concept of governmentality makes it pos-
sible to bring out the freedom of the subject and its relationship to others – 
which constitutes the very stuff [matière] of ethics’ (1997a: 300).
In several instances Foucault ’s work suggests an engagement with a 
positive ethos. For example, he claims that technologies of the self that turn 
individuals into subjects due to constellations of power and knowledge can 
(partly) be overcome if the subject masters itself or develops its own capa-
bilities with a minimum of power relations (1997a: 298, 1997b: 115-116, 
1997c: 152). In his opinion, the main issue is how ‘the growth of individual 
capabilities [can] be disconnected from the intensifications of power 
relations’(1997b: 116). In this regard, we should ask ourselves whether or 
not our current freedom practices restrict the way in which we are able to 
think, act and speak. Foucault acknowledges that this critical, political atti-
tude will not necessarily detach power from all truths (because truth will 
always be interrelated with power). He therefore argues that a critical atti-
tude may enable the subject to detach power of the truths from the social, 
economic hegemony in which it operates (2000a: 132-133). In order to 
achieve this, we have to liberate ourselves ‘both from the state and from the 
type of individualization linked to the state’, says Foucault . For instance, a 
critical attitude towards liberal government involves an experiment to go 
beyond existing truth systems, showing that other subject positions (rather 
than self-interested subjects) are possible that lay outside the dominant 
(neo)liberal discourses (Foucault 2000c: 336; Hamman 2009: 58).17 Hence, 
despite the fact that Foucault has often been accused of only providing neg-
ative critique, this part of his work in which he calls for a minimum of pow-
er relations instead suggests a normative stance (Fraser 1981; Bernstein 
1991).
In the final years before his death, Foucault ’s engagement with a posi-
tive ethos became more outspoken (1997a). In this period Foucault is inter-
ested in particular in the ‘care of the self’, an ancient Greek technology of 
the self. Whereas for the ancient Greeks the care of the self also entailed the 
care for others, the care of the self was perceived as an ethical concept. The 
care of the self could be described as the practice of a certain autonomous 
17 For a critical stance towards the neoliberal lifelong learning discourse, which is also 
present in the Dutch discourse on a ‘life course based society’, see Biesta (2008).
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attitude in which the individual works on herself. The techniques involved, 
amongst others, daily practical exercises aimed at self-control and offered 
the people the freedom to create themselves as ethical subjects. Important-
ly, to Foucault the care of the self inevitably implies the care for others or 
should ‘be beneficial to others’ (1997a: 289). Thus, by playing the game dif-
ferently, Foucault seeks to resist given forms of subjectivity that are gov-
erned by existing truth systems.
Foucault further seems to suggest that rights and the law can play a 
constituent role in the ethical self-formation of people. In one interview he 
contended, for example, that the development of human rights can be use-
ful in liberation processes, because ‘[t]hey are the limits that one places on 
all possible governments’ (2000f: 471). He warns us, however, ‘against 
reintroducing a hegemonic thought on the pretext of presenting a human 
rights theory or policy’(2000f: 472). To prevent this from happening, limita-
tions of power must always involve ‘unrestricted rights’ (2000e: 453 italics 
added by the author). Thus, rights remain open to future inventions. 
Regarding social rights, he further argues that ‘an optimal social coverage 
joined to a maximum of independence is necessary if one wants to give 
people security as well as autonomy’ (2000d: 370). Yet, innovations in social 
law should have ‘the effect of a kind of ethical consensus, so that the indi-
vidual can recognize himself in the decisions made and in the values 
behind the decisions’ (2000d: 378). Hence, for Foucault , law reforms should 
not come from those who exercise authority, but from those who seek to 
resist this exercise of authority (2000d: 371).
These last remarks beg the question of how Foucault ’s ethical critique 
can be connected to Habermas ’ deliberative democratic theory . Whereas 
Foucault distances himself from Habermas ’ deliberative democratic theory 
to a great extent, because this theory ignores the existence of power rela-
tions, he does not entirely reject the idea of deliberative democracy. He 
holds that deliberative democratic practices are acceptable if these ‘games 
of power’ are played with ‘as little domination as possible’(1997a: 299). 
This means, amongst others, that ‘one must not be for consensuality, but 
one must be against non-consensuality’ (1984b: 379). His work suggests, 
above all, that the public sphere should be opened up to struggle and con-
flicts that combat relations of dominance (Flyvjberg 2001).18
Thus Foucault ’s works does provide some incitements towards a 
positively formulated ethos. In this respect I also want to mention three 
interpretations of Foucault ’s late work that point at some further, perhaps 
even ‘universalistic’ ethical implications. First of all, Gordon has summa-
18 Flyvjberg clearly illuminates the differences between Habermas and Foucault . Whereas 
Habermas wants to introduce more democratic institutions based on his (universalistic) 
discourse ethics, Foucault seeks to fi nd out how actual constitutions and institutions 
can be employed in a more democratic way, with a minimum of domination (2001: 
98-109).
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rized Foucault ’s ethical stance in the following way: ‘[our objective should 
be] to seek for possibilities of (self)government within the public sphere, 
which struggles to be governed less or to govern oneself in the way one 
wishes’(Donzelot and Gordon, 2008: 57). Hence, according to Gordon, 
Foucault ’s ethics involve an attitude directed at self government outside 
or resisting existing constellations of power and knowledge. The second 
interpretation originates from Vintgens, who takes Gordon’s interpreta-
tion one step further as she contends that Foucault ’s late work provides 
an argument for access to practices of freedom for everyone. According to 
her, Foucault ’s ethos implies an active engagement with politics, which is 
expressed in the concept of active citizenship (2003 and 2004).
With respect to Foucault ’s concept of the law, Golder and Fitzpatrick’s 
work (2009) provides a third (universal) ethically informed interpretation 
of Foucault’s late work. According to them, Foucault considers the law in a 
twofold way. On the one hand, the law is a determinate law, a law with a 
definite content, a law to be resisted. On the other hand, the law is like 
power , in the sense that it can never be total; it is continuously reformed by 
resistance. As Golder and Fitzpatrick argue, ‘like power, Foucault ’s law 
cannot be [given], but must constantly remain in negotiation with powers 
which (…) “beleaguer it” from outside’ (2009: 78).19 They illustrate this 
double meaning of the law with the example of social law. On the one hand, 
social law is a law with a definite content that is backed by power, such as 
administrative sanctions. On the other hand, social law tends to be colo-
nized by normalizing power that governs the conduct of the subjects, with-
out being able to capture social law entirely, though. In other words, there 
always remains an openness to resist the normalizing power of social law. 
This impossibility of social law to be captured by power has wider ethical 
implications, according to Golder and Fitzpatrick. Then, based on 
Foucault’s late work the view can be defended that instead of being an 
expression of a closed (normalizing) sociality (Ewald 1986) social law 
should enable a de-individualized ethics that is open to alteration. They 
further argue that Foucault’s late engagement with rights reflect his late 
engagement with ethical self-formation. Then ‘these rights do not corre-
spond to a determinate subject identity but rather reflect the unfinished 
subject of Foucaultian ethics’. Therefore, rights must be open to alterity, 
meaning that they are able to respond to ‘future emanations of the human’ 
(Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009: 123). Golder and Fitzpatrick conclude that for 
19 With this analysis they seek to respond to the expulsion thesis, which states that 
Foucault ’s law is ultimately occupied by other forms of power such as discipline and 
governmentality .
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Foucault the law and rights must be responsive to future developments.20 
Thus, the law can be a locus for the development of a positive ethos, which 
is not necessarily developed against the law, but can also flourish with the 
law.
In some scarce instances Foucault himself also refers to some wider 
ethical political implications of his body of thought. For example, with 
respect to the situation in Poland in the beginning of the 1980s, Foucault 
argues that
‘for ethical reasons, we have to raise the problem of Poland in the form of a nonaccep-
tance of what is happening there, and a nonacceptance of the passivity of our own gov-
ernments. I think this attitude is an ethical one, but it is also political; it does not consist in 
saying merely, “I protest”, but in making of that attitude a political phenomenon that is 
as substantial as possible, and one which those who govern, here or there, will sooner or 
later be obliged to take into account’ (1984b: 377).
This quote, which in fact argues in favor of an active engagement with free-
dom practices, seems to confirm the examined interpretations of Foucault’s 
late work. In the next subsections it will be shown that Foucault’s ethical 
work also finds resonance in poststructuralist approaches to democratic 
theory .
4.2.2 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe: radical democracy
The next subsections consider the implications of some poststructuralist 
approaches to democracy for a normative/ethical evaluation of law reform. 
This subsection starts with the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe .
In 1985 Laclau and Mouffe published their groundbreaking work 
‘Hegemony and Socialist Strategy’ (HSS). In short, in this work they argue 
that the start of democratic politics was conditioned upon the emergence of 
antagonistic forces that break through formerly oppressive relations. Due 
to the availability of signifiers such as liberty and equality , free to be invest-
ed with new meaning, former relations of subordination could now be per-
ceived as relations of oppression and accordingly become sites of antago-
nism (1985: 152-156). What are the implications of HSS for a normative/
ethical evaluation of law reform? Mouffe ’s more recent work ‘Democratic 
Paradox’ (2000), in which she reflects on her work with Laclau , provides 
some helpful explanations in this respect. The following quotes from this 
book illuminate some major issues in HSS:
20 This notion of responsive law must, however, not be confused with the pragmatic view 
on the responsiveness of law (Nonet and Selznick 2001), because ‘this position reduces 
law to an instrument of public policy, whereas (..) “responsiveness” is intended to con-
vey both law’s instrumental reduction and yet its inability to be ultimately captured in 
this way’ (2009: 94).
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1. ‘any social objectivity is ultimately political and has to show the traces 
of the acts of exclusion which govern its constitution’ (2000: 21);
2. the project of radical and plural democracy is to ‘acknowledge the ex-
istence of relations of power and the need to transform them, while re-
nouncing the illusion that we could free ourselves completely from 
power’ (2000: 22);
3. ‘modern democracy’s specificity lies in the recognition and legitima-
tion of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritar-
ian order’ (2000: 103).
The first quote refers to the poststructuralist distinction between the political 
and politics. Whereas politics refer to the traditional concept of political 
actions such as elections, democratic processes, bureaucracy, etc., the politi-
cal refers to the moment that (new) hegemonic forces institute society.21 As 
Mouffe argues:
‘By “the political ”, I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human rela-
tions, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social rela-
tions. “Politics”, on the other side, indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses and 
institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in 
conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimen-
sion of “the political ”’(2000: 101).
Thus ‘the political ’ can be regarded a ‘figure of contingency’; it prevents the 
closure of the social in which we find ‘politics’; it points at the always 
incomplete institution of society (Marchart 2007: 7-8).
Within this context contemporary philosophical concepts of justice and 
democratic legitimacy , such as Rawls ’ and Habermas ’ concepts, acquire a 
novel meaning. As Mouffe argues, dominant ideas on justice and delibera-
tive democracy are necessarily contingent; they confirm existing constella-
tions of power and knowledge in which the force of rational argumentation 
dominates. Therefore, the centrality of rationality in both Habermas ’ and 
Rawls ’ work conceals that ‘the legitimate’ in fact ignores other voices than 
the reasonable voice. Consequently, it remains unnoticed that the frontier 
between what is legitimate and what is not legitimate is ultimately a politi-
cal frontier that must stay contestable in order to gain legitimacy (Mouffe 
2000: 49). The difference between politics and the political thus implies that 
the social world cannot be characterized by ‘rational consensus’ and ‘com-
municative action’, but instead refers to ‘struggle’ and ‘antagonism ’.22 
21 For a defi nition of the notion of ‘hegemony’, see chapter 4.
22 In this respect, consider Foucault ’s comments on Habermas ’ idea of communicative 
theory:
 ‘[t]he idea that there could exist a state of communication that would allow games of 
truth to circulate freely, without any constraints or coercive effects, seems utopian to 
me’ (1997a:298).
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On this view, all Kantian based justice theories must necessarily be reject-
ed.23 As Mouffe argues, Rawls ’ theory of justice can only be understood 
as one interpretation that belongs to a struggle between different justice 
discourses ; the most a justice theory can do is provide us with the language 
to articulate different interpretations of the democratic ideal of liberty and 
equality (1987: 120-121).24
This brings us to the question to what extent Laclau and Mouffe take a 
normative stance in their work. Regarding the second quote that argues in 
favor of ‘the project of radical and plural democracy’, their argument cer-
tainly contains normative elements. In other words, Laclau and Mouffe 
refute the alleged ‘normative deficit’ (Critchley 2004). They even reconcile 
the seemingly insolvable dispute between the liberal and the socialist that 
was depicted in section 3.1.1,25 as they hold that
‘total equivalence never exists; every equivalence is penetrated by a constitutive precari-
ousness, derived from the unevenness of the social. To this extent, the precariousness of 
every equivalence demands that it be complemented/limited by the logic of autonomy. 
It is for this reason that the demand for equality is not sufficient, but needs to be balanced 
by the demand for liberty, which leads us to speak of a radical and plural democracy’ 
(1985: 184).
Laclau and Mouffe ’s argument for radical democracy thus entails both the 
socialist demand for equality and the liberal demand for liberalism and 
pluralism. Moreover, neither of these demands can claim supremacy over 
the other. According to Howarth (2008), the same conclusion can be drawn 
from Laclau ’s later work on populist movements (2005).26 Both the demand 
for equality and the demand for (liberal) pluralism can generate desired 
changes. Still, as Glynos and Howarth note, Laclau and Mouffe ’s norma-
tive stance is in need of further development (2007: 7).
The second part of the second quote refers to the impossibility of free-
ing us from power . Thus their approach to democracy clearly differs from 
23 However, in Mouffe ’s opinion not only Kantian inspired philosophers ignore the politi-
cal moment. The same can be said of post modernist authors, to whom democratic poli-
tics appear to be an ‘“endless conversation” in which one should constantly try to enter 
into dialogical relation with the “Other”’. According to Mouffe , this view lacks a proper 
perspective on the moment of decision that is central to politics (2000:129-130).
24 Also see Foucault ’s remarks on justice: ‘It seems to me that the idea of justice itself is an 
idea which in effect has been invented and put to work in different types of societies as 
an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a weapon against that 
power’ (1974:171, cited by Rabinow 1984:6).
25 This was suggested to me by David Howarth in a conversation that we had in Novem-
ber 2011.
26 According to Howarth , the logics of populism that divides society in two opposed 
camps: ‘‘the people’ against a defi ned enemy such as the government or vested inter-
ests, is not necessarily more radical or progressive than a more institutional form of poli-
tics’ (2008: 182).
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Habermas ’ view. This can be illustrated by a quote from the preface to the 
second edition of HSS:
‘There are however, important point of divergence between our view and [the view of the 
Habermasians] which hinge on the theoretical framework that informs our respective 
concepts. (..). [C]onflict and division, in our view, are neither disturbances that unfortu-
nately cannot be eliminated nor empirical impediments that render impossible the full 
realization of a harmony (..) Indeed we maintain that without conflict and division, a 
pluralist democratic politics would be impossible’ (1985: xviii).
Thus, to Laclau and Mouffe the full realization of a harmony is not only 
impossible, it even threatens the existence of pluralist democratic politics. 
This brings us to the third quote, which expresses the view that democratic 
politics should be open to antagonistic relationships that constitute democ-
racy because otherwise democracies are in danger of falling back into sub-
ordinate relationships. This issue has been of particular concern in Mouffe ’s 
late work. As the remainder of this section demonstrates, on this view 
Mouffe expands her normative and ethical position.
In ‘Democratic paradox’ (2000) and ‘On the political’ (2005) Mouffe 
warns us about the danger of current democracies that put too much 
emphasis on consensus politics. Drawing on the work of Carl Schmitt she 
asserts that modern democracy has been built upon two contrasting tradi-
tions: the liberal tradition that is based on the rule of law and the protection 
of human rights on the one hand, and the idea of popular sovereignty and 
equality on the other. Hence, whereas Habermas seeks to reconcile human 
rights and popular sovereignty, Schmitt holds that there is no requirement 
for these different doctrines to be connected. Moreover, according to him 
liberalism that rests on universality is ultimately incompatible with popu-
lar sovereignty that is based on political frontiers between the ‘insiders’ – 
the person with equal rights – and the ‘outsiders’ – persons without rights. 
Therefore, Schmitt concludes that liberal democracy ultimately leads to 
self-destruction.
Like Schmitt, Mouffe contends that difficulties are bound to arise due 
to the different languages that are spoken in both liberal traditions. Where-
as liberalism is rooted in abstract universalism and rationality, the language 
of popular democracy is the language that responds to concrete practices; 
it is the language of feelings, passion and emotion . She warns us about 
the dangerous consequences of current hegemonic law discourses. With-
out the establishment of democratic institutions to channel antagonistic or 
agonistic voices that express passion and emotion , she fears for ‘an explo-
sion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility’. According 
to Mouffe , it is not only impossible to transcend constructions of ‘we’ and 
‘the other’, it would ultimately result in self-destruction (2000: 104). She 
therefore argues in favor of a multiplication of ‘institutions, discourses, and 
the forms of life that foster identification with democratic values ’(2000: 96).
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This entails, amongst other things, that ‘agonistic confrontations (….) [are] 
staged around the diverse concepts of citizenship which correspond to 
different interpretations of the ethico-political principles’(2000: 103-104). 
Mouffe thus falls back on an ethical concept of democratic citizenship that 
seems somewhat at odds with her earlier work with Laclau . Yet, her work 
has been an important source of inspiration for poststructuralists such as 
Connolly and Norval , whose arguments for the development of a ‘demo-
cratic ethos ’ as alternatives for Kantian based evaluations will be examined 
in the next section.
4.2.3 William E. Connolly and Aletta Norval: a democratic ethos of engagement
Like Mouffe , Connolly and Norval seek to elaborate a democratic ethos 
that is rooted in poststructuralist theory. However, at important points 
their work can also be distinguished from Mouffe ’s work. This section elab-
orates on Connolly and Norval ’s democratic ethos of engagement and the 
way in which their positive ethos is related to (Laclau and) Mouffe ’s work.
Connolly basically endorses Mouffe ’s work on agonistic democracy. 
Yet, he believes that Mouffe fails to design ‘a positive ethos of politics’ 
that does not rest on our present democratic tradition. According to Con-
nolly , Mouffe could draw some more on the ‘Foucauldian faith’ which 
involves a more extensive engagement with a ‘political ethos of agonis-
tic care’ (2008a: 314-315). Above all, Connolly explicitly wants to ‘craft a 
generous ethos of engagement’ in the current political situation of ethical 
pluralism (2004: 173). This ethos of engagement is inspired by the ‘sensi-
bility’ that Connolly finds in the work of Nietzsche and Foucault . Accord-
ing to Connolly , their account of sensibility remains undeveloped because 
‘(post) Nietzschean ideals of nobility, a pathos of distance, agonistic care, 
and passing by never arrive; they are at best always coming to be. One ele-
ment is always incompletely articulated with the other to which it must 
be united’ (1993: 378). To him, the idea of sensibility can be strengthened 
if it is articulated within a democratic imaginary. Combining Foucault ’s 
ethical sensibility with his own concept of a democratic ethos , Connolly ’s 
ethos of engagement entails a:
‘cultivation of care for possibilities of life that challenge claims to an intrinsic moral order; 
democratic disturbances of sedimented identities that conceal violence in their terms of 
closure; practices that enable multifarious styles of life to co-exist on the same territory; a 
plurality of political identifications extending through and beyond the state to break up 
the monopolies of sate-centered politics’ (1993: 381).
In a recent interview Connolly aptly summarized his ethical stance:
‘We need a new liberalism, one that is militant in challenging forces that press for uni-
formity, pre-emptive wars, surveillance and inequality, and one that listens with sensitive 
ears to injuries, pressures, ideas and ideals struggling to attain presence in a crowded 
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world. This would be a liberalism that draws upon a broader range of sources than those 
most familiar in Anglo-America philosophy. It will be exploratory in its practices, and it 
will compensate for the decline in guidance provided by its received concepts of argu-
ment, principle, tolerance, and contract with cultivation of noble, presumptively gener-
ous sensibilities. It will also seek to negotiate a more generous ethos of engagement with-
in territorial states and between regions of the world’ (Connolly 2008b: 326).
This quote shows that, like Mouffe , Connolly seeks to transform relations 
of antagonism into agonistic relations. However, more so than Mouffe , 
Connolly fosters a new ethos. He encourages two virtues in particular: 
‘agonistic respect’ for the enemy and ‘critical responsiveness’. These ethical 
virtues are not reducible to liberal virtues, but ‘involve a tactical work on 
the lower affective registers of being that filter into the higher intellect but 
are unsusceptible to its direct regulation’ (2004: 177). To him, agonistic 
respect affirms ‘an ambiguous relation of interdependence’ instead of a 
‘passive letting the other be’ as liberal tolerance requires (1993: 382). In 
addition, critical responsiveness ‘is a presumptive generosity to new con-
stituencies’ (2004:177). Thus, more so than Mouffe , Connolly seeks to foster 
a new positive democratic ethos that is not necessarily rooted in current 
democratic traditions.
Some aspects of Norval ’s elaboration of a ‘democratic ethos ’ resonate 
with Connolly ’s work on ‘an ethos of engagement’. She holds that Laclau 
and Mouffe have not managed to give enough content to their normative 
dimension in HSS, because they ‘have focused exclusively on activities of 
question, disruption and desedimentation in democratic practice’, while 
ignoring the institution of democratic arrangements (2007: 55). Instead of 
formulating negative critique, Norval argues in support of a positive 
account of what democratic subjectivity is about.
An important difference between HSS and the work of Norval concerns 
the perspective on the construction of the community. Whereas to Laclau 
and Mouffe a community is constructed ‘in our exclusion of, or opposition 
to, the other’, instead Norval argues that the community is ‘disclosed in the 
act of making and staking claims’ (2007: 174). This means that the emergence 
of a community not only entails the construction of relations of equivalence 
that are, for example, established between different (oppressed) groups that 
oppose the government, but also the construction of relations of equality 
(Norval 2007: 179-180). Cavell’s example of Nora in The Doll’s House further 
clarifies how the community is disclosed in the act of making claims (Cavell 
1990). In this example, Nora is accused of ‘speaking like a child, of being ill 
and of not understanding the world she lives in’. According to Norval ,
‘through the example of Nora, Cavell captures the experience of a sense of injustice that is 
inexpressible (..) Nora stands as an exemplar . She embodies a claim exceeding existing 
discourse, one that acts as a call to open ourselves up to other, foreign possibilities. Con-
sequently, there are no readily available responses to other (.…). In denying the possibil-
ity of this response, Cavell alerts us to the fact that Nora’s claim, even if it fails to find 
expressing in the dominant discourse, nevertheless has an impact upon it. (…). At the 
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very least, one will have to restate the terms and reasons for the denial of the claim. In 
this case, one will have become aware of the painful distance from ‘perfect justice ’ in the 
current order, forcing reflection on the fact that my consent to society (…..) reaches into 
every corner of society’s failure or ugliness. This acknowledgement of society’s distance 
from perfect justice, for Cavell, signals a disposition that allows for ‘civil life to go on in 
the face of broken promises, conflict of interest, discrimination (…). It also means that I 
recognize that at some time my sense of my society’s distance from the reign of perfect 
justice, and of my implication in its distance, may become intolerable’ (2007: 181-182).
As Norval explains, the figure of Nora functions as an ‘exemplar ’. Exem-
plars can play an important role in the process of policy change , because 
they can both capture the dissatisfaction with how things are going (disi-
dentification) and the possibility of doing things in another way. In this 
manner, they provide new imaginaries (identification); they ‘facilitate the 
glimpsing of a universal, of another way of doing things’ (2007: 190). This 
implies that the emergence of democracy does not necessarily involve the 
destruction of oppressive regimes through the formation of chains of 
equivalence, but that democratic practices can also be furthered through 
experiencing injustice resulting from a claim that escapes the dominant dis-
course, which provokes a re-examination of the dominant position. Norval 
therefore argues that the story of Nora in The Doll’s House visualizes what a 
democratic ethos is about: it implies ‘the self’s openness to a further self, in 
oneself and in others’ to enable responses to these excluded voices (2007: 
183). This picture resonates in Derrida ’s account of ‘democracy to come’ 
(2007: 184), which entails that democracy has the structure of a promise; a 
claim for an impossible future; a means by which an imagined future can 
intervene and act upon the present, which is inscribed in the idea of democ-
racy such as equality and freedom (2007: 145-146).27
Thus, democracy becomes a form of life rather then a regime or a set of 
institutions. Crucial to these practices of contestation – embodied in the 
variety of attempts to exert control over the way one is governed – is an 
ethos of questioning, responding, negotiating, challenging, and disruption. 
This critical ethos focuses on the activities of the citizen-subjects ‘who are 
not satisfied to let others speak for them and who question the ordering of 
prevailing institutions and practices of governance’ (2009: 314). This kind of 
questioning does not necessarily involve rational argumentation, but 
includes all kinds of (rhetorical ) reason giving such as rhetorical argumenta-
tion, non-verbal and passionate elements. Norval stresses the role of rheto-
ric with respect to the constitution of a democratic subject, because rhetoric 
can make people see things in a different way. It opens up a new world that 
remains closed if we stick to rational argumentation, as Habermas does.
27 Whereas to Norval the core of a democratic ethos concerns the ‘responsibility to respond 
to claims, to acknowledge society’s distance from perfect justice ’ (2007: 208), it is clear 
that Norvals’s normative dimension closely resembles Derrida ’s account of justice (1992).
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4.2.4 Jason Glynos and David Howarth: critical explanation
Thus far we have examined five poststructuralist alternatives to contempo-
rary political philosophical approaches to justice and democracy, namely 
the versions presented by Foucault, Laclau Mouffe, Connolly and Norval. 
It must be noted, though, that most of these poststructuralist scholars do 
not present their work as normative or ethical approaches, perhaps with 
the exception of Connolly’s ‘ethos of engagement’. Instead, Glynos and 
Howarth have explicitly sought to design a poststructuralist normative/
ethical evaluative framework for social change. This section examines their 
normative/ethical framework while reflecting on other poststructuralist 
versions that were examined earlier in this chapter.
Glynos and Howarth distinguish two kinds of critique. In the first place 
there is ethical critique that is based on a Lacanian understanding of the ethi-
cal subject. Secondly there is normative critique that involves the norm of radi-
cal democracy as proposed by Laclau and Mouffe . Glynos and Howarth pri-
oritize ethical critique because, in contrast to normative critique, it is directly 
related to the acknowledgement of a radical contingency of all practices, 
which fits in better with the ontological presumptions of discourse theory .
First of all we will examine Glynos and Howarth ’s category of ethical 
critique that is based upon Lacanian psycho-analytical theory. Chapter 2 
already introduced this aspect of discourse theory. Central to Lacan's think-
ing is the rejection of the idea that the human subject is a conscious, inten-
tional and reflexive individual. According to Lacan , the subject must 
instead be understood as a desiring and split subject (Lacan 1998). This 
desire emanates from the impossibility of identification of the subject with-
in the symbolic order. Desire thus comes into existence through an experi-
ence of something that is lacking. At the same time this desire is mediated 
by an unconscious relationship with the Other, which does not reflect a sta-
ble whole universal authority, though, but is also split. The ethical subject 
can be distinguished from the ego in that the ethical subject acknowledges 
that one’s desire is bound up with the desire of the Other and that the Oth-
er is radically contingent. The ego, in contrast, denies its own split and, con-
sequently, is not aware of the contingency of the Other. In the confrontation 
with its own lack, the ego resorts to an imaginary construct of complete-
ness. As it does not recognize its own split, nor the contingency of the Oth-
er, it is not aware that this lack is mediated by unconscious language that is 
just as fluid as the signifying elements that structure it.
One way for the ego to strive for completeness is to seek justice . Lacan 
calls this ‘desire for justice’ a special mode of enjoyment, one that is struc-
tured around a fantasy. It must, however, be noted that enjoyment should 
not necessarily be understood as pleasure, because as Glynos and Howarth 
argue, enjoyment belongs to the same category of terms as fantasy, desire 
and repression (2007: 107). Douzinas and Geary poignantly describe this 
mode of enjoyment that is erased by feelings of injustice:
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‘Justice is what society lacks and desires; is has no other definition – or rather justice is the 
definition of the indefinable, the unconscious of the law. We can only know it through its 
symptoms, injustice. Theories of justice are therefore a ‘fantasy’, the Fantastical screen or 
frame that philosophers poets and lawyers have erected to shield ourselves and to 
explain away the unknown desire of the other and of the impossible community. The 
theory of justice answers the symptoms by negating their cause. But the radical dissym-
metry, the abyss of the other’s desire and of injustice, will always leave behind a remain-
der for which neither the law nor fantasy can fully account’ (Douzinas and Geary, 2005: 
315).
Thus, instead of being an evaluative criterion, to Lacanians ‘justice ’ acts as 
some kind of ‘fantasy’, an imaginary construct of completeness that grips 
people. To Douzinas and Geary, people’s identification with the law may 
even be a result of their identification with these justice fantasies.
Subjects may also identify with new narratives in order to fill their 
emptiness. According to Glynos and Howarth , these narratives cover over 
or conceal the subject’s lack by ‘providing an image of fullness, wholeness 
or harmony, on the one hand, while conjuring up threats and obstacles to 
its realization on the other’ (2007: 130). In this regard these identification 
processes provide a locus for ethical critique , i.e. in new identifications 
either the ideological aspect or the ethical aspect is highlighted. Glynos and 
Howarth relate the ideological inauthentic response to Lacans’ mode of 
enjoyment that reveals how subjects are complicit in concealing the radical 
contingency of social relations. The authentic ethical response instead 
entails an engagement with the radical contingency of social relations.28
Glynos and Howarth thus introduce a kind of ethical critique that dif-
fers from other poststructuralist ethical approaches that were examined 
earlier in this section in that it draws on psycho-analytical theory.29 The 
ethos based approaches of Foucault, Connolly and Norval and the ethical 
critique of Glynos and Howarth show some commonalities as well, though. 
First of all, they all share a preference for an ethical position that recognizes 
the contingency of sociality. In addition, Glynos and Howarth ’s idea of the 
ethical seems to be closely related with Norval ’s and Connolly ’s ‘critical 
responsiveness’ and Foucault’s argument for ‘freedom practices’. Note, for 
example, the similarities between Foucault’s neoliberal ‘rational economic 
subject’ and Lacanian fantasmatic identifications such as the ‘immigrant 
welfare fraud’. Both subject constructions can be distinguished from the 
(free) ethical subject that escapes dominant truth concepts.
28 In the same way, public contestation can function on both an ethical and ideological 
level, depending on the extent to which public contestation reveals the contingent insti-
tutional moment of a social practice (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 111)
29 Laclau introduces Lacanian based explanations in ‘New refl ections on the revolutions 
of our time’ (1990), without, however, explicitly articulating it as ethical critique .
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In their normative critique Glynos and Howarth aim to explain the 
(implicit) normativity in HSS. According to them, the analyst can construct 
a counter logic of a plural and democratic community that serves as a norma-
tive vantage point. The analyst, then, fulfills a normative role in two ways. 
In the first place, by naming dominant social logics 30 the analyst actively 
combines different elements into ‘what is ultimately a heterogeneous field 
of elements’ that have no ‘objective’ or ‘necessary’ connections’. Thus, she 
can invoke alternative political visions (2007: 194). However, as Glynos and 
Howarth rightly emphasize, objectivity should not be simply replaced by 
the subjective preferences of the analysts; instead, it brings to the fore that 
‘the political analyst is already engaged in a hegemonic struggle, deploying 
political logics of rhetorical redescription in the very process of character-
izing and explaining discursive practices’(2007: 196).
Nonetheless, the question can be raised if it is necessary to distinguish 
normative from ethical critique . After all, Connolly and Norval ’s call for 
democracy cannot be easily separated from the self’s openness to a further 
self, in oneself and in others. Thus, their ‘democratic ethos ’ or ‘ethos of 
engagement’ seems to speak to both Glynos and Howarth ’s ethical and 
normative critique . In addition, one could defend the view that Foucault ’s 
ethical work on freedom practices is clearly interrelated with his normative 
stance on the minimization of domination. Therefore, the concluding sec-
tion of this chapter examines how ethical and normative critique can be 
combined into a singular poststructuralist based evaluative category.
4.3 Conclusion: a poststructuralist alternative for a 
normative evaluation of law reform
Section 4.1.1 examined to what extent justice theories generate adequate 
evaluative criteria for law reform. In this section it was noted first of all that 
justice theories are downplayed at a level that is too abstract to provide 
concrete evaluative criteria. In addition, it was argued that in the face of 
moral pluralism, democratic theories that endorse plurality of concepts of 
the good should be preferred over substantive justice concepts. Therefore, 
section 4.1.2 investigated to what extent Habermas’ procedural democratic 
theory is able to generate commonly shared criteria for law reform. It was 
concluded that this theory is based on a specific (Kantian) concept of per-
sonhood, which excludes other forms of communication from the delibera-
tive process.
Section 4.2 showed that poststructuralists deal more thoroughly with 
issues such as power relations, hegemonic practices, rhetoric , affect and 
passion than the examined philosophical approaches. Poststructuralist dis-
30 The notion of ‘social logics’ is further explained in chapter 4.
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course theory spotlight first and foremost the (unawareness of the) political 
moment inherent in the centrality of rationality in current dominant ideas, 
which tend to suppress other (non-rational) voices. Still, the acknowledg-
ment of the political moment does not necessarily imply that contemporary 
justice theories are totally useless. Justice based theories, such as Rawls' the-
ory of justice can, for example, be considered one interpretation that belongs 
to a struggle between different justice discourses . In addition, criteria 
derived from Habermas ’ procedural democratic theory may provide a start-
ing point (but nothing more than that) for a poststructuralist normative cri-
tique .
Yet, despite the fact that poststructuralist ontology implies that the 
researcher engages in a discursive struggle in which she may also propose 
to evaluate social law reforms on the basis of a Rawlsian justice concept, a 
poststructuralist inspired normative/ethical critique rejects this kind of 
evaluation. This will also be the case with respect to hermeneutic (or com-
munitarian) approaches to justice, such as Michael Walzer's 'Spheres of jus-
tice' (1983), which deny the existence of a (rational and objective) point of 
view that is situated outside cultural practices and institutions. These 
approaches, then, tend to deploy their ontology in the service of closure, As 
such they do not resonate with a ‘democratic ethos of engagement’, which is 
forwarded in poststructuralist theory. This ethos entails:
– a care for the other that presupposes a care of the self, since without a 
care for the self one is not able to care for the other;
– an openness to the other, independent of a moral order and free from 
state politics, operating outside existing truth systems;
– the endorsement of multifarious lifestyles ;
– a questioning of prevailing institutions and practices of governance, in-
cluding all kinds of reason giving such as rhetorical argumentation, 
non-verbal and passionate elements.
This ethos endorses Glynos and Howarth ’s ethical mode of identification, 
which can be opposed to ideological modes of identification. The latter 
mode of identification may also involve an identification with theories of 
justice, which misrecognizes the radical contingency of social relations. 
Moreover a democratic ethos of engagement transcends Glynos and 
Howarth's normative/ethical distinction, as this ethos can also be brought 
into play by the analyst who articulates a counter logic of radical democra-
cy . A democratic ethos of engagement brings together the views of several 
poststructuralist thinkers. For example, it entails the Foucauldian struggle 
'to be governed less or to govern oneself in the way one wishes’ (Donzelot 
and Gordon, 2008: 57), which comes close to Norval ’s call for practices of 
contestation in order to ‘exert control over the way one is governed’ (2009: 
314). In short, a ‘democratic ethos of engagement’ proposed in this study 
entails:
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– an acknowledgement of the radical contingency of social relations;
– a responsiveness to injustice and practices of contestation, which in-
volves an openness to all kinds of reason giving, including rhetorical 
argumentation, non-verbal and passionate elements;
– a freedom based ethos that seeks to escape dominant truth concepts.
4.4 A methodical introduction to the chapters
This section introduces a Poststructuralist Explanatory Framework for pol-
icy analysis (PEF). PEF can be understood as an extension of LCE that is 
geared to make LCE suitable for a poststructuralist based policy analysis. 
For this purpose, PEF adopts elements of the other approaches that were 
discussed in this chapter and in chapter 2.
4.4.1 Basic analytical categories in the proposed Poststructuralist Explanatory 
Framework
The proposed Poststructuralist Explanatory Framework (PEF) maintains 
Glynos and Howarth ’s distinction between the basic ontological categories 
and concrete phenomena. These phenomena become meaningful in dis-
courses , which are, following Laclau and Mouffe, being defined as a struc-
ture that results from an articulatory practice. Following a dislocationary 
event, involving the glimpse of the universal, discourses and practices may 
change. However, unlike Glynos and Howarth ’s model, change is not nec-
essarily preceded by the experience of a big event. Other practices (exemplar ), 
narratives or rhetoric may also cause subjects to experience the contingencies 
of the world, which make them ‘see’ things differently. Yet, like LCE, change 
only follows when the political dimension is foregrounded. At a macro level 
of analysis this entails that chains of equivalence and difference are constructed. 
At a lower level of analysis, the attention shifts to the more concrete analysis 
of the construction of discourse coalitions .
In addition, PEF renames fantasmatic logics to rhetorical logics. As such, 
PEF includes more concrete concepts for the explanation of transforma-
tion processes, such as rhetorical tropes or (fantasmatic) narratives operating 
as rhetorical tropes. Rhetorical logics can be distinguished from social logics 
as rhetorical logics are constitutive of new discourses ; they articulate their 
conceptual categories. That is, rhetorical logics (i.e. a storyline operating as 
a rhetorical trope) can make people see things in a different way at a lower 
and more concrete level of analysis than political logics . In PEF, rhetorical log-
ics appear as the main explanatory categories for the construction of new 
discourse coalitions , which characterize existing discourses . The concept of 
discourse coalitions may, however, also be used to explain the working of 
rhetorical logics in case rhetorical moves (i.e. the fantasmatic aging society nar-
rative ) encourage the formation of a new discourse coalition between differ-
ent discursive positions in a policy discourse.
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According to LCE, both political and fantasmatic logics are formal con-
structs that enable us to account for orders and practices in a variety of his-
torical contexts. In PEF, the same is true for rhetorical logics. In addition, in 
contrast to LCE (and drawing on the work of Foucault), in PEF social logics , 
defined as the characterization of particular social practices, regimes or tech-
nologies, may also account for orders and practices in different historical con-
texts. This will be the case, for example, when the invention or development 
of new technologies induces the emergence of new social logics. Thus in PEF 
change is not confined to the working of rhetorical logics and political logics , 
change can result from certain social practices that characterize social logics.
Drawing upon other poststructuralist approaches, post-positivist poli-
cy analysis and Foucauldian genealogy, PEF presents a model of policy 
change and permanence involving more concrete explanatory elements 
compared with LCE. As a result, PEF is better suited to policy analysis.
4.4.2 Analytical steps
The analytical steps of PEF are copied from LCE, according to which social 
analysis proceeds along the stages of problematization, retroduction, persua-
sion and critique. With respect to the case study, the first chapter problema-
tized the introduction of the LCA as follows. First of all, the question was 
raised as to how to be critical about the introduction of savings arrange-
ments. Secondly, the question arose as to how the establishment of the idea 
of individual savings arrangements could be explained within the context 
of traditional collective social security law. This problematization resulted 
in the following central question.
How can the establishment of the idea of individual savings arrangements 
within the Dutch traditional collective system of public security law be criti-
cally explained?
The first empirical sub question (sub question 3) looked at the introduction 
of the LCA as a paradigmatic example of the introduction of (the idea of) 
individual savings arrangements, giving rise to the following question (3):
How can the establishment of the Life Course Arrangement be critically ex-
plained?
This sub question can now be further operationalized with the help of the 
questions that were formulated in section 2.1.4, which guide the problema-
tization of a certain phenomenon (first analytical step). After each question 
it is indicated which chapter(s) examine(s) these questions:
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1. How can these new practices (the LCA as a new practice of social law) 
be characterized? (chapter 9)
2. Where did these practices originate from? (chapters 5, 6 and 7)
3. How and why were these new (regimes of) practices introduced? 
(chapters 8 and 9)
4. Why was there a lack of resistance of political subjects who embrace 
other values such as solidarity and equality such as solidarity and 
equality? (chapters 8 and 9)
The second analytical step involves the process of retroductive explanation. 
This means that by going back and forth between the phenomena investi-
gated and the various explanations that are offered, the relevant social, polit-
ical and rhetorical logics are identified. As was explained in section 2.1.4, in 
the process of retroductive explanation the researcher further elaborates 
upon the aforementioned questions that problematize the emergence of the 
LCA. Thus, the first question is elaborated upon in chapter 9, which exam-
ines the main juridical characteristics of the LCA as a new practice of social 
law. Both the second and third questions refer to the ‘conditions of the pos-
sibility’ of the LCA. The second question mainly refers to the genealogical 
and rhetorical origins of the LCA as a new way of looking at social security. 
This question is examined further in part II of this book, which is constitut-
ed by chapters 5, 6 and 7. The third question addresses the establishment of 
the LCA as a new law practice. This question is discussed further in part III, 
which consists of chapters 8 and 9. This part also addresses the fourth ques-
tion.
Generally speaking, moving from the first question to the fourth ques-
tion, the questions consecutively include social logics (question 1, and ques-
tion 2 when it regards the development of new technologies), rhetorical log-
ics (in particular question 2 and to a much smaller extent questions 3 and 4) 
and political logics (questions 3 and 4). In the final chapter (11) the threads of 
the various chapters are put together in a retroductive explanation of the 
establishment of the LCA.
The third analytical step, the process of persuasion, guides the form in 
which the results are presented in the final chapter. This chapter offers a 
persuasive narrative on the LCA, which seeks to account for the emergence 
of this facility.
The fourth analytical step involves the question of how to be critical. Before 
formulating the ethical/normative questions that guide the critical dimen-
sion of this research, the concept of law that is used in this study must be 
further explained. The first chapter referred to pragmatic approaches to 
law, according to which law is considered a practice devoted to the realiza-
tion of certain values or ideals . Regarding section 4.2,1 we can add now 
some more content to the values and ideals that are to be realized. First of 
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all, they must acknowledge the radical contingency of social relations; sec-
ondly, they have to be responsive to injustice and practices of contestation; 
and thirdly, they should strive for (free) ethical subjects that escape domi-
nant truth concepts. Following Foucault , this study recognizes two further 
characteristics of the law. On the one hand, the law is considered a determi-
nate law, a law with a definite content. On the other hand, the law resem-
bles power in that it never becomes total. It is continuously reformed 
because of acts of resistance and therefore ultimately escapes an encapsula-
tion by power. This also implies that social law is never entirely colonized 
by normalizing powers. According to this reading of Foucault’s work, 
unrestricted social law can and should enable a de-individualized ethics 
that is open to alteration.
With respect to future social law designs, a democratic ethos of engage-
ment thus implies first and foremost an openness to other repressed voices 
that can appear in various forms. This does not mean that the lawmaker 
simply ‘listens to the people’ and translates the voice of the people into law, 
but regards a genuine openness to questioning, responses, negotiations, 
challenges and disruptions involving all kinds of reason giving. This open-
ness goes beyond rule following within existing democratic institutions. 
Social rights that are required to enable people to care for themselves 
should thus not be dictated, but emanate from the people themselves and 
remain open to alteration. In this respect there are no ‘natural’ rights, but as 
Zerilli has convincingly argued ‘[t]here is only the practice of freedom, of 
making political claims that question (…) [and] set the terms of that ques-
tioning’ (2005: 177). On the basis of this concept of law a ‘democratic ethos 
of engagement’ gives rise to the following questions that guide a critical 
evaluation of law reforms:–
1. Did the discourse that preceded the emergence of the LCA suppress 
certain voices that left behind a sense of injustice?
2. What forms of resistance could be distinguished during the lawmaking 
process of the LCA and afterwards?
3. To what extent did different forms of resistance succeed in overcoming 
forms of exclusion?
4. To what extent has the emergence of the LCA been fostered by ideo-
logical identifications?
5. What subjects were constructed and/or presupposed by the LCA?
6. What kind of alternative social law designs can be imagined that enable 
an ethos of engagement that is open to alteration?
All chapters from part II (chapters 5, 6 and 7) and part III (chapters 8 and 9) 
of this book address the critical dimension, though not always explicitly. 
Part IV (chapter 10) explicitly responds to the second empirical sub ques-
tion (4), which addresses a Foucauldian informed critical perspective:
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How does the Life Course Arrangement function as a new governmental 
technology in the perspective of (neoliberal) governmentality?
In the final chapter the different aspects of normative and ethical critique 
are articulated together.
4.3.3 Policy context and methods
Different methods have been used in this study. For the articulation of 
social and political logics, a wide range of primary and secondary docu-
ments were read. In addition, almost 40 key actors were interviewed. With 
respect to the articulation of rhetorical logics, this data was extended with 
textual analysis. Finally, the study used the method of comparing cases.
Whereas the Dutch social system can be described as consensual and 
corporatist, the interviewees were selected from amongst a large range of 
parties and interest groups. A list of the interviewees is provided in annex 1 
of this book. They include the Ministers of Employment and Social Affairs 
and the Minister of Finance, representatives of the main political parties, 
(political) advisers, representatives of the main labor unions and the main 
employers’ organization, representatives of other relevant interest groups 
(private insurance companies and organizations, the Family Council) and 
several officials working at departments and in other advisory councils 
(such as the Temporary Expert Commission Emancipation).
The interviewees were selected mainly for their perceived role in the 
policymaking process, based on official documents. In the course of the 
research, the data from the interviews guided a further selection of 
respondents. Almost all respondents who were asked to cooperate 
responded positively to this request. The respondents were asked to give 
their account of the development of the ideas on life course policy and the 
establishment of the life course perspective. Their (summarized) answers 
were categorized according to 29 themes which, when combined, articulate 
the story of the rise and fall of life course policy. The main themes of the 
interviews can be found in annex 2. The advantage of questioning different 
actors on the same theme was that memories could be checked and 
rechecked and that different perspectives on similar themes and situations 
could be compared. The interview data were of particular importance for 
chapter 8.
The interviews were also useful for the selection of texts that were ana-
lyzed, amongst others, using Discourse Historical Analysis (DHA) devel-
oped by Wodak and others.31 The selection methods and the specific way of 
31 Montesano-Montessori put forward the idea to apply DHA during a conversation that 
we had in June 2010 in Amsterdam. also see Montesano-Montessori (2009).
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analyzing these texts are further illuminated in chapters 5 and 6. The details 
of the DHA analysis are presented in annex 3. In addition to DHA frame 
analysis was deployed to analyze (policy) texts. This method is further illu-
minated in chapters 6 and 7.
The method of comparing cases was used in two instances. In chapter 9 
the Dutch LCA is compared with a similar Belgian arrangement called the 
time credit scheme. This comparison reveals, amongst other things, the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of the LCA. In addition, chapter 10 compares 
two Dutch instances of liberal governmentality the discourse on the LCA 
and the nineteenth century discourse on the Dutch Poor law. This compari-
son served to refine the critical aspect of the analysis.
The major methods used in this book can thus be summarized as a 
qualitative analysis of interviews with key actors, a discourse historical and 
frame analysis of a selection of texts, and comparing cases.
Part II
The emergence of 
new ideas in the 
policy discourse

Abstract
Using methods that are developed in Discourse Historical Analysis this 
case study on Dutch life course policy, suggests that analysis of (the inter-
relationship between) rhetoric and affect can contribute to a poststructural-
ist explanation of policy change. It is argued that the catachretic act of nam-
ing this policy ‘life course policy’ produced new spaces of representation 
within which (partly) incompatible goals and values were united. Actors 
identified with these new signifiers because they contained a promise, a 
way out of the old, dead-end discursive positions. Thus, the use of rhetoric 
constituted the dominant social security discourse in a new way, contain-
ing both the former dominant discourse and the voices of resistance, as a 
result of which the emphasis in the Dutch social security discourse shifted, 
albeit temporarily, from a policy informed by the values of the market to a 
work-life balance policy.
A slightly modified version of this paper will published in Critical Policy 
Studies (Eleveld 2012b).
5 The role of rhetoric and affect in policy 
changes. The case of Dutch Life Course 
Policy
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5.1 Introduction
Just after the turn of this century, the issue of a ‘life course based social 
security system’ arose on the Dutch policy agenda. The idea that the social 
security system was to be reformed into a ‘life course based’ system was 
shared by diverse groups, such as supporters of family policy; labor unions; 
employer unions; social-democrats, Christian and liberal political parties 
and feminists. They endorsed a common storyline that sounded like this:
‘Different trends in modern society have caused major transformations in individual life 
courses. The social security institutions are not able to meet the demands of ‘modern 
society, such as the increased labor market participation of women, individualization, 
aging and globalization. The problems accumulate in particular during those stages of 
life in which workers have to combine different activities such as work, care, education 
and leisure. In addition, people desire more balance and say in the way they distribute 
their time between these activities. This mismatch between, trends, desires and the social 
security system can only be solved in case social policy is reconciled with modern life 
courses’.
The new ‘life course based social security system’ should thus anticipate 
the new ways individuals prefer to distribute their time between work and 
other activities like care, education, leisure, etc. As such, the Dutch social 
security discourse of the time that emphasized the values of the market 
was transformed into a discourse that foregrounded a work-life balance . 
How can this policy change be explained?
For scholars engaged in post-positivist policy analysis, policy change 
can to a great extent be ascribed to the construction of narratives and sto-
rylines . According to Hajer (1995), a storyline can both simplify the various 
aspects of a complex problem and facilitate different groups to read their 
own narrative in this storyline. As a result, a storyline not only suggests 
unity in complex situations, it is also able to create unity among different 
groups anc consequently generate change. Other scholars have argued that 
existing policies may alter because of the availability of new ideas (Cox 
2001; Hay 2002; Blyth 2002; Schmidt 2002). This paper aims to add to these 
interpretive approaches to policy change arguing that change also occurs in 
the process of (rhetorical ) argumentation, which can also be characterized 
by unconscious identification processes. Drawing on a (poststructuralist) 
discourse theoretical understanding of rhetoric , it is suggested that the 
introduction of new words into the social security discourse, such as ‘life 
course’ and ‘life course perspective ’, functioned as rhetorical tropes that 
gave shape to a new discourse and as such generated policy change.
In poststructuralist discourse theory the use of rhetoric in the policy 
making process is intrinsically related to social phenomena (i.e. the emer-
gence of new social policy). As Griggs and Howarth argue, poststructural-
ist discourse theorists do not separate between ‘a concept and a metaphor , 
between a realm of rhetorical meaning and an underlying material reality, 
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or indeed between the figurative and the proper/literal’ (2006: 29). Instead 
they view rhetoric as an essential dimension of all social relations. The the-
oretical and empirical analysis of rhetoric is therefore essential for under-
standing and explaining social phenomena. Poststructuralist discourse 
theorists differ in this respect from other scholars whose research is also 
based on a ‘post-positivist paradigm of explanation ’ (Glynos and Howarth 
2007: 18).1 For example, as Finlayson has pointed out, Bevir and Rhodes, 
wrongly understand the formation of beliefs and the argumentation about 
them as two distinct actions. According to him, in poststructuralist rhetori-
cal analysis, the formation of consensus or a unified constituency does not 
involve the ‘discovery’ of a shared interest or opinion, as is proposed in 
interpretive studies, but its creation in argumentation. In general, then, 
from a poststructuralist perspective, rhetoric does not merely serve instru-
mental goals, but constitutes new beliefs in a struggle between contingent 
beliefs (Finlayson 2004, 2007, Griggs and Howarth 2006, Norval 2007, 
Laclau 2004, 2005).
The aim of this study is twofold. In the first place the study seeks to 
extend our understanding of processes of policy change , which in this case 
study involves the explanation of the emergence of life course policy in the 
Netherlands. A second aim of the study concerns a further development of 
discourse theoretical concepts for empirical analysis. This is important, 
because discourse theory tends to draw on highly abstract concepts that are 
difficult to operationalize for the purpose of empirical research. The case 
study thus illustrates how discourse theoretical concepts can be translated 
into less abstract methodological tools and how they can contribute to an 
explanation of policy change.
This paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 further explains 
how, according to poststructuralist discourse theorists, the analysis of 
rhetoriccontributes to the explanation of policy change . The data and meth-
ods used in this study are addressed in section 3. Section 4 shows how the 
1 Glynos and Howarth (2007) distinguish the post-positivist paradigm of explanation 
from the positivist paradigm of explanation . In this latter mode of reasoning that is 
predominantly used in natural sciences, deduction assumes a prominent role. That is, a 
theory is being accepted as long as the falsifi able hypotheses are not disproved by the 
observed facts. Within this mode of reasoning explanation and prediction are closely 
connected. As Glynos and Howarth argue, this model does not suffi ce in social sciences, 
because, in contrast to the natural world, the social world is an open system within 
which it is not possible to conduct closed experiments. In other words, there exists no 
constitutive link between explanation and prediction. According to Glynos and 
Howarth , a post positivist paradigm of explanation involves, amongst others ‘a to-and-
fro movement between the phenomena investigated and the various explanations that 
are proffered. In this way, an initially chaotic set of concepts, logics, empirical data, self-
interpretations, and so on, at varying levels of abstraction, are welded together, so as to 
produce an account which, if it removes our initial confusion, can constitute a legiti-
mate candidate for truth or falsity’ (2007: 33-34).
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emergence of a ‘life course perspective’ can be situated in the history of 
Dutch social security discourse. Consequently the ‘genealogical origins’ of 
the ‘life course perspective’ in the social security discourse are examined in 
section 5. Section 6 describes how the signifiers ‘life course’ and ‘life course 
perspective’ are dispersed in social security discourse. This section further 
examines why some key actors identified with these new signifiers. On the 
basis of the results of a textual analysis that is presented in section 7, the 
relationship between the introduction of the new signifiers and the shift in 
Dutch social security discourse is further investigated. Finally, Sections 8 
and 9 comprise the conclusions and some recommendations for future rhe-
torical analysis that is rooted in discourse theory.
5.2 Discourse theory and the use of rhetoric
The discourse theoretical approach of rhetoric is related to its ontological 
presumptions. Discourse theory as it has been developed by Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) follows the Heideggerian distinction between the ‘ontical’ 
and the ‘ontological ’. Whereas the ‘ontical’ refers to a particular domain or 
phenomenon, the ‘ontological ’ entails ‘the categorical pre-conditions for 
such objects and their investigation’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 108). For 
Laclau , rhetoric is ‘tropology which outlines ontological logics of politics, 
that structure the social’ (Pallonen 2006: 114). As such, rhetoric functions as 
an ontological conceptual category; it constitutes the ‘ontical’. Rhetoric is 
thus also constitutive of ‘discourse ’, which, according to Laclau and 
Mouffe , can be defined as ‘a structured totality’ that results from an ‘articu-
latory practice ’ or the practice in which a relationship is established ‘among 
elements such that their identity is modified’ (1985: 105).
Whilst for poststructuralist discourse theorists rhetoric constitutes dis-
course, rhetoric can also change discourse: it reveals ‘how changes occur 
and politics move between unity and fragmentation’ (Pallonen 2006: 114). 
With respect to the transformative potential of rhetoric, Laclau introduces 
the rhetorical category of catachresis , which he describes as ‘the use of a fig-
ural term when there is no literal term that can replace it (e.g. when we 
speak of a leg of a chair)’ (2004: 306). Since Laclau views discourse as a sys-
tem of differences, unity can only emerge by assuming the representation 
of an impossible totality. According to him, the name of this impossible 
totality must be a catachretic name, because there is no other representation 
that can replace it; this name constitutes a new chain of equivalences 
between distinct elements. Drawing on Zizek ’s argument that it is the name 
of the signifier that supports the identity of the subject, he concludes that it 
is ultimately the (cathacretic) name of the object that brings about political 
unity (Zizek 1998: 94-95, cited by Laclau 2005: 102-103). The catachretic ‘act 
of naming’ may generate social change as catachresis involves ‘figurative’ 
or ‘imaginative’ reasoning that is essential for the production of ‘new spac-
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es of representation’, sustaining new discourses and new coalitions (1990: 
65, 2004: 307).2
Laclau further argues that the act of naming is intrinsically connected 
with affect , because ‘affect is required if signification is going to be possible 
at all’. Drawing upon Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, he holds that ‘the 
name’ becomes the ‘rallying point of passionate attachments’ as the split 
subject constantly seeks new fullness (2005: 116). Glynos and Howarth 
(2007) have in this respect put forward that these fantasmatic identifica-
tions tend to cover up other possibilities. According to them, a critical anal-
ysis of policy change should study how policy change has been furthered 
by fantasmatic elements that lead us to foreclose alternatives.
Norval (2007) shows, in a slightly different way, how rhetoric can gen-
erate change. According to her, rhetoric can make people see things in a 
different way: ‘If a grammar gives us the ability to word the world, a new 
grammar opens up fresh worlds in which different objects and projects 
may appear and old ones may be ruled out’ (2007: 129). To illustrate this 
point, she refers to Wittgenstein ’s example of the rabbit/duck picture. The 
moment in which a subject suddenly discovers a picture of a rabbit, which 
she earlier regarded as a picture of a duck, is what she calls ‘aspect dawn-
ing ’; unexpectedly, the subject has discovered a new aspect. This is a 
moment of surprise: now it is a rabbit! At the same time the subject notices 
that the picture has not changed. In other words: in the new perspective, 
continuity and discontinuity occur. This is what Norval calls ‘aspect 
change ’: seeing the duck now differs from the moment before the rabbit 
was discovered. According to Norval , both moments – aspect dawning and 
aspect change – are important for change. Translated to policy change , this 
means that policy change is conditioned upon a first moment of surprise in 
which the same things are seen in a different way, and the rediscovery of 
this initial moment of surprise.
A question which is, above all, relevant to policy analysis is how this 
poststructuralist approach to discourse and rhetoric is related to narrative 
analysis. After all, policy narratives are important units of analysis in poli-
cy analysis that is based upon a ‘post-positivist paradigm of explanation’, 
such as (interpretative) post-positivist policy analysis (Fischer 2003). In 
poststructuralist discourse theory the concept of ‘narrative’, to a great 
extent, converges with the aforementioned definition of ‘discourse ’. That is, 
the ‘narrative’ refers to a certain type of articulatory practices, namely one 
which produces a specific kind of order between the elements: an order 
which persuades people to draw certain conclusions. Otherwise put, (poli-
cy) narratives can make people see things in a different way. If they do so, 
narratives operate as rhetorical tropes that change our understanding of 
the world. Thus, from the perspective of poststructuralist discourse theory , 
2 See also Griggs and Howarth (2006) and Pallonen (2006).
88 Chapter 5
a (policy) narrative can contribute to policy change through its operation 
as a rhetorical trope. The analysis of policy narratives is therefore also rele-
vant to a discourse theoretical analysis of policy change.
It can be concluded that for both Norval and Laclau , rhetoric should 
not only be perceived as ‘strategic manipulative acts’, but also as constitu-
tive of new discourses . In addition, they relate the deployment of rhetoric 
to affect . While Norval points to the ‘moment of surprise’ inherent in aspect 
dawning , Laclau argues that the identification with new signifiers is relat-
ed to subconscious desires for fullness. The works of Laclau and Norval 
thus address some interesting issues that can be used for a poststructuralist 
analysis of policy change . Applying their theoretical concepts to our case 
study, the following research question can be formulated:
What was the role of the new signifiers, ‘life course’ and ‘life course per-
spective ’ in the process of policy change ?
This research question implies several other questions, such as:
– Which signifiers constituted the new discourse?
– How and/or why did actors identify with the new signifiers?
– How can the introduction of these signifiers be situated in the continu-
ity and discontinuity of the ongoing discourse?
Before the main research question is addressed, the next section first illumi-
nates the data and methods.
5.3 Data and methods
This paper is written as a part of a larger research project that studies the 
emergence of savings facilities in Dutch social security law. For this project 
almost 40 key actors were interviewed. The interviewees involved the min-
ister of Employment and Social Affairs and the minister of Finance, repre-
sentatives of the major political parties, advisors of the government and 
political parties, representatives of the main labor unions and the main 
employer union, representatives of other relevant interest groups (private 
insurance companies and organizations, the family council) and several 
officials working at the departments and in other advisory councils, such 
as the Temporary Expert Commission Emancipation (TECENA). For the 
purpose of the present research the data from nine interviews are relevant. 
These involved mostly interviews with advisors or prominent members of 
the Christian Democratic Party (CDA ) and interviews with officials work-
ing in the field of emancipation policy. The respondents were asked how 
they interpreted ‘the life course perspective ’ and what meaning they 
assigned to this signifier in public discourse.
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In addition, the three most influential documents referring to the ‘life 
course perspective ’ were selected for a textual analysis. These texts were all 
published in 2001 and 2002 and originated from: 1) the CDA , 2) the SER 
(Social and Economic Council that advises the government, and 3) the gov-
ernment.3 Consequently, the interview data from the entire project served 
as guidance for the selection of a number of key texts for further analysis. 
That is, eight other texts were selected which originated from five different 
key actors whom the interviewees referred to as being ‘the main figure(s) 
with respect to the emergence and dispersion of ‘life course policy’ dis-
course.4
The next methodological step was to determine how to analyze these 
documents. Whereas poststructuralist discourse theory has not yet devel-
oped concrete research methods of its own, I looked at other possible 
research methods in the field of discourse analysis and decided to use some 
tools that are developed within Discourse Historical Analysis (DHA) 
developed by Wodak and others (Wodak et al. 1999; Reisigl and Wodak 
2009).5 DHA entails a detailed study of texts. Each claim that is made in 
these text needs to be studied and categorized. For this kind of text analysis 
DHA formulates a number of heuristic questions. Of these, the following 
three are of interest to this study:
1. How are people, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions 
named and referred to linguistically (strategies of nomination)?
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social ac-
tors, objects, phenomena/events and processes (strategies of predica-
tion)?
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question (Reisigl and 
Wodak 2009: 93)?
Wodak et al. (1999) use the third heuristic question to analyze the construc-
tion of national identities. As such, they distinguish between strategies of 
justification, strategies of construction, transformative strategies and strate-
gies of dismantling. This study adapted these analytical categories to the 
structure of the analyzed texts.
3 Research Institute for the CDA (2001), Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2002) 
and SER (2001).
4 Bovenberg (2001, 2003), Cuyvers (1996), Evenhuis (1999a, 1999b), Leynse (2001a, 2001b) 
and Schippers (2001).
5 See also Montesano Montessori (2009).
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5.4 Dominant discourses and counter-discourses on 
Dutch social policy
To situate the emergence of the discourse on life course policy within social 
security discourse , a limited historical analysis should start with the influ-
ential Van Rhijn report from 1945, which can be considered the first design 
of the current Dutch welfare state. This report argues in favor of a 
reformed system of social security that ensures a decent life for the entire 
population (Van Rhijn Committee 1945: 7). In the years that follow, a collec-
tive system is built up that aspires to cover all possible collective risks. This 
collective responsibility for individual welfare fits in well with the pater-
nalistic welfare state discourse that is popular at the time: social security 
should take care of the citizens ‘from cradle to grave’. Notwithstanding 
constant struggles over its basic principles during the first decades after 
1955, this ‘cradle to grave principle’ is hardly ever challenged (Noordam 
1998 and 2007).
In the mid-1970s, with the social security system ‘completed’, the Neth-
erlands are struck by the (world) economic crisis, which results in a crisis of 
the social security system. In response to this crisis, social security dis-
course increasingly emphasizes individual risk responsibilities. This new 
discourse fits in well with the new individualization discourse, according 
to which the governmental interference in private affairs must be reduced. 
Another shift in the discourse concerns the framing of the crisis. Instead of 
attributing the crisis of the welfare state to external economic factors, the 
debate is increasingly determined by arguments referring to the wide-
spread improper use of social benefits and the unmanageable costs of the 
welfare state. In the years that follow the system is further reduced and 
responsibilities shift from the collective to individual citizens. In addition, 
because of European demands regarding equal treatment of men and 
women, so-called bread winner facilities are abolished in favor of more 
individualized facilities that endorse equal treatment of men and women 
(Asscher-Vonk 2001; Jaspers 2001; Noordam 1996 and 2007; Van der Veen 
2001).
The report by the Buurmeijer Committee (1993) marks a new shift in 
the social security discourse. It reveals how the organization of unemploy-
ment and disability schemes has not led to the reintegration of unemployed 
and disabled workers into paid employment but has, in fact, encouraged 
welfare dependency. The report advocates the introduction of market proc-
esses in the social security system. Correspondingly, within the discourse, 
social security is increasingly approached in terms of economic incentives 
and disincentives and less in terms of rights and obligations. This impli-
cates that citizens are no longer perceived as passive consumers of govern-
mental policies, but as active, calculating subjects who carefully weigh 
what strategy promises most profits (Noordam 1996, 2007; Van Gestel, et al. 
2009; Trommel and Van der Veen 1999). As such, in the 1990s the Dutch 
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social security system moves steadily from the category of ‘corporatist wel-
fare state ’ towards the category of ‘liberal welfare state’ (Esping-Andersen 
1990).
Initially, the changed discourse and the practical introduction of mar-
ket processes in the social security system do not meet with much opposi-
tion.6 Nevertheless, family policy supporters challenge the individualiza-
tion of social security rights, because so-called ‘bread winner facilities’ that 
grant additional allowances to workers who are responsible for their fami-
lies have been abolished without reallocating the freed-up funds to the ben-
efit of families. Other voices of resistance are heard from the opposite site, 
i.e. from supporters of the emancipation movement. Their protests concern 
the misrecognition of the modern worker as a ‘worker with care tasks’. This 
novel construction of the modern worker encourages some feminist law-
yers to argue in favor of a public insurance for care tasks (Holtmaat 1999; 
Westerveld 1999).
During the 1990s, more opponents enter the discourse. The Christian 
democrats, who are not part of the governing coalition for the first time 
since World War II, object to the increasing infiltration of the logic of the 
market into the social system during the reign of the ‘purple’ coalition 
(1994-2002) between the right wing liberals (VVD ), left wing liberals (D66 ) 
and social democrats (PvdA ). Among these Christian democratic oppo-
nents is future Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, who in 2001 contends 
that ‘for the [purple government] coalition, the introduction of market 
processes seems to provide inspiration for almost all policy fields’ 
(Balkenende 2001: 232). He advocates an alternative perspective:
‘Most people in society realize that the process of individualization has reached its limit. 
Society is being experienced as impersonal and people are looking for certainty, recogni-
tion and respect. People fear that the value of solidarity will vanish. Time pressure has 
increased. People identify less with their work and to a decreasing extent they strive for 
economic status’. (Balkenende 2001, p. 253)
In addition, two political parties that have been part of the ‘purple’ govern-
mental coalition since 1994 share the criticism of the ‘marketization of soci-
ety’. The PvdA , which has just shed its ‘ideological feathers’ during its 
‘purple’ governmental years, reconsiders its political agenda and increas-
ingly discards the introduction of market processes in different segments of 
society. In the election program of the social democrats (2002-2006) we can 
read:
6 Van Gestel et al. suggest that a consensus could be formed because the most important 
coalition partners of the purple government, the socialist PvdA and the liberal VVD , 
interpreted concepts such as ‘the introduction of market processes’ in different ways 
(2010:94).
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‘Market processes have been the solution to all problems. We think that the citizen has an 
interest in more options and more quality. (…) After two decades of liberalization and 
privatization, experiences have not been altogether positive. The PvdA argues in favour 
of quality for everyone on the basis of solidarity . (…) We do not want a 24-hour economy, 
but a 24-hour good life’.(PvdA 2002a: 16)
Another coalition party, D66 , argues in this regard in favor of less ideology 
and more pragmatism, which according to this party is embodied in a ‘life 
course perspective ’:
‘The pointless fight between public service and market will be left behind. Now it is time 
for creative politics. (…) We have to realize that individual choices are not without conse-
quences for others. As a citizen and as a country we choose for more than our own inter-
est in the short term’ (D66 2002:1).
‘What matters in 2001 is to replace political, ideologically inspired perspectives with 
pragmatic perspectives. One of those perspectives is the perspective of the life course.’ 
(D66 2002: 6)
In sum, the emergence of the ‘life course perspective ’ in social security dis-
course can be situated in a shift from a corporatist welfare state towards a 
more liberal welfare state, which approaches social security increasingly in 
terms of economic incentives and disincentives, and individualized rights 
(instead of family based rights). Voices of resistance come, first of all, from 
family policy supporters and the feminist movement. In addition, some 
major political parties oppose the increased marketization of society . With-
in this discursive field, the signifier ‘life course perspective’ is introduced. 
Before the spread of the ‘life course perspective’ is further explicated in sec-
tion six, we first take a step back in the next section to study the origins of 
the ‘life course perspective’.
5.5 The ‘life course perspective’ as a research practice
According to Foucault (1984a), to understand our present regime of truth 
we have to investigate its ‘genealogical origins’ or its ‘conditions of the pos-
sibility’. Therefore, before the dispersion of the signifiers ‘life course’ and 
‘life course perspective’ in the social security discourse is further investi-
gated, this section studies the ‘genealogical’ origins of these signifiers.
Prior to the introduction of the signifier ‘life course perspective ’ in 
social security discourse, this signifier is, above all, used in scientific 
research practices. The first research practices which are based upon the 
‘life course perspective’ can be encountered in the United States just after 
World War II. The development of life course based research in this country 
seemed to have been conditioned upon the specific background situation 
of American society in that period: diverse demographic processes such as 
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immigration and aging in combination with the progress of new longitudi-
nal research methods stimulate research on themes such as diversity and 
individual differences. Researchers become interested in the influence of 
these social changes on individual lives in particular. They incorporate a 
‘life course perspective’ into their research to examine the patterns in the 
ways in which individuals construct their own life courses within histori-
cally determined constraints. This new approach in social research differs 
significantly from that of classic social research, which rather focused upon 
abstractions and the development of grand theories (Elder et al. 2003).
In the 1980s, Dutch researchers also start to conduct quantitative analy-
ses of life courses. Like their American colleagues, the Dutch researchers 
have become increasingly interested in studying individual processes 
instead of structures (Keilman 1986; Kuijsten 1992). In the late eighties and 
early nineties, a few Dutch researchers use life course research to counter 
the increasing dominance of the discourse on individualization. In their 
‘life course research’ they demonstrate that the stage in which a person 
lives with her family not only remains an important stage in the lives of 
most individuals, but also that the disposable income during this stage of 
‘family life’ is much lower than in the stages just before and after this peri-
od (Kronjee 1992; Kuijsten 1992; Latten 1993; Van Leeuwen 1990). Paradoxi-
cally, these researchers use life course research to reveal individual lives in 
order to counter the individualization discourse.
Life course research is also valuable to the economic theory of human 
capital . Due to the introduction of human capital theory, which emerges in 
the 1960s, the focus shifts from abstract relationships between labor, capital 
and production to individual choices that affect the worth of human capi-
tal. In the 1980s, Dutch interest in economic life cycle research increases as 
some economists realize that human capital theory does not account for the 
different life cycles of men and women and the values of human capital 
that result from it (Schippers 1987).
More recently, the life cycle approach has been used in the field of labor 
market studies. Schmid (1995) has developed a ‘transition model’ of the 
labor market that visualizes individual life courses as transitions in indi-
vidual lives where people shift from fields such as care, training, sabbati-
cals and (early) pension to the labor market and vice versa. According to 
him, full employment must be possible if – measured on a life course basis –
both men and women work an average of 30 hours per week. He further 
argues that temporary ‘transitions’ between different fields should be fos-
tered in order to prevent ‘structural unemployment’.
These examples show that life course research can be characterized by 
its attention to individual lives. Indeed, an essential aspect of life course 
research is that – in contrast to previous research – reality is constructed 
from the point of view of the individual whose decisions – which are made 
within historically and socially determined constraints – have an impact on 
herself and the world around her. As will be shown in the next two sections, 
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this meaning of life course perspective in research practices (i.e., the atten-
tion for individual lives in relation to their historical and social context) 
leaves traces behind in the Dutch discourse on ‘life course based policy’.
5.6 The dispersion of the life course perspective in social 
security discourse
This section examines how the ‘life course perspective ’ – which, as we saw 
in last section originated in scientific practices – dispersed in social security 
discourse . Additionally, it will be considered why some key actors identi-
fied with these new signifiers.
The research revealed, first of all, that one of the factors that contribut-
ed to the relatively quick spreading of the new signifiers could be ascribed 
to the fact that there was no one ‘singular origin’ from which the signifiers 
infiltrated the discourse. As one interviewee stated: 'It is not possible to tell 
who invented the "life course perspective ", the idea of the life course per-
spective was suddenly there, out of the blue, the idea floated in the air'. 
Indeed, around the turn of the century diverging actors belonging to differ-
ent political parties started to deploy the signifiers ‘life course’ and ‘life 
course perspective’ in social security discourse: (1) CDA , which sought to 
refurbish its traditional political agenda on family policy;7 (2) D66 , which 
specifically invested in emancipation issues;8 and (3) somewhat later, the 
PvdA , which in that period demanded attention for its orientation to ‘third 
way’ politics.9 Thanks to a number of meetings attended by a broad range 
of political actors, the new signifiers circulate further in social security dis-
course.10 Some policy actors endorsing the life course perspective contrib-
uted to this dispersion because of their involvement in other influential 
institutions such as: (1) the Social Economic Council (SER),11 a tripartite 
7 See CDA (2001).
8 See D66 (2001).
9 See PvdA (2002b).
10 October 1999 (Parliament) and 16 March 2001 (SER), conferences organized by the Joke 
Smit Stichting (non-governmental emancipatory institution). 1 February 2002 (Depart-
ment of Emancipation), expert meeting organized by the Department of Emancipation, 
The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) and the Dutch National Family 
Council (NGR). These meetings were followed by others, such as conferences organ-
ized by social partners on 26 February 2002 and 27 March 2002. Participants included, 
among others, representatives of diverse political parties; representatives of social part-
ners; experts (governmental advisors); representatives of non-governmental organiza-
tions (including SCP and NGR), and public offi cials.
11 Goudswaard (affi liated with D66 ), Bovenberg (affi liated with CDA ) and Leynse (affi li-
ated with PvdA ) all endorsed the new signifi ers and were Crown-appointed members 
of the SER. In a 2001 SER document on the future of employment policy, ‘life course 
perspective ’ is a central signifi er (SER, 2001).
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commission that advises the government on issues of social policy and 
occasionally on emancipation policy; (2) the Temporary Expert Commis-
sion Emancipation (TECENA), a commission that encourages advisory 
commissions to address the emancipation aspects of proposed policy in 
their advice;12 and (3) the Dutch National Family Council (NGR).13
The new signifiers fell in particular on fertile ground with prominent 
members of the CDA . In addition, some actors concerned with emancipa-
tion policy – some of whom are affiliated with D66 – recognized the poten-
tial of the new signifiers. The remainder of this section examines, on the 
basis of the interview data, why these key actors were so attracted to the 
‘life course perspective ’.
Cuyvers , who was a member of the Dutch National Family Council 
and an advisor to the CDA , contended that he wanted to prove that the 
stage of family life was still an important stage in most people’s lives. In 
fact, he used the signifier ‘life course perspective ’ in the same way as some 
Dutch life course researchers had applied it. That is, for him, 'the life course 
had been the explanatory model to combat the "myth" of individualiza-
tion'. Another Christian democrat, De Geus, who was Minister of Employ-
ment and Social Affairs between 2002 and 2007, also argued that he used 
the new signifier for strategic reasons. According to him, the ‘life course 
perspective’ could reconcile CDA’s traditional agenda on family life with 
modern society :
‘We were looking for a concept that would express both the idea of family life and the 
(desired increased) labor participation of women. Where traditional ideas on the bread-
winner society were not fruitful anymore, the concept of “life course” felt as a lucky 
strike. We thought: now we have really discovered a strategic treasure, a concept that 
respects family life, that represents modernity, and that suits politics of reduced govern-
ment’.
On the other hand, however, De Geus also felt that the introduction of the 
signifier ‘life course’ in social security discourse helped to structure modes 
of thinking in a new way and opened up possibilities to break through 
existing dichotomies:
‘The name “life course” was important to the CDA . We insisted that a new instrument of 
social security, which would address these objectives, carried the name ‘life course’, as 
the new instrument had to become an ‘image carrier of a new perspective, a new ambi-
tion’.
12 Evenhuis and Schippers , affi liated with D66 and members of TECENA, endorsed the 
new signifi ers.
13 Cuyvers , affi liated with CDA , was a staff member of the Dutch National Family Council.
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This was confirmed by van Asselt, a member of the research institute for 
the CDA , who argued that ‘as a frame of mind, “life course” totally dis-
turbed the social security system’. The new concept was thus celebrated as 
an appealing invention that carried a promise for the future.
Economic scientist Bovenberg , advisor to the CDA , whom other inter-
viewees credited with being the ‘father of the Life Course Arrangement ’ 
also mentioned that the signifier ‘life course’ provided ‘an escape’:
‘The initial reason that people started to think about the “life course perspective ” was to 
transcend the standard dichotomy between those who believe that children should be 
educated and raised within the realm of the family on one hand and those who argued 
that women should participate in the labor market on the other. Hence, the concept of 
‘life course’ provided an escape from the “musty smell” (…). In addition, the ‘life course’ 
concept sustained the activation of the system of social security and a way to reinvent the 
labor union and solidarity ’.
Bovenberg further explained how the new signifiers helped him to recon-
cile his individual religious belief with his views on society:
‘The term “life course” involves the union of one’s individual interests with the interests 
of others: unity in diversity. There is always tension within a society: between individu-
alization and collectivity, between left and right, between liberalism and socialism. How-
ever, at the same time they belong together; one cannot exist without the other. You can 
only become human if you also think about others; and you can only be a collective if 
people also think about themselves. Thus, there is no paradox at all between individual-
ity and collectivity. Ultimately this is the Christian religion, God’s triad: God is one, but 
also diverse. (…) Therefore, the idea of “life courses” should partake in a larger cultural 
offensive in which people are educated in social life. (...) Hence, what is important is not 
so much a new arrangement of social security, but a new perspective on one’s life. This 
means that people invest in themselves, in their individual health, in their relationships; 
that they realize that they possess human capital and social capital’.
Hence, for Bovenberg the new signifiers did not only shape a new dis-
course on the social security system, it also helped to constitute a new unit-
ed society.
A few actors concerned with emancipation issues also endorsed the new 
signifiers ‘life course’ and ‘life course perspective ’. According to Schippers , 
a member of TECENA, the ‘life course perspective’ was in fact developed 
within ‘the emancipatory way of thinking’. In addition, Evenhuis , a mem-
ber of TECENA and chairwoman of the national office for age discrimina-
tion, argued that for her ‘the “life course perspective” opened up new pos-
sibilities, because this perspective threw new light on existing relationships 
and particularly provided inspiration for improving legislation and policy.’ 
Wierda, an emancipation policymaker, emphasized the strategic advantages 
of the new signifiers as they facilitated the Department of Emancipation to 
distance itself from the anti-family feminist movement and to form a coali-
tion with former opponents, such as the Dutch National Family Council. 
The new signifiers put emancipation policy in a new perspective:
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‘In the preceding years we had attempted in vain to include care in the system of social 
security. We could not obtain sufficient political support for these plans. The life course 
offered a new way of integrating care in the system of social security (….) We also dis-
tanced ourselves a bit from the anti-family feminist movement and looked for a broader 
coalition, and ended up with the concept of life courses. (…) We collaborated with the 
Dutch National Family Council. Our motto was: “If you can’t beat them, join them.” In 
the early stages of emancipation policy it had been necessary to be anti-family, because at 
that time the traditional ideology on motherhood dominated the discourse. However, 
they kept on repeating this stance whereas, in my opinion, there is nothing wrong with a 
modern family. The Dutch National Family Council was a good partner in our coalition, 
it strengthened our position'.
Furthermore, according to Wierda, the new signifiers offered new impulses 
for reform:
‘The life course perspective was a concept that provided emancipation policy with new 
impulses. The old debates were dominated by ‘individualization of the system of social 
security ’. Since you were either an opponent or a supporter of “individualization”, this 
debate was paralyzed. The life course perspective offered new opportunities’.
In summary, the interviews show that strategic reasoning was important 
with respect to the introduction of the new signifiers. The actors used the 
signifiers to promote their own body of thought. On the other hand, the 
signifiers affected the discourse in other ways also: they entailed a promise 
for change, served as inspiration for reform of the social security system 
and gave shape to a new, emerging discourse.
5.7 Analysis of the texts
The new signifiers popped up in a number of texts, reaching a peak around 
the year 2001. The heuristic questions that were introduced in the third sec-
tion form the starting point for the analysis of eleven selected texts. The 
analysis was guided by the main research question that was formulated in 
section two: ‘What was the role of the new signifiers, “life course” and “life 
course perspective ” in the process of policy change ?’ Section 5.7.1 address-
es the question how the selected texts were constituted. For this purpose 
the argumentation strategies of all texts were analyzed. As was explained 
in section 3, the texts that were selected for further analysis entailed, next to 
three basic texts, eight other texts that originated from five actors who pre-
sented different views on the ‘life course perspective’. Section 5.7.2 and 
5.7.3 investigate more in detail the argumentative strategies, nomination 
strategies and predication strategies that are used in these texts. As such 
section 5.7.2 reveals how the texts diverge. Section 5.7.3, on the other hand, 
points at some important convergences between the texts. Section 5.7.4 
summarizes the main conclusions that can be drawn from the textual anal-
ysis.
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5.7.1 The constitution of reality in the texts
In order to figure out which signifiers were constitutive of the text, the main 
claims made in each text were listed. The texts, first of all, appeared to 
deploy similar argumentative strategies: after a description of main social 
trends, existing institutions were problematized and proposals for institu-
tional reforms were made. In fact, the claims could be categorized according 
to the following categories: social trends (and threats) such as aging, indi-
vidualization, globalization, and the increased labor participation of wom-
en; problematization of those trends, involving an account of their expected 
negative consequences; undesired reality, enfolding an unattractive picture of 
a (static) future social system; and finally, desired reality in which we encoun-
ter a more dynamic social security system that is tailored to the described 
social trends. The argumentation strategy thus followed the structure of a 
‘narrative of control’, which after telling what is going wrong, offers some 
possibilities of interference (Stone 1988). Section 5.7.2 examines in more 
detail what ‘narratives of control’ were told in the investigated documents.
The analysis of the argumentation strategies according to the afore-
mentioned categories revealed that the signifier ‘life course’ was frequently 
present in all different types of claims. Moreover, in most cases the signi-
fier ‘life course’ and related signifiers (‘period of life’, ‘transitions’ and ‘life 
patterns’) dominated the argument. The analysis of one of the three basic 
texts on life course policy, the CDA document, can serve as an illustration. 
Table 5.1 shows how the main claims in the text were listed according to 
the categories social trends, problematization of social trends, undesired reality 
and desired reality. In each category most of the claims included the words 
‘life course’ or acquainted words, such as ‘periods in life’ or ‘stages in life’. 
These claims were listed first. The second part of each category comprises 
the main claims in the text that did not refer to these new signifiers. The 
CDA document starts with a description of social trends. As the table shows, 
almost all ‘social trends’ refer to the emergence of a ‘modern life course’. 
This ‘modern’ or ‘changed life course’ is problematized, because people 
have to combine more activities – work, care and education/training – in 
the same ‘stage of life’, which gives rise to ‘financial, economic and emo-
tional problems’ (problematization). Most important, current institutions 
cannot accommodate ‘modern life courses’ as they are still tailored to the 
‘standard life course’ (undesired reality). The document further designs 
some future social security institutions that address the diversity of labor 
participation and the preservation of employability during the entire ‘life 
course’ (desired reality).
The textual analysis thus shows how the world becomes meaningful 
from the perspective of ‘life course’. From the textual analysis of the oth-
er texts similar conclusions could be drawn. That is, in most selected texts 
trends, threats and reform were approached in terms of ‘life courses’ or relat-
ed signifiers, such as ‘periods of life’, ‘life patterns’ and ‘transitions in life’.
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Table 5.1 Argumentation strategies CDA (2001)
categories Main claims in the text
Social trends – increased prosperity has affected the life course;
– although there is more time and space for different choices in the 
life course, people are still devoted to the values and norms that 
are attached to the existing institutions; in addition, a sense for 
community remains important;
– in the modern life course the stage of family life remains dominant;
– in the modern life course people combine more activities;
– in the modern life course the division of roles between men and 
women is increasingly blurred;
– compared to the traditional life course, the modern life course 
contains two extra periods;
– modern society can be characterized with trends as globalization, 
technological developments and aging;
– in modern society traditional religious and political barriers are 
removed and the emphasis has shifted to individual life designs.
Problematization 
of social trends
– because of changed life courses the interests of children and the 
interests of people in need of care are endangered;
– because of a diversity in life courses and an increase in activities, 
‘leaves’ have to be bridged;
– families can be conceived as the losers within the life course;
– in the period of family life people suffer a loss of income; this also 
affects the life of the children;
– new life courses cause pressure to achieve and increased insecurity;
– the overstrained labor market and the new life course cause prob-
lems in financial, economic and emotional realms;
– a lot of women and men are not able to realize their desired family 
ideal;
– the Dutch knowledge economy has a shortage of well educated 
people. 
Undesired reality – institutions are tailored to the standard life course;
– labor market policy does not conjure up with developments in the 
life course (transitions, lifelong learning);
– the social security system and collective labor arrangements are 
still tailored to the traditional life course as a result of which it is 
difficult to combine diverse activities during the life course; people 
are insufficiently protected;
– the social security system is insufficiently tailored to the modern 
life course, particularly in regard of different labor patterns and 
the need for education;
– the one-sided attention for female economic independency injures 
the desires with respect to the modern life course, in the period of 
family life in particular; 
– problems arise in case the government disposes of relations of 
mutual solidarity;
– science was wrong to depict citizens as rational economic persons;
– it was wrong to limit labor market policy to the realm of the factory.
Desired realities – Institutions should become more tailored to increase the diversity 
of labor participation during the life course without dispersing the 
realm of income, career perspective and family;
– Employability and education during the period in the life course 
that people participate in the labor market should become more 
and more important.
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In addition to the analysis of argumentative strategies, the main nomina-
tion strategies and predication strategies in all eleven texts were catego-
rized. This analysis revealed that terms such as ‘life course perspective ’, 
‘modern life course’, ‘transitional labor markets’ and ‘perspective on labor 
patterns’ were put into a chain of equivalences with words like ‘modern’, 
‘dynamic’, ‘diversity’, ‘free choice’ and ‘change’. A contrasting chain of 
equivalences was built among words such as ‘traditional life course’ and 
‘standard life course’, which were associated with words like ‘static’, ‘role 
patterns’ and ‘clear activities’. These specific forms of argumentation thus 
foregrounded the new and dynamic aspects of ‘the modern life course’. 
Since the construction of these opposing chains of equivalences constituted 
both the desired system of social security and the undesired system of 
social security, the new signifiers gave new meaning to the signifier ‘social 
security’. That is to say, the signifier ‘social security’ was now understood 
in relation to its effects on individual ‘life courses’.
In sum, from the analysis of the texts it can be concluded that the signi-
fier ‘life course’ constituted a new world. Trends, problems, undesired and 
desired realities, including the undesired and desired social security sys-
tem, became meaningful in relation to a new chain of equivalences that was 
established around the signifier ‘life course’.
5.7.2 Different meanings of life course policy
The analysis of the eight texts that originated from five key actors revealed 
that, notwithstanding a similar constitution (‘life course’), the texts differed 
in important aspects. That is, the identification of ‘social trends’, ‘problema-
tization of those trends’, ‘undesired realities’ and ‘desired realities’ revealed 
five different ‘narrative of control’, which filled the signifier ‘life course’ 
with different meaning.
Table 5.2 shows that five different narrative could be distinguished: the 
‘family life narrative’, the ‘diversity narrative’, the ‘emancipation narra-
tive’, the ‘human capital narrative’ and the ‘new risks narrative’. Each of 
these narratives contained a different storyline and, accordingly filled the 
signifier ‘life course perspective ’ with different meaning. The family life nar-
rative problematizes the period in life during which one or two parents 
have to take care of their children because of a financial shortage. The prob-
lem can be solved in case time and money are redistributed during the life 
course. The ‘life course perspective’ thus refers to the ‘income gap’ that citi-
zens experience during the stage of family life. The diversity narrative dis-
putes the fact that social security institutions are still based on standard 
male life courses, while at the same time life courses of women have 
become more diverse. It is argued that social security institutions should 
anticipate on these diversified lives. Accordingly, the ‘life course perspec-
tive’ views and celebrates the diverse lives of women. The emancipation nar-
rative argues for the facilitation of leave arrangements, which enhances the 
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female labor market participation. Within this narrative the ‘life course per-
spective’ involves the view on ‘transitions’ of workers between the spheres 
of paid work and care. The human capital narrative problematizes the depre-
ciation of human capital in current social security system. According to this 
narrative, human capital is the key to labor participation. The ‘life course 
perspective’ refers to a perspective on the depreciation and investments in 
human capital during the life course. Finally, in the new risks narrative it is 
argued that it is inefficient to base the social security system on ‘external 
risks ’, because it is clear in modern society to a great extent people are able 
to influence risks of unemployment and/or having children. Shifting the 
emphasis to manufactured risks (i.e. ‘internal risks') will result in a stimula-
tion of labor market participation. In this narrative the ‘life course perspec-
tive’ shows how life courses increasingly become the product of ones own 
choices.
Taken together the narratives told two different stories. On the one 
hand, ‘the life course perspective ’ revealed how the labor market participa-
tion could be increased. On the other hand, the ‘life course perspective’ 
expressed the desire to increase the quality of life. As such, the narratives 
seemed to be partly continuous and partly discontinuous with the domi-
nant social security discourse at that time. On the one hand, then, the narra-
tives that argued for an increased labor market participation along with a 
more efficient social security system, ‘human capital ’ and ‘new risks ’, pur-
sued the dominant social security discourse. On the other hand, the narra-
tives ‘family life’ and ‘diversity’, which emphasized the quality of life 
would also entail the facilitation of the preferences of those who, for vari-
ous reasons, prefer – in some periods in their lives – to spend their time 
with other activities than (only) paid work. These narratives thus endorsed 
the counter discourses . The narrative ‘emancipation ’ occupied a middle 
position in this respect, as this narrative dealt with both the (desired) 
increased labor market participation and the issue of combining this 
increased labor market participation with care activities.
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Table 5.2 Five narratives 
Key signifier Narrative Meaning of the life 
course perspective
Family life Parents are not (financially) capable of 
caring for their children; a ‘family gap’ 
is emerging. Therefore, a redistribution 
should take place of the peak load in 
time and money during the life course.
Perspective to view the 
income gap during the 
stage of family life
Diversity Social security institutions are based on 
the standard male life course, whereas 
life courses (in particular those of 
women) and desires have become more 
diverse. These institutions should antici-
pate on the diverse range of activities 
that people (whish to) perform within 
one life period.
Perspective to view (and 
celebrate) the diverse life 
courses of women
Emancipation Institutions of social security and labor 
market policy are insufficiently tailored 
to the increased labor market participa-
tion of women. Social security should be 
based on transitional labor markets that 
facilitate leave arrangements for both 
men and women.
Perspective to analyze the 
transitions of men and 
women between the 
spheres of paid work and 
care
Human capital The current social security system stim-
ulates the depreciation of human capi-
tal . Human capital is the key to the 
desired labor participation. A system of 
social security that is based upon invest-
ments in human capital should depart 
from a better spread of education, work, 
care and spare time over a life course.
Perspective to view the 
investments and depreci-
ation of human capital 
New risks Although consciousness has grown that 
people can influence risks to a great 
extent, the social security system is still 
based on the idea of external risks . In 
regard of the growing importance of 
manufactured risks , 
the system of social security should be 
based increasingly on investment incen-
tives and individual responsibility.
Perspective that enables 
one to view the life course 
as an individual product 
in which the individual 
makes her own risk based 
decisions
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5.7.3 Convergence between the narratives 
Despite the evident differences and – in some cases – incompatibilities 
between the new (policy) narratives that accompanied the introduction of 
the new signifier ‘life course perspective ’, section 5.7.1 suggested that the 
introduction of this new signifier established a common vocabulary that 
constituted a common discourse. This section presents some additional 
convergences between the different identified narratives .
In the first place, as the analysis of predication strategies in Table 5.3 
demonstrates, the different texts endorsed a similar construction of the 
subject. That is, the signifiers ‘life course perspective ’ and ‘life course’ pro-
moted new subject constructions that just slightly differed from the earlier 
rational calculating subject. To begin with, the two narratives that contin-
ued the former discourse – ‘human capital ’ and ‘new risks ’ – partly 
replaced and partly completed the picture of the calculating subject with a 
new type of rational acting subject. This newly constructed subject is, above 
all, capable of planning her entire life based on her preferences. As such, 
within the ‘human capital’ narrative the individual and/or the worker is 
constructed as a ‘flexible entrepreneur’ that ‘invests in her own capital and 
that of her children’ and is responsible for dividing her income during the 
life course. The ‘new risks’ narrative which also constructs the individual/
worker as an ‘entrepreneur that works on her own competences’, emphasiz-
es in particular the relationship between this entrepreneurship and risk behav-
ior, implying that the entrepreneurial worker must be viewed more and more 
as a consumer in the social security market. In addition, subjects who are not 
yet capable of making their individual life plan must be either ‘empow-
ered’ to make autonomous decisions (Schippers 2001) or ‘educated’ 
through savings systems within the social security system (Bovenberg 
2003).
Even the narratives that represented former voices of resistance – ‘fam-
ily life’ and ‘diversity’ – endorsed this ‘subject of choices’ who continuous-
ly weighs her preferences against the expected costs. Then, according to the 
‘family life’ narrative, the individual/worker ‘must have more choices with 
regard to investments in family life and labor participation’. In addition the 
‘diversity’ narrative emphasizes that individuals/workers need to balance 
their lives between ‘their own interests and preferences and those of their part-
ner, children and others’.
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Table 5.3 The construction of the subject in the different narratives 
Narrative Individuals/Workers
Family life – live mostly in the realm of a family;
– increasingly endorse the principles of emancipation , freedom of 
choice , and individualization;
– must have more choices with regard to investments in family life 
and labor participation;
Diversity – have a ‘double loyalty’ in their life course: their own interests and 
preferences and those of their partner, children and others;
Emancipation – have an interest in more freedom of choice with respect to their 
own life course;
– must be empowered to participate in the labor market;
Human capital – need to be flexible;
– behave as entrepreneurs;
– must invest in their own human capital and that of their children;
– are responsible for dividing their income during their life course;
New risks – want to take more risks and responsibility for social risks;
– need incentives to continue working and refrain from welfare 
facilities;
– must permanently work on their competences;
– must behave as entrepreneurs;
– must be new consumers in transparent markets for care, education 
and social security .
Secondly, the new signifiers pointed to a shared discourse that ‘Dutch peo-
ple have always taken care of their children by themselves and that they 
desire to continue this way of life’. This discourse endorses part of the ear-
lier criticism from both feminists and supporters of family policy, because it 
acknowledges the problem that accompanies the combination of paid work 
and unpaid care activities. As a matter of fact, all narratives more or less 
problematize the ‘double tasking’ of workers, usually women. The analysis 
of predication strategies revealed that 8 out of 11 analyzed documents, 
which included all distinguished storylines , endorsed this desire for hav-
ing more time for bringing up the children. This is illustrated in a number 
of quotes in Table 4. Furthermore, the outcome of the research provides 
evidence that the introduction of the signifiers ‘life course’ and ‘life course 
perspective ’ initiated some discursive interchange between former voices 
of resistance that appealed to family values and care tasks and the domi-
nant social security discourse in the mid-1990s. For example, whereas in 
the mid-1990s PvdA and D66 , parties in the governmental coalition 
between 1994 and 2002, had openly rejected family policy, in 2002 the facili-
tation of family life was one of the themes in the election campaigns of 
these parties (De Hoog and Hooghiemstra 2002).
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The construction of a common ‘(responsible) subject of choices’ and the 
desire ‘to care for the children by ourselves’ suggest that the signifiers ‘life 
course’ and ‘life course perspective ’ not only constituted a new social secu-
rity discourse, they also seem to have created a new space of representation 
in which the ‘subject of choices’ was joined with a ‘Dutch desire to care for 
the children by themselves’. In this new space of representation it was pos-
sible to represent the potential beneficiaries of the social security system as 
both fellow citizens in need of collective support and as self-interested con-
sumers. As such, the values of solidarity and efficiency were united in a 
common discourse.
Table 5.4 Care for children as a common discourse
‘We all want to stay strongly involved in the upbringing of our children’ (Leynse 2001a);
‘Compared with other European countries the Netherlands is a country of people who 
combine different tasks’ (Bovenberg 2003);
‘The Dutch people strongly desire (at least partly) to take care of their children by them-
selves’ (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2002);
‘Abolition of breadwinner facilities without creating new care facilities can endanger 
social cohesion’ (SER 2001);
‘The majority of the population still thinks that family situations where both parents 
work full-time are not preferable’ (CDA 2001);
‘People face a double loyalty, they have to be available for paid labor and for care’ 
(Evenhuis 1999b);
‘New slogan: 32 hours while retaining the kids’ (Schippers 2001).
5.7.4 Main conclusions with respect to the textual analysis
The textual analysis revealed, first of all, that the signifiers ‘life course’ and 
‘life course perspective ’ constituted the texts. That is, in these texts the 
world is viewed from the perspective of the ‘life course’. As a result, the 
signifier ‘social security ’ now becomes meaningful in its relationship with 
these new signifiers. The textual analysis also revealed that the meaning of 
the ‘life course perspective’ depended on the partly incompatible narra-
tives within which it was expressed. Whereas some of these narratives 
reflected the dominant social security discourse at that time, other narra-
tives rather endorsed the counter discourses. The analysis thus suggests 
that this signifier ‘life course perspective’ was able to unite partly incom-
patible discourses. On the basis of the last part of the analysis it was con-
cluded that a synthesis between the different narratives was also furthered 
because of the creation of a new space of representation in which the ‘sub-
ject of choices’ was joined with the ‘Dutch desire to care for the children by 
themselves’.
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5.8 The ‘life course perspective ’ and the act of naming
How can we interpret the outcome of this study in the perspective of post-
structuralist discourse theory ? First of all, this study has demonstrated 
that, instead of merely being instruments of external persuasion, the new 
signifiers ‘life course’ and ‘life course perspective ’ were constitutive of the 
construction of undesired and desired reality and consequently filled the 
signifier ‘social security’ with new meaning. The creation of a common 
vocabulary and the resulting interdiscursive communication between 
former dominant discourses and counter discourses seems to have created 
something new: the act of naming established a new perspective on social 
security, a perspective that created unity among a variety of discourses and 
counter discourses , which would address the need for an enhanced (indi-
vidual responsibility for) labor participation in a way that did not nega-
tively affect the quality of lives of individuals who preferred to participate 
in non-paid work activities.
The analysis further suggests that naming the desired changes ‘life 
course’ policy involved a catachretic name, because there was no other rep-
resentation that could replace this new mode of social policy. This act of 
naming brought into being ‘something’ that had already been there in 
counter discourses, but that had not been properly worked out yet, for the 
lack of representation. The problem of connecting a finite number of words 
and the infinite number of things in the world was solved by transposing 
the signifier ‘life course perspective ’ from the sphere of research practices 
to social security discourse. Following Laclau , it can be argued that this 
catachretic act of naming fostered new ways of reasoning that were essen-
tial for the production of ‘new spaces of representation’ that sustain new 
discourses and new coalitions. This new space of representation imagined 
a ‘subject of choices’ that prefers ‘to take care of its own children’. Within 
this new space of representation a reformed social security system would 
both stimulate labor market participation and improve quality of life for all 
Dutch citizens. As such, values as solidarity and efficiency were united in a 
common ‘life course based discourse’.
The case study also endorses Laclau ’s and Norval ’s ideas that the iden-
tification with new signifiers produces affect that contributes to policy 
change . First of all, actors could identify with the new signifiers, ‘life 
course’ and ‘life course perspective ’, because they recognized that they 
provided a way out of their old discursive positions; they held a promise of 
something new. The signifiers appealed to ‘aspect dawning ’, capturing a 
feeling of surprise or excitement that can be described by a sentence like 
'now we have got it'. This first moment of surprise, seems to have provided 
the energy for the establishment of this discourse. In addition, Bovenberg ’s 
conflation of ‘life course’ with ‘unity in diversity’ provides evidence for the 
assumption that the act of naming responds to a subconscious desire for 
fullness. The fact that the new signifiers addressed formerly opposed nar-
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ratives further supports this conclusion. That is, the new discourse was 
structured around the fantasy that increased labor participation and more 
time for care or leisure do not cancel each other out. The new rhetoric also 
closed the new spaces of representation that it just had created. For exam-
ple, endorsing the fantasy that all subjects are driven by choices, alternative 
subject constructions were foreclosed. Thus the act of naming the new 
social policy ‘life course policy’ comprised a fantasmatic dimension which, 
as Glynos and Howarth have argued, provides a ground for critique.
In sum, as the new policy was called ‘life course policy’, the dominant 
social security discourse was constituted in a new way, containing both the 
former dominant discourse and the voices of resistance. The catachretic act 
of naming produced new spaces of representation within which (partly) 
incompatible goals and values were united. Actors identified with these 
new signifiers because they contained a promise, a way out of the old, 
dead-end discursive positions. Hence, this study suggests that the intro-
duction of the new signifiers ‘life course’ and ‘life course perspective ’ con-
tributed to an important, albeit temporary, policy change in which the 
emphasis shifted from a policy informed by the values of the market to a 
work-life balance policy.
5.9 Concluding observations
Along with the analysis in section 9, some additional conclusions can be 
drawn from this study. First of all, this study has demonstrated that a dis-
course theoretical analysis of the use of rhetoric contributes to the explana-
tion of policy change . This is not to say, however, that other approaches that 
are based on a ‘post-positivist paradigm of explanation ’ are rejected.14 The 
study rather suggests that a discourse analysis of rhetoric may be used 
together with other explanatory approaches, on the condition that their 
ontological assumptions are adjusted to discourse theory .
Secondly, some additional comments can be made with respect to cata-
chresis . Whereas catachresis involves ‘the use of a figural term when there 
is no literal term that can replace it’, this study also showed that the trans-
position of a signifier from one sphere to another sphere leaves traces 
behind in the latter sphere. Indeed, it was possible to observe some conver-
gences between the meaning of life course perspective in specific research 
practices and in social security discourse. In the first place, like social scien-
tific life course research, the ‘diversity narrative ’ and the ‘new risks narra-
tive’ endorsed concrete individual persons as basic ontological categories. 
14 For example, Hajer ’s concept of storyline and discourse coalitions can also add to the 
explanation of the emergence of a life course discourse in the Netherlands (Eleveld 
2013a).
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Secondly, like recent Dutch life course research, the ‘family life narrative’ 
took the individual family as a basic ontological category. And finally, like 
economic life cycle research and the research on transitional labor markets, 
the ‘human capital narrative’, the ‘emancipation narrative’ and the ‘new 
risks narrative’ viewed the individual lives of men and women as ‘transi-
tions’ between different domains. In addition, both the ‘life course dis-
course ’ and the life course research practices were sustained by the same 
individualization discourse. This relationship between the meaning of the 
signifiers in the first sphere and the transposed (catachretic) sphere , needs 
to be developed further.
The case study further revealed that DHA provides useful tools for a 
poststructuralist rhetorical analysis. The analysis of the nomination strate-
gies, predication strategies and argumentative strategies of the selected 
texts were in particular useful for the analysis of the constitution of the new 
discourse . In addition, the analysis of argumentation strategies proved to 
be helpful for deciphering (policy) narratives . As such, DHA might also be 
useful for interpretive policy analysis. Nonetheless, more methodological 
tools are needed to conduct thorough empirical research based on post-
structuralist discourse theory , in particular, with respect to the relationship 
between affect and policy change . This paper therefore encourages scholars 
to engage in poststructuralist empirical studies to further develop empiri-
cal research methods.
In sum, though there is still a lot of work to be done to translate dis-
course theoretical concepts to less abstract methodological tools, the case of 
the emergence of Dutch life course policy has shown that discourse theory 
can certainly contribute to an explanation of policy change that is rooted in 
a post-positivist paradigm of explanation.
Abstract
How can actors with very different views of the world around them reach 
an agreement on a new social policy? Around the turn of the century, a new 
approach to the social security system was introduced in The Netherlands: 
the ‘life course perspective’. The approach was to anticipate how individu-
als organize their lives into working life and other activities such as educa-
tion, care, and leisure. Various groups, such as proponents of family policy, 
workers, employers, feminists, and socialist, Christian and liberal parties 
endorsed this ‘life course perspective’. This chapter investigates how the 
discourse about the new approach afforded an agreement on a politically 
controversial issue. A discourse-analytic methodology was adopted on the 
hypothesis that the central storyline of the discourse gives a broad sense of 
cohesion to the signifier and works like glue. Each actor could interpret the 
‘life course perspective’ on their own terms, leaving it open to acceptance 
from different perspectives and thus allowing for an unusual coalition.
A slightly modified version of this paper will be published in: Kaal, B., 
Maks, I., and Van Elfrinkhof, A. (eds.), From text to political position. Converg-
ing approaches to estimating party positions (Book series Discourse approaches 
to politics society and culture), Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publisinhg.co, 
chapter 9 (Eleveld 2013a).
6 Christians, feminists, liberals, socialists, 
workers and employers: The emergence 
of an unusual discourse coalition
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6.1 Introduction
Just after the turn of this century, the issue of a life course based system of 
social security arose on the Dutch policy agenda. The social security system 
was to be reformed into a ‘life course based’ system. This idea was shared 
by diverse groups, such as supporters of family policy; labor unions; 
employer unions; social-democrats, Christian and liberal political parties 
and feminists. This roughly meant that they agreed on a new social security 
system that should anticipate on the ways individuals prefer to distribute 
their time between work and other activities like care, education, leisure, 
etc. In 2006, the consensus on the life course perspective was followed by 
the introduction of the Life Course Arrangement, a new instrument of 
social security law. This chapter seeks to answer the question how the reali-
zation of an agreement on ‘life course policy’ can be explained as such 
diverse parties were involved.
New institutionalist approaches to policy analysis often experience dif-
ficulties explaining institutional changes, particularly with respect to social 
security policies (Hemerijck & Visser 1997; Pierson 2000; Powel & DiMag-
gio 1991). Therefore, new institutionalist theory increasingly turns to post-
positivist policy analysis (Schmidt 2008). Scholars working within the field 
of post-positivist policy analysis particularly recognize the central role of 
values in the process of policymaking (Fisher 2003; Hajer and Wagenaar 
2003). For such scholars, problems are not a given in the world waiting for 
policymakers to take action; instead, these problems are actively construct-
ed in the form of narratives or storylines . According to Hajer (1995), an 
important function of a storyline is that it can both simplify the various 
aspects of a complex problem and facilitate different groups to read their 
own narrative in this storyline. As a result, a storyline not only suggests 
unity in complex situations, it is also able to create unity among different 
groups. In fact, the main property of a storyline is that ‘it sounds right’. In 
case a number of actors in the context of a set of practices use a particular 
set of storylines a discourse coalition may emerge that can facilitate change.
This study demonstrates how, post-positivist policy analysis can con-
tribute to the explanation of agenda setting and policy change . The hypoth-
esis is that a broad discourse coalition could emerge, because different 
actors were able to read their own narrative into an appealing storyline on 
the life course perspective . Based on this assumption, the study seeks to 
contribute to a further development of research methods on the formation 
of discourse coalitions within texts, an approach that has so far remained 
rather undeveloped.
Drawing on Schmidt (2002, 2008) this study distinguishes between the 
‘coordinative’ and the ‘communicative discourse’. The construction of a 
discourse coalition takes place at the level of the coordinative discourse, 
which is located in the policy sphere and consists of individuals and 
groups, such as civil servants, elected officials, experts and organized 
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interest and activists, who are involved in the ‘creation, elaboration, and 
justification of policy and programmatic ideas’ (Schmidt 2008: 310). The 
coordinative discourse can be contrasted with the communicative dis-
course in that it operates in the political sphere in which various individu-
als and groups seek to convince the public. Whereas in countries with a 
single authority, such as France and the UK, the communicative discourse 
dominates, the coordinative discourse is particularly important in corpo-
ratist and multi-party countries such as The Netherlands where close con-
sultations between different (small) parties are imperative in the decision-
making process. In these multi-party countries the communicative 
discourse is made subordinate to coordinative discourse, because it could 
easily disrupt carefully construed compromises. A discourse coalition is, 
then, understood to be ‘a coalition between different discursive positions 
within the coordinative discourse which aims to influence the policy 
agenda’.1
This study on the formation of discourse coalitions distinguishes ana-
lytically between different functions of narratives in the policy process. To 
enhance the potential revisability of the study (Wesley 2012), hermeneutic 
methods, which are commonly used in post-positivist policy analysis, are 
complemented with tools derived from Discourse Historical Analysis. 
Analysis of the results leads to reflections on the implications of this 
approach for a post-positivist policy analysis of discourse coalitions and 
considerations as to what extent other methods that are presented in this 
volume can contribute to the analysis.
6.2 Methodology: A post-positivist analysis of narratives 
Post-positivist policy analysis is a term for a broad range of analytical 
approaches in the field of policy analysis, which seeks to move beyond an 
‘objectivist’ concept of reality. Scholars working within this field primarily 
object to the positivistic claim that policy problems can be approached in a 
technocratic, pure empiricist way. Rather, policy problems are constructed 
in the form of narratives . For analytically purposes this section distinguish-
es between the following overlapping functions of policy narratives : they 
can reflect meaningful realities (narrative as meaningful practice); they can 
function as an argumentative strategy (narrative as argumentative practice); 
and they can generate social change (narrative as transformative practice).
1 Note that this defi nition of a discourse coalition diverges from Hajer ’s defi nition which 
also takes the practices into account in which storylines are uttered.
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Story telling is considered an important instrument to frame problems, 
because the elements of a specific story become related with a particular 
way of looking at these elements. An analysis of the narratives , expressed 
in different interpretive communities eventually reveals the underlying 
interpretive frames through which different meanings are expressed 
(Schön and Rein 1977, 1994; Yanow 2000). A policy frame selects and high-
lights certain features of a policy problem while it ignores other features. In 
addition, a policy frame connects the salient features into a pattern that is 
coherent and easy to grasp (Schön and Rein 1977). Instead of identifying, 
the ‘right’ interpretation, the analyst should conceive conflicts between 
interpretive frames as an opening for a new understanding of the policy 
problem (Yanow 2000) or to reframe the policy problem (Schön and Rein 
1994). The analysis of narratives as a reflection of meaningful realities thus 
enables us to comprehend how a discourse coalition is endorsed in differ-
ent interpretive frames .
Although Schön and Rein argue that (policy) narratives can reveal the 
‘tacit’ frames that underlie the problem settings, particularly in their later 
work, they do not strictly distinguish between narratives and frames 
(1994). This study follows Brandwein (2006) who proposes to separate 
baseline categories of thought from their interpretive products.2 According 
to Brandwein , an interpretive frame consists of baseline categories of 
thought which can give rise to different narratives . Together, these ele-
ments form the interpretive frame in which certain aspects of a policy prob-
lem is highlighted while other features are ignored. In case the baseline cat-
egories of thought are analytically separated from their interpretive 
products the process of interpretation comes to the fore.
In interpretive policy analysis, the analysis of frames requires first of all 
an articulation of the policy narratives that are presented in a policy text. 
Consequently, the analyst has to find out which baseline categories of 
thought give rise to these narratives . For these purposes the analyst has to 
engage in a hermeneutic analysis of (spoken) texts. This means that after a 
first interpretation of the text or interview, further analysis is required in 
order to check if the interpretation is (in-)complete or erroneous. In this 
process the analyst eventually interprets the texts in the context of other 
related texts, which may also be her own intent and thoughts. In fact, the 
analysts may go back and forth from text to context several times. This 
hermeneutic circle ends when further analysis does not lead to any new 
interpretation (Schwarz-Shea 2006, Yanow 2006).
2 Also see Linder (1995).
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In post-positivist policy analysis , narratives are not only considered as 
meaningful interpretations of reality, they are also deployed as argumenta-
tive strategies of policymakers (Fischer and Forrester 1993; Fischer 2003). 
Fischer, for example, argues that policymaking becomes like story telling. 
For him, ‘finding or reconstructing the appropriate storyline is a central 
form of agency for the political actor’ (2003: 88). For this reason he claims, 
that political conflicts are often due to disagreement about the basic story-
line, or a competition between narratives and counter narratives . In addi-
tion, a policy narrative can appear in the quality of a narrative of decline or 
control (Stone 1988). In a narrative of decline attention is being put on the 
way things are getting worse and worse. In a narrative of control, while 
it is admitted that things are going bad, possibilities of interference are 
advanced. In this struggle on the basic storyline, policymakers can thus 
purposefully deploy these narratives .
Finally, narratives or storylines can affect the emergence of discourse 
coalitions and generate policy or even institutional change . In this respect 
Hajer challenges Sabatier (1988) who argues that policy change can be 
attributed to the formation of advocacy coalitions . For Hajer , in contrast, 
Sabatier fails to acknowledge that individual beliefs may be altered, 
because of the emergence of new central storylines (Hajer 1995). Hajer thus 
explicitly views narratives as transformative practices, that are capable of 
changing discursive positions.
6.3 The Dutch policy context
The Dutch political system can be characterized as consensual, that is, the 
power over political decisions is distributed among different political party 
coalitions. From the Second World War on, the Christian democrats (CDA ) 
were constantly present in governing coalitions. However, between 1994 
and 2002, when the ideas on life course policy emerged from the coordina-
tive discourse, The Netherlands were governed by the ‘purple’ coalition. 
This coalition consisted of the other two important political parties – the 
social democrats (PvdA ) and the right-wing liberals (VVD ) – and the rela-
tive small left wing liberals (D’66), leaving the Christian democrats in the 
opposition for years. Another feature of the Dutch system is that it is corpo-
ratist. Corporatism can be described as ‘an empirical relationship between 
interest groups and the government that is based on exchange (influence 
for support), and on cooperation rather then competition’ (Andeweg and 
Irwin 2002: 39, cited by Kuipers 2004: 51). Dutch society can be character-
ized as corporatist as governments cooperate with the labor unions and 
employer unions. The most influential labor unions are the social-demo-
cratic FNV and the Christian CNV , of which the FNV is by far the largest. 
The largest employers organization is VNO-NCW .
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6.4 The selection of the data and the methods of analysis
The hypothesis that a broad discourse coalition could emerge, because dif-
ferent actors were able to read their own narrative into an appealing sto-
ryline on the life course perspective , led to the expectation that the vague-
ness of a central storyline of the ‘life course perspective’ facilitated the 
inclusion of various interpretive frames . Hence, the first step in the analysis 
was to find the central storyline. Second, the purpose was to figure out how 
the signifier ‘life course perspective’ was filled with meaning in different 
interpretive frames and related narratives . In a third step, the analysis shift-
ed to the way actors assigned different meanings to ‘the life course perspec-
tive’.
With respect to the first step, the three most influential documents 
referring to the life course perspective were selected in order to construct 
its central storyline .3 In the second step, a number of actors were inter-
viewed about the way they interpreted the signifier ‘life course perspec-
tive’ and whom they thought contributed significantly to the meaning of 
the signifier and the introduction of the life course perspective in the coor-
dinative discourse.4 On the basis of those interviews, five key actors were 
selected who participated in the coordinative discourse.5 In an attempt to 
capture the baseline categories of thought , the first two steps were inspired 
by the hermeneutic circle . This means that the researcher went back and 
forth to the interviews, the most important writings of the interviewees, 
other related documents and her own thoughts. However, whereas herme-
neutic processes tend to be less transparent than other more quantifiable 
methods, it was decided to repeat the analyses deploying a method that 
could more easily be replicated by other researchers.
This second method builds on Discourse Historical Analysis (DHA) 
developed by Wodak and others (Reisigl and Wodak 2009; Wodak et al. 
1999).6 DHA entails a detailed study of texts. Each claim that is made in a 
3 Research Institute for the CDA (2001), SER (2001), Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment (2002).
4 For this purpose the following actors were interviewed: Bovenberg (Crown- appointed 
member of the SER and advisor of CDA ), Bijleveld (FNV ), Cuyvers (Dutch National 
Family Council and advisor of CDA), Driessen (FNV), Dolsma (VNO-NCW ), Evenhuis 
(Member of Temporary Expert Commission Emancipation and member of working 
group ‘life course’ D’66), De Geus (CDA minister of Social Affairs and Employment), 
Kastelein (CNV ); Goudswaard (crown-appointed member of the SER), Leijnse (crown-
appointed member of the SER), Schippers (Member of Temporary Expert Commission 
Emancipation), Slootweg (CNV); Van der Braak (VNO-NCW), Wierda (Public Offi cial 
Sector Emancipation),
5 These actors were: Bovenberg , Cuyvers , Evenhuis , Leynse and Schippers (for details 
see former references).
6 Montesano-Montessori put the idea forward to apply DHA during a conversation we 
had in June 2010 in Amsterdam. also see Montesano Montessori (2009).
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text needs to be studied and categorized. DHA formulates a number of 
heuristic questions for this kind of text analysis, of which the following 
three are relevant for this study:
1. How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions 
named and referred to linguistically (strategies of nomination)?
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social ac-
tors, objects, phenomena/events and processes (strategies of predica-
tion)?
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?
(Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 93).
This third heuristic question is further elaborated in a study on the con-
struction of national identities in which Wodak et al. (1999) distinguish 
between strategies of justification, strategies of construction, transforma-
tive strategies and strategies of dismantling. These categories were adapted 
to the structure of the analyzed texts.7 Deploying DHA, all claims made in 
selected texts originating from the key actors were categorized and ana-
lyzed according to the heuristic questions.8
A few additional notes need to be made with respect to the construc-
tion of the interpretive frames . First, the frames presented in Table 1 cannot 
be attributed to the individual selected key actors, as they are also entan-
gled in webs of meaning. Second, the content of the publications of these 
key actors are richer than the interpretive frames seem to suggest. In addi-
tion, the frames were not jointly exhaustive of all possible constructions or 
necessarily the most salient. The purpose of these constructions, then, was 
not to categorize all possibilities, but to analyze the discursive position of 
the actors involved in the coordinative discourse.
The third purpose of this research involved the analysis of the discur-
sive position of political parties, social partners, policymakers and interest 
groups who referred to the central storyline . After a quick scan, the follow-
ing actors were selected: CDA , PvdA and D’66 (political parties); FNV , 
CNV and VNO-NCW (social partners); the Dutch National Family Council 
and insurance companies (interest groups);9 and emancipation policy-
7 The claims in the text were categorized in one of the following classes: social trends, 
problematization of social trends, undesired reality considering these problematiza-
tions, persons and entities contributing to these undesired realities, desired reality.
8 After having read their most important publications that referred to the ‘life course per-
spective ’ (publications that also already informed the hermeneutic process), eight docu-
ments were selected that were most representative for the emergence of the ‘life course 
perspective’ became popular: Bovenberg (2001 and 2003), Cuyvers (1996), Evenhuis 
(1999a and 1999b), Leijnse ( 2001a and 2001b), Schippers (2001).
9 Insurance companies were primarily involved with the technical aspects of the Life 
Course Arrangement . Their role was less prominent in the generation of the ‘life course 
perspective discourse’. Therefore this paper leaves the insurance companies out.
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makers. Consequently, a number of articles, reports and pamphlets were 
picked out for further analysis.10 To identify the interpretive frames that 
were used in these documents, a list of key signifiers was selected that 
could be attached to each separate interpretive frame.11 After a signifier had 
been traced down, the meaning of the signifier in the specific context deter-
mined whether this signifier was related to one of the identified interpre-
tive frames . In this way it was possible to determine how different actors 
assigned meaning to ‘the life course perspective ’.
6.5 Results of the analysis
For scholars engaged in hermeneutic research it may be no surprise that the 
more ‘transparent’ DHA did not render salient results. On the other hand, 
DHA could provide more precise information regarding the argumentative 
structure of the storylines /narratives and the baseline categories of 
thought . This section provides a summary of the results.
10 The analyst gathered as much as possible documents originating from diverse actors 
that seemed to refer to the life course perspective . As the success of the storyline on the 
life course perspective reached its peak in 2001/2002, the focus was put on document 
that appeared before 2002. The most important/infl uential documents were selected 
for further analysis: Advisory Council Emancipation (1996); Balkenende [CDA ] (2002), 
D’66 (2001and 2002), De Ley [VNO-NCW ] (2001), Dolsma [VNO-NCW] (2004), CNV 
(1997), FNV (1993, 2001, 2003a and 2003b), FNV Women’s Union (2001), Kastelein 
[CNV] (1997), Kastelein and Van Suijdam [CNV] (2001), Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment (2001), PvdA (1996, 2002a 2002b), Research Institute for the CDA (1997, 
2000, 2001), Terpstra and Oostveen [CNV] (2001), Van der Braak [VNO-NCW] (2001), 
Westerlaken [CNV] (1996). Finally some Parliamentary Papers were selected for further 
analysis: PP 2000-01, 27 061 and No. 3; PP 1999-00, 27 061, No. 1-2.
11 For each interpretive frame different key signifi ers were identifi ed. Family life: income of 
a family, the costs of children, social and human capital of children, taking care for the 
children by yourself; Human capital: human capital, economic costs, employability , edu-
cation, life long learning; New risks: new risks , manufactured risks , internal risks, exter-
nal risks , distribution of responsibilities, saving for social security ; Emancipation: (distri-
bution of) paid work and care, labor participation of women, transitions of men and 
women, individualization of social security arrangements, human capital, economic 
independence of women. Taking care of the children by yourselves; Diversity: diversity, 
multiversity, quality of life, choice options, leisure, sabbatical, individualization of 
social security.
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6.5.1 The story on the life course perspective
The following central storyline could be constructed:
Different trends in modern society such as the increased labor market participation of 
women, individualization, aging and globalization have caused major transformations in 
individual life courses. In regard to these latter trends, changed life courses are also 
imperative. The institutions of social security are, however, insufficiently tailored to these 
demands and those (required) modern life courses, particularly concerning those stages 
of life in which workers have to combine different activities such as work, caring and 
education. In addition, people desire more balance and say in the way they distribute 
their time between these activities. This mismatch between, trends, desires and the sys-
tem of social security can only be solved in case social policy is reconciled with modern 
life courses.
The structure of the central storyline shows how the storyline functions as 
an argumentative strategy. In the first place, the storyline offers a solution 
for current and expected problems. Second, the problems are constructed 
in a way that stresses the gravity of the problems. For example, the deploy-
ment of nominalizations , like ‘globalization’, ‘aging’ and ‘individualiza-
tion’, make these problems look inevitable.12 The storyline further appeals 
to some contradictory feelings. Whereas on the one hand, the storyline 
expresses fear of staying behind in the international economic competition, 
on the other hand, the storyline provokes anxious feelings about the loss of 
nationally cherished values , such as ‘taking care of the care for the children 
by ourselves’ and ‘an enhanced quality of life’. At first glance, the storyline 
thus includes a narrative of control that is multi-interpretable.
6.5.2 One storyline , five interpretive frames 
On the basis of the hermeneutic analysis and the Discourse Historical Anal-
ysis, the researcher constructed five interpretive frames (Table 1): ‘family 
life’, ‘diversity’, ‘emancipation ’, ’human capital ’ and ‘new risks . Each inter-
pretive frame distinguishes between baseline categories of thought 
(appeals and warrants; the constructions of society and human being) and 
their interpretive products (problematization; solution; the meaning of the 
‘life course perspective ’). It should be noted that the construction of the 
baseline thought categories should not be understood as essentialist fixed 
ideas, but as a contingent comparison between positions.
Table 6.1 demonstrates that the interpretive frames appeal to very dif-
ferent values , such as traditional family values; quality of life; equality 
between men and women; efficiency ; and individual responsibility (fourth 
column). The dominant constructions of society and human being are also 
12 On nominalizations also see Fairclough (2003).
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diverse. Though they picture in all instances human being as an ‘autono-
mous chooser’, some frames construct human being either as a person 
whose preferences are primarily determined by the broader social context 
or as a person whose preferences are primarily determined by rational 
individual life plans. In addition, corresponding with the construction of 
human being, most frames tend to construct either a caring or an enterprise 
society. The baseline category of thoughts particularly reveals some contra-
dictions between on the one hand ‘family life’ and ‘diversity’, and on the 
other hand ‘human capital ’ and ‘new risks ’. The interpretive frame ‘eman-
cipation ’ seems to occupy a middle position in this respect.
Based on these different baseline categories of thought , each interpre-
tive frame constructs its own narrative of control that can be viewed as a 
meaningful interpretation of the world as well as an argumentative strate-
gy (second column). In addition, as is shown in table 6.2, DHA reveals sys-
tematically that each narrative or frame constructs its own ‘scapegoat’ as it 
points at a distinct target group or entity that impedes the realization of the 
‘right’ social system, or worse, profits from the current system, such as elite 
groups (‘family life’), the elderly (‘human capital ’), the welfare recipient 
(‘new risks ’), men (‘emancipation ’), and the dominant discourse (‘diversi-
ty’).
Table 6.1 further shows that the meanings of the signifier ‘life course 
perspective ’ are embedded in the narratives . Each interpretive frame thus 
fills the signifier ‘life course perspective’ with different meanings (third col-
umn): (1) it means that during the stage of family life, the income of house-
holds decreases (‘family life’); (2) it celebrates the increasing diverse life 
courses of women (‘diversity’); (3) it problematizes the distribution of paid 
work and care activities between women and men (‘emancipation ’); (4) it 
refers to the investments and depreciation of human capital (‘human capi-
tal’); and (5) it refers to the way life courses increasingly become the prod-
uct of ones own choices (‘new risks ’).
DHA further reveals in detail other contradictions between the differ-
ent frames (table 6.2). For example, an analysis of predication strategies in 
table 6.2 shows how the interpretive frame of family life challenges groups, 
such as ‘the elite’, ‘social liberals’ and ‘the emancipation movement’: 
groups that refer to the same central storyline . DHA also discloses some 
incompatibilities between the frames ‘diversity’ and ‘emancipation’. The 
first frame openly attacks the emancipation model (and indirectly also the 
frames ‘human capital ’ and ‘new risks ’), because in this model the availa-
bility of women for paid work remains dominant.
Finally, with regard to the transformative function of narratives , DHA 
provides some additional results. This analysis particularly shows that sig-
nifiers such as ‘life courses’ and ‘life patterns’ acquire a central place in 
claims concerning the construction of desired and undesired reality. In all 
frames those words seem to be constitutive for the new discourse, giving 
rise to a changed perspective on reality.
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Table 6.1 Five interpretive frames 
Interpretive
frame
Narrative Meaning of 
the life 
course 
perspective
Appeals and 
warrants
Dominant 
constructions 
of society and 
human being
Family life Parents are not 
(financially) capable 
of caring for their 
children: a ‘family 
gap’ is emerging. 
Therefore a redistri-
bution should take 
place of the peak 
load in time and 
money during the 
life course
Perspective to 
view the 
income gap 
during the 
stage of fami-
ly life
Traditional 
family values 
A caring society
The autonomous 
chooser whose 
individual pref-
erences are pri-
marily deter-
mined by the 
broader social 
context
Diversity Institutions of social 
security are based 
on the standard 
male life course, 
whereas life courses 
(particularly those 
of women) and 
desires have become 
more diverse. These 
institutions should 
anticipate on the 
diverse range of 
activities that people 
(whish to) perform 
within one period of 
life 
Perspective to 
view (and cel-
ebrate) the 
diverse life 
courses of 
women
Quality of 
life;
Freedom
A caring society
The autonomous 
chooser whose 
individual pref-
erences are pri-
marily deter-
mined by the 
broader social 
context
Emancipa-
tion
Institutions of social 
security and labor 
market policy are 
insufficient tailored 
to the increased 
labor market partici-
pation of women. 
Social security 
should be based on 
transitional labor 
markets that facili-
tate leave arrange-
ments for both men 
and women
Perspective to 
analyze the 
transitions of 
men and 
women 
between the 
spheres of 
work and care
Equality 
between men 
and women
A society that is 
both caring and 
enterprising
The autonomous 
chooser whose 
individual pref-
erences are part-
ly determined by 
to the broader 
social context 
and partly relat-
ed by rational 
individual life 
plans. 
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Interpretive
frame
Narrative Meaning of 
the life 
course 
perspective
Appeals and 
warrants
Dominant 
constructions 
of society and 
human being
Human 
capital
Current system of 
social security stim-
ulates the deprecia-
tion of human capi-
tal . Human capital 
is the key to the 
desired labor partic-
ipation. A system of 
social security that 
is based in invest-
ments in human 
capital would 
depart from a better 
spread of education, 
work, care and 
spare time over a 
life course.
Perspective to 
view the 
investments 
and deprecia-
tion of human 
capital 
Efficiency An enterprise 
society
The autonomous 
chooser whose 
preferences are 
primarily deter-
mined by ratio-
nal individual 
life plans
New risks Although the con-
sciousness has 
grown that to a 
great extent people 
can influence risks, 
the system of social 
security is still 
based on the idea of 
external risks . In 
regard of the grow-
ing importance of 
manufactured risks , 
the system of social 
security should be 
increasingly based 
on investments 
incentives and indi-
vidual responsibility 
Perspective 
that enables 
one to view 
the life course 
as an individ-
ual product in 
which the 
individual 
makes his/
her own risk 
based deci-
sions
Optimal com-
bination of 
efficiency and 
justice ;
Individual 
responsibility
A fair enterprise 
society
The autonomous 
chooser whose 
preferences are 
primarily deter-
mined by ratio-
nal individual 
life plans
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Table 6.2 Dominant nomination and predication strategies
Interpretive
frame
Dominant nominations and 
predications
Nominations that are contrasted 
with dominant nominations
Family life The majority of the population
has a family life’;
‘sustains a white legend of family 
life’ (happiness, love, etc.);
The elite, social liberals, 
emancipation movement
‘sustain the black legend of family 
life (suppression)’; ‘proponents of 
the individualization of social secu-
rity.
Human 
capital
Women
‘female capital becomes scarce’; 
‘the worth of female capital has 
risen’; ‘are emancipated’; ‘master 
their own life course’; ‘are better 
educated’; ‘their position on the 
labor market has become more 
stronger’;
The elderly people
‘are too relaxed’, ‘have been profit-
ing from the increased labor partic-
ipation of women’; ‘leave the labor 
market to early’; ‘find their way to 
the system of social security’; make 
strong appeals on the solidarity of 
younger generations’;
New risks The New Worker
‘bears the risks of the undertaking’; 
‘possesses more power then the 
traditional worker’; is a ‘consumer 
of labor conditions’; ‘makes choices 
that provoke risks’;
The individual
‘is able to make more choices in his 
life’; wants to take responsibilities 
for social risks; ‘possesses more 
financial and social reserves to bear 
the consequences of the risks
The welfare recipient
‘wants to work, but remains 
passive as a result of the system’; 
‘uses the social system whereas he 
does not need it’; ‘assumes an 
appearance of reintegration activity 
in order to receive income’;
Emancipa -
tion
Women
‘are sometimes worker, sometimes 
self employed, sometimes exclusive 
mother and housewife, but often 
combine these functions’; partici-
pate not enough (hours) on the 
labor market’; ‘want to participate 
more on the labor market’; ‘have to 
fight against the image that they 
are predominantly mothers’; ‘care 
too much’; 
Men
‘want to work less’; ‘are the most 
important problem in regard tot the 
emancipation of women; ‘think 
they must be permanently avail-
able for their work; ‘do not perform 
care tasks’;
Diversity Women
‘ Question the busy life’; ‘ can be 
viewed as pioneers in the develop-
ing trend towards more choices 
and more diversity in life courses’; 
do not take it for granted to be 
stuck in to a retrace of career, per-
manent education, overtime; and 
financial planning’; ‘are more free 
to look for alternatives’; ‘prioritize 
the quality of work’; women of 40 
years and older seem more cheer-
ful, open, curious, enterprising and 
more free than their male peers. 
Women according to the current 
debate
‘according to the current debate, 
women should take their economic 
independence more seriously’; 
‘according to this debate, women 
should choose for a standard life 
course’; ‘for the “combination sce-
nario” the availability for paid 
work remains dominant’; ‘ the cur-
rent debate forcefully sustains the 
picture of one standard worker 
with care duties’.
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6.5.3 Actors and frames
Table 6.3 demonstrates that most actors (political parties, social partners, 
interest group and policymakers) who endorsed the central storyline draw 
on one or two dominant interpretive frames . The actors involved thus 
assign different (dominant) meanings to ‘the life course perspective ’. In 
addition, in case those actors address more than one dominant frame, the 
baseline categories of thought seem to be compatible. On the other hand, it 
is remarkable that almost all actors somehow refer to at least three or more 
interpretive frames . This may indicate that they reconcile different values , 
and different constructions of the society and human being. Still, funda-
mental differences between the actors did not disappear as most actors 
explicitly reject one interpretive frame (fourth column).
Table 6.3 Actors and interpretive frames 
Actor drawing 
on central 
storyline
Dominant interpretive 
frames 
Important interpretive
frames
Contested 
frames
CDA Family life Human capital, Diversity Emancipation
PvdA Emancipation, 
a combination
of Human capital and 
New risks
Diversity, Family life
D’66 Diversity Emancipation, Human 
capital, Family life
New risks
Policymakers 
emancipation 
(1995-2001)
Emancipation, Diversity Human capital, Family 
life, New risk 
VNO-NCW Human capital and 
New risks
Diversity
FNV Emancipation and 
Diversity
Human capital New risks
CNV Family life Human capital, Diversity Emancipation
Family Council Family life Diversity
6.6 An explanation on the emergence of a discourse coalition
An application of the analytical distinction between different functions of 
narratives on the results of the analysis reveal first of all that the storyline 
on the ‘life course perspective ’ contains an appealing narrative of control 
(narrative as argumentative practice). In addition, the signifier ‘life course per-
spective’ proves to carry different meanings. In the coordinative discourse 
these meanings are embedded in five, to some extent conflicting, interpre-
tive frames (narrative as meaningful practice), containing diverse baseline cat-
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egories of thought that give rise to different narratives of control (narrative 
as meaningful and argumentative practice). Most actors who endorsed the cen-
tral storyline, deploy one or two dominant frames. The central storyline 
thus seems to have facilitated the formation of a life course discourse coali-
tion between actors who hold diverging beliefs.
The results further show that actors themselves also refer to (partly) 
incompatible frames. This suggests that part of the success of the storyline 
can be ascribed to the fact that it addressed win-win situations, which ena-
bled the actors to incorporate unfamiliar frames into their own body of 
thought: on the one hand, advertizing a more relaxed life; on the other 
hand, promoting an increase in labor participation; on the one hand 
encouraging the (collective) facilitation of more time and money to take 
care of the children; on the other hand holding individuals responsible for 
care tasks, which are now defined as manufactured risks . The central sto-
ryline thus facilitated the interchange of different interpretive frames (nar-
rative as argumentative and transformative practice). Importantly, the discourse 
coalition not only united different groups, a discourse historical analysis of 
a number of key-texts also suggests that this coalition transformed the 
coordinative discourse, as reality was now viewed from the perspective of 
‘life courses’ and ‘life patterns’ (narrative as transformative practice).
In sum, the findings seem to support the hypothesis that the discourse 
coalition could flourish because different actors (political parties, social 
partners, interest groups and policy makers) were enabled to read their 
own narrative in the storyline . The central storyline functioned as a cohe-
sive glue uniting and mixing discursive positions in an attractive way that 
opened up possibilities for new agreements between diverse actors whose 
perspective on reality had altered.
6.7 Implications
This case study shows how a post-positivist policy analysis of discourse 
coalitions contributes to an explanation of the agenda setting process. An 
(analytical) distinction between the functions of the (policy) narrative 
proves to be useful and can be recommended for future research on dis-
course coalitions .
The study further demonstrates that the Discourse Historical Analysis 
provides similar results as the ‘more subjective’ hermeneutic analysis . On 
the other hand, DHA enables the analyst to be more precise and provides 
additional information with respect to the research on discursive change. 
Still, conclusions regarding changed discursive positions must be backed 
up by further research on the discursive position of the actors involved in 
the period before the signifier ‘life course perspective ’ was introduced. In 
addition, notwithstanding the fact that that the rise of a discourse coalition 
may be an important condition for institutional change , it should be 
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acknowledged that the formation of a discourse coalition does not neces-
sarily result in institutional change. As a matter of fact, the ‘life course per-
spective’ discourse coalition failed to bring about major institutional 
changes. That is, the Life Course Arrangement that was introduced in 2006 
remained a rather trivial arrangement in the social security system, despite 
proposals for an enlargement of this arrangement. Possibly, the success of 
the storyline on the life course perspective also explains the failure of major 
institutional change: concrete proposals with regard to a ‘life course based’ 
social security revealed important differences of opinion between the 
actors. Recall, in this respect, that a number of actors contested one inter-
pretive frame. There are also indications that agreement on the level of the 
coordinative discourse was not translated into communicative discourses. 
Yet, these hypotheses are also in need of further investigation.
The question can be raised if quantitative methods can further add to 
the analysis of discourse coalitions . For example, Dahlberg & Sahlgren 
(2012) show how quantitative methods can be useful for the investigation 
of issue framing. In regard to the study of discourse coalitions , this method 
can be interesting to sort out how and when words such as ‘life courses’, 
life patterns, ‘human capital ’, ‘diversity’, ‘family gap’ entered the dis-
course; how these words are interrelated with each other (within each 
frame ) and how they constituted the discourse of social policy in a new 
way. In addition, this method seems particularly useful for the selection of 
texts and a preliminary analysis of the discursive positions of the actors. On 
the other hand, these methods fail to provide a more substantive picture of 
interpretive frames (baseline categories of thought , mutual contradictions 
and exclusions, etc.). Also, with respect to the argumentative structure of 
policy narratives , qualitative contextual analysis of political and policy 
texts remain necessary.
A different issue concerns the question to what extent discourse theory 
based on Laclau and Mouffe (Montesano-Montessori 2012) can contribute 
to the study of discourse coalitions . For example, it could be argued that 
the signifier ‘life course perspective ’ transformed to an empty signifier and 
thus contributed to the rise of a discourse coalition (compare Griggs and 
Howarth 2006). In my opinion, the concept ‘empty signifier’ is particularly 
useful in the study of communicative discourses, as it explains how, on a 
macro level of analysis, the union of diverse groups (‘the population’) is 
sustained by their common identification with a new (empty) signifier (for 
example ‘democracy’ or ‘justice ’). Concerning the analysis of the coordina-
tive discourse, however, I believe that the concepts of ‘storyline ’ and ‘dis-
course coalition’ are more adequate. Second, it seems that the articulation 
of an ‘empty signifier ’ can be helpful for the explanation of political proc-
esses in a field that consists of antagonistic forces. In this case study, how-
ever, it was not possible to identify oppositional forces. The discourse coali-
tion could rather be characterized as inclusive: it attempted to address as 
many identities as possible.
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In conclusion, hermeneutic research and DHA are suitable methods for 
research on discourse coalitions . Future research could profit from a mix of 
quantitative approaches with a wider deployment of discourse analytical 
methods. In case a discourse coalition emerges in opposition to some other 
group(s), concepts and methods derived from discourse theory might also 
be considered.

Abstract
The post-positivist view on policy analysis – i.e. that policy change is not so 
much the result of the development of problems that can be determined 
objectively, but that these problems are constructed largely in policy narra-
tives and frames – has by now become part of mainstream policy analysis. 
However, the exact relationship between frames, storylines, problems, data 
use, values, opinions and assumptions is not always crystal clear. System-
atic analyses of this topic are hard to find in literature. One of the few 
exceptions is the work of Brandwein (2006). She separates values, opinions 
and assumptions within an interpretive frame from the interpretive prod-
ucts such as storylines and problematizations. This paper adds the selec-
tion and interpretation of data to her list of interpretive products and con-
sequently examines the analytical potential of this extended version of 
Brandwein's model as it is used for the analysis of female labor market par-
ticipation policy in Dutch women emancipation memorandums.
A Dutch version of this paper has been published in Beleid en maatschap-
pij (‘Policy and Society’), Volume 38, issue 3, pp. 283-300, Oktober 2011. The 
Dutch version is available at http://www.boomlemmatijdschriften.nl/tijd-
schrift/benm/detail (Eleveld and Versantvoort 2011).
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Interpretive frames in emancipation 
policy between 1992 and 2007
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7.1 Introduction
The post-positivist view on policy analysis – i.e. that policy change is not so 
much the result of the development of problems that can be determined 
objectively, but that these problems are constructed largely in policy narra-
tives and frames – has by now become part of mainstream policy analysis. 
However, the exact relationship between frames, storylines , problems, data 
use, values , opinions and assumptions is not always crystal clear. System-
atic analyses of this topic are hard to find in literature.1 One of the few 
exceptions is the work of Brandwein (2006). She separates values, opinions 
and assumptions within an interpretive frame from the interpretive prod-
ucts such as storylines and problematizations. Her model illuminates how 
a shift in values, opinions and assumptions in a certain policy area affects 
the way a policy problem is formulated in storylines. In this paper we 
examine the analytical potential of Brandwein's model as it is used for the 
analysis of female labor market participation policy in Dutch women 
emancipation memoranda. In addition, we aim to develop her model fur-
ther by adding the selection and interpretation of data to the list of inter-
pretive products.
The emancipation memorandums are of particular interest for this 
study, because, since the first memorandum appeared in 1985, they have 
presented different selections and interpretations of data with regard to the 
issue of female labor market participation. At the outset these emancipa-
tion memorandums argued that the emancipation of women is obstructed, 
because labor and care tasks are divided unequally between men and 
women. In these memorandums we find a lot of data regarding the sharing 
of work between men and women. For example, the emancipation memo-
randum that was issued in 2000 presented so called 'life course data' which 
showed how much time men and women spent on diverse activities dur-
ing their entire life course. Yet, by the year 2007 the life course data have 
completely vanished from the emancipation memorandum. In this year the 
new objective of a general increase in female (and male) laobr market par-
ticipation is sustained by a different selection and interpretation of data 
compared to previous emancipation memorandums. Thus at first sight 
these memoradums seems to confirm Stone's statement that, in policy doc-
uments, data do not simply provide an objective representation of reality, 
but reveal a certain interpretation of the world out there (Stone 1988). This 
paper examines the extent to which Brandwein's extended model is able to 
further unravel the relationship between the selection and interpretation of 
data and the interpretive policy frames used in Dutch women emancipa-
tion memorandums.
1 Linder (1995) is an exception to the rule.
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This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sheds further light on the 
insights from post-positivist policy analysis and, more specifically, Brand-
wein’s frame analysis. In section 3 we indicate how we arrived at the selec-
tion of documents that was made. Sections 4 and 5 contain the results of the 
analysis of the policy documents. Based on these results, section 6 estab-
lishes connections between the body of opinions, assumptions and values, 
problematizations, the selection and interpretation of data, storylines and 
the emancipation policy’s course. Finally, in section 7 we draw the main 
conclusions and paint a picture of the implications of our analysis for 
future emancipation policy .
7.2 Policy: frames, values, opinions, problematizations, 
narratives and figures
According to post-positivist policy analysis , it is impossible to create an 
objective representation of reality. Instead of approaching policy problems 
from a purely technocratic, empirical perspective, research into values and 
argumentation strategies should play a central part in policy analysis 
(Fischer 2003). This also means that problems cannot be considered objec-
tively determinable circumstances that are awaiting the initiative of policy-
makers. On the contrary, it is assumed that they are constructed as part of 
policymaking.
In this regard, Schön and Rein (1977, 1994) have indicated the impor-
tance of problem definition in policy. They consider the process of prob-
lematization to be dependent upon the use of underlying frames that high-
light, select or ignore certain characteristics of a problem. Furthermore, a 
frame assembles the various characteristics into a coherent entity. In other 
words: the specific frame provides the ‘glasses’ through which the policy-
maker looks at reality.
Post-positivist policy analysts also show that the specific problematiza-
tion of a certain policy area is often communicated through a ‘policy narra-
tive’ with which the policymaker tries to convince the reader of the serious-
ness of the problem (Fischer 2003; Hajer 1995; Stone 1988). Policymakers 
use policy narratives to tell what they think is going on; what problem we 
are dealing with; what the facts are and how they should be interpreted; 
how the problem can be solved and what consequences the intervention 
will have. Thereby, facts and values are usually mixed together. Stone 
(1988) distinguishes between the ‘narratives of decline’, in which things 
will get increasingly worse according to the policymaker if we do not inter-
vene fast enough, and the ‘narratives of control’, in which she tells how an 
initially large problem can be made manageable through policy interven-
tions. It is her opinion that conflicts about which policy to implement do 
not primarily concern the details, but instead can be traced back to disa-
greement on the dominant narrative.
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Often, the policymaker will try to make his policy narrative more con-
vincing by incorporating metaphors into the story. A metaphor can be 
described as the use of a familiar notion to represent a more abstract notion. 
Because metaphors can define complex matters with a single word, they 
are used to explain these complex matters to the public. In many cases a 
normative charge is connected with the metaphor, which confirms a certain 
policy direction. Stone takes the use of the word ‘fragmented’ as an exam-
ple of a metaphor’s normative action. Although at first glance this word 
seems to be a mere description of a certain situation, it is often employed as 
a call for reorganization. Therefore, metaphors not only work descriptively 
but also prescriptively and thus reflect the interpretive frames that under-
pin a certain policy (Fischer 2003; Schön and Rein 1977; Stone 1988; and 
Yanow 2000).
Figures may be considered as a special kind of metaphor . Stone (1988), 
for instance, states that numbers and statistics are used in policy docu-
ments to tell a story: they indicate which activities should be counted, what 
groups must be identified and what should be done with these groups. 
According to her, the use of data in policy can have a similar effect on the 
public as the ‘frames’ defined by Schön and Rein . After all, the specific use 
of data focuses the attention on a certain aspect of a policy area whereas 
other characteristics of the policy area receive little attention. In other 
words: counting a certain event, practice or group implicitly indicates that 
this event, practice or group is worth counting and therefore should be tak-
en seriously. On the other hand figures and statistics are ambiguous, just 
like other metaphors , which leaves room to debate the interpretation of the 
phenomenon. Stone concludes that data do not simply provide an objective 
representation of reality. On the contrary, data are often used for both stra-
tegic purposes and subconscious manipulation of policymakers who deter-
mine what should be counted, how it will be counted and how the outcomes 
must be interpreted.
What coherence can be constructed between interpretive frames , prob-
lematizations, policy narratives and the use of data as a metaphor ? For 
instance, neither the descriptions of Schön and Rein nor those by Stone 
make clear in what respects a policy narrative or data acting as a metaphor 
can be distinguished from a policy frame . An interesting suggestion on 
how to clarify these concepts is offered by Brandwein (2006). She argues 
that within an interpretive frame an analytical distinction can be made 
between baseline categories of thought (such as opinions, assumptions and 
values ) and the interpretive product (such as problematizations and sto-
rylines ). She poses that the baseline categories of thought categories give 
shape to diverging storylines . Thus, she not only distinguishes the manner 
in which reality is observed from the interpretation of this observed reality, 
just like Schön and Rein she also makes an analytical distinction between 
the way of viewing reality (baseline categories of thought) and the actions 
that are taken based upon it (interpretive products). Although Brandwein 
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does not address the relationship between the use of data (as a metaphor) 
and policy frames, based on her model and Stone ’s analysis we are of the 
opinion that data, just like storylines and problematizations, can be consid-
ered an interpretive product.
On the one hand, this makes problematizations, data and storylines 
indicative of the baseline categories of thought that correspond with the 
frame . On the other hand, along with the baseline categories of thought cat-
egories these interpretive products set the norm for the policy to be 
deployed. Table 7.1 shows the relationship between baseline categories of 
thought, problematizations, data and storylines within an interpretive frame.
Table 7.1 Interpretive frame
Baseline categories of thought Interpretive products
Values
Assumptions
Opinions
Narratives
Problematizations
Data
7.3 Document selection
The emancipation memorandum of 1985 provided basic principles for the 
labor participation of women with the objective of enhancing their emanci-
pation.2 This memorandum forms the point of departure for the emancipa-
tion memorandums of later years. The central policy objective formulated 
in this memorandum is:
‘to promote the development of the current society, where the gender difference is still 
institutionalized to such a great extent, into a pluriform society in which everyone has 
the possibility to acquire an independent existence, irrespective of their gender or civil 
status, and in which women and men can realize equal rights, opportunities, liberties and 
responsibilities’ (p. 12).
Applied to the area of work and income, the 1985 memorandum aspires to 
stimulate both the overall participation in paid labor and the overall par-
ticipation in unpaid labor (p. 23). In 1992 the next emancipation memoran-
dum is published, the Emancipation Policy Plan (referred to hereafter as 
the 1992 memorandum)3, which is followed in 1995 by Emancipation in 
Progress (referred to hereafter as the 1995 memorandum).4 In the years 
thereafter, this emancipation memorandum is elaborated upon in annual 
2 PP 1984-85, 19 052, No. 1-2.
3 PP 1992-93, 22 913, No. 1.
4 PP 1995-96 24 406, No. 5.
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policy letters (1996-2001).5 The next emancipation memorandum that out-
lines the policy for several years is the Multi-year Program Plan on Emancipa-
tion Policy of 20006 (referred to hereafter as the 2000 memorandum). The 
next year, following advice by the Social and Economic Council of the 
Netherlands (SER), this memorandum is expanded on several points.7 In 
2006 the following multi-year emancipation memorandum is issued (Mul-
ti-year Policy Plan on Emancipation 2006-2010).8 In 2007 the memorandum 
is renewed (More Opportunities for Women, Emancipation Policy 2008-
2011, referred to hereafter as the 2007 memorandum).9 The latest emancipa-
tion memorandum is the leaflet LGBT and Gender Equality Policy Plan 
2011-2015.10
In this contribution we focus on four of the seven emancipation memo-
randums in which the labor market policy for women was developed after 
1985: the memorandums of 1992, 1995, 2000 and 2007. Three memoran-
dums have been excluded, because (1) the memorandum is largely analo-
gous to a previous memorandum (2001 memorandum), (2) the multi-year 
memorandum was soon replaced by a new multi-year memorandum (2006 
memorandum) and (3) the memorandum was published after the study 
was completed (2011 memorandum).
7.4 The interpretive product: problematizations and the use 
of data
The frame analysis started with the analysis of two important interpreta-
tive products, namely the problematization of the labor market participa-
tion of women and the use of data in the studied emancipation memoran-
dums. For this purpose all statements with respect to female labor market 
participation were listed. Consequently only those statements were select-
ed, which problematized female labor participation and which, in the con-
text of the memorandum, could be labeled as 'salient problematizations'. In 
addition, all data that were used with respect to the labor participation of 
women – such as graphs, numbers and tables – were arranged in a number 
5 It should be noted here that the issue of female labor participation is also addressed in 
other advisory reports and memorandums. See, for instance: ‘Possibilities of combining 
paid work and other responsibilities’ (PP 1994-95, 24 332, No. 2); Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment (1995 and 1998); Advisory Council Emancipation (1996), Stip-
ulations regarding fi nancing career breaks (PP 1996-97, 25 477, No. 3; Memorandum on 
Labor and Care (PP 1998-99, 26 477, No. 2).
6 PP 2000-01, 27 061, No. 2. It should be noted here that between 1996 and 2001 emancipa-
tion letters were issued annually, which are not included in the analysis.
7 Multi-year memorandum on emancipation policy (PP 2000-01, 27 061, No. 3).
8 PP 2005-06, 30 420, No. 2.
9 PP 2007-08, 30 420, No. 50.
10 PP 2010-11, 27 017, No. 74.
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of overview tables. These data were classified in the following categories: 
female labor participation , women’s economic independence, the division 
of labor between men and women, the desires with regard to the division 
of labor between men and women, and the desires with regard to child 
care. Although we were able to classify the majority of the statistical data 
into these selected categories, some (often ‘loose’) data did not fit into any 
of these categories. These data were not included in the analysis.
The results of the research into the problematizations and the use of 
data were arranged in five problem fields that partly encompass multiple 
policy memorandums, which are listed hereafter. For each problem field we 
have investigated if and how the manner of problematizing the labor par-
ticipation of women and the use of data are interrelated and to what extent 
these interpretive products have produced normative storylines in emanci-
pation policy. The outcomes of these analyses were at the basis of the inter-
pretive products, are used in section 5 to construct the interpretive frames 
that informed emancipation memorandums between 1992 and 2007.
Table 7.2 Problematization female labor participation 
Year Problematization female labor participation 
1992 a. ‘The labor participation of women has increased, but too little progress has 
been made in other areas including the division of child care duties and other 
unpaid work between men and women’ (p.2).
d. ‘Combining tasks [is] still a problem’ (p.97).
e. ‘Despite these positive developments the work potential of women is still not 
being utilized optimally’ (p.99).
1995 f. ‘If men do not take on a larger part of the care tasks, greater participation of 
women in (..) paid labor will stagnate’ (p.2).
g. ‘Although progress has been made, it turns out that the Netherlands is lagging 
behind as far as female labor participation is concerned (…) in comparison to 
the developments in the member states of the European Union’ (p.4).
h. ‘The realization of social and economic independence of women is of great 
importance from an emancipatory perspective. Equally important is the utili-
zation of the socio-economic potential of women in the national economy, the 
redistribution of paid and unpaid work between men and women, and the 
redistribution of responsibilities within the living unit’ (p.4).
2000 i. ‘Practice tells us that there are still relatively many women who do not earn 
enough and, therefore, are dependent upon ‘the breadwinner’ (p.4).
j. ‘It goes without saying that the balance between work and private life is 
important for both women and men (…). In practice, though, it is still mostly 
the women who perform the care tasks’ (p.4).
k. ‘Furthermore, practice shows that many women do not easily progress to the 
higher positions that they are eligible for – they are hindered by the ‘glass ceil-
ing’ (p.4).
l. ‘Within the European context, the Netherlands is at the back of the pack with 
regard to equal participation of men and women in the economy (…) The rea-
son why the Netherlands is still performing poorly is that a large part of the 
women hold small part-time jobs that offer no economic independence and 
few prospects for promotion’ (p.10).
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Year Problematization female labor participation 
2000 m. ‘[for a better balance between work and private life] economic arguments can 
be provided. After all, greater female labor participation will result in a better 
use of productive abilities and talents and a broader basis for collective services
that, also in view of the aging population, is a necessity’ (p.10).
n. ‘Many women and men want a combination of work, care and spare time that 
is tailored to their needs. Standard patterns are increasingly experienced as 
being restrictive. Individual citizens are looking for fitting solutions that can be 
filled in differently depending on their life phase’ (p.15).
2007 o. ‘Female labor participation in hours and the number of women in top posi-
tions are amongst the lowest within Europe’ (p. 10).
p. ‘In the past few years it has become increasingly clear that the participation of 
women is not so much a matter of redistribution as it is a question of combin-
ing tasks’ (p. 10).
q. ‘Increased labor participation is necessary to be able to carry the burden of an 
aging population’ (p.11).
r. ‘In summary, an increase of the labor participation in hours is desirable for two 
reasons. In addition to compensating for the effects of an aging population, it 
stimulates the economic independence of women. And that is an important 
prerequisite for emancipation’ (p.22).
1992: The labor participation of women has increased, but the potential is still being 
utilized insufficiently.
The 1992 memorandum sets itself apart from the subsequent memo-
randums in that it describes the female labor market participation as 
‘increased’ (see problematizations a and c) instead of ‘lagging’ (d, e, g, j, l, 
n, o and p). The ‘increased’ (1992) female labor market participation is sup-
ported by data regarding the participation of women in paid labor during 
the past 15 years in terms of percentage. The new assessment of the extent 
of female labor market participation from 1995 onwards proves to guide 
the specific selection of data. These memorandums, which have as their 
point of departure that the labor participation of women is lagging in com-
parison to that of men, contain more specific data regarding female labor 
market participation, such as the number of hours that women work and the 
labor participation of women who have children. These additions construct 
a different image of female labor market participation, because they high-
light that female labor participation is still low compared to male labor par-
ticipation. A striking detail in this regard is that these later memorandums 
emphasize that women with children often work less hours after childbirth 
whereas the 1992 memorandum, in contrast, states that the increased labor 
participation is most prominent amongst the group of married and cohabit-
ing women between the ages of 25 and 55.
The presented data and the manner of problematization seem to be 
related to the labor market participation promoting instruments that are 
proposed. Whereas the dominant narratives in the memorandums of 1995 
onwards emphasize the in necessary increase in labor market participation 
of all women, the narrative of the 1992 memorandum limits itself to specific 
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groups such as women re-entering the labor market and women from 
minority groups. Moreover, unlike in later memorandums, the 1992 narra-
tive emphatically aims for a part-time labor participation.
1995, 2000 and 2007: Labor participation of women is low compared to that of men, 
because it is mostly the women who take on the care tasks.
As mentioned above, after the 1992 memorandum the problematization of 
female labor market participation shifts from ‘increased’ to ‘lagging’. Based 
on the specific selection of data, such as ‘counting’ the labor participation 
of women with and without children, it is indicated where the (main) prob-
lem and the solution to the lagging female labor participation should be 
found: the care for the children hinders women to participate in paid labor. 
The problematization of combining work and care is interpreted in various 
ways, though. Whereas, as will be shown below, the memorandums of 1995 
and 2000 consider the combination of labor and care to be a goal in itself, in 
light of the pursuit of equality between women and men, the 2007 memo-
randum considers it a means to increase female labor market participation.
1992, 1995 and 2000: Labor and care tasks are divided unequally between men and 
women.
The problematization of female labor market participation in terms of an 
unequal division of labor and care tasks between men and women takes 
center stage in the memorandums of 1992, 1995 and 2000 (see problemati-
zations a, d, g and h). This manner of problematization recognizes that an 
increase in the labor market participation of women is not an isolated 
event, but is related to the time spent on care tasks. According to the narra-
tives in these memorandums a redistribution of labor and care tasks 
between men and women contributes to a more equal relationship between 
women and men and as such enhances women emancipation . Thus, the 
second spearhead in the 1992 memorandum – increasing the possibilities 
for combining parenthood and paid labor – is linked to a structural redistri-
bution of paid and unpaid work between men and women. Aside from 
this, with regard to female labor participation the 1995 memorandum 
focuses entirely on a ‘more balanced division of paid and unpaid labor’ 
(p.12). The 2000 memorandum further mentions the promotion of male 
care responsibilities as a sub-objective to ‘create the conditions under which 
men and women in their private lives can arrive at different choices with 
regard to unpaid work’ (p.21).
A redistribution of labor and care tasks between men and women is 
also considered to be of importance because of the – according to the mem-
orandums of 1995 and 2000 – typical Dutch value of ‘self-provided care’:
‘it is about a well-balanced division between self-provided care and paying others to per-
form care tasks. This scenario ties in well with the Dutch culture of bearing a major part 
of the care for children and the elderly’ (1995 memorandum, p.5).
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‘The ample availability of part-time labor in the Netherlands also has an advantage: in 
addition to doing paid work there is more time available to care for children, loved ones 
or the broader living environment. This proves to be an essential aspect of Dutch culture’ 
(1995 memorandum, p. 10).
In view of this dilemma of a desire for greater labor market participation of 
women, the appreciation of self-provided care and the objective of equality 
between men and women, the 1995 narrative forwards a ‘combination sce-
nario’ as an important solution. This scenario focuses on a more equal divi-
sion of unpaid work between partners on the one hand and refers to a bal-
anced distribution of unpaid care tasks and paid care work on the other.
The problematization of female labor participation in terms of the divi-
sion of labor and care between men and women is supported by the spe-
cific selection of data. In comparison to the 2007 memorandum, for 
instance, the memorandums of these years contain many data regarding 
the sharing of work between men and women, including information on 
the amount of time that men and women spend on care tasks. How these 
data are interpreted is important as well. For example, the explanatory 
texts mention that based on the presented information it can be concluded 
that the division of paid work and care between men and women is still not 
sufficiently equal. This conclusion is affirmed by data on opinion research 
with regard to the desired division of labor between men and women, 
which show that both men and women find it desirable that work and care 
tasks are shared equally by men and women.
The narrative in the 2000 memorandum links the existing division of 
labor and care tasks between men and women to the ‘life course perspec-
tive ’ (l). According to this narrative, a life course-based approach of work 
and care tasks contributes to a better quality of life for both women and 
men, because – in contrast to what is the case with the existing division of 
labor – the various wishes (of women in particular) are taken into account. 
As such, the life course perspective also gives expression to the objective of 
‘diversity’, which has been a central aspect of emancipation policy ever 
since the 1996 policy letter on emancipation. In this respect, the 2000 mem-
orandum states:
‘The policy will only be effective if the instruments take note of the differences between 
(groups of) people, as well as the various needs (time, income, space, activities) that cor-
respond with people’s life phase’ (2000 memorandum, p.7).
In other words, the division of labor and care tasks between men and wom-
en must expressly take into account the diverging wishes of various groups 
as well as the necessity of generating sufficient income and the time that 
one can and wants to free up for the various tasks. It is important to con-
sider these wishes and needs over the course of an entire life, because they 
can vary depending upon one’s life phase.
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Interestingly, 'the life course perspective' is supported by a new way of 
counting. Unlike in previous years, the 2000 memorandum provides 
detailed figures on the time that men and women in different age catego-
ries spend on labor and care tasks. They show that men and women 
between 25 and 34 years old spend the most time on paid labor, with the 
level for men being higher than for women. If we focus on time spent on 
unpaid labor the peak lies with the group of 35 to 44 year olds, with the 
level being higher for women than for men. After age 55, the time spent on 
paid and unpaid work decreases for both men and women. These numbers 
indicate what is needed in order to achieve ‘a sustainable situation where 
as many people as possible can combine an economic independent exist-
ence with care responsibilities during their life course’ (p.16).
2000 and 2007: Due to lagging female labor participation the economic independence 
of women is also lagging.
The (lagging) female labor participation is problematized increasingly from 
the viewpoint that women are less economically independent than men. 
This is true in particular for the memorandums of 2000 (f and j) and 2007 
(p). However, the meaning of the notion of ‘economic independence’ seems 
to change. Whereas the 2007 memorandum expressly relates ‘economic 
independence’ to goals such as ‘self-realization ’ and ‘self-determination’, 
in the 2000 memorandum the notion of ‘economic independence’ should 
be interpreted within the context of care responsibility. In 2000 it is stated, 
for instance, that the objective must be that ‘as many people as possible can 
combine an economic independent existence with care responsibilities dur-
ing their life course’ (2000 memorandum, p.16).11 In the 2007 memorandum 
this basic principle is given much less weight.
The increasing importance of economic independence is reflected in 
the manner in which data are selected. After all, only the memorandums of 
2000 and 2007 present figures related to women’s economic independence. 
These figures are interpreted in different ways, though. Whereas in 2000 it 
is noted that the share of economically independent women has increased, 
the 2007 document exclusively emphasizes the lagging economic independ-
ence of women, which supports that year’s objective of ‘increasing female 
labor participation in number of people and number of hours’ (p.13).
2007: Female labor participation is too low, which is reason for concern in view of 
the future aging of the population.
In comparison with previous policy memorandums the lagging female 
11 Attention for ‘care responsibility’ in emancipation policy becomes visible for the fi rst 
time in the policy letter of 1996, which states: ‘besides individualistic principles, rela-
tional concepts must be given greater weight. For emancipation policy this means that 
social responsibility will get attention as a new dimension, in addition to equality and 
independence’ (PP 1996-97, 25 006, No. 1, p. 14).
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labor participation is problematized most strongly in the 2007 memoran-
dum. In this regard, concerns over the aging population play an important 
role (o and p). The 2000 document also points at the problem of the aging 
population (k). However, in comparison with this memorandums the 2007 
memorandum puts much more emphasis on the problem of aging.
The narrative in the 2007 memorandum uses the term ‘aging’ as a met-
aphor to describe with a single word a complexity of trends, facts and val-
ues that are used to set the course for the emancipation policy. ‘Aging’ 
gives expression to concerns about the shrinking working population in 
relation to the sustainability of the welfare state and the necessity of eco-
nomic growth and thus confirms the need for greater labor participation. It 
is therefore no surprise that the 2007 memorandum not only presents the 
lagging labor participation of women as a point of concern, but that of men 
as well.
The importance of increased labor participation by both men and wom-
en is expressed in the selection of the data. For example, in 2007 we see for 
the first time that the ‘degree of participation’ of both women and men is 
compared to target figures developed by the SER, an economic advisory 
council of the government. Moreover, compared to previous years, more 
data are presented in this year that relate to the possibilities of professional 
child care. Another striking point concerns the wording of the research 
questions on the basis of which the data are generated. Whereas previously 
quoted research addressed the question if formal child care would be an 
acceptable care solution for children, the research presented in 2007 investi-
gates the advantages of formal child care for the development of children. 
On the basis of these data, the memorandum presents measures that focus 
exclusively on increasing the parents’ labor participation. In addition, in 
comparison with previous memorandums, these instruments are more 
geared towards facilitating professional child care.
7.5 Shifting frames 
An initial analysis on the basis of the problematizations and the use of data 
in the studied memorandums shows a shift of emphasis between the mem-
orandums of 1992, 1995 and 2000 on the one hand and the 2007 memoran-
dum on the other. Whereas the division of work and care between women 
and men plays a central role in the former memorandums, the latter memo-
randum problematizes the lagging labor participation of women (and men) 
exclusively from the perspective of concerns about the aging population. 
An important indicator for the presence of shifting policy frames is the new 
interpretation of the term ‘economic independence’ in 2007. Whereas the 
2000 memorandum interprets the notion of ‘economic independence’ with-
in the context of care responsibility, in 2007 we see that this concept is given 
meaning in relation to objectives such as ‘self-realization ’ and ‘self-determi-
nation’.
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In this section we further elaborate on the interpretive frame that forms 
the basis for the 2007 memorandum by comparing the specific use of data 
in the 2007 memorandum with the use of data in the memorandums of 
1992, 1995 and 2000. Using the results of this exercise and the results pre-
sented in the previous section, we subsequently construct the most impor-
tant storylines (interpretive product) and the values and assumptions that 
form the foundation for these storylines (baseline categories of thought ).
Incentives instead of breaking existing structures
In the previous section it was shown how the specific manner of problema-
tizing the labor participation of women was linked to the method of data 
selection and interpretation. Thereby, we touched upon how certain man-
ners of problematization were tied to certain values . For example, the 
memorandums of 1992, 1995 and 2000 emphasized the value of ‘self-pro-
vided care’. In contrast, the 2007 memorandum linked the objectives of the 
emancipation policy to a value such as ‘self-realization ’. A further look at 
the selection and interpretation of the data used in the 2007 memorandum 
also reveals a different portrayal of mankind than the one presented in pre-
vious memorandums. Whereas the memorandums of 1992, 1995 and 2000 
depict the individual as a person who lives in a (care) relationship with oth-
ers, the 2007 memorandum seems to be based in first instance on the image 
of man as a ‘utility maximizer’. This image comes to the fore in particular 
when the data presented in the memorandums of 1992, 1995 and 2000 on 
the one hand are compared to those presented in the 2007 memorandum on 
the other.What is noticeable in the first place is that in 2007 a table is includ-
ed on the productive use of time (paid labor and care work) in order to 
show that the economic choice between labor and spare time is gender 
dependent. In 1992, 1995 and 2000, in contrast, data on the division of labor 
and care are presented to spotlight the unequal division of labor and care 
tasks between men and women. In 2007, the data on the division of labor 
no longer have this function. Now it is shown that the usual economic 
rational choice models do not suffice, because they are gender dependent. 
On the basis of these data it is argued that these models should be adjusted, 
in order to develop a more efficient set of instruments that stimulate wom-
en to participate in paid labor. This opinion is given further expression in 
the presentation of data regarding the conditions under which women 
would like to work (more). From these data the conclusion is drawn that 
the remuneration forms an important incentive for women to accept (more 
hours of) paid labor.
The selection and interpretation of data in the 2007 memorandum 
reveal, especially in comparison with previous memorandums, a new ratio 
behind the emancipation policy: an increase in female labor market partici-
pation can only be achieved by coming up with the right ‘incentives’ or 
‘rewards’ on the basis of which women decide whether or not they will 
perform paid labor. This approach of the ‘lagging’ labor participation dif-
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fers from the one that comes to the fore in the documents of 1995 and 2000. 
These memorandums consider the lagging labor market participation of 
women to be mostly a problem of existing structures, such as the existing 
division of roles between men and women. For instance, the introduction 
of the 1995 memorandum states that ‘there are still impeding opinions and 
structures that hinder further progress. The stagnation that they cause is a 
reason for concern’ (1995 memorandum, p.2). The policymakers were con-
fronted with the task of breaking these structures, although they failed to 
make clear how these structures could be broken.
The diverging views on how to increase female labor market participa-
tion are reflected in the approach to the unequal pay of men and women. 
Whereas previous memorandums addressed the matter of inequality in 
pay between men and women within the framework of the unequal treat-
ment of men and women, the 2007 document focuses on the effect of the 
unequal pay on the labor participation and economic independence. Based 
on these data, direction is given to the first sub-objective of the 2007 eman-
cipation policy: it should pay to work.
Two policy narratives 
In the studied memorandums, the manner of problematization and the use 
of data give direction to the policy. They support and flank various norma-
tive policy narratives . Based on the analysis presented in the previous sec-
tion two dominant policy narratives can be constructed surrounding the 
problematization of female labor market participation. Whereas the first 
policy narrative takes center stage in the memorandums of 1992, 1995 and 
2000, the second narrative dominates the 2007 memorandum. The first nar-
rative goes along the following lines:
‘Compared to men, the labor participation of women is lagging (although there is an 
upward trend [1992]). Increased female labor participation requires a change in existing 
structures, in particular regarding the unequal division of labor and care tasks between 
men and women. A positive effect of breaking these structures is that (over one’s entire 
life course [2000]) it contributes to a better quality of life’.
The second narrative , which dominates the 2007 memorandum, is:
‘Female labor participation is lagging. This is a serious problem in view of the aging pop-
ulation. The instruments should stimulate women to increase their participation in paid 
labor’.
The analysis shows that the storylines were constructed based on different 
sets of opinions, assumptions and values . Whereas the second storyline 
takes as its starting point the idea that man as a utility optimizing creature 
is being driven by incentives, the first storyline instead depicts man as a 
social creature. Her position in society depends on the relationship that she 
has with other people. The consequence is that, in contrast to the second 
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storyline, behavioral change (increased labor participation) cannot only be 
achieved by a change in incentive structure, but also would require certain 
structures to change first.
Other differences regard the values underlying both storylines . Where-
as the first storyline takes values such as ‘equality ’, ‘self-provided care’, 
‘balance in life’ and ‘diversity’ as its point of departure, the second sto-
ryline is primarily based on values like ‘economic growth’ and ‘self-realiza-
tion ’. The values, assumptions and policy narratives are summarized in the 
interpretive frames in table 7.3.
Table 7.3 Shifting interpretive frames 
Year  Baseline categories of thought Interpretive products
Values Opinions/assumptions Storylines
1992
1995
2000
Equality
Self-provided care
Quality/balance in life
Diversity (2000)
Man is a social creature. 
her position is deter-
mined by her relation-
ship with others in soci-
ety
Greater female labor 
market participation 
requires a change in 
existing structures, in 
particular with regard 
to the division of labor 
between men and 
women. Moreover, a dif-
ferent division of labor 
will contribute to a better 
quality of life.
2007 Self-realization 
Economic growth
Man is a utility optimiz-
ing creature and can be 
driven by incentives . She 
lives in a society that is 
focused on economic 
progress
Female labor market par-
ticipation is lagging. This 
is a serious problem in 
view of the aging popu-
lation. The instruments 
should entice women to 
increase their participa-
tion in paid labor.
7.6 Synthesis
The analyses presented in this contribution underscore the insights from 
post-positivist policy analysis that the interpretive frame that is used to 
view reality determines the course of emancipation policy. More specifi-
cally, Brandwein ’s suggestion to separate the interpretive product from the 
baseline categories of thougt delivers enlightening insights in research into 
shifting frames. It turns out, for example, that a comparable set of values and 
assumptions forms the basis for different interpretations of female labor 
market participation (‘increased’ in 1992 and ‘lagging’ in 1995 and 2000) 
and to either or not problematize labor market participation in terms of the 
‘life course perspective ’. On the other hand, the analysis shows that compa-
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rable problematizations, such as the problematization of the female labor 
market participation against the backdrop of the ‘aging population’ and 
the ‘lagging economic independence’ (in 2000 and 2007) are prompted by 
different sets of values and assumptions. Thus, the analytical separation 
between baseline categories of thought and interpretive products also 
shows that the meaning of certain terms, such as economic independence, 
is related to the interpretive frame in which they are used.
Creating this analytical separation also makes clear how values and 
assumptions are being ‘packaged’ in interpretive products. After all, as it 
turns out, on closer inspection even a seemingly objective element such as a 
data set is not so much an objective description of the status quo of a certain 
policy area but more so an indication of underlying values and assump-
tions. For instance, baseline categories of thought determined whether data 
were chosen regarding the division of labor between men and women 
(1992, 1995 and 2000) or data regarding the incentive structure (2007). Thus, 
the study illustrates that the policymaker uses a specific set of values and 
assumptions to determine what is relevant to count (and what is not) and 
how it should be counted. At the same time numbers and statistics are 
ambiguous, as has become clear from the interpretation of the data on the 
economic independence of women: comparable figures can be interpreted 
in different ways, depending upon the interpretive frame in which they are 
presented.
Finally, the analysis shows that besides baseline categories of thought 
and the way of problematization, the selection and interpretation of data 
also shape the policy course in norm-setting storylines . It was shown in 
section 4, for instance, that there is coherence between the selection and 
interpretation of data related to the extent of female labor market participa-
tion and the importance attached to a generic increase of women’s labor 
market participation. Moreover, it is striking that the memorandums of 
1995 and 2000 contain many data on the division of labor between men and 
women, possibly during an entire life course (2000), whereas the 2007 
memorandum contains more data about professional child care. This data 
selection is congruous with the directions in which solutions are being 
sought in the memorandums (see section 4).
However, an analysis of the way in which the norms of emancipation 
policy are established also shows the limitations of Brandwein ’s model at 
the same time. For instance, it remains unclear what elements within the 
interpretive frame determine the direction of emancipation policy . It is our 
opinion, though, that these limitations are inherent to the analytical separa-
tions that are made by her model. After all, based on a post-positivist 
approach it is impossible by definition to separate facts and values . The 
intertwining of these elements hinders an unambiguous cause-result rela-
tionship as is preferred in positivistic analyses. On the other hand, Brand-
wein ’s model does make it clear that baseline categories of thought deter-
mine and give meaning to the interpretive products. Therefore, it can be 
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concluded from the analysis that the remarkable shift in emancipation pol-
icy can be attributed primarily to a change in baseline categories of thought. 
At the same time it should be noted that interpretive products also play 
their ‘own’ role in the policy success or failure. For instance, the persuasive-
ness of the interpretive products is of great importance for the success of 
the policy. It could be suggested, for example, that the 2007 emancipation 
policy was not just inspired by changed baseline categories of thought, but 
that the change was facilitated by the lack of convincing policy narratives 
in the previous memorandums about the possibility to actually alter exist-
ing structures through policy.
7.7 Implications
The majority of the actors involved in the materialization of emancipation 
policy will be, in our opinion, well aware of the fact that new policy is not 
only realized as a consequence of the availability of new data, but that poli-
cy, the specific problematization and its use of data also change because 
new political objectives get priority, which alters the perspective from 
which the policy area in question is viewed. However, using an extended 
version of Brandwein's model, we have tried to make this implicit knowl-
edge explicit and systemize it. As was shown in section 7.6 this model con-
tributes to a more systematic post-positivistic analysis of policy frames as it 
separates values and assumptions from the interpretive product such as 
storylines , problematizations and the use of data.
The analysis made visible that the policy frame in the emancipation 
memorandums has shifted over the past year, which affected the problema-
tizations and use of data in these memorandums. Values and assumptions 
such as ‘economic growth’ and ‘utility maximizer’ seem to have replaced 
values and assumptions from previous interpretive frames like ‘equality ’, 
‘diversity’ and ‘the social individual who lives primarily in a (care) rela-
tionship with others’. Relationships that so far were considered to be part 
of the ‘social domain’, such as the relationship between men and women 
and parents and their children, have increasingly become ‘economized’.12 
Probably a proposal for a public insurance for the finance of care leaves will 
not get much support within this new frame.13 From the perspective of a 
policy frame that is focused on economic growth, then, ‘care’, just like hav-
ing children, will be considered a ‘manufactured’ and therefore uninsura-
ble risk (Leijnse et al. 2003).
12 This relationship between the ‘economization’ of the social domain and (the thinking 
on) social security has been addressed previously by one of the authors (Eleveld 2009, 
2010).
13 For example, the proposal of trade union FNV (2010) for a public insurance of the 
fi nance of care leaves did not get much response.
144 Chapter 7
We are of the opinion that the consequence of continuing the course 
that was set in the 2007 memorandum will be that emancipation policy 
– specifically the part that regards female labor market participation – will 
develop towards a general labor market policy (Labor Participation Com-
mittee, 2008) that, in view of the ‘aging population’ will point continuously 
to the necessity of increased labor market participation of both women and 
men. Whether or not it is desirable that (this aspect of) emancipation policy 
will thus render itself obsolete in the future is another, primarily political, 
question. Answering this question requires one first and foremost to con-
template the place, function and social importance of care.14
14 The latest emancipation memorandum, which was not included in this study because it 
was issued after completion of this contribution, continues the trend of 2007. The lag-
ging labor participation of women is problematized primarily from the perspective of 
labor market shortages, which are considered cause for concern in view of the aging 
population (p. 10). Another striking aspect of this memorandum is that women’s eman-
cipation (and female labor market participation) receives little attention in comparison 
with other years. Women’s emancipation is incorporated in gay and lesbian emancipa-
tion policy, for instance. The decreased attention is refl ected in the use of data. Hardly 
any data are presented that regard female labor participation : the fact that no fi gures are 
calculated indicates that women’s emancipation has less priority than in previous 
years.
Part III
The Establishment 
of the Life Course 
Arrangement

Abstract
How do new policy ideas enter the dominant policy discourse and how do 
they manage to change these discourses and policy practices? Ideational 
analysis tends to emphasize the role of intentional acting policy actors. 
Instead, this paper draws on poststructuralist discourse theory, which 
focuses on subconscious processes while reemphasizing the role of struc-
tures at the same time. Using this theoretical perspective, two purposes are 
being served. On the one hand, this study further develops discourse theo-
retical poststructuralist concepts as methodological tools for policy analy-
sis, which, in a way, challenges the claim that was recently made by Hay 
that ‘postmodernist perspectives (…) largely disavow[s] explanation as the 
privileging of one subject position over others’ (2011: 171). On the other 
hand, by applying these concepts to the case of the introduction of indi-
vidual savings arrangements in the Dutch collective social security system, 
this paper offers a refreshing perspective on processes of policy change and 
permanence.
This paper is accepted for publication in Administrative Theory & Praxis 
(Eleveld 2013b).
8 Discourse Theory on Ideas and Policy 
Reform: the Case of the Life Course 
Arrangement
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8.1 Introduction
In 2006 the Life Course Arrangement (LCA ), a fiscally facilitated individual 
savings instrument for the financing of leave, was introduced in Dutch 
social security law. This arrangement, as well as the amendments to it that 
were proposed thereafter, shows that the idea of individual savings 
accounts for social risks has become firmly established within the Dutch 
policy discourse. These developments are, however, puzzling in the con-
text of the long Dutch tradition of collective social security arrangements, 
which rather seems to confirm the well-known new institutionalist claim 
that social security institutions tend to remain stable during long periods of 
time (Pierson 2001). Moreover, with respect to corporatist societies like the 
Netherlands in particular, the argument has been put forward that labor 
unions tend to slow down major social reforms (Hemerijck and Visser 1997; 
Kuipers 2004).
A plausible explanation for emerging ruptures in the collective social 
insurance system has been offered in ideational analysis . Scholars in this 
field of analysis have argued that the availability of new ideas may cause 
existing structures to alter (Cox 2001; Hay 2002; Blyth 2002; Schmidt 2002). 
How then, according to ideational theory, do new ideas such as the notion 
of individual savings arrangements actually change existing institutional 
structures? According to Béland and Cox (2010), who provide an interesting 
overview of current themes in ideational analysis, most ideational analyses 
of changes are agency-centered, that is:
‘[w]hat things change and how they change are all the result of what people choose to do 
in response to the world in which they find themselves (…) these choices are shaped by 
the ideas people hold and debate with others. These ideas, in turn, are based on interpre-
tations people have of the world and of those around them’
(Béland and Cox 2010: 12).
For an idea to be successful, ‘[t]he idea must capture the attention of actors 
who advocate for it and successfully use it to influence the observed out-
come’ (2010:13). Béland and Cox thus foreground the role of intentionally 
acting agents.
Scholars in the field of ideational analysis also point at some unsettled 
issues in this field of policy analysis. In the first place, having decoupled 
ideas from interests, ideational analysis still insufficiently explains why pol-
icy actors identify with those new ideas (Hay 2010). A second, related prob-
lem concerns the fact that ideational analysis cannot explain how ideology 
affects people’s choices, since this impact is not measurable (Béland and 
Cox 2010). Thirdly, as Schmidt (2008) argues, it often remains unclear how 
policy actors move from ideas to action. She therefore asks for more atten-
tion to collective and structural processes to explain the process of policy 
change and permanence. Nevertheless, following philosophers like Searle 
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and Habermas , Schmidt still foregrounds the role of intentionally acting 
(situated) agents who seek to enforce changes through discourse.
This focus on intentionally acting agents struggling with ideas has been 
challenged in poststructuralist approaches to policy analysis. For example, 
Finlayson (2007) holds that ideational analysis has wrongly examined ideas 
instead of arguments, viewing argumentation strategies or rhetoric as 
merely instrumental to policy goals. Instead, he has argued for an analysis 
of the constitutive function of rhetoric. Others have pointed at the role of 
fantasy in the process of policy change and permanence (Glynos and 
Howarth , 2007). This paper suggests considering some discourse theoreti-
cal solutions for the aforementioned issues in ideational analysis as a result 
of which it becomes possible to provide an account of why actors identified 
with certain new ideas and how these ideas were sedimented within exist-
ing social structures.
As will be shown in the study on the establishment of the LCA , post-
structuralist discourse theory offers a refreshing perspective on policy anal-
ysis as this approach focuses on the constitutive role of rhetoric , subcon-
scious identification processes and the role of conflict and resistance in 
processes of change and permanence.
An outline of discourse theoretical approaches is provided in next sec-
tion. The first empirical sections, sections 5 and 6, show how a new per-
spective emerged in the Dutch social security discourse: the life course per-
spective . Section 7 examines how in an atmosphere of conflict, 
disagreement and compromise, these new ideas ultimately resulted in a 
political decision on the establishment of the LCA . The last empirical sec-
tions (8-10) reveal how, despite the continuous struggles and conflicts in 
the policy process, the idea of an individual savings arrangement managed 
to take root in the social policy discourse.
8.2 Discourse theoretical approaches to change
Let us first consider the discourse theoretical distinction between the ontic 
and the ontological level of analysis. Whereas the ontic refers to a particular 
domain or phenomenon, the latter concept refers to the categorical precon-
ditions for such objects and their investigation. That is, in order to under-
stand processes of change and permanence we should first study the onto-
logical preconditions of the objects. As Glynos and Howarth argue, on a 
micro level of analysis the study of rhetoric can be helpful to gain an under-
standing of these categorical preconditions, because rhetorical patterns 
‘shape our language use and meaning in non-conscious ways’ and, accord-
ingly, give shape to the ontological preconditions of the ontic objects (Glynos 
and Howarth 2007: 75). This implies that, instead of viewing rhetoric as 
merely instrumental to policy goals or ideas, rhetorical arguments them-
selves can be constitutive of new ideas (Finlayson 2007).
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Norval ’s concept of ‘aspect change ’ sheds further light on the relation-
ship between rhetorical arguments and the constitution of new ideas. She 
uses Wittgenstein ’s example of the rabbit/duck picture to explain her 
point. As she argues, the moment in which a subject suddenly discovers a 
picture of a rabbit, which she earlier regarded as a picture of a duck, comes 
with surprise; unexpectedly, the subject has discovered a new aspect. At 
the same time, however, the subject notices that the picture has not 
changed. In other words, in the new perspective, continuity and disconti-
nuity occur. This is what Norval calls ‘aspect change’: seeing the duck now 
differs from the moment before the rabbit was discovered (Norval 2007). 
Rhetorical moves may thus, within a general frame of continuity, cause peo-
ple to see things in different ways and generate change accordingly.
Within discourse theoretical studies the concept of dislocation is used to 
explain changes on the level of the state. Dislocationary moments, may entail 
the effects of an economic crisis, processes of commodification, bureaucra-
tization or globalization (Laclau 1990: 52-65). According to Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), the experience of a dislocationary event causes subjects to see 
the contingent basis of sedimented social practices. They suddenly realize 
that things are not necessarily the way that they are. As a result, signifiers 
are no longer fixed to a particular meaning and begin to float. These float-
ing signifiers are only partly stabilized when they are successfully incorpo-
rated into dominant discourses, capable of a new fixation of meaning.
Yet, as Glynos and Howarth argue persuasively, a dislocation does not 
necessarily generate change. That is, change can only be expected if a brief 
glimpse of the contingent basis of social practices causes people to chal-
lenge (the norms underlying) social practices (2007: 121-124). In this situa-
tion equivalential chains between different particular demands can be con-
structed against the current hegemonic regime. As a result, this regime may 
be overthrown and a new hegemonic regime is established. For example, 
during Thatcherite populism the antagonisms constituted around disloca-
tionary processes of bureaucratization were constructed around two poles: 
the people, which included everyone defending traditional family values 
and the freedom of enterprise, and their opponents: the state and their sub-
versives such as feminists, blacks and young people (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985: 170). In contrast to these logics of equivalence , the logics of difference seek 
to keep different elements separate and autonomous, causing relatively 
small institutional changes (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 141-145). The logics 
of difference dominate when different demands are fulfilled such as, for 
example, in the modern welfare state (Laclau 2005: 78). Still, as Laclau 
argues, within a hegemonic regime we can find both logics of equivalence and 
difference.
In recent years, insights of Lacanian psychoanalytics have been added 
to this interplay between logics of equivalence and difference. Discourse 
theoretical scholars have argued that fantasies are essential to the process 
of social change, because they sustain existing or emerging discourses. 
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To them, the subject identifies with new fantasies because he or she is an 
internally split subject who is constantly seeking new fullness (Stravrakakis 
1999; Laclau 2005; Glynos and Howarth 2007). Glynos and Howarth men-
tion two kinds of fantasmatic dimensions in policy narratives : the ‘beatific 
dimension’ of fantasy, which ‘promises a fullness-to-come once a named or 
implied obstacle is overcome’, and the ‘horrific dimension’ of fantasy, 
which ‘foretells of disaster if the obstacle proves insurmountable’ (2007: 
147). In some instances fantasmatic logics are closely related to political 
logics . For example, the logics of equivalence may create ontological links 
between different demands through the construction of an enemy within, 
such as ‘the Muslim minorities.’ The construction of the logics of difference , 
on the other hand, can be sustained by a fantasmatic narrative in which an 
enemy without is created that takes away the national identity, such as ‘glo-
balizing forces.’
Hence, discourse theorists as Glynos and Howarth hold a different con-
cept of the subject than scholars in the field of ideational analysis . They 
probably agree on the interpretive idea that social agents always find them-
selves ‘thrown into’ a system of meaningful practices (Bevir and Rhodes 
2005). However, whereas, in poststructuralists theory structures are always 
incomplete, they can never fully determine the identity of these agents. 
According to Glynos and Howarth , then, ‘the whole point of poststructur-
alists theories of language and human subjectivity is to problematize the 
idea of a fully-resent subject and a fully constituted linguistic structure’ 
(2007: 78). Thus deconstructing the structure/agency opposition, Glynos 
and Howarth centralize the role of power and ideology with respect to the 
(always ‘lacking’) constitution of social structures and new forms of life. To 
them, individuals only turn into (acting) subject, to the extent that they 
experience a lack of identity which drive them to identify with new signi-
fiers or narratives.
In summary, whereas in discourse theory the emergence of new hege-
monic regimes is primarily caused by the construction of new chains of 
equivalences and differences, at a lower level of policy analysis change may 
occur because of the identification with new (constitutive) rhetoric . Yet in 
both cases fantasmatic identifications determine the speed and the direction 
of new policies.
8.3 Methodology
The empirical sections present a historical narrative on the establishment of 
the idea of individual savings arrangements in the Dutch policy discourse. 
To operationalize the rather abstract discourse theoretical concepts I 
designed a four steps research method. In a first step I formulated the fol-
lowing guiding questions:
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1. How can former and new social law practices and discourses be char-
acterized?
2. How and why were these new practices and discourses installed?
3. Why was there a lack of resistance of political subjects who embrace 
other values, such as solidarity and equality?
In a second step almost 40 key actors in the policy process were inter-
viewed, including (former) ministers, political representatives, representa-
tives of social partners, officials and political advisors. These semi-struc-
tured interviews were completed with the readings of secondary literature. 
The interviews and the readings were, in the first place, helpful for the 
characterization of social law practices and discourses and the presence of 
fantasmatic narratives. They, amongst other things, revealed the impact of 
the introduction of the signifiers ‘life course’ and ‘life course perspective’ 
had on the social security discourse. Therefore, the three most influential 
documents referring to these signifiers were selected for a textual analysis. 
In addition, the interview data served as guidance for the selection of a 8 
other texts for textual analysis. Finally to study the discursive change with-
in the most powerful political party, 3 additional texts were selected for 
textual analysis.
A third step involved the analysis of the selected texts. Whereas Glynos 
and Howarth have not developed methodological tools themselves for tex-
tual analysis, I looked for suitable discourse analytical tools which are 
developed in other approaches. Discourse Historical Analysi s (DHA) 
seemed to be useful in this respect (Wodak, et al.1999). DHA entails a 
detailed study of texts. Each claim that is made in these text needs to be 
studied and categorized. For this kind of text analysis DHA formulates a 
number of heuristic questions. Of these, the following three were of interest 
to this study:
1. How are people, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions 
named and referred to linguistically (strategies of nomination)?
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social ac-
tors, objects, phenomena/events and processes (strategies of predica-
tion)?
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question (Reisigl and 
Wodak, 2009: 93)?
Wodak, et al. (1999) use the third heuristic question to analyze the construc-
tion of national identities. As such, they distinguish between strategies of 
justification, strategies of construction, transformative strategies and strate-
gies of dismantling. For this study these analytical categories were adapted 
to the structure of the analyzed texts.
Together with the data from the interviews and the analysis of second-
ary literature, the (textual) analysis of argumentative strategies was also 
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helpful, to figure out the ‘beatific’ or ‘horrific’ dimension in the narratives. 
In addition, I took the presence of incompatible elements as a rule of thumb 
to trace fantasmatic dimensions in those narratives.
In a fourth step I analyzed the social conflict that preceded the estab-
lishment of the LCA for the ways different identities (social groups) were 
either connected or kept separate. As such I sought to figure out how chains 
of equivalences and difference affected discourses and practices.
8.4 Policy context
The Dutch political system can be characterized as consensual, i.e. the pow-
er over political decisions is distributed among different political party coa-
litions. From the Second World War onwards, the Christian democrats 
(CDA ) have been a constant presence in governing coalitions. However, 
between 1994 and 2002 the CDA sat in the opposition benches and the 
Netherlands were governed by the other two important political parties – 
the social democrats (PvdA ) and the right wing liberals (VVD ) – and the 
relatively small left wing liberals (D66 ). During its time in opposition, the 
CDA refurbished its political position. One of the new ideas they came up 
with in 2001 concerned the 'life course perspective' . Based on this, they 
designed a new social security system that included a partly collective and 
partly individual savings facility (Research Institute for the CDA, 2001). 
When the Christian democrats re-entered the government coalition in 2002 
as the biggest political party, they sought to materialize their ideas on a life 
course based social system. In 2010, after four subsequent governmental 
coalitions dominated by the CDA, the Balkenende IV cabinet was succeed-
ed by a CDA-VVD coalition headed by VVD leader Rutte.
With respect to the Dutch system’s corporatist elements, the influence of 
the unions is channeled in two important ways. First of all, the government 
must consult the tripartite Social Economic Council (SER) on every impor-
tant socio-economic policy change . Secondly, twice a year the social part-
ners united in the Labor Foundation discuss the terms of employment for 
the coming year with the central government. The most influential labor 
unions are the social democratic FNV and the Christian CNV , of which the 
FNV is the largest by far. The largest employers’ organization is VNO-NCW .
8.5 The emergence of the idea on the ‘life course perspective’
Dutch social security law has changed during the last decades. These chang-
es can be characterized as a slow transformation from a system informed by 
notions of equality and solidarity to a system that is increasingly influenced 
by the values of freedom of choice and individual responsibility. Moreover, 
since the middle of the 1990s, next to the individual responsibility discourse, 
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the social security system is increasingly affected by the discourse that cele-
brates the introduction of marketization processes. At the same time, these 
dominant discourses are also challenged in counter discourses, which, 
object the increasing infiltration of the logic of the market into the social sys-
tem. Other counter discourse emphasize the misrecognition of the worker 
as a 'worker with care tasks'. In addition other discourses. 
Around the turn of the century, several dominant discourses and coun-
ter discourses are united in a discourse coalition that is formed around the 
theme of the ‘life course perspective ’. Generally speaking, this new per-
spective expresses the idea that in our current day and age all people, 
women in particular, are combining more and more activities in their lives. 
As a result, there is a need for more flexibility and possibilities to take a 
break, especially during the ‘rush hour of life when parents combine differ-
ent tasks: taking care of their children and their own parents, making a 
career for themselves, and engaging in training and education. This dis-
course coalition consists of a variety of groups, including the CDA , PvdA , 
D66 , supporters of family policy and feminists. The labor unions FNV and 
CNV also support this new idea. For the Christian CNV, the life course idea 
fits in well with its affiliation with a family friendly social policy. For the 
FNV, on the other hand, the new concept of the ‘life course perspective’ not 
only expresses its new attention to the position of female workers, it also 
facilitates its shift towards individual responsibility , which had started in 
the mid-1990s.1
A Discourse Historical Analysis of a selection of key texts from 2001-2002 
shows that the new signifiers ‘life course’ and ‘life course perspective ’ estab-
lish a new world view: the world is now interpreted in terms of either ‘stand-
ard’ or ‘modern’ life courses, Whereas ‘standard life courses’ are associated 
with ‘traditional’, ‘the past’ and ‘static’, ‘modern life courses’ are related to 
words such as ‘dynamic’, ‘free choice’ and ‘change’. Other key signifiers in 
the studied texts, such as ‘risk’ and ‘social security’, become meaningful in 
relation to these new signifiers. For example, ‘risk’ is no longer considered 
an external event that could happen to any individual; ‘risk’ is now viewed 
as an event that is dependent on individual ‘life course decisions’. Instead of 
being a new argument in a political struggle over ideas, the study thus sug-
gests that the ‘life course perspective’, above all, facilitates a new way of see-
ing. Social security is now perceived in the perspective of an individual life 
course, which enables the view that individuals can anticipate future events.
1 For example, a document from 2003 where the FNV defends a ‘life course based social 
policy, states: ‘the labor market needs a culture change, workers should save and deal 
with time in a more conscious way. This culture change also presupposes that workers 
take their responsibility’ (2003a:15). FNV respondents maintain that this emphasis on 
individual responsibility had already started in the 1990s. In this regard, also see this 
quote from a 1995 document by the FNV on social policy: ‘Workers are increasingly (…) 
capable to make their own choices and to bear responsibility’ (FNV 1995: 24).
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The data from the interviews support the conclusion that the new way 
of looking at things provokes enthusiasm amongst involved policy actors. 
That is, for them the idea on the ‘life course perspective ’ provides a way out 
of existing, deadlocked discussions on future social security design. 
Addressing win-win situations, the new signifiers reconcile different, for-
merly opposing, perspectives: advertising a more relaxed life style on one 
hand and promoting an increased labor participation on the other; encour-
aging the (collective) facilitation of more time and money for the caretaking 
of children on one hand and holding individuals responsible for care tasks 
on the other.
Participants in this new ‘life course discourse coalition ’ draw diverse 
designs of a future ‘life course based’ social security system that, above all, 
attends to the ‘rush hour of life’. Most designs involve a mixture of collec-
tive and individual savings, which enable workers to take time off in order 
to take care of their children and/or their parents, to take educational leave 
or to enjoy a sabbatical (Research Institute for the CDA : 2001; PvdA : 2002b; 
D66 : 2001; FNV Women’s Union: 2001).
8.6 Changed ideas: the aging society narrative
After 2002, when the Netherlands is hit by an economic crisis, the discourse 
coalition alters in important ways. The impact of the economic crisis on 
governmental policy is clear: the Balkenende II cabinet, a coalition of CDA , 
VVD and D66 that soon will be named the ‘reform government’, forcefully 
argues that the slow economy is seriously threatening the Dutch welfare 
state. The aging society narrative adds to the expressed concerns. Accord-
ing to this narrative, the economic crisis compels the state to foster a higher 
and longer labor participation of the citizens to ensure a stable financial 
basis for the welfare state. This narrative particularly dominates the gov-
ernmental discourse in the years between 2002 and 2005. In this period the 
slogan of the Balkenende II government is: ‘we cannot lose any more time 
(..) Big efforts are necessary to prevent definite future catastrophes from 
happening’ (Van der Steen 2009, p. 310). In this context, the Balkenende II 
cabinet presents far-reaching social reforms, among which the gradual 
abolishment of the fiscal facilitation of early retirement provisions.
The economic crisis and the aging society narrative seriously affect the 
discursive position of one of its most important and most powerful defend-
ers, the CDA . A Discourse Historic Analysis of CDA documents from 
between 2001 and 2005 reveals this impact.2 Whereas in 2001 the signifier 
2 The following documents were compared for this study. On the one hand the Research 
Institute for the CDA (2001) and Balkenende (2001) and on the other hand the Research 
Institute for the CDA (2004) and Balkenende (2005).
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‘life course perspective ’ refers to the decreasing quality of life, resulting 
from the lack of time and money for family life and leisure, a few years later, 
the signifier ‘life course perspective’ is, conversely, invoked to show how 
people can enhance their labor market participation. This discursive shift 
also affects the party’s ideas on life course policy. Whereas the CDA initially 
designs a partly collective ‘life course insurance’ that is tailored to the recon-
ciliation of work and family life in particular, in 2004 the Christian demo-
crats argue for a comprehensive individual (savings) arrangement, a pre-
cautionary arrangement that encourages overall labor participation. It is 
believed that after a period of 10 to 20 years to reach full maturity, the LCA 
will become the starting point for an individualized social security system.
The aging society narrative also affects the deliberations between the 
labor and employers’ unions in the SER, which had been asked to design a 
‘life course based social system’ some months earlier.3 As one interviewee 
reported: ‘Instead of talking about workers’ desires to take care of family, 
the discussions in the SER on a ‘life course based society’ rather addressed 
the theme of the ‘aging society (…). The general idea was that the collective 
money that was stuck in existing traditional social security arrangements 
could be used in a more productive way’. Above all, the discussions in the 
SER reveal a major controversy between the biggest employers’ union, 
VNO-NCW , and the biggest labor union, the FNV . Although, as argued in 
the previous section, the FNV increasingly endorses ‘individual responsi-
bility ’ as one of the basic principles in social security arrangements, the 
labor union is also afraid to lose ‘old collective rights’. Among other things, 
the union fears that a life course based system will threaten workers’ unem-
ployment rights in the long run. On the other hand, VNO-NCW, a strong 
advocate of further flexibilization and individualization of social security 
arrangements, supports an exclusively individual savings scheme for the 
financing of leave. The continuing disagreement between the FNV and 
VNO-NCW severely obstructs the proceedings in the SER. In May 2003, the 
SER deliberations are stopped. According to the official annual report of 
the SER for 2003, this was due to the reforms announced by the Balkenende 
II cabinet. Most respondents, however, believed that further SER negotia-
tions were blocked because of the ongoing disagreement between the social 
partners. Moreover, as will be argued in the next section, the disagreement 
between two former supporters of the ‘life course perspective ’ seems to 
have been the first sign of a slow dissolution of the ‘life course perspective 
discourse coalition .’
3 In 2001 the former ‘purple government’ had asked the SER to sketch the options for a 
life course based social security system. Its advice should focus on the division of 
responsibilities between individuals, social partners and the government in particular.
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8.7 Disagreement, antagonism and compromise
In the summer of 2003, as the economic situation is getting worse, the gov-
ernment decides to speed up the intended abolition of the fiscal facilitation 
of early retirement arrangements.4 In addition, the government announces 
grand reforms in existing public disability and unemployment insurance 
schemes. Following strong protests from the labor unions, the social part-
ners are allowed to negotiate the conditions for the abolition of the fiscal 
facilitation of early retirement arrangements and the establishment of the 
LCA in the Labor Foundation.
The deliberations in the Labor Foundation start in the spring of 2004. 
The FNV and VNO-NCW have not solved their earlier disputes and thus 
find themselves back in the same antagonistic positions. Moreover, the 
announced abolition of the fiscal facilitation of early retirement drives the 
social partners further apart. Whereas the FNV seeks to preserve the early 
retirement provisions, VNO-NCW, which shares the fears of a tight labor 
market, tends to support most of the governmental plans. As the negotia-
tions are progressing with great difficulty, Minister De Geus of Social 
Affairs and Employment (SAE) responds to the call of the labor unions to 
allow workers to withdraw savings from the proposed LCA to finance ear-
ly (full-time) retirement. The minister, however, does not give in to the 
FNV’s demand to allow workers to save within the LCA on a collective 
basis. Yet, in a later phase of the negotiations, the minister does permit the 
partial continuation of collective early retirement insurance on the condi-
tion that workers are allowed to opt out of the collective insurance scheme. 
For the FNV and CNV opting out is not an option, though; in their opinion, 
‘opting out’ would destroy the collective system. Since the FNV and CNV 
do not foresee any acceptable agreement, they cause the negotiations to col-
lapse. The government, in turn, announces that the reforms are carried 
through without consulting the social partners any further.5
The labor unions are furious, now that the government has explicitly 
rejected them from the policy process. As an ultimate act of resistance, they 
call for a big social demonstration in October 2004. The labor unions defi-
nitely are not the only ones opposing the government. They are joined by a 
minority of the employers’ unions that share their opinion that the govern-
ment is increasingly marginalizing the role of the social partners in the pol-
icy process. In addition, the unions are joined by all kinds of other groups, 
including the entire left wing political opposition, which – like the unions 
– oppose further retrenchments of the welfare state. Calling for a reformed 
solidarity system, the new chain of equivalences channels a generally felt 
4 In September 2003, this intended abolishment and the introduction of the LCA are 
translated into two enactments: PP 2003-04, 29 208, No. 3 and 29 210, No. 3.
5 PP 2003-04, 29 760, No. 3.
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anger against the harsh Balkenende government. The call for the demon-
stration covers the demands of different groups, such as the demands of 
those who, like the unions, defend the preservation of the present collec-
tive social security system, the demands of students (against the increase 
in college fees), refugees and other members of ethnic minorities (against 
exclusion), tenants, users of public transport, environmentalists and oth-
er opponents of the Balkenende cabinet. The formation of a new chain of 
equivalences is clearly described by Van der Braak, a staff member of VNO 
NCW: ‘[the announced demonstration] increasingly becomes a political 
demonstration that can be characterized as a people’s front: Left, the labor 
union and the street against the right-wing government’ (2006: 85). The 
establishment of these chains of equivalences thus definitively thwarts the 
former life course perspective discourse coalition ’.
Interestingly, the emerging chain of equivalences also seems to have 
covered up the internal disputes within the FNV , where an internal strug-
gle had been going on between (mainly) male staff members defending tra-
ditional pension rights and those wanting social reforms that would facili-
tate female labor participation .6 Whereas the life course perspective merged 
the interests of female workers, who wanted to reconcile work and family 
life, with the interests of male workers, who rather strived for earlier pen-
sions and a shortened work week, the proceedings in the Labor Founda-
tion, on the other hand, drove male and female interests further apart. 
Interviewees reported that the FNV’s female rank and file in particular dis-
agreed with linking the design of an LCA to the abolition of the fiscal facili-
tation of pre-pensions. Yet, at the protest march in October 2004 in Amster-
dam, which turned out to be the biggest social protest march ever with 
300,000 people marching against the Balkenende II cabinet, the internal dif-
ferences within the FNV are set aside. Both male and female staff members 
report about the euphoric atmosphere during the protest march and frame 
the protest as a successful act of resistance against the government and its 
individualization policy. Above all, according to them, the protest march 
put the labor union back on the map.
At the beginning of November 2004, only a few days after the Labor 
Foundation of new negotiations between the labor unions and the govern-
ment, the parties come to an agreement. According to the respondents 
present at the negotiations, the fast agreement is due to the brute killing of 
controversial filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim fundamentalist on 
the second of November. The negotiating parties now realize that they 
have a common national responsibility and that their mutual quarrels need 
to be settled. They agree on some important adjustments to the proposed 
reforms of the disability insurance as well as on some transitional early 
6 This disagreement within the FNV was confi rmed by further research in the archives of 
the Institute of Social History.
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retirement provisions and amendments to the proposed LCA , which com-
pensate for the abolishment of the collective early retirement arrangements. 
The parties thus decide to introduce an individual savings instrument in 
social security law that not only facilitates workers to save for leave during 
the ‘rush hour of live’, but that also enables workers to compensate for the 
loss of the fiscal facilitation of early retirement arrangements.
The new agreement is praised extensively in the media channels of the 
FNV and CNV , which celebrate the outcome of the November negotiations 
as a triumph for the labor unions. One would almost forget that most 
reforms of the Balkenende II cabinet are still carried through. In this 
respect, De Geus, Minister of SAE, reported that the cabinet decided to let 
the unions celebrate their victory now that the government had finally got 
their approval for further reforms: ‘We said to each other: “Okay, let it go, 
they have the flowers and we have the signatures”’ (interview, 2009). As a 
matter of fact, even some interviewed union representatives admitted that 
the unions’ positive framing concealed the fact that the material outcome 
was not entirely positive for them. However, for them it was not so much 
the material results that mattered. Above all, the protest march had put the 
labor unions back on the map. The involved ministers even maintained 
that the labor unions would not have been able to come to an agreement 
with the government without the manifestation. According to them, the 
unions felt more secure after the protest march had taken place: it enabled 
them to make concessions to the government.
Despite the fact that the parties decide that the LCA will take the form 
of an individual savings arrangement instead of a compulsory collective 
facility, which would have been the FNV ’s preference, the 2004 compromise 
also marks the start of important efforts on the part of the FNV to make the 
LCA a success. As a result, a great number of collective agreements that 
are agreed upon in the following years contain specific regulations with 
regard to the LCA , particularly in support of the elderly workers. FNV 
chairwoman Jongerius even claims that despite much expressed skepti-
cism the FNV forms a ‘coalition of the willing’ because, according to her, 
the LCA is potentially the most innovative regulation that the Balkenende 
cabinets have brought forth.7 Nevertheless, the FNV accepted a compro-
mise containing elements that it had strongly opposed to just a month ear-
lier. How was this possible? The study suggests that the Balkenende gov-
7 Jongerius at an LCA promotion meeting of insurance company Aegon at 19 November 
2007 in Amsterdam. In this respect it should not be forgotten that, some years earlier, 
FNV had already embraced the ‘life course perspective ’, including the idea of individu-
al savings facilitation. Moreover, even in 2003, in the midst of the disagreement between 
the labor unions and employers’ unions a small group of representatives of both par-
ties, the so-called ‘Balie group’, had been working on a proposal to reform the social 
security system based on partly individual, partly collective individual savings 
arrangements. Their design would become a source of inspiration for future proposals.
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ernment effectively decoupled the different demands, as it addressed the 
most important demand of the unions that was not included in the call for 
the demonstration, namely (the idea of) regaining influence in the policy 
making process. This enabled the government not to give away too much 
with respect to the other demands. The government thus successfully cut 
across the established chains of equivalences and restored the peace in the 
corporatist society.
8.8 The LCA: ‘a monstrous design’
The events preceding the political decision on the LCA , as well as the 
involvement of other stakeholders in the policy making process, to a great 
extent determine the final design of the LCA . First of all, as we saw in last 
section, the labor unions successfully argue to use the LCA as an early 
retirement facility. Secondly, the CDA pays a price for its new equivalent 
relationship with right wing liberal party VVD . VVD chairman Zalm, who 
is also a finance minister in the Balkenende II-III cabinets and a strong 
opponent of ‘subsidies on spare time.’ only accepts the introduction of the 
LCA on the condition that workers will not be allowed to save part of their 
wages in the popular ‘wage savings arrangement’ at the same time. Look-
ing back, Zalm admits that he had hoped that the LCA would fail, because 
of the workers’ habit to save money in the wage savings arrangement 
(interview, 2009). A third stakeholder influencing the final LCA design are 
the private insurers. In contrast to minister Zalm and the labor unions, the 
private insurers support the CDA’s ideas as they envision, above all, a prof-
itable market and further individualization and privatization of social 
security. The CDA, in turn, views the private insurers as tactical allies, 
because they can promote the new arrangement in the market. The private 
insurers are particularly successful with their lobby for an exclusively pri-
vate execution of the LCA instead of a partly collective one, which is what 
the labor unions would have preferred.8
The details of a future LCA are further elaborated by the Departments 
of SAE and Finance. Some officials at the Department of SAE are very dis-
appointed by the fact that, compared with a leave facility that they devel-
oped a year earlier by commission of the Balkenende I cabinet, the idea has 
shifted from a facility that enables the combination of work and care activi-
ties to an early retirement arrangement. They wonder how workers with a 
low income in particular, are able to save enough money to finance leaves 
8 Another successful lobby concerns the lobby to outsource the monitoring of the proper 
use of the LCA , as it is decided that the government and employers will carry out these 
tasks. Indeed, one offi cial argued regarding some of the LCA ’s preconditions that too 
much had been given away to the insurers.
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in the period when they have young childeren. Hence, to these officials the 
underlying idea of the leave arrangement has changed profoundly. In addi-
tion, officials at both the Departments of SAE and Finance further foresee a 
negative impact of the aforementioned compromise between CDA and 
VVD . Officials working at the finance department also principally question 
the governmental interference with private savings in case of market fail-
ure. According to them, the fact that workers at that moment do not save 
for leave simply means that there is no need for it. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, almost all interviewed officials reported that they were rather skep-
tic about the possible effects of the LCA on labor participation. Some of 
them argued that the whole idea of the life course perspective concerned a 
kind of belief, namely the belief that workers participating in the LCA 
would participate longer in the labor market.9 One of the interviewed offi-
cials summarized the discontent as follows: ‘We all felt that we had to deal 
with a monstrous design.’
8.9 Proposed extensions of the LCA and renewed resistance
A year after the introduction of the LCA in 2006 no more than 5% of the 
workers is saving part of their wages in this arrangement, most of them for 
the purpose of early retirement. With the objective of making the arrange-
ment more attractive to workers, the new Balkenende IV cabinet agrees on 
a number of modifications. They concern, amongst others, integrating the 
LCA with the aforementioned wage savings arrangement, the extension of 
its scope of application to the self employed, and the possibility to with-
draw money from the account to finance periods ‘in between jobs’ and the 
start-up period of a new company. A year later, the Labor Foundation 
launches similar proposals (Labor Foundation 2008). A few months after 
the Labor Foundation report is published the Labor Participation Commit-
tee, which was installed to advise on labor market reforms, presents plans 
for a mixed individual and collective savings arrangement modeled on the 
LCA , with which periods of unemployment can be financed. The proposed 
scheme partly replaces existing collective social security arrangements 
(Labor Participation Committee 2008).
In the same year the Departments of SAE and Finance are ordered to 
design various workable options that respect the 2007 coalition agreement. 
They extensively discuss the following two options:
9 In the governmental debate in November 2004 the cabinet exposed itself as a firm 
believer, because it said to expect that the life course arrangement would have a behav-
ioral effect on workers and employers (PP 2004-05, 29 760, No. 10).
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1. The LCA is regulated under the income tax law (instead of the wage tax 
law) in order to include self-employed workers. People are only al-
lowed to take out money as an income substitution in case they choose 
not to do paid work, but to dedicate their time to (unpaid) care activi-
ties or training activities instead or when they decide to fi nance a peri-
od between two jobs or the start-up of a company.
2. As in the first option, the LCA is regulated under the income tax law, 
but there is no control with regard to the purpose of withdrawals.
However, both options are declined for a number of reasons. Not only are 
they too expensive, they are also connected with too many goals. Some 
interviewees reported that at that time it seemed that new goals were for-
mulated constantly for an existing, instrument, the LCA . First, the LCA had 
to be tailored to finance leave for care and educational activities. Later on, 
the LCA additionally had to address the demand for a pre-retirement 
arrangement. Then, according to the last proposals, the LCA also had to 
cover periods of unemployment and help employees to set up their own 
company. One interviewed official explicitly blamed the ‘technocratic hob-
byists’ for the unfruitful discussions at the departments: ‘what had started 
with a small problem, the reconciliation of work and family life, had grown 
totally out of control’. In addition, some interviewed officials doubted the 
desirability of extending the scope of application to include the self 
employed because, according to them, the self employed tend to care for 
themselves by definition. For example, one official said: ‘Is this really a 
problem? Can you imagine the streets to be full of people demanding a life 
course arrangement for the self employed?’
With regard to the first option, which showed great similarities with 
the proposals by the Labor Participation Committee, the involved officials 
further raised some practical objections. Most importantly, the tax authori-
ties would not be capable of controlling the specific use of the withdrawals. 
Regarding the second option, there were doubts if participants were really 
going to use their savings for relevant goals that would facilitate a long 
working career, such as financing leave for the purpose of care and educa-
tion. As one respondent argued: ‘Why would they not use the savings to 
finance consumer goods, such as a caravan?’ According to these skeptical 
officials, the proposals had no longer anything to do with the objective of 
public social insurance.
As a result, despite the intentions of the Balkenende IV cabinet and the 
advice of the social partners and the Labor Participation Committee, it is 
decided not to extend the LCA for the time being. Apart from the objections 
of the officials against the coalition plans, the more ambitious plans of the 
Labor Participation Committee are opposed by the labor unions that fear 
that these plans might destroy the existing system of collective social insur-
ance. The elaboration of the new plans is also postponed because of the 
(financial) crisis of 2008, which shifts the attention of the government and 
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social partners from individual savings arrangements towards the prob-
lems of insolvent companies and the danger of long-term unemployment.
8.10 The future of individual savings arrangements in the social 
security system
At the time of the interviews, in 2009 and 2010, most of the interviewed key 
actors were rather pessimistic about the future of the LCA . Some of them 
refer to the technical details of the arrangement, such as the non-accumula-
tion verdict that resulted from the VVD -CDA compromise.10 A second set 
of arguments reveals that the respondents identify themselves as ‘non-
believers’: they do not believe that the LCA will either solve the ‘rush hour 
of life’ or the problems of the tight labor market.11
The expressed pessimism with respect to the LCA does not imply, how-
ever, that the idea of individual savings arrangements in the field of social 
security vanishes from the policy discourse. In contrast, after two quiet 
years the Rutte cabinet (CDA -VVD ) announces a ‘vitality plan’.12 This plan 
contains a new savings arrangemment, the ‘vitality arrangement ’, that has 
to replace the LCA in 2013 . The vitality arrangement is first and foremost 
presented as an arrangement that sustains a longer labormarket participa-
tion, which is necessary in the face of aging society.13 Like the 2007 and 2008 
proposals, the vitality arrangement allows workers – including the self 
employed – to withdraw money from their individual account during peri-
ods in which they are ‘between jobs’ in order to stimulate ‘the transition 
from job to job’. Since the social partners have launched similar ideas a few 
years before (Labor Foundation 2008), it comes as no surprise that they 
support this proposal, albeit on the condition that it remains possible to use 
the instrument for financing early retirement.14
By the year 2011, thanks to the aging society narrative , the idea of an 
individual savings arrangement has thus definitely shifted from an 
arrangement for the ‘rush hour of life’ to a scheme to facilitate ‘work-to-
work transitions’, obviously connecting the idea of an individual savings 
arrangement with the traditional collective unemployment insurance.
10 These concerned the non-accumulation rule and the prohibition of exclusive employ-
ers’ contributions to participants in the life course arrangement.
11 A fi nal set of arguments concerns issues of presentation and promotion of the LCA .
12 Letter of the Minister of SAE, 4 July 2011.
13 See 'National Reform Program 2011 The Netherlands (addition to PP. 2010-2011, 21 501-
20, No. 531), PP 2010-2011, 30 413, No. 157 and 2011-2012, 33 003, No. 3). 
14 PP 2010-11, 30 413, No. 157.
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8.11       A discourse theoretical approach to ideas and policy change 
Reflecting on the rhetorical rediscription presented in the previous empiri-
cal sections, this section seeks to answer the question how and why new 
ideas on individual savings arrangements affected Dutch social policy.
First of all, we saw that in the 1990s some counter discourses increas-
ingly challenged the existing logics of the social security system (solidarity , 
breadwinner system, etc.). Put otherwise, a gap seemed to have been 
opened up between the term social security and its meaning. This gap was 
soon filled up with the terms ‘life course’ and ‘life course perspective ’. 
Actors could easily identify with these new signifiers, because they 
responded to a fantasmatic demand for a new fullness in a discursive field 
that was increasingly immersed with counter discourses . As such, new 
names united former dominant discourses and counter discourses .
In addition, instead of being just one idea, strategically proposed by 
policy actors, this paper argues that in the process of deliberation the new 
terms constituted a new world view, which confirms Finlayson’s claim that 
the process of argumentation cannot be separated from the formation of a 
consensus. Thus new rhetoric changed the categorical pre-conditions of the 
social security discourse and as such changed the existing discourse.
Following the 2003 dislocationary events, the economic crisis and the 
announced cutbacks in social expenditure, chains of equivalences were con-
structed between different demands against the hegemonic neoliberal poli-
cy of the Balkenende II regime. This process was sustained by a strong fan-
tasmatic aging society narrative , which expressed the fear that the stable 
Dutch welfare state would soon decline if no measures were taken to 
expand the labor supply. The aging society narrative also profoundly 
altered the meaning of the ‘life course perspective ’ within the context of 
hegemonic neoliberal regime, putting the emphasis on individual precau-
tionary measures that enhance labor participation. Now former partners in 
the ‘life course discourse coalition ’ had become antagonists , the question 
can be raised how the introduction of the LCA was secured?
The study suggests, first of all, that the government effectively decou-
pled different demands. That is, the unions, which wanted first and fore-
most to re-establish their position as a serious party were given the credits 
of the victory in negotiations, as a result of which the government could cut 
across the established chain of equivalences and restore peace in the corporat-
ist society. The working of the logics of difference thus allowed the govern-
ment to go on with their neoliberal program , including the introduction of 
an individual LCA . The study further suggests that the working of the log-
ics of difference was reinforced by fears for both an aging society and Muslim 
fundamentalists, which, according to the involved policy actors, urged 
them to collectively take a stand for a stable Dutch welfare state. Thus cre-
ating an enemy without, the working of fantasy effectively sustained the 
logics of difference that maintained the unity of neo-liberal government.
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On the other hand, the working of the logics of difference also seems to 
have contributed to the failure of the LCA , i.e. the decoupling of demands 
also implied that the government gave in to some of the labor unions’ 
demands. For example, the LCA could now be used effectively as an alter-
native for collective pre-pension arrangements. Secondly, attending to the 
VVD ’s demand of maintaining the wage savings arrangement as a separate 
arrangement further weakened the LCA .
Another important factor inhibiting a successful LCA concerns the 
position of policy officials who, positioning themselves as ‘non-believers,’ 
seemed to have hindered a further extension of the LCA . The counter dis-
courses that were invoked by their ‘silent resistance’ against the hegemonic 
policy regime that increasingly constructed the subject as a self responsible 
life planner , reveals the always existing lack in social structures. Moreover 
these counter discourses seem to have been sustained by the public, seeing 
the low degree of participation in the arrangement.
Yet, despite the silent resistance of both the public and the officials, the 
idea of individual savings arrangements has been firmly established in the 
Dutch policy discourse. How was this possible? The poststructuralist dis-
course theoretical approach answers this question in three steps. First of all, 
the ‘life course perspective ’ enabled a new way of seeing. Social security 
was now perceived in terms of individual life courses, which opened up 
the possibility of introducing individual savings arrangements in the tradi-
tional collective system of social insurance. Secondly, the working of the 
logics of equivalence and difference secured the support of the labor unions for 
this novel arrangement. Thirdly, due to the identification with a strong fan-
tasmatic aging society narrative that continued to nourish the urge for social 
reforms, different forms of (silent) opposition were effectively resisted.
8.12 Conclusion
This study showed that a discourse theoretical approach is able to over-
come some problems that are raised within ideational analysis . Firstly, the 
study explained how ideas altered and why policy actors could identify 
with those new ideas. The study further showed that research should not 
focus on how policy actors move from ideas to action. In fact, ideas cannot 
be separated from actions; ideas emerged and altered because of the use of 
rhetoric , discursive interactions, (fantasmatically based) identification 
processes and the working of the logics of equivalence and difference, 
which are all processes that are largely beyond the control of intentionally 
acting individual policy actors. However, whereas the subject is constantly 
looking for new fullness, she seems to be present all the time. Hence, para-
doxically, individual actions of ‘situated agents’ seem to be just as impor-
tant for explaining policy change as in ideational approaches.
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The failure of discourse theory to present a full blown alternative to 
more conventional approaches to the analysis of policy change seems to be 
due to the fact that despite its empirical ambitions, the discourse theoretical 
explanatory concepts are mostly presented on a philosophical level of anal-
ysis. As a result, to a great extent, it remains unclear how to apply the 
abstract discourse theoretical concepts on the analysis of policy change. 
Moreover, these concepts seem to be designed for a macro level of analysis 
in particular.
In order to make the discourse theoretical approach more suitable to 
the analysis of policy change this study recommended the deployment of 
tools that are developed within DHA. Still, discourse theory is in need of 
further methodological development. For example, how do political logics 
operate in concrete policy situations, where differences and equivalences 
between identities are not as outspoken as in South Africa, a country which 
Howarth and Glynos often use to explain the working of political logics 
(2007: 141-145)? To answer this and other questions, this study encourages 
other scholars to engage in (empirical) policy studies that are based in post-
structuralist discourse theory .
Abstract
How is it possible that the life course arrangement has failed to become the 
flagship of social security reform in the Netherlands? A comparison with 
the Belgian TC and a discussion of the proposed extensions to the life 
course arrangement show that part of the answer to this question can be 
found in a clash between the sets of values, assumptions, normative claims 
and views of society and the individual underlying the life course arrange-
ment and the existing social security system, respectively. The author 
reaches the conclusion that for a social security reform to be successful the 
baseline categories of thought underlying these reforms must either corre-
spond with the baseline thought categories on which the existing system of 
social security was founded or with the baseline categories of thougt of cur-
rent trends in society.
A Dutch version of this paper has been published in Tijdschrift voor Recht en 
Arbeid (Journal for Law and Labor), Volume 3, issue 2, pp. 5-11, February 
2011. The Dutch version is available at http://tijdschriftrechtenarbeid.nl/
tijdschrift-recht-en-arbeid.html (Eleveld 2011a).
9 Conflicting baseline categories of thought 
and the demise of the life course 
arrangement
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9.1 Introduction
Shortly after the turn of the century, various parties seemed to agree that 
social security law should be reformed towards a system that was ‘life course 
proof’. The pressure on the ‘rush hour of life’ had to be relieved, and the time 
spent on work, education and care needed to be distributed more evenly over 
the course of an individual’s life. In this regard, the life course was expressly 
considered to be the product of individual choices. This meant, at least to 
most parties, that a shift towards a life course-proof social security system 
would be accompanied by a corresponding shift from collective decisions 
and responsibilities to individual ones. In 2006 the Life Course Arrangement 
(LCA ) was introduced. Using this scheme, employees can save up part of 
their gross salary (fiscally facilitated) for the purpose of financing future 
work leave. The advocates of the life course concept saw the life course 
arrangement as a first step towards a life course-proof social security system.
In 2010 the life course based thinking seems to have died a silent death. 
Only 6% of employees participate in the life course arrangement1 and 
attempts to extend the scheme’s material and personal scope of application 
have so far been unsuccessful. In literature, the life course scheme’s lack of 
success is related primarily to the way in which individual choices are 
being made. Based on economic studies, for instance, it has been argued 
that employees prefer to choose arrangements that require them to make as 
few active choices as possible (the so-called ‘default option’) (Kremer 2005; 
Van Rooij and Teppa 2008). Also, citizens would not be very much inclined 
to save up money voluntarily (Bovenberg 2008). Consequently, the current 
LCA would be geared insufficiently to the choice behavior of employees. In 
addition, studies have shown that the scheme is not attractive to many 
employees, because of its lack of immediately tangible financial incentives 
(Anker Solutions 2007). The inclusion of an alternative incentive structure 
would improve the scheme (Van Bijnen 2006). Furthermore, many have 
pointed at the way in which the LCA came into being, stating that the 
scheme’s coherence and purposiveness were lost in the process.
This contribution takes a somewhat different approach. Unlike the lit-
erature discussed here, the question of why the LCA so far has not devel-
oped into the intended rush hour scheme, let alone into an instrument of 
social security reform, is not being treated exclusively from the point of 
view of individual choice considerations or the scheme’s origination story 
but primarily from the perspective of conflicting baseline thought catego-
ries. This term refers to the conflict between different combinations of val-
ues , assumptions, normative claims and views of society and the individu-
al underlying the social security system and the LCA , respectively.
1 It should be noted, though, that in 2009 the total amount deposited in life course accounts 
rose for the fi rst time since the scheme’s inception in 2006 (source: Statistics Netherlands).
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Brandwein uses the category of baseline categories of thought for a sys-
tematic analysis of interpretive frames in policy texts (Brandwein 2006). 
According to her, a clear distinction can only be made between the frame 
through which one views reality and the way in which this observed reality 
is then described in meaningful texts if baseline categories of thought, such 
as opinions, assumptions and views of the individual and society, are dis-
tinguished from the interpretive product, such as the problematization of a 
certain policy area and policy narratives. Translated to social security law, 
Brandwein ’s concepts imply that instruments of social security law and the 
corresponding clarifying law texts – the interpretive product – can be dis-
tinguished from certain norms, values and images of man and society on 
which they are based.
The idea of ‘conflicting baseline thought categories’ originated after 
reading a paper by a Belgian political scientist on the social discourse that 
preceded the introduction of the Time Credit scheme (TC ), the Belgian 
equivalent of the LCA (Vanderweyden 2002). As it turned out, the Belgian 
social discourse showed striking similarities with the Dutch life course dis-
course . However, the results of these discourses – the TC and the LCA – dif-
fer quite dramatically. First of all, the TC is much more popular.2 Moreover, 
compared to the LCA the Belgian scheme is much more rooted in the val-
ues of solidarity and mutual rights and obligations, which are values that 
are also underlying Belgian and Dutch social security law. These insights 
led me to construct a new perspective on the life course saving scheme’s 
success and failure factors based on an articulation of the baseline catego-
ries of thought against the background of both schemes’ origination stories.
The first step in this process is taken in section 2. A legal comparison 
between the LCA and the TC shows that the LCA , in contrast to the TC , is 
not so much based on the value of solidarity but primarily takes voluntari-
ness and individual responsibility as its points of departure. In other 
words, based on a comparison with the TC the striking characteristics of 
the LCA are highlighted. The second part of the section investigates how 
the distinctive values, normative claims and assumptions relate to the 
schemes’ origination stories. Subsequently, a discussion of proposed exten-
sions to the LCA in section 3 provides a further specification of the previ-
ous articulation of thought categories. In section 4 the results from sections 
2 and 3 culminate in the question to what degree the phenomenon of ‘con-
flicting baseline categories of thought ’ can hinder the reform of social secu-
2 In 2007, for instance, 15 000 female participants in the life course arrangement indicated 
that they were planning to use the credit to fi nance their maternity leave. In the same 
year, 40 000 women between 25 and 49 years old took leave under the TC , the majority 
of whom probably used it for maternity leave. It should be noted, though, that these 
figures can only be compared to some degree because in one case it concerns the 
number of people taking leave (TC ) whereas in the other case it concerns the number of 
people saving for leave (life course arrangement).
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rity law. In the final section, this argument leads to the conclusion that 
social security reform can only be successful if the baseline categories of 
thought underlying the reform proposals either correspond with those on 
which the existing systems were founded or with with the baseline catego-
ries of thougt of trends in society.
For the analysis, amongst other things, use was made of interviews with 
actors who were involved in the discussion surrounding the (extended) 
LCA .
9.2 A comparison between the LCA and the Belgian time credit 
system
This section aims to make clear the limited role of the LCA as a rush hour 
scheme by comparing it with the popular TC . To do so, first of all the base-
line categories of thought will be articulated based on a legal comparison 
with the TC . Subsequently it is investigated how the schemes’ origination 
stories relate to the values underlying both schemes.
9.2.1 Both schemes compared
The LCA and TC are compared to one another with regard to their place in 
law, leave entitlement, compensation during leave, duration of leave, 
employment protection and accrual of social security entitlements.
The situation in law and circle of entitled persons
The first difference regards the place in law where leave provisions are stip-
ulated. The LCA is covered by the Work and Care Act (Wazo) and the Wage 
Tax Act. The fact that the LCA is regulated in law at two different places, 
has consequences for its personal scope of application. A distinction can be 
made, for example, between those who are entitled to participate in the LCA 
(art. 7:2 Wazo), i.e. everyone who performs labor by virtue of an employ-
ment contract under civil law or by statutory appointment (art. 1:1 Wazo), 
and those who are allowed to participate in the LCA (art. 2 through 5b Wage 
Tax Act 1964). In deviation of the first group, the latter group also includes 
people who do not work based on an employment contract or by statutory 
appointment, such as welfare recipients and people who are working based 
on a 'fictitious labor relationship'.
Unlike the LCA the TC is not regulated by formal law, but via a gener-
ally binding collective labor agreement (cao No. 77, referred to hereafter as 
cao) that applies to all employees that are bound by a work contract under 
private law as well as employees who work for wages but without work 
contract under the authority of another person, with the exclusion of peo-
ple who are employed in public bodies. In addition, certain employee cate-
gories can be excluded from the scope of application of the collective labor 
agreement on the basis of sectoral agreements (art.1 cao).
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Leave entitlement
Regarding the entitlements connected to the LCA and TC , the following 
differences catch the eye. Only an entitlement to participate in the scheme (see 
above, art. 7:2 Wazo) and no general entitlement to leave is connected to the 
LCA .3 Nevertheless, according to the government, the employer cannot 
simply deny a request to grant leave. Good employership (art. 7:611 CC) 
entails that the employer in the case of a request for unpaid leave must 
weigh both his own interests and those of the employee.4 Good employer-
ship may play a role in the future with regard to employees who have been 
with the company for a long time and can be temporarily replaced without 
too many problems.
In contrast to the LCA , the TC does include a general leave entitlement. 
Since January 1st 2010 the condition is attached that an employee must be 
employed for at least two years before he or she can request leave. Previ-
ously, this term was set at one year. It should be noted, though, that this 
general leave entitlement does not apply to companies with ten employees 
or less. In that case, the entitlement is subject to permission by the employ-
er. In addition, if more than 5% of employees are absent at the same time, 
the employer has the right to deny a leave request. Moreover, the employer 
is permitted to apply rules of preference on which grounds requests in con-
nection with care leave or parental leave, respectively, can be granted pref-
erence over other leave objectives (art. 4.2.2 cao).
Compensation during leave
An important difference regards the compensation (financing) during the 
employee’s leave period. In contrast to the LCA , the TC entitles the partici-
pants to monthly benefits of € 453.28 gross upon full-time leave if they have 
been employed between two and five years and of € 604.38 in cases of 
employment for more than five years.5 These benefits are funded from 
social contributions, supplemented with government subsidies. Moreover, 
certain sectors or companies can grant additional premiums. Furthermore 
it can be noted that, in addition to the TC , Belgian law includes the right to 
thematic leave. Such types of leave are granted for a maximum of three 
months for the purpose of specific goals such as parental leave and care 
leave. In that case the monthly supplemental benefits are € 726.85 gross. 
In the Flemish Region the benefits can be further increased by a monthly 
allowance of roughly between € 50 and € 150 if the leave is taken for the 
purpose of care or education.
3 An amendment to entitle the employee to take leave unless this confl icts with an impor-
tant business or employment interest, was rejected (PP 2004/05, 29 760, No. 19).
4 PP 2004/05, 29 760, D, p. 37.
5 These fi gures apply as of September 1st 2010.
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In contrast to the TC , no benefits are paid under the LCA . The participat-
ing employee must fund her own leave by depositing part of his wages in a 
life course account or life course insurance. Although it is permitted to agree 
by collective labor agreement that the employer will contribute to the LCA , 
she will have to pay an equal amount to non-participants in that case. Fur-
thermore, the LCA includes limited collective funding through the applica-
tion of fiscal rules and the granting of a tax rebate for each year that a partici-
pant has saved funds under the LCA . In 2011 this life course leave rebate is 
€ 201. Moreover, apart from a fiscal rebate for parents, unlike in Belgium there 
is no entitlement to benefits during parental leave under Dutch law; (par-
tial) leave funding is arranged in only very few collective labor agreements.6
Leave period
Under the TC an employee is allowed to take full-time leave for a maxi-
mum period of one year. In case of a collective labor agreement at the secto-
ral level, the leave period can be extended to a maximum period of five 
years. In most sectors, this entitlement is extended to two, three or five 
years. The establishment of a maximum term is obviously connected to the 
fact that the employee is entitled to benefits during the period that she is 
taking leave under the TC . No maximum leave period is stipulated in the 
LCA . If an employee wants to finance her leave via the LCA , it is up to the 
employer and employee to determine in mutual consultation how long the 
leave period will be. The LCA does set a maximum to the savings balance, 
though. This maximum is 210% of the last salary. Thus, the employee can 
take a three-year leave at 70% of his last salary.
Employment protection
The LCA and TC differ significantly when it comes to employment protec-
tion. If an employee takes life course leave under Dutch law he does not 
receive any extra protection against dismissal. In contrast, the Belgian 
scheme offers specific employment protection from the time that the leave 
is announced in writing up until three months after the leave has ended. 
During this period the employer can only dissolve the labor agreement on 
urgent grounds that are unrelated to the exercised leave entitlement. In that 
case, the burden of proof rests on the employer. If she fires the employee in 
violation of these rules, she will owe an additional compensation equal to 
six months salary (art. 5.2 cao No. 77). Furthermore, in contrast to the LCA 
the TC guarantees the employee that she can return to her former position 
upon return after leave (art. 5.1 cao No. 77).
6 In 2009, this was the case for only 4% of all collective labor agreements. As a result, it 
concerns only 7% of the total number of employees covered by collective labor agree-
ments that are studied in the standard sample survey (Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment 2009: 53).
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Accrual of social security entitlements
Finally, the differences in accrual of social security entitlements are worth 
mentioning. Under Dutch law, the duration of someone’s benefits entitle-
ment are calculated based on the employee’s work pattern prior to taking 
(life course) leave. However, this only applies during the first 18 months of 
unpaid leave. An employee who takes leave under the TC , accrues social 
security entitlements throughout the entire leave period.7 It should be not-
ed, though, that under the TC in many cases a maximum leave period of 
only one year is allowed.
Conclusions
Table 9.1, which summarizes the main differences between the LCA and 
the TC , shows that in comparison with the TC the LCA can be character-
ized as an individual scheme that is hardly backed by any collective guar-
antees. The TC , on the other hand, features many more aspects of solidarity 
and also seems to be embedded to a greater degree within the existing sys-
tem of social security with regard to the granting of employees’ rights. 
Thus, more so than the LCA the Belgian scheme seems to be founded on 
the value of solidarity and the value of mutual rights and (to a lesser extent) 
obligations (Debacker, De Lathouwer and Bogaerts 2004: 5). In contrast, the 
LCA is based on individual responsibility and voluntariness.
Table 9.1 Characteristics of LCA and TC 
LCA TC 
Work and Care Act and Wage Tax Act Generally binding collective labor agreement 
No leave entitlement Leave entitlement
No maximum period Maximum leave period of 1 to 5 years, 
depending on sectoral agreement
Individual arrangement Benefits
Funded primarily by the individual par-
ticipant. In addition: government subsidy 
(fiscal facilitation) and sometimes employ-
er’s contribution
Funded by social contributions, supple-
mented with government subsidies
No employment protection Employment protection
Accrual of social security entitlements for 
a maximum of 18 months
Accrual of social security entitlements 
throughout the entire leave period
Leave objective is unrestricted Leave objective is unrestricted, but in some 
cases care and education receive additional 
facilitation
7 Royal Decree of 21 January 2003 (Belgium).
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9.2.2 One life course discourse, two schemes
It is an interesting puzzle: how is it possible that a similar life course dis-
course in two comparable countries resulted in two very different schemes? 
This question cannot be answered within the scope of a single paper, let 
alone in a single section. Yet, I would like to make a few suggestions here.
First of all, it can be put forward that there has been a popular career 
break scheme in place in Belgium since 1985 that shows similarities to the 
TC on a number of points. In this sense, the TC could simply be considered 
a follow-up to the career break scheme. Another point that I would like to 
give further attention here concerns the way in which the life course dis-
course was connected to a division of responsibilities. In the Belgian debate, 
for instance, the emphasis was put not so much on the individual responsi-
bility for life course decisions; instead, the discussion was oriented more 
strongly towards the question how equal access to jobs and income could 
be achieved. Values such as equality and solidarity took center stage in this 
regard. ‘Reconciling the interests of employers and employees’ was the 
main theme of the debate.
Contrastingly, after the turn of the century the Dutch life course dis-
course focused increasingly on individual responsibility for so-called life 
course decisions, such as having children, keeping up one’s work skills, 
and taking a temporary break during ‘the rush hour of life’. By placing 
responsibility for this with the individual employee, the labor participation 
– measured across an entire life course – was thought to increase in the end. 
Another important difference concerns the manner in which the schemes 
eventually came into being. Whereas the TC was supported by the most 
important political parties and can be considered to be a collective product 
of the employers, employees and government, the introduction of the LCA 
was marked by commotion. In first instance this manifested itself in a con-
flict between government parties CDA , VVD and the employers on the one 
hand, and the left-wing opposition parties PvdA , SP, Groen Links and the 
unions on the other, with the latter opposing the further ‘demolition of 
social security’. This conflict culminated in 2004 in a mass demonstration 
and was clearly manifested in the clashing visions about how to shape the 
LCA . Whereas the government and employers were of the opinion that the 
LCA should be an individual scheme, the left-wing opposition foresaw a 
more collective realization of the scheme. Government parties CDA and 
VVD were divided as well. Whereas the CDA was a fervent advocate of the 
LCA , its coalition partner VVD did not see much in a provision like this. 
Instead, VVD minister Zalm put himself forward as a personal defender of 
the popular wage savings arrangement and designed the current anti-
cumulation rule, which stipulates that one cannot participate concurrently 
in the LCA and the wage savings arrangement. As a result, this political 
compromise was that the success of the LCA was frustrated at an early 
stage.
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Based on a comparison between the origination stories of the TC and 
the LCA , the hypothesis can be formulated that a new scheme is more like-
ly to be embedded in the existing social security system if the social dis-
course seeks to connect with the values underlying this system and if the 
scheme is supported by the actors who traditionally play an important part 
in shaping social security. In the final section this hypothesis will be elabo-
rated upon.
9.3 A trailer funded by society?
The previously formulated starting points for the LCA can be specified fur-
ther based on the proposals that were made to extend the scheme. These 
proposals (including the 2007 coalition agreement) focused on the expan-
sion of both the personal and material scope of application of the scheme 
(Labor Participation Committee 2008; Social and Economic Council 2006; 
Labor Foundation 2008). It was proposed, for instance, to extend the scope 
of application to include the self-employed without personnel. Other pro-
posals concerned extending the spending possibilities to include financing 
the periods ‘in between jobs’ and funding the start-up of entrepreneurship . 
It is noteworthy that most extension proposals seem to be geared primarily 
to facilitating a new type of employee, whereas the rush hour problems are 
taking a back seat. Seen from this perspective, the pure employee is becom-
ing increasingly rare and is being replaced gradually by the post-modern 
‘new worker’, who is sometimes an employee and sometimes an entrepre-
neur and in any case will act increasingly as an ‘entrepreneur of herself’. 
One could say that the extension proposals to the LCA highlighted a new 
view of the individual, even more pronounced than the previous life course 
discourse : that of the citizen/employee as an entrepreneur.
It might not be entirely coincidental that this shift in the discourse 
about the renewal of social security from rush hour problems to the ‘new 
worker’ is also reflected in the manifestos that were published by the so-
called Balie group in the past few years. In these manifestos, a variety of 
representatives of employees and employers as well as thinkers of various 
political persuasions give their vision on the future of social security. 
Whereas in 2005 the first Balie manifesto (Leenders, Kuijpers and Rotten-
berg 2005) expressly pays attention to the combination of work and care, in 
2009 the second Balie manifesto (Beukema, De Glas and Kamps 2009) 
addresses the emancipation of the employee. According to the latter mani-
festo, the employee is showing herself more and more often to be an entre-
preneur who wants to break free from the restrictive bonds of compulsory 
collective insurance for the benefit of more individual forms of social secu-
rity.
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The stream of ideas regarding extensions to the LCA was halted for the 
time being by the 2008 Leave Memorandum.8 According to the memoran-
dum, the monitoring issue played a prime role in this regard. Indeed, inter-
viewed officials asserted that the question was raised how one can monitor 
if a self-employed person without personnel uses her withdrawal from the 
LCA to finance leave of work. In addition, a more principal matter was 
addressed in the discussion on extending the LCA . As one of the interview-
ees argued, by extending the personal scope of application to include the 
group of self-employed persons the LCA was under threat of being trans-
formed into an ‘inflated wage savings arrangement’. After all, an extension 
such as this implies the transfer of the LCA from Wage Tax to Income Tax, 
as a result of which the LCA in principle could also be used to finance con-
sumer goods like a trailer. Therefore, based on the official elaboration of the 
2007 coalition agreement, some officials at the Ministry of Social Affairs 
posed the question wether or not an extended LCA such as this still had 
anything to do with social security . In other words, they doubted if the gov-
ernment should subsidize a scheme in case its social or public importance 
is unclear.
In my opinion, the above reasoning leads one to believe that a ‘conflict 
between the baseline categories of thought ’ underlying an extended LCA 
and social security law, respectively, have played an important role in the 
failure of the extension proposals. In this respect, one can think of the dis-
crepancy between the image of the citizen/employee as an entrepreneur 
and the principle of voluntariness on the one hand and the value of (com-
pulsory) solidarity between, for example, people with children and people 
without children on the other hand.
9.4 The reform of social security law and conflicting baseline 
categories of thought
The principal question then arises to what degree the phenomenon of ‘con-
flicting baseline categories of thought ’ may hinder a reform of social secu-
rity law. To answer this question, a closer look will be taken at the assump-
tions underlying the (extended) LCA .
In the discourse surrounding the LCA it has been argued that, indirect-
ly, participation in the LCA would contribute significantly to labor partici-
pation. After all, the LCA enables the employee to take work leave, as a 
result of which she will get the possibility during this leave to take care of 
8 PP 2008-09, 26 447, No. 42. The current government again has plans to extend the life 
course arrangement. The new scheme, which unites the life course arrangement and the 
salary arrangement, will be given the name ‘vitality scheme’. The cabinet has promised, 
by the way, that the current life course arrangement will remain in force in 2011.
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her children, educate herself or possibly take a break. This will prevent this 
person from claiming social benefits and/or leaving the job market prema-
turely. In other words, this argument is based largely on the assumption 
that the employee will act as an entrepreneur of herself. After all, she has 
the freedom to save up for work leave and subsequently also has the free-
dom to decide for what purpose the leave will be taken. In section 3 we saw 
that this assumption regarding the employee’s behavior was given an even 
more central role in the proposed extensions to the LCA . The question 
whether or not this assumption is correct seems to be a crucial point in the 
discourse about social security renewal. After all, if the extended LCA is 
not used for communal purposes such as increasing labor participation, to 
what degree should this scheme then still be financed with collective 
means? In this regard, think of the example of the collectively financed 
trailer. Would not it have been more logical to assume that the employee 
would use his collectively funded savings for consumer goods as well?
‘Conflicting baseline categories of thought ’ do not have to pose a prob-
lem for social security law reform, though. For example, a conflict between 
the baseline categories of thought underlying the LCA and the existing 
social security system could reflect a transitional situation, That is, the val-
ues of solidarity and mutual rights and obligations and the corresponding 
social views of man could be in the process of becoming gradually replaced 
by new values, assumptions and views of man: individual responsibility , 
voluntariness and the citizen/employee as an entrepreneur. The life course 
saving scheme’s lack of success, however, seems more of a confirmation of 
the permanence of the former values and ideas. Social scientific theory con-
firms that dominant norms on which institutes such as the social security 
system are based, only change gradually (Pierson 2000).
In addition, it could be suggested that a system of social security that 
takes voluntariness and an enterprising citizen/employee as its points of 
departure can only function properly and thus contribute to the public 
interest if these baseline categories of thought correspond to the behavior 
of individual citizens. Although entrepreneurship is certainly not foreign to 
the modern citizen, the average employee does not seem to behave (yet) as 
an entrepreneur of himself.
9.5 Conclusions
This contribution has attempted to look at the failure of the LCA as a ‘rush 
hour scheme’ and instrument of reform for social security from the per-
spective of ‘conflicting baseline categories of thought ’.
A comparison with the successful Belgian TC showed that, unlike the 
TC , the LCA is not embedded in social security law. The embedding of the 
TC in existing social security law seems to be connected to the harmonious 
manner in which the scheme came into being. In stark contrast, the LCA ’s 
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origination story was characterized by political conflicts. Based on the anal-
ysis I would like to defend the proposition that a social security reform that 
is founded on an alternative set of thought categories can only be success-
ful if this renewal is supported widely and with conviction by the political 
actors involved.9
In this contribution it has also been argued that a social security system 
founded on voluntariness and an enterprising citizen/employee can only 
function properly and thus contribute to the public interest if these points 
of departure correspond with the behavior of the individual employee. I 
believe that at this moment (still) a large discrepancy exists between both 
areas. This discrepancy will decrease, though, if the logic of the market is 
expressed increasingly in social life. In that case the employee may consid-
er himself increasingly to be an entrepreneur of himself, corresponding 
with the picture that was painted in the second Balie manifesto (Eleveld 
2008, 2009). Also, it is not unlikely that in such a situation any reform pro-
posals that are based on the image of the enterprising citizen/employee 
can expect broader support. Changing baseline categories of thought and 
political support therefore seem to be intrinsically interconnected and play 
an important role in reshaping social security.
The current state of affairs, however, does not correspond (yet) with the 
situation described above. Based on the example of the Belgian TC , a rush 
hour scheme seems to be more effective if such a scheme is embedded in 
current social security law, which is founded on the values of solidarity and 
mutual rights and obligations. In view of the intended cutbacks, however, a 
(real) equivalent of the TC will not be easily accepted in Dutch social secu-
rity law.
9 On this topic, also see Habermas (1996).
Part IV
Governmentality 
and the Construction 
of the New Worker

Abstract
This contribution intends to add to Foucault’s considerations on liberal 
configurations of security and freedom and deepen them. Comparing two 
Dutch discourses on social security: the discourse surrounding the Poor 
Law in the mid-nineteenth century and the life course discourse, the paper 
observes both continuities and discontinuities between the two discourses. 
Discontinuity is expressed primarily in the specific subject constructions. 
Unlike the poor law discourse, the life course discourse constructs an active 
and enterprising subject whose prime objective is to invest in herself and in 
her children. On the other hand, however, the contrasts between the classi-
cal liberal and neoliberal discourse turn out to be less marked. In both dis-
courses the now is colonized by the future, which mean that they both 
emphasize saving behavior and long-term thinking, possibly encouraged 
by schooling and education. It is argued that with respect to modern 
designs of social security law, current neoliberal use of behavioralist tech-
niques refine analyses of neoliberal government, according to which indi-
viduals are (solely) forced to be free and live their life in terms of risk man-
agement.
A Dutch version of this paper has been published in Krisis Journal for Con-
temporary Philosophy, issue 2, pp. 31-45, September 2011. The Dutch version 
is available at http://www.krisis.eu/index_en.php (Eleveld 2011a).
10 Configurations of liberal governmentality : 
continuities and discontinuities in classical 
and neoliberal discourses
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10.1 Introduction
Foucault ’s lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1979 are still current on 
liberalism as a modern form of governmentality. Thanks to their English 
translations, namely Security, territory, population (named STP hereafter) 
and The birth of biopolitics (referred to as BB hereafter), these have recently 
been brought to the attention of a wider audience again. In these series of 
lectures, Foucault argues that the classical liberal governmentality from the 
nineteenth century and the neoliberal governmentality from the second half 
of the twentieth century have in common that they both address the rela-
tionship between ‘security’ and ‘freedom’. At the same time, both forms of 
liberal governmentality can be clearly distinguished from one another. 
Where classical liberal government tried to create a free space in which 
subjects are enabled to pursue their own interests as much as possible, neo-
liberal government is primarily characterized by government interventions 
that focus on the environment of the free acting individual.
This contribution intends to add to Foucault’s considerations and 
deepen them, based on a study into Dutch configurations of liberal govern-
mentality. The research focuses on the degree of continuity and discontinu-
ity between two Dutch discourses on social security the discourse sur-
rounding the Poor Law in the mid-nineteenth century and the life course 
discourse, a relatively recent innovation in the thinking on social security. 
The choice for these discourses was based on the following considerations. 
First of all, both discourses concern social security, a theme that plays an 
important role in BB. Secondly, we can trace back the discourses to the lib-
eral eras that Foucault distinguishes, namely the time of classical liberal 
government in the nineteenth century and the time of the advent of neolib-
eral government in the second half of the twentieth century. Thirdly, just 
like in BB, the main characters in the discourse are mostly liberal econo-
mists.
Classical liberal forms of governmentality were studied previously by 
other authors. It has been argued, for instance, that pauperism – a symp-
tom of illness, crime and political threat – posed a major problem for the 
nineteenth century ‘laisser-faire ’ government. A solution to this problem 
was sought in deploying philanthropy. This made it possible to impose 
rules of conduct on the interface between private initiatives and govern-
ment intervention in order to stimulate self-sufficiency (M. Dean 1999: 128; 
Donzelot 1979: 55-56).1 Governmentality literature, however, is best known 
for its analysis of neoliberal government. O’Malley (2004), for instance, 
contrasts subject constructions at the time of classical liberal government 
with neoliberal subject constructions. According to him, both classical lib-
1 Other governmentality studies into classical liberal forms of governmentality include, 
amongst others, Dean (1995), Ewald (1991) and Procacci (1991).
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eral and neoliberal government propagate an ‘uncertain future’. However, 
whereas citizens in the nineteenth century were mainly told to take precau-
tionary measures to be able to cope with future misfortune, according to 
O’Malley we encounter a more positive approach to an ‘uncertain future’ 
under neoliberal government; an approach that offers citizens, in contrast, 
chances to develop entrepreneurship and creativity. The word ‘risk’ now 
no longer refers to the chance of an uncertain incident that can be covered 
through insurance technology, but is given meaning primarily as ‘an 
opportunity to create prosperity’ (O’Malley 1996: 204). O’Malley’s analysis 
ties in with other governmentality studies that argue that neoliberal govern-
mentality increasingly constructs the citizen into an entrepreneur of the self, 
a risk manager who must live his life in terms of choices and whose identi-
ty is determined by the rationality of the market (M. Dean , 1999; Rose , 1999; 
Rose and Miller, 1992). This contribution will reflect upon the above find-
ings in governmentality literature. 
The argument is organized as follows. First of all, a summary is pre-
sented of Foucault’s analysis of liberal governmentality in STP en BB. In sec-
tions three and four, the differences and similarities between classical lib-
eral government and neoliberal government are unraveled based on a 
comparison of the Dutch discourse on the Poor Law in the mid-nineteenth 
century and the life course discourse in the early 21st century. The conclud-
ing sections analyze how the Dutch discourses relate to the continuity and 
discontinuity between classical and neoliberal forms of liberal governmen-
tality described in BB and the governmentality literature mentioned above.
10.2 Foucault on liberal government
In STP and BB, Foucault analyzes liberal government as a modern form of 
governmentality that earns itself a place alongside other types of power – 
sovereignty and disciplinary power – in the eighteenth century. According 
to Foucault, the roots of governmentality can be traced back to the sixteenth 
century. In this era, the government’s attention shifts more and more from 
expanding the territory to the prosperity and happiness of the people. Gov-
ernmentality originates as a new form of government, defined by Foucault 
as:
'The ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, 
and tactics that allow the exercise of this specific, albeit very complex, power that has the 
populations as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and the appa-
ratuses of security as its essential technical instrument' (Foucault 2007: 108).
The central elements in this definition are population, political economy 
and security (2007: 110), which according to Foucault also form the founda-
tion for contemporary configurations of governmentality (2007: 354). The 
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relation to sovereignty and disciplinary power , forms of power that remain 
in existence concurrently with governmentality, is expressed in the concept 
of ‘security’. Unlike sovereignty, governmentality does not focus on orders 
and bans or, like the discipline, on regulations, inspections and surveil-
lance. In contrast, it ‘regulates natural events’ on the basis of the security 
dispositive (2007: 46-47).
The term ‘security’ needs some clarification here. This word has a 
broader meaning than sécurité, which was used by Foucault . Whereas secu-
rity in the sense of safety is indicated by sûreté, sécurité refers to the future-
oriented management of risks (Foucault 2007: 65). According to Foucault, 
modern forms of governmentality do not primarily concern the prevention 
of events (sûreté) but regard insuring the natural economic processes (sécu-
rité) (2007: 353). Thus we see that, according to Foucault, under the influ-
ence of the work of economists like Bentham and Smith, the classical liberal 
government in the eighteenth and nineteenth century creates a free space, 
so to speak, wherein the subject of interest does his or her own ‘natural’ 
thing, so that the individual interests automatically converge with the 
interests of others thanks to the invisible hand. Consequently, the most 
important question for liberal governmentality becomes how to guarantee 
such a free space without the ‘natural movements’ being hindered by gov-
ernment interventions; too much and too little government are continu-
ously being weighed against each other (2008: 63).
Subsequently, Foucault discusses the crisis of liberal governmentality in 
the second half of the twentieth century. Whereas on the one side the 
expanding welfare state offers a basis of security from which the people can 
act freely within the economic force field, on the other hand the free space 
is in danger of being undermined by new welfare state institutions: the 
ever extending social security system is increasingly showing itself as ‘the 
other face of freedom’ (2008: 65). According to Foucault , alternatives for the 
large welfare state are presented by representatives of neoliberal move-
ments . German Ordo-liberals and American neoliberals advocate a new 
configuration of freedom and security. The Ordo-liberals are of the opinion 
that if there are any social politics at all, their sole function should be to 
facilitate optimum economic participation by the citizens. Furthermore, 
they pose that the homo economicus is not a natural fact that originates 
automatically because of the free exchange of desires and interests (man of 
exchange), but that this phenomenon (man of competition) must be protected 
and created (2008: 147). The notion of the competitive, enterprising citizen 
is further expanded in the concept of ‘human capital ’. According to the 
American neoliberals , economic growth can only be safeguarded by invest-
ing in human capital (2008: 225-233). The people are expected to work on 
their competences continuously, in order to increase their value. This 
implies that matters that were considered part of the social sphere up until 
then, such as marrying and raising children, are being ruled increasingly 
by the rationality of the economy (2008: 268).
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Neoliberal governmentality therefore reflects a different relationship 
between freedom and security than previous forms of liberal governmental-
ity. Whereas under classical liberalism the use of freedom is a necessity in 
order to ensure the economy’s natural processes, the preconditions of 
which are guaranteed by the government (2007: 48-49), contrastingly, free-
dom and security seem to mutually influence one another under neoliberal 
rule. The free acting citizens are continuously stimulated to work on their 
own competences, so that they can successfully compete with others. This 
varies from creating competitive mechanisms in cohesion with the con-
struction of a social security that is related to economic politics (Ordo-
liberals)2 to the construction of a system of negative taxes (French liberals).3 
The American neoliberalism is the most radical in this regard: matters that 
so far have been considered part of the social sphere are now being ana-
lyzed in an economic manner, so that they are not only visible as an eco-
nomic rationality but at the same time become a (new) economic rationali-
ty.4 Consequently, the laisser-faire principle is transformed into a 
do-not-laisser-faire government: instead of refraining as much as possible 
from intervening in order to let the economic processes take their natural 
course, the government must actively stimulate these processes in all of 
their facets. In the words of Foucault 
‘In classical liberalism the government was called upon to respect the form of the market 
and laisser-faire . Here [in neoliberalism], laisser faire is turned into a do-not-laisser-faire gov-
ernment, in the name of a law of the market which will enable each of its activities to be 
measured and assessed’. (2008: 247).
An important difference between neoliberal governmentality and other 
forms of power is, according to Foucault, the insight that neoliberal govern-
mentality does not act on the individual itself, as the sovereign or discipli-
nary power does, but on the environment of the individual. He explains the 
functioning of the neoliberal government paradigm using the American 
2 According to the Ordo-liberals, the objective of social politics is not the redistribution of 
welfare, but the creation of conditions that stimulate competition. First and foremost, 
social politics must warrant the participation of each individual in the economy. This 
implies that social security not so much guarantees the insurance of all citizens against 
social risks, but that it only has to ensure that individuals are being enabled to insure 
themselves against risks. This makes the regulating mechanism that of an entrepreneur-
ial society (2008: 146-148).
3 A system of negative taxes entails that citizens with a (very) low income, instead of hav-
ing to pay taxes, are entitled to receive a certain amount from the state. An advantage of 
such a system is that little control mechanisms are required, in contrast to the freedom 
undermining bureaucratic set of instruments of the welfare state. Partly thanks to this 
minimum protection, above the minimum income supplied by the tax system the free 
economic game of competition and enterprise can be brought to full fruition (2008: 203-
207).
4 On this topic, also see Gudmand-Høyer and Lopdrup Hjorth (2009: 122).
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neoliberal vision on drug-related crime as an example. Research done by 
liberal economists Eatherly and Moore, for instance, shows that drug crime 
should not be battled by simply punishing the criminal and focusing the 
attention on the reprehensible act of crime itself, but by influencing the 
market price of drugs. A policy such as this requires knowledge of how the 
price of drugs is determined. With (long-term) addicts the demand for 
drugs turns out to be completely inelastic; they are prepared to pay any 
price. Among potential new drug users, on the other hand, the demand for 
drugs is elastic. They can be persuaded to experiment with drugs as long as 
they do not cost too much. Based on these behavioral expectations, says 
Foucault , it can be argued that an effective policy to lower the drug crime 
rate should focus primarily on dealing with the small-scale drug trade in 
the environment of new users, so that the price of drugs for this group will 
go up. In contrast, a restrictive policy with regard to the drug trade as a 
whole will be counter-productive. After all, a policy such as this will lead to 
an overall increase of the drug price and the formation of monopolist drug 
cartels that will push up the prices even further. Ultimately this will result 
in an increase in crimes by addicts, who are willing to pay almost any price 
(2008: 256-259).
Based on the work of the American liberal economist Becker, Foucault 
then argues that the current (neoliberal) economic analysis no longer exclu-
sively relates to the economic actions of individuals, but to any form of 
rational and non-rational actions. Becker proves, for instance, that even 
‘irrational households’ respond in a systematic manner to changes in their 
environment, such as price increases (Becker 1962). The new approach to 
economy proposed by Becker shows a paradox, according to Foucault. 
Whereas classical liberal economists were of the opinion that the individual 
had to be left alone as much as possible, in order for their self-interest to 
converge with the general interest, the homo economicus appears in Beck-
er’s definition as an individual who responds systematically to changes in 
the environment, and consequently becomes a manageable individual: 
'From being the intangible partner of laisser faire, homo economicus now 
becomes the correlate of a governmentality which will act on the environ-
ment and systematically modify its variables' (2008: 270-271).
Foucault thus shows that freedom and security affect each other in yet 
another way under neoliberal government. Freedom of acting is a precon-
dition for effective interventions because only then can systematic, predict-
able reactions be expected on which neoliberal governmentality can antici-
pate. The consequence of this multi-layered relationship between freedom 
and security is that biopolitical processes are being intensified.5 After all, 
both the construction of the citizen as an entrepreneur of the self and the 
5 According to Dean (2010), biopolitics must be considered a by-product of neoliberal 
government. 
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application of methods derived from behavioral economy result in the fact 
that the government gets involved in an increasing number of aspects of 
concrete life. Thus, biopolitics extend into a vast array of phenomena: not 
only life, health, life expectancy and birth rate, but also competition, con-
sumption, dangers, education, enterprise, family life, freedom, human 
behavior, interests, rights, risks and work.6
10.3 Classical liberal government and the problem of pauperism
The discourse surrounding the realization of the Dutch Poor Law in 1854 
was analyzed on the basis of the parliamentary discussions about the act 
and on a number of publications on the subject that appeared around 1850.7 
Firstly, the analysis shows an important similarity with Foucault ’s discus-
sion of classical liberal governmentality: attempts are made to govern the 
(poor) people without marring the laisser-faire principle. A good example 
of this is the thinking of laisser-faire economist De Bosch Kemper.8 This sec-
tion will put the emphasis on his work from 1851, in which he reflects upon 
the future government of the poor.
The influence of the laisser-faire thinking on De Bosch Kemper is evi-
dent in his analysis of economic crises. According to De Bosch Kemper, eco-
nomic crises can only be prevented by ‘cautious politics and home econom-
ics’. This implies that the state should focus primarily on keeping peace 
and order, and for the rest must ‘let things run their natural course as much 
as possible’ (1851: 276). Most laisser-faire economists advise against fight-
ing poverty through ‘charity’, since this ‘artificial’ intervention would only 
promote the laziness of the workman.9
In the discourse on the Poor Law , alongside the laisser-faire thinking, 
we also find the body of thought of the English economist Malthus. Accord-
ing to Malthus, the growth of the population should keep pace with the 
increase in production. Several followers of Malthus’ teachings advise 
against helping the poor; after all, this would lead to population expansion 
without an accompanying production increase. Furthermore, the discus-
sion is dominated by fears that an expanding class of paupers will increase 
6 Also see Gudmand-Høyer and Lopdrup Hjorth (2009: 125).
7 The following publications were included in this study: Ali Cohen and De Sitter (1854), 
Blaupot ten Cate (1851), De Boer (1850), De Bosch Kemper, (1851), De Bruyn Kops 
(1851), Donkersloot (1849), Grevelink (1850), Luttenberg (1851), Mees, (1844), H.W. 
Tydeman, J. Heemskerk & J.W. Tydeman (1850), H.W. Tydeman, J. Heemskerk & J.W. 
Tydeman, (1852). In addition, secondary literature was used: Boschloo (1989), Melief 
(1955), Van der Voort (1998).
8 Boschloo argues extensively why De Bosch Kemper can be ranked amongst the laisser-
faire economists (1989: 89-103).
9 See, for instance, De Bosch Kemper (1851: 205). Furthermore, Grevelink uses the motto 
‘freedom above all’ to improve the life standard of the poor (1850: 109).
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the chances of revolutionary upheaval. De Boer poses, for instance, that 
poor relief should limit itself to the poor: ‘the old of age, handicapped, sick 
and so on, who are physically incapable of earning a living’. The poor must 
be distinguished from the paupers, a group that is described by De Boer as:
‘the increasing number of people in the lowest classes of society who have [insufficient 
or] no means of living at all, and who continue to pine away partly or fully at the expense 
of their more well-to-do fellow citizens, creating ever more new offspring, in danger of 
sinking deeper and deeper as time goes by, a number that will continue to increase if 
material help will be expanded, and now in many countries within Europe has grown 
into a population that shocks the tranquility of the states, yes, even threatens to over-
throw the foundations of societies. This illness, this sickly condition of the states is borne 
from completely different causes.’ (1850: 3-4).
According to De Boer, the growing group of paupers poses a threat to soci-
ety. Just like Malthus he is of the opinion that charity is undesirable; pau-
pers may only be helped on the grounds of ‘principles derived from nature’ 
(1850:134), with which he alludes to pushing back poverty through a natu-
ral decrease in the number of paupers due to sickness and food shortage.
Using Malthusian analyses such as these, various authors defend the 
point of view that the role of the state should be limited to keeping peace 
and order. Some of them, however, including De Bosch Kemper, also see in 
this a justification for limited ‘charity’ by the state (De Bosch Kemper 1851: 
284; Blaupot ten Cate 1851: 10; De Bruyn Kops 1851: 50). Their reasoning is 
that by providing the most necessary support to the impoverished popula-
tion the safety of the other citizens can be guaranteed. After all, in the 
absence of such a scheme ‘cause is given (…) for malicious practices and 
begging that, whether performed involuntarily or as a means of livelihood, 
are most pernicious for the morality, for the society and even for the public 
safety’.10 An important condition for the entitlement to monetary support is 
the offering of labor. Thus, labor no longer has a disciplinary function but is 
primarily considered an incentive for performing economic activities (De 
Bosch Kemper 1851: 292; Mees 1844: 209).
The general tenor in the literature that was studied, however, remains 
that one should be very cautious with supporting the poor. The most 
important critics of the Poor Law , the majority of the laisser-faire econo-
mists and influential people in religious circles, are of the opinion that pov-
erty is caused mainly by the subjective characteristics of the poor (De Bru-
yn Kops 1851:15; Donkersloot 1849: 26; Ali Cohen and De Sitter 1854). For 
instance, De Bosch Kemper argues that lagging production is not so much 
the result of a lack of raw materials, but rather of a lack of ‘laboring’ that is 
caused by a lack of schooling and basic moral principles among the work-
10 Blaupot ten Cate during the parliamentary discussions on the bill to regulate the poor 
relief (supplement to the Nederlandsche staatscourant 1853-1854, p. 782).
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ers, amongst other things (1851: 155-156). Seeing that production is a neces-
sity to achieve wealth, the cause of the poverty should be sought primarily 
with the poor themselves:
‘In the very lowest class of society a lethargy and laziness is present that keeps one from 
working. If something is earned, a large part of the wages are spent on liquor; in the 
absence of thrift, people will continue to live on carelessly in the prospect of the relief for 
the poor’ (1851:174).
Based on this view of the poverty problem it is no surprise that its solution 
is also sought with the poor themselves. In almost all reflections on a future 
poor law a ‘moral uplifting of the poor’ is advocated.11 The exception on 
the principle of freedom that this requires is justified, according to the 
economist De Bruyn Kops:
‘The principle of freedom causes infinitely more bad than good [if it is] introduced in a 
poorly developed and immoral population (…). For that reason, the more one approach-
es freedom, the more the intellect must also be developed as an essential component for 
advancement; and a population only deserves freedom as its morals improve’ (1851: 16).
De Bosch Kemper even contributes personally to the spreading of a moral 
education. In 1851 he sets up the foundation ‘De Vriend van Armen en 
Rijken’ (The Friend of the Poor and Rich), for instance, and in the same year 
a weekly publication appears that gives life tips and offers advice about, for 
example, offering and requesting work via the so-called ‘weekblaadje’ (a 
sort of employment agency) and depositing money in a savings account 
(Boschloo, 1989: 99).
The publications studied also name a number of elements that can con-
tribute to increasing the morality: education, religion, house calls and 
patronage. Patronage refers to the protection of the poor by a ‘civilized 
(rich) citizen’ who also takes care of the moral development of this person 
and/or family. Often, a link is made between moral development and reli-
gion. Some Members of Parliament argue, for instance, that support by the 
church is superior to care by the state, because charity by the church is 
accompanied by an uplifting of the soul.12
11 See the publications listed in footnote number 7.
12 Mackay argues, for example, during the parliamentary discussions on the Poor Law 
that charity by the church should have preference over charity by the state, because the 
church gives “with discipline”. With this he means that the church ‘lessens poverty by 
improving the poor’ (parliamentary discussions on the bill to regulate the poor relief, 
supplement to the Nederlandsche staatscourant 1853-1854, p. 812). In this regard, also 
see De Kempenaer: ‘When the needy in that class (...) get support from the state, they 
will not care about this spirituality, they will continue to move in their earthly circles 
and neglect to join a congregation’ (p. 803). Thorbecke, on the other hand, is of the opin-
ion that the poor should be supported because they are poor and not because of the 
moralizing infl uence of the church (p. 884).
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In addition, some authors are of the opinion that house calls and 
patronage are excellent tools for teaching the poor the virtue of saving 
(Donkersloot 1849: 63; De Bosch Kemper 1851: 266 and H. W. Tydeman, 
Heemskerk & J.W. Tydeman 1852: 101). This notion ties in with the objec-
tive of savings and loan banks in those days, which were often founded on 
philanthropic principles. These banks were not primarily interested in cap-
ital formation, but mostly in teaching the lower classes thriftiness, self-con-
trol and precaution (Van der Voort, 1998: 457). De Bosch Kemper pays spe-
cific attention to premarital saving. According to him it is useful and 
sensible for children to continue living in their parental home until the age 
of thirty-five, so that they have some more time to work and save up mon-
ey before having children (1851: 268). Furthermore, this will help the poor 
to ‘control the stimulus of sensuality’, which will decrease overpopulation 
and, as a result of this, poverty (1851: 196). Moreover, Donkersloot propos-
es to hold out a reward for those who marry no sooner than after they have 
turned thirty and can also show proof of thrift and good conduct (1849: 40). 
He underpins his proposition with a calculation of the amount that a citi-
zen (male or female) could save up before marriage between ages eighteen 
and twenty-eight (1849: 55-56). Once married, both men and women are 
supposed to continue doing paid labor (1849: 20, also see Luttenberg 1851: 
64).
In the mid-nineteenth century the problem of poverty is not ascribed 
entirely to the subjective characteristics of the poor, though. Thorbecke, 
who is responsible for the first draft of the Poor Law in 1851, has the opin-
ion that poverty is also the result of economic powers.13 He thinks that 
those who are not supported by ‘economic measures’ (read: laisser-faire 
policy) should not perish due to want. It is, therefore, ‘the obligation of a 
civilized state’ to prevent this from happening as much as possible (Melief 
1959: 189). Tydeman, an authoritative economist in the period preceding 
the heyday of the laisser-faire thinking in the Netherlands, agrees with this 
analysis. He argues that unemployment (and poverty) can also be caused 
by bankruptcies, individual crisis and failed market speculating (H.W. 
Tydeman, J. Heemskerk & J.W. Tydeman 1850: 9-10).14 Although Tydeman 
calls for charity by the state, based on this analysis, he shares the opinion of 
the laisser-faire economists that the position of the poor can be improved 
significantly through education, schooling and civilization (H.W. Tyde-
man, J. Heemskerk & J.W. Tydeman 1850: xiii).
13 Parliamentary discussions on the bill to regulate the poor relief, supplement to the Ned-
erlandsche staatscourant, 1853-1854, p. 949.
14 In this regard, Tydeman seems to be ahead of his time. This insight would only gain a 
fi rm foothold in the late nineteenth century. The work of Luttenberg also provides a dif-
ferent view. He argues that there is no overpopulation, but rather an unequal distribu-
tion of prosperity (1851: 39 and onwards).
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The analysis of the discourse on the Poor Law shows that the laisser-
faire economists were major advocates of moral philosophy. In addition to 
the incentives produced by the workhouse, which no longer served prima-
rily as an instrument to discipline the poor, moral philosophy was for the 
laisser-faire economists the only option to bring the poor to increasing her 
productivity or to performing any productive activities at all, for that mat-
ter, through which she could contribute to the economic welfare.15 They 
meant that compulsory house calls to educate the needy about morals, sav-
ing and education were justifiable exceptions to the principle of freedom. 
Boschloo therefore argues that the laisser-faire economists and (confession-
al) anti-revolutionaries find common ground in their shared objections 
against government intervention: a true ‘monstrous alliance’ was formed 
(Boschloo 1989: 71). The Poor Law of 1854 largely fulfilled the wishes of 
this monstrous alliance. After all, the role of the government in executing 
the law was smaller than had previously been advocated by Thorbecke. In 
addition, the act left room to link support for the poor to their moral uplift-
ing (which was often taken care of by the church).
10.4 Neoliberal government and the life course discourse
Elements from the discourse surrounding the Poor Law make a reappear-
ance in the debate on the life course policy in the early stages of the twenty-
first century. Just as was the case in the nineteenth century discourse, sav-
ing, long-term thinking and the importance of education are advocated in 
the life course discourse . On the other hand, the life course discourse also 
deals with the creative and enterprising citizen. In 2006, the life course dis-
course is given shape in the form of the life course arrangement, a new 
form of saving within the social security system. For a proper understand-
ing of the life course discourse and the functioning of this arrangement as 
part of liberal governmentality we will have to delve deeper into its intrinsic 
logic (M. Dean 1999: 21-22). To do so, two lines of investigation were fol-
lowed in this study. Firstly, a number of basic articles and reports were 
studied, which were published on this topic around 2001.16 In addition, the 
work and thinking of one of the founders of the life course discourse, 
the economist Bovenberg , was analyzed.17 The main focus has been put on 
the second line of investigation.
15 On this topic, also see Boschloo (1989: 45, 73).
16 The most important of these are Evenhuis (1999b), Leynse (2001a), Leynse (2001b), 
Leynse et al. (2002); Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2002), Research Insti-
tute for the CDA (2001), Schippers (2001) and SER (2001).
17 The emphasis is on Bovenberg (2003, 2006 and 2008), and Bovenberg and Van de Klun-
dert (1999). In addition, I have used my own interview material from 2009.
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Shortly after the turn of the century, the life course discourse becomes 
very popular. The discourse is dominated by the thought that trends such 
as an aging population and globalization require increased labor market 
participation: both men and women must be optimally employable in the 
labor market. To make this happen, the individual employee should dis-
tribute the time that she spends on work and other activities, such as care 
and education, more efficiently over the course of her life. The prime 
responsibility for an optimum expenditure of time is put on the employee 
himself. This (new) distribution of responsibility is connected with a new 
way of thinking about risks. For instance, a number of life course thinkers, 
such as Bovenberg and Leynse , are of the opinion that it is incorrect in the 
current day and age to consider risk as an exclusively external event. Fol-
lowing Giddens (1994, 1999), they argue that risks are becoming more and 
more internal in nature, which means that the citizens themselves exert 
increasing influence on whether or not these risks will occur. This is true in 
particular for new risks such as having children and the necessity of educa-
tion and training (employability ) (Bovenberg 1997; Leynse 2001a; Leynse 
2001b; Leynse , Goudswaard, Plantenga & van der Toren 2002). Therefore, 
in order to remain optimally employable in the labor market, the employee 
needs to take the necessary precautions himself.
Bovenberg is one of the main advocates of (life course) arrangements 
within social security . He argues that a life course arrangement can finance 
extra time for the formation of the human capital of the working adults as 
well as their children (2001: 77). Young people between ages eighteen and 
thirty (‘the playtime of life’) in particular should be stimulated to put money 
aside for the family phase (2006: 7-8). According to Bovenberg , the modern 
life course brings together a number of problems. The increased labor par-
ticipation of women, for instance, may lead to neglect of the future human 
capital. This development is enhanced by the decreasing fertility amongst 
more highly educated women. After all, children’s capacities are often close-
ly related to those of their parents (2008: 605).18 Policy that takes the indi-
vidual life course as a point of departure responds to these developments. In 
that manner, says Bovenberg , insight is provided into how the distribution 
18 The decreased fertility of women is actually a problem that is addressed more often 
within the context of the life course discourse . For instance, the emancipation memo-
randum of 2006 states: ‘The life course approach is connected with a demographic 
awareness: preventing that the increasing labor participation negatively affects the 
birth rate fi gures’ (PP 2005-06 30 420, No. 2, p. 25). In the emancipation memorandum of 
2000 the life course approach is tied to the ‘combination model’, a model that is con-
trasted with the ‘outsource model’. According to the memorandum, the disadvantage 
of the latter model is ‘the high average age at which Dutch women have their fi rst child 
and the increasing childlessness amongst more highly educated women’ (Parliamenta-
ry papers II 1999-00 27 061, Nos. 1-2, p. 20). Moreover, see the remarks in the clarifi ca-
tion of the Childcare Provisions Act (PP 2005-06 30 479, No. 6, p. 5) and the most recent 
Family memorandum (Jeugd en Gezin programmaministerie 2008: 24).
193Configurations of liberal governmentality
of time and money across life can benefit both the fertility of women and the 
investments in the human capital of children and (older) employees.
According to Bovenberg , the formation of human capital is not only 
promoted by teaching professional skills, but also by teaching non-cogni-
tive skills such as social skills, skills to create stable relationships, work eth-
ics, self-discipline, self-control, mutual respect, a sense of standards, and 
virtues (2001: 77, 2008: 600: 614). Although this list is reminiscent of previ-
ous analyses regarding the growing influence of economic values on social 
relationships within neoliberal government, Bovenberg sets himself up as a 
fierce opponent of the advancing economization of society. In his opinion 
this development is counterproductive, because it is accompanied by an 
erosion of social standards of conduct. Seeing that man is only rational to a 
limited degree, he thinks that the economization of the social sphere will 
actually contribute to a disruption of the market (1999: 852, 2008: 615). 
Therefore, for Bovenberg the formation of human capital is intrinsically 
connected with the acquisitions of social standards. Human capital does 
not only regard the ability to learn, but also the ability to let the needs of 
others prevail over those of your own and the ability to think long-term. 
Bovenberg poses, for instance:
‘You can only become a human being if you think about others, too. In this regard there is 
no paradox between individuality and collectivity. Ultimately, this is about the Christian 
faith: God is one, but also diverse. (…) That is why the idea of the life course must be part 
of a broader cultural offensive that educates people on social life. (…) Thus, this is not so 
much about a new social security scheme but about a new perspective on life where peo-
ple invest in themselves, their personal health and their relationships. And where they 
realize that they not only possess human capital , but social capital as well.’19
Bovenberg thus makes a connection between the seemingly opposing 
aspects of ‘individuality’ and ‘collectivity’ and therefore also between 
‘human capital ’ and ‘social capital’. According to him, the life course 
arrangement is an important instrument for making this link, because it 
stimulates people to build up both human and social capital. Above all, this 
makes the life course arrangement part of a ‘broader cultural offensive’ 
wherein people are given a better understanding of long-term thinking and 
thinking about others.
These opinions are reflected in a number of concrete proposals that 
Bovenberg makes. With regard to the social integration of low-educated 
migrants and their children, he advises to combine an obligation to work 
for women with programs that contribute to the development of the human 
capital of their children (2008: 614, 631). In addition, he calls for the intro-
duction of a ‘life course’ curriculum as part of economy class in high school, 
where teenagers are taught to consciously take care of the design of their 
19 A.L. Bovenberg , personal communication, 3 March 2009.
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own life course. After all, acquiring human capital is not something that 
will happen automatically. Proper education and schooling are becoming 
increasingly important for making the right economic choices, such as the 
choice for a partner, marriage, children and a profession (2006).20 Saving up 
money is also something that does not come naturally, says Bovenberg 
(2008: 615-616). Because people only have limited rationality they should 
be helped in this regard through an institutional embedding of arrange-
ments, such as the life course arrangement. According to him, trade unions 
and employers’ organizations are suitable in particular to offer people a 
helping hand when it comes to long-term thinking.21 Moreover, citizens can 
be coaxed to participate through the introduction of tax breaks or can be 
forced to do so via compulsory arrangements. Another option is the intro-
duction of defaults, which make that the citizen will save automatically 
unless she actively indicates to refrain from participation.
In summary, Bovenberg and other life course thinkers such as Leynse 
seem to connect the life course discourse with a changing notion of risk: risks 
are more and more often considered to be internal. Therefore, citizens must 
be spurred on increasingly to invest in themselves (and their children). Thus, 
the life course discourse ties in effortlessly with the neoliberal discourses 
that Foucault is referring to. On the other hand, Bovenberg ’s plea for a cul-
tural offensive is reminiscent of the nineteenth century discourse surround-
ing the Poor Law . Above all, Bovenberg intends to promote the long-term 
thinking, so that the limited rational employee will take preventative meas-
ures in a timely fashion. According to him, the principle of freedom of choice 
must be safeguarded by the institutional design of new rules. A remarkable 
detail is the similarity between Bovenberg and a number of nineteenth cen-
tury thinkers who encourage youngsters between around eighteen to thirty 
years old to put aside means for the family phase of their lives. However, in 
contrast to these nineteenth century thinkers, the danger that investments in 
the human capital may be at the expense of female fertility is an important 
point of concern for a life course thinker such as Bovenberg .
10.5 Liberal government: (changing) relationships between 
freedom and security
A comparison between the poor law discourse and the life course discourse 
gives the following result. First of all, it turns out that in the nineteenth cen-
tury the ‘natural course of economic processes’ is ensured by the ‘moral and
20 By now, the life course topic has been introduced in economy classes at high school and 
college prep.
21 On this topic, also see the advisory report of the Labor Participation Committee (2008), 
to which Bovenberg made an important contribution.
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spiritual uplifting’ of the population. This task is mostly left to the church 
and private persons. Direct government interventions only relate to keep-
ing peace and order. This objective is also served by the promotion of sav-
ing behavior, long-term thinking and family planning. Using these central 
(security) technologies, the classical liberal government incorporates the 
threatening mass of paupers into the self-created domain of freedom. In a 
different form, the latter technologies make a reappearance in Bovenberg ’s 
life course discourse. Although the citizen is stimulated primarily to act as 
a manager of her own life course (freedom and security affect one another), 
with regard to her family planning in particular, citizens who do not (yet) 
exhibit this desired behavior must be helped to do so through schooling, 
education, societal interventions and the introduction of compulsory sav-
ing schemes. Insofar as these intentions are actually turned into practices,22 
the increased freedom of choice is accompanied by the expansion and 
intensification of technologies that safeguard security. Thus, in both dis-
courses the biopolitical phenomenon of family planning is rationalized as a 
problem of liberal government. Also in another way there seems to be con-
tinuity: in both discourses the citizen’s behavior is governend within the 
context of an, albeit changing, relationship between freedom and security.
Furthermore, the comparison shows that uncertainty regarding the 
existence of the homo economicus is not only present in contemporary 
(neoliberal) thinking, but that there were doubts in the nineteenth century 
as well if the general interest would be served automatically by the creation 
of spaces and freedom – and the functioning of the invisible hand. For 
instance, the laisser-faire economists were of the opinion that the citizen 
needed quite a bit of work before she would be capable of acting as a true 
homo economicus. The individual human capital of a large part of the poor 
first had to be increased considerably before it would be possible at all to 
release these citizens in a productive way into the free game of economic 
powers. The importance of moral philosophy could not only be found in 
the safeguarding of the ‘natural course of economic processes’. Economists 
also recognized that moral philosophy could contribute to the economic 
growth in a more direct manner. When it comes to this, the poor law dis-
course shows parallels with the investments in human capital encouraged 
by the neoliberal discourse. In this respect, the results from this study seem 
to differ from both the argument in BB and the governmentality studies.23 On 
the other hand, other neoliberal trends that are described in BB are con-
firmed by this study. For instance, it is stated in BB that neoliberal econo-
mists, unlike classical liberal economists, were of the opinion that the state 
22 Examples are the design of the life course arrangement and the introduction of life 
course classes in economic education.
23 In governmentality literature there is a one-sided emphasis on philanthropy’s preventa-
tive function.
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should be actively involved in constructing the economically competitive 
subject. This distinction was also found in the study: whereas in the poor 
law discourse the laisser-faire economists, supported by confessional par-
ties, wanted to keep the state at bay in favor of involvement by the church 
and private persons, we see that in the life course discourse government of 
the modern citizen is attempted through a statutory life course arrange-
ment and other institutional constructions.
Summarizing, it can be said that there are both continuities and discon-
tinuities between the two discourses. Discontinuity is expressed primarily 
in the specific subject constructions. Unlike the Poor law discourse, the life 
course discourse constructs an active and enterprising subject who lives 
first and foremost in order to invest in him/herself and in his/her children. 
On the other hand, the contrasts between the classical liberal and neoliberal 
discourse turn out to be less marked than the governmentality literature 
under review wants to make us believe. In both discourses the now is colo-
nized by the future: saving behavior and long-term thinking, possibly 
encouraged by schooling and education, are important elements that are 
used in an attempt to secure the citizen’s optimum economic participation.
A point of discussion is the specifically Dutch design of liberal govern-
mentality. The Christian/Calvinist thinking that is characterized by an 
interplay between individual interests and the care for others plays a prom-
inent role in both discourses. Could this justify the conclusion that, in addi-
tion to the French, German and American (neo)liberal constructions 
described by Foucault, we have found evidence of a typically Dutch form 
of liberal governmentality? In the twenty-first century the ‘monstrous alli-
ance’ between confessional parties and the liberal economists still seems to 
be current, for instance. To verify the suggestion of a specifically Dutch 
form of ‘Christian liberal governmentality’, further research into the advent 
and development of the Dutch neoliberal governmentality is required. After 
all, there is more to Dutch neoliberalism than just the life course discourse.
10.6 Concluding observations
This concluding section aims to highlight the current govermental use of 
behavioral techniques with respect to the modern design of social security 
law. According to some scholars engaged in governmentality studies, under 
neoliberal or ‘advanced liberal’ government individuals no longer have the 
freedom to choose; they are forced to be free and live their life in terms of 
choices or risk management (M. Dean 1999; Rose 1999; Rose and Miller 
1992), a strategy that can also be seen in the life course discourse . These 
scholars have, for instance, pointed at the neoliberal trend of turning com-
pulsory social insurance into non-compulsory insurance. In this manner, 
individual citizens themselves can choose the product that best fits their 
personal circumstances. In contrast, it is evident from BB that Foucault 
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does not just view neoliberalism as a discourse in which subjects are con-
structed who work on themselves – processes of subjectivation (Milchman 
and Rosenberg 2009). He also argues that neoliberalism actually deems the 
(irrational) homo economicus to be manageable, because she responds to 
incentives in a systematic way.
In this regard, Foucault’s analysis is a precursor to the articles on 
behavioral economics that were published in the nineteen eighties, most 
notably by Tversky and Kahneman.24 In the last few years, there has been 
renewed attention for the insights of behavioral economics . First and fore-
most, this movement points at people’s limited rationality and makes pro-
posals for steering the choice process of individuals towards the most 
rational choice. The merits of behavioral economics are discussed exten-
sively in the popular American book Nudge by Thaler and Sunstein. 
According to these authors, in order for the (free) individual to make the 
‘right’ decision she must get a nudge in the right direction. Based upon 
these insights it is suggested with regard to the design of healthcare or pen-
sion insurance, for instance, to make the selection process easier by apply-
ing default options. This means that a rational (pre-programmed) option 
applies to citizens who do not make a choice. Earlier we saw that Boven-
berg proposed to compensate for the citizen’s limited rationality by apply-
ing default options and introducing tax breaks. Others advocate the applica-
tion of framing techniques to ‘seduce’ the citizen to make certain choices 
(Nijboer 2009).
At the end of BB, Foucault concludes that liberal government ultimate-
ly is about ‘how to model government, the art of government, how to 
[found] the principle of rationalization of the art of government on the 
rational behavior of those who are governed’ (2008: 312). The homo eco-
nomicus is therefore no atom of freedom but a specific subject, which has 
enabled a form of government based on the principles of economy. In the 
end, liberal governmentality is founded on the rationality of the ‘governed’ 
(2008: 271). This is true as well for the construction of nudges, which are also 
based on (rational) systematic behavioral patterns of citizens. Thus, the 
current behavioral economic nudge seems to have replaced the moral nudge 
of the nineteenth century. Bovenberg ’s work, however, shows that the 
application of insights from behavioral economics and (Christian) morality 
can show many similarities
24 Foucault argues, for instance, that Becker’s analysis of the manageable subject provides 
insight into the possibilities of further integrating the economic analyses with the 
behavioral techniques that were developed by Skinner and Castel.

Part V
Main findings, 
conclusion and outlook

This study started with the hypothesis that the establishment of the idea of 
individual savings schemes in the traditional collective Dutch social secu-
rity system can be explained by the rise of new hegemonic discourses that 
increasingly compel citizens to behave themselves as self responsible life 
planners. Consequently the research was guided by the following central 
question:
How can the establishment of the idea of individual savings systems within 
the Dutch traditional collective system of public social security law be criti-
cally explained?
In addition, four sub questions were formulated:
1.  How can a poststructuralist model for critical explanation of changes in 
Dutch social security law be designed?  
2. How can social law be evaluated using justice based criteria?
3. How can the establishment of the Life Course Arrangement be critically 
explained? 
4. How does the Life Course Arrangement function as a new governmental 
technology in the perspective of (neoliberal) governmentality?
11.1 The theoretical sub questions
The theoretical sub questions 1 and 2 were answered in chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
The first first theoretical question was addressed in chapters 2 and 4. Based 
on Glynos and Howarth’s logics model and drawing on different post-
structuralist and post-positivist concepts these chapters designed a post-
structuralist explanatory framework. Following Martin Heidegger this 
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explanatory framework distinguishes between 'ontical' phenomena and 
their 'ontological' preconditions. Change emerges as a political response to 
a dislocationary event in which one views the radical contingency of sedi-
mented practices. Also, the use of rhetoric may cause people to see things 
differently. According to discourse theory, then, rhetoric shapes the ontical 
phenomena and practices. In recent years, insights of Lacanian psychoana-
lytics have been added to discourse theoretical explanations of social 
change. Central to this thinking is the rejection of the idea that the human 
subject is a conscious, intentional and reflexive individual. That is, political 
contestation only takes place to the extent that the subject experiences a 
lack of identity, which drives it to identify with new signifiers. In chapter 4 
this discourse theoretical approach was completed with insights from 
Michel Foucault's work and post-positivist policy analysis. 
The proposed explanatory model consists of three central concepts: 
social logics (the characteristics of existing discourses and practices), political 
logics (the characteristics of political practices that emerge after the experi-
ence of a dislocationary event) and rhetorical logics (rhetoric and narratives 
people identify with to cover over their experienced lack; these logics 
determine the speed and direction of transformation processes). 
With respect to the second theoretical question special attention was 
paid at the critical dimension of this framework. Chapter 3 showed how 
political philosophical reflections substantively improved the normative 
argumentation in social law. This chapter proposed to use the arguments 
developed within egalitarian liberal political philosophy to evaluate the 
labor obligation under the Dutch Work and Welfare Act (WWB). Whereas 
Rawls' interpretation of the reciprocity principle seems to reject this labor 
obligation, the chapter argued that this obligation is affirmed by Stuart 
White's approach on the condition that a collective participation fund with 
individual drawing rights is created, such as a collectively financed Life 
Course Arrangement. In chapter 4 it was, however, argued that in the face 
of moral pluralism, democratic theories that endorse plurality concepts of 
the good should be preferred over substantive justice concepts such as 
those forwarded by Rawls and White. Therefore, this chapter investigated 
to what extent Habermas' deliberative democratic theory is able to provide 
for evaluative criteria for law reform. It was concluded that, despite the fact 
that Habermas' concept of justice will not enable us to evaluate piecemeal 
law reforms, his democratic principle generates fairly concrete criteria to 
evaluate the legitimacy of law. That is, based on Habermas' democratic the-
ory the degree of deliberation in the public sphere may indicate the legiti-
macy legal reforms. Yet, it was further argued that Habermas, like Rawls, 
does not adequately take power relations into account. In poststructuralist 
terms: they both fail to acknowledge the political moment inherent in the 
centrality of rationality in current dominant ideas, which tend to suppress 
other (non-rational) voices. Nevertheless, chapter 4 argued that their theo-
ries may be considered one interpretation that belongs to a struggle between 
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different (justice) discourses . Drawing on a poststructuralist ontology chap-
ter 4 advocated a critical approach which spotlights the political moment. 
Following Glynos and Howarth, critique was conceptualized as a way to 
'highlight the constructed and political character of social objectivity (2007: 
11). Consequently, the chapter discussed the work of poststructuralist theo-
rists, such as Michel Foucault , Ernesto Laclau , Chantal Mouffe , William 
Connolly , Aletta Norval , Jason Glynos and David Howarth which provid-
ed some interesting leads. It was concluded that, despite the fact that justice 
based evaluations may be forwarded in a discursive struggle, a poststructur-
alist inspired normative/ethical critique, rejects these kind of evaluations, 
because they do not resonate with a poststructuralist based ‘democratic 
ethos of engagement’.
In the final part of chapter 4 several questions were formulated which 
guided the explanatory and critical empirical research. This concluding 
section summarzes the results of this research. First of all, sections 11.2 and 
11.3 answer the two empirical sub questions. Next, section 11.4 answers the 
study’s main question. Finally, section 11.5 presents an outlook.
11.2 A critical explanation on the establishment of the LCA
For a critical explanation of the establishment of the LCA this section fol-
lows the analytical steps that were formulated in chapter 2: problematiza-
tion, retroductive explanation, persuasion and critique. The first three steps 
will be addressed in section 11.2.1. The fourth step is presented in section 
11.2.2.
11.2.1 A persuasive narrative on the emergence of the LCA: an articulation of 
logics
Chapter 4 identified four questions that guided the problematization stage 
(first step) with respect to the emergence of the LCA :
1. How can these new practices (the LCA as a new practice of social law) 
be characterized?
2. Where did these practices originate from?
3. How and why were these new (regimes of) practices introduced?
4. Why was there a lack of resistance of political subjects who embrace 
other values, such as solidarity and equality, such as solidarity and 
equality?
In a second step, the moment of retroductive explanation I further elabo-
rated upon these questions and identified the relevant social, political, and 
rhetorical logics by going back and forth between the phenomena investi-
gated and the various explanations offered. The result of this analysis is 
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presented in this subsection, which articulates the relevant logics in a per-
suasive narrative that explains the establishment of the LCA in Dutch social 
security law (third step).
1. How can these new practices (the LCA as a new practice of social law) be char-
acterized?
The juridical comparison of the Belgian time credit scheme and the LCA 
revealed that, whereas the time credit scheme is based on the values of soli-
darity endorsing collective rights and duties, the LCA is primarily based on 
the values of individual responsibility and voluntariness. As a result, the 
time credit scheme is much more embedded in existing social security law 
than the LCA (chapter 9), which is governed by the logics of the self respon-
sible life planner , in particular with respect to the planning of family life 
(chapter 10). How was it possible that an arrangement governed by these 
contrasting logics could emerge in Dutch social security law?
2. Where did these practices originate from?
To answer this question, we need to go back to the shifts that took place 
in the social security discourse in the 1990s. Whereas at the beginning of 
the 1990s the logics of the Dutch social security system could be character-
ized by its emphasis on collective rights and obligations based on solidarity , 
due to a dislocation caused by the publication of the Buurmeyer report in 
1993, social security was increasingly infiltrated by the logics of the market. 
At the end of the 1990s, a few counter logics had emerged. Supporters of 
family life expressed the view that the social security system insufficiently 
addressed family life. In addition, feminists argued that the social securi-
ty system wrongly depicted the average worker as a worker without care 
tasks. A third counter logic originated from those who resisted the increas-
ing infiltration of the logics of the market into the social system. As a result, 
ongoing discourses and practices were being questioned and a gap opened up 
between the signifier ‘social security system’ and its meaning (chapter 5).
This gap was soon filled with new rhetoric . ‘Life course’ and ‘life course 
perspective ’ became the new terms in the social security discourse and 
functioned as exemplars that, like a dislocationary event, facilitated a 
glimpse of the universal, of another way of doing things. In other words, 
the term ‘life course perspective’ made people ‘see things’ in a novel way 
(chapter 5). Due to the working of other rhetorical logics , such as the con-
struction of the ‘life course perspective storyline ’ (chapter 6) and the deploy-
ment of numbers as a generative metaphor (chapter 7), different voices of 
resistance established a new dominant discourse coalition , adressing both 
former dominant discourses and former counter discourses. Nonetheless, 
it was the cathacretic act of naming the new desired policy ‘life course’ policy 
that constructed a new space of representation that enabled the reconcilia-
tion of previously opposed logics. Within this new space of representation a 
reformed social security system would both stimulate labor market partici-
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pation and improve the quality of life for all Dutch citizens. In fact, the new 
‘life course based logics’ encouraged a work-life balance uniting the values 
of ‘efficiency ’ and ‘solidarity ’. These signifiers provided a way out of dead-
locked discursive positions, holding a promise of something new. Actors 
identified with them, because they captured a feeling of surprise or excite-
ment. Identification with the new signifiers was also facilitated because 
they responded to a subconscious desire of fullness. That is, the new dis-
course was structured around the fantasy that increased labor participation 
and more time for care or leisure do not cancel out each other (chapter 5).
An important ‘condition of the possibility’ of these new social logics 
could be attributed to the invention of new technologies within the practice 
of social scientific research. That is, the invention of statistics enabled the 
development of ‘life course research’ that, in contrast to previous social 
studies, was able to construct reality from the point of view of the individu-
al whose individual decisions have an impact on herself and the world 
around her. These practices left traces behind in the new logics, which imag-
ined a reformed social security law that would be able to address different 
individual life courses (chapter 5).
3. How and why were these new (regimes of) practices introduced?
After 2003 ‘the life course perspective ’ became increasingly articulated 
with the fantasmatic aging society narrative that expressed the fear that the 
stable Dutch welfare state would soon decline if no measures were taken to 
expand the labor supply. Consequently, in addition to being considered a 
solution to the problems experienced during the ‘rush hour of life’, the ‘life 
course perspective’ was now explicitly associated with the need for higher 
labor participation and the individual responsibilization of social risks. 
Furthermore, following the 2003 dislocationary crisis and the announced cut-
backs in social expenditure, chains of equivalences were constructed between 
the labor unions, the leftist political parties and other interests groups 
against the Balkenende II regime and its supposed allies (most employers’ 
organizations). As a result, after 2003, former partners in the life course dis-
course coalition became antagonists (chapter 8).
The labor unions, which felt that they had been increasingly excluded 
from the policy making process, were able to re-establish their position as a 
serious negotiating party thanks to the successful protest march in 2004. 
Allowing the unions to celebrate the protest march exuberantly, the gov-
ernment could largely disregard the labor unions’ other demands, such as 
the preservation of a collective social insurance system. Moreover, the logics 
of difference enabled the government to decouple most of the demands of 
their antagonists. Hence, the differences between the logics governing the 
LCA and the time credit scheme were largely due to their distinct genesis. 
Whereas the introduction of the time credit scheme was accompanied with 
harmonious deliberations between the main political parties and social 
partners, the establishment of the LCA was surrounded with conflict and 
206 Chapter 11
resistance. The logics governing the LCA were further influenced by the 
aging society narrative , which fundamentally changed the meaning of the 
term ‘life course perspective ’ (chapters 8 and 9).
4. Why was there a lack of resistance of political subjects who embrace other val-
ues, such as solidarity and equality?
Despite the fact that the establishment of an individual savings arrange-
ment was strongly resisted by the labor unions, which preferred a collec-
tive savings arrangement, the decoupling of demands effectively broke the 
chain of equivalence that was constructed against the neoliberal measures 
of the Balkenende government . Yet the construction of the chain of difference 
also contributed to the failure of the LCA . For example, due to the demands 
of the labor unions the LCA encouraged workers to save up for their early 
retirement instead of using the LCA for the purpose of care, education or 
sabbatical leave (in order to stimulate a longer labor market participation). 
In addition, the need to attend to the VVD ’s demand of maintaining the 
wage savings arrangement as a separate arrangement, further weakened 
the LCA . Finally, the new hegemonic policy discourse that was sustained by 
the strong aging society narrative further surmounted the ‘silent resistance’ 
against the hegemonic regime that could be encountered among the policy-
makers who positioned themselves as ‘non-believers’. These policymakers 
rejected the dominant policy discourse that was governed by the logics of 
the self responsible life planner . This resistance by the policymakers seems 
to have been sustained by the workers. Seeing the low degree of participa-
tion in the arrangement, these workers do not (yet) seem to consider them-
selves to be such an individual (chapter 8). Thus, the presence of counter 
logics revealed the 'lack' in social structures.
In conclusion, the establishment of the LCA can be explained by a com-
bination of social logics (the invention of statistics, the development of life 
course research), rhetorical logics (the cathacretic act of naming, the ‘life course 
storyline ’, the ‘life course based discourse coalition ’, the aging society narra-
tive) and political logics (the logics of equivalence and difference ).
11.2.2 Critique
The fourth analytical step involves the category of critique. As was argued 
in chapter 4 this study takes a ‘democratic ethos of engagement’ as its point 
of departure. For the purpose of a systematic presentation of critique, this 
section first answers that were formulated in chapter 4 and that guide a 
critical analysis:
1. Did the discourse that preceded the emergence of this law reform sup-
press certain voices that left behind a sense of injustice?
2. What forms of resistance could be distinguished during the lawmaking 
process of this law reform and afterwards?
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3. To what extent did different forms of resistance succeed in overcoming 
forms of exclusion?
4. To what extent has the emergence of this law reform been fostered by 
ideological identifications?
5. What subjects were constructed and/or presupposed by this law re-
form?
6. What kind of alternative social law designs are imaginable that enable 
an ethos of engagement that is open to alteration?
1. Did the discourse that preceded the emergence of the LCA suppress certain 
voices that left behind a sense of injustice?
Starting in the 1990s the dominant social security discourse suppressed cer-
tain voices that were uttered in counter discourses. Yet, due to the ‘life course 
perspective ’ rhetoric these previously suppressed voices could be heard and 
taken seriously within the dominant social security discourse. A new dis-
course coalition emerged that, as chapter 6 showed, represented both the 
voices of the dominant discourse and the voices of the former counter dis-
courses (chapter 5).
Subsequently, as revealed in chapter 8, the ‘life course discourse coali-
tion ’ dissolved and the meaning of the signifier ‘life course perspective ’ 
fundamentally changed within the CDA discourse. Whereas in 2001 the 
signifier ‘life course perspective’ referred to the decreasing quality of life 
resulting from the lack of time and money for family life and leisure, a few 
years later the signifier ‘life course perspective’, conversely, was invoked to 
show how people can enhance their labor market participation. This dis-
cursive shift was important since the CDA was the leading political party at 
the time and one of the few parties still believing in ‘life course policy’. As a 
result of this discursive shift, by the year 2005 ‘life course policy’ was 
understood within the context of the ‘human capital narrative’ and the ‘new 
risks narrative’ in particular, suppressing the voices of those who endorsed 
the ‘diversity narrative’ and, to a lesser degree, the voices of those who 
endorsed the ‘family life narrative’ and ‘emancipation narrative’. It is impor-
tant to note that these voices also represented the counter logics in the 1990s 
(chapter 8).
Did the suppression of these voices leave behind a sense of injustice? In 
my opinion it certainly did. Illustrative of the new hegemonic discourse is the 
direction emancipation policy has taken since 2006. Emancipation policy is 
a policy field that, more so than other fields, is concerned with the interests 
of women, who are still the primary care takers at home. Yet, even emanci-
pation policy is now dominated by an interpretive frame that is informed by 
economic values . Consequently, when it comes to this issue emancipation 
policy can hardly be distinguished from general labor market policy and 
thus threatens to eradicate itself. What has happened to the voices of those 
who believe that women do not simply want to copy the lives of the aver-
age man, who devotes most of his adult life to paid work activities? Within 
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the hegemonic social security discourse voices demanding more time for non-
paid work activities, such as care activities, tend not to be heard (chapter 7). 
The available terms in this new hegemonic social security discourse that 
largely draws on the ‘human capital narrative’, the ‘new risks narrative’ and 
the related ‘aging society narrative ’, are derived from economic opposition-
al concepts such as ‘internal’ and ‘external risks ’. Whereas the decision to 
have or not have children basically depends on one’s own (internal) choice, 
the risk of care taking must not necessarily be covered within this system. 
Then, in the terms of this discourse, the collective social security system is 
meant to cover ‘external risks’ exclusively.25 The transformation of the 
Dutch social security discourse thus shows that in case economic terms are 
transferred to the social security discourse, other voices that speak a differ-
ent language addressing non-economic values, like the voice of Nora in The 
Doll’s House, tend not to be heard.
2. What forms of resistance could be distinguished during the LCA lawmaking 
process and afterwards?
Chapter 8 provided evidence for diverse forms of resistance during the 
lawmaking process. After the dissolution of the ‘life course discourse coali-
tion ’, the proposed individual LCA sharply contrasted with previously pro-
posals of a ‘life course based social security system’ that in most cases 
entailed a combination of individual and collective savings systems. The 
new individual LCA was, first of all, resisted by the labor unions. They 
wanted first and foremost that the LCA compensated for the loss of the fis-
cal facilitation of early retirement. Indeed, the social conflict in 2004 was 
dominated by anger over the retrenchment of the welfare state in particu-
lar. From this perspective the big demonstration could be seen as a demon-
stration against all social reforms of the Balkenende government including 
the introduction of the individual LCA , which confirmed the shift to indi-
vidual responsibility in social security law.
Another source of resistance originated from the VVD , the CDA ’s coali-
tion partner, which principally opposed the ‘subsidy on spare time’. How-
ever, for the VVD the introduction of the LCA was not a big enough issue to 
break with the CDA. Instead, VVD accepted the LCA as long as the CDA 
would not touch the popular wage savings arrangement, which seriously 
weakened the LCA .
More serious resistance could be found among the officials who had to 
expand the LCA into a workable arrangement. Presenting themselves as 
non-believers they disagreed with the CDA ’s assumption that the LCA 
would contribute to an increased labor market participation. They not only 
critizised some technical aspects of the arrangement, they also resisted the 
dominant policy regime that increasingly constructed the subject as a self 
25 On this issue also see note 12, chapter 1.
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responsible life planner . This resistance to the LCA seems to have been sus-
tained by the workers who were permitted to save under the LCA . Seeing 
the low degree of participation in the arrangement, these workers do not 
(yet) seem to consider themselves to be such an individual (chapter 8).
3. To what extent did different forms of resistance succeed in overcoming forms of 
exclusion?
Chapter 9 showed how the labor unions were able to re-establish their posi-
tion as a serious party in negotiations thanks to the demonstration in 2004. 
Thus the labor unions succeeded at least partly in overcoming earlier exclu-
sion of the policy making process. The study did not provide evidence of 
other forms of resistance that succeeded in overcoming forms of exclusion.
4. To what extent has the emergence of the LCA been fostered by ideological identi-
fi cations?
In section 11.3.1 it was argued that the gap that appeared between the signi-
fier ‘social security’ and its meaning was filled with new rhetoric , which 
covered up the social contingencies. The ‘life course perspective storyline ’ 
told the story of a modern society that is characterized by trends of indi-
vidualization, globalization, aging and increased female labor participa-
tion . The deployment of nominalization s like ‘globalization’, ‘aging’ and 
‘individualization’ made these problems seem inevitable. The storyline fur-
ther appealed to some contradictory feelings. Whereas on the one hand the 
storyline expressed the fear of staying behind in international economic 
competition, on the other hand the storyline provoked anxious feelings 
about the loss of nationally cherished values such as ‘providing care for our 
children ourselves’ and ‘an enhanced quality of life’. In response to these 
fears, the ‘life course storyline’ promised the prospect of a fullness – a life 
course based system – that adequately addressed the ‘dangers’ that accom-
panied the genesis of modern society. Thus the ‘life course perspective sto-
ryline’ was structured around the fantasy’, that the desired system could 
unite incompatible elements. That is, a life course based social security sys-
tem would both increase (female) labor market participation and preserve 
the (relatively large) amount of time that people could spend on caring for 
their children. In doing so, the desired policy would be able to contribute to 
a further internationalization of the Dutch economy as well as cherish the 
Dutch national values (chapter 6).
The new terms of ‘life course’ and ‘life course perspective ’ did not just 
encourage an ideological identification with a fantasmatic storyline . They also 
facilitated a new way of ‘seeing’, which instead of covering over social con-
tingencies opened up new possibilities, extending the range of possible 
interpretations of the concept of ‘social security’ (chapter 5). Therefore, in 
my opinion the identification with the new signifiers should not be inter-
preted as a purely ideological identification.
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In contrast, identifications with the aging society narrative must be 
interpreted as purely ideological identifications. After 2003, the aging society 
narrative started to dominate the social security discourse. Like the ‘life 
course perspective storyline ’, this narrative contains a ‘beatific dimension’. 
That is, prospective fullness – a stable welfare state – can only be reached if 
citizens participate more and longer in the labor market. This ideological 
identification not only contributed to the establishment of the LCA in 2006, 
it also overcame new forms of (silent) resistance and fostered new propos-
als on individual savings arrangements in social security law (chapter 8).
A final important ideological identification concerns identification with 
new subject constructions. This issue will be examined next.
5. What subjects were constructed and/or presupposed by the establishment of 
the LCA ?
Chapters 5 and 6 showed that the ‘life course perspective discourse coalition ’ 
constructed a singular subject of choices. In chapter 10 it was further noted 
that, apart from constructing an active enterprising subject that lives to 
invest in herself and her children, ‘the life course discourse ’ anticipated the 
fact that the desired ‘homo economicus ’ does not exist in reality. Therefore, 
the LCA was also designed to encourage and create the homo economicus. 
Thus, both the ‘life course perspective discourse’ and the LCA constructed 
and/or encouraged the construction of a specific subject, while other sub-
ject constructions were foreclosed.
6. What kind of alternative social law designs are imaginable that enable an ethos 
of engagement that is open to alteration?
Drawing in particular on Foucault , Connolly and Norval , Chapter 4 stated 
that a democratic ethos of engagement entails:
– a care for the other that presupposes a care for the self, since without a 
care for the self one is not able to care for the other;
– an openness to the other, independent of a moral order and free from 
state politics, operating outside existing truth systems;
– the endorsement of multifarious life styles;
– a questioning of prevailing institutions and practices of governance, in-
cluding all kinds of reason giving such as rhetorical argumentation, 
non-verbal and passionate elements.
With respect to future social law designs, a democratic ethos of engage-
ment thus implies first and foremost an openness to other repressed voices 
that appear in various forms. This does not imply that the lawmaker sim-
ply ‘listens to the people’ and translates the voice of the people into law. 
Instead, a democratic ethos of engagement involves a genuine openness to 
questioning, responses, negotiations, challenges and disruptions, involving 
all kinds of reason giving. This openness goes beyond simply following the 
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rules within existing democratic institutions. Thus, social rights that are 
needed to enable people to care for themselves should not be dictated, but 
have to emanate from the people themselves while remaining open to alter-
ation. In this respect there are no ‘natural’ rights, but as Zerilli has argued 
convincingly ‘[t]here is only the practice of freedom, of making political 
claims that question (…) [and] set the terms of that questioning’ (2005: 177).
A basic income system that goes further than Stuart White ’s proposal 
that was examined in chapter 3 responds to some preconditions of a demo-
cratic ethos of engagement, because this system ensures all citizens of a 
basic income to care for themselves and for others, regardless of their polit-
ical or cultural identity.26 Yet, from the perspective of a democratic ethos of 
engagement, this system presents a feasible social law design as long as it is 
forwarded by the citizens themselves. Therefore, it was argued in chapter 4 
that alternative designs and interpretations are not imperative but must be 
understood as proposals, which can be put forward in a political struggle. 
Indeed, a basic income system that is designed at the state level, such as the 
French negative income tax described by Foucault in ‘Birth of biopolitics’ 
(2008) (chapter 10), has the appearance of being contaminated with hegem-
onic neoliberal politics.
Having said this, I do think it is useful to figure out a substantial alter-
native social law design which comes closer to a democratic ethos of 
engagement than current social law. In view of the level of prosperity in the 
Netherlands, a basic income system combined with a genuine access to 
health insurance would, in my opinion, present a feasible alternative for (at 
least) part of the existing social security system. It would enable most citi-
zens to care for themselves, which would also enable them to care for and 
be open to others. More than current system of social security this system 
would allow suppressed voices to make themselves heard. Without a need 
to accept any full-time job, no matter how harsh it is or how little perspec-
tive it offers, and without being submitted to degrading practices at social 
welfare offices, people can express themselves more easily, questioning, 
challenging, negotiating and disrupting current practices. It should be not-
ed, though, that my proposal does not serve the purpose of equality . 
Instead, a democratic ethos of engagement implies that claims to equality 
are context dependent and preconditioned upon freedom practices. This 
means that social law instruments involving unrestricted rights to a basic 
income and health insurance primarily serve to facilitate these freedom 
practices.27 However, as stated before, this proposal must be perceived as 
just one proposal in a political struggle, then ‘law reforms should come 
26 Stuart White ’s proposal involves a temporary right to a basic income .
27 It should be noted that it is not my intention here to repeat the discussion on a basic 
income system. I only argue here that a basic income system combined with a genuine 
access to health insurance is perhaps one of the few social systems that practical sus-
tains a democratic ethos of engagement. 
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from those (…) who seek to resist [the] exercise of authority’ (Foucault 
2007d: 317).
Conclusion
This critical reflection on the emergence of the LCA has touched upon some 
interesting issues.
First of all, this section revealed a paradox. While the new signifiers 
‘life course’ and ‘life course perspective ’ and the storyline that gave mean-
ing to these signifiers covered up social contingencies, they also functioned 
as exemplars that enabled actors to view the contingencies of current law 
practices. Thus, the identification of these signifiers reflected two sides of 
the same coin. On the one hand, the rhetoric on life courses enabled a new 
way of seeing, furthering discursive interaction between existing dominant 
discourses and counter discourses; on the other hand, regarding the fantas-
matic ‘life course perspective storyline’ and the construction of a singular 
subject of choices, the new rhetoric closed the open spaces that it had creat-
ed. From the perspective of a democratic ethos of engagement the use of 
the ‘life course rhetoric’ can therefore be both applauded and rejected.
Secondly, the emergence of the LCA can be criticized, because the polit-
ical process clearly suppressed some voices that in an earlier stage 
endorsed the broad discourse coalition , namely the voices of those who sup-
ported the diversity narrative and, to a lesser degree, the voices of those 
who supported the family life and emancipation narratives, leaving one 
with a feeling of injustice. Whereas by the year 2005 ‘life course policy’ was 
understood within the context of the ‘human capital narrative’ and the ‘new 
risks narrative’, voices demanding more time for non-paid work activities 
such as care activities tended not to be heard. Addressing the value of a car-
ing society, these voices spoke a different language that exceeded the hege-
monic discourse.
Thirdly, at first sight the introduction of the LCA did not meet with 
much resistance. However, this was probably due to the fact that the atten-
tion was drawn to the abolition of the fiscal facilitation of early retirement. 
Yet, regarding the construction of chains of equivalences in 2004, the big dem-
onstration may be viewed as a demonstration against all reforms of the 
Balkenende government, which reflected a shift from the value of solidarity 
to the value of individual responsibility . This presumed resistance against 
the LCA is confirmed by the silent resistance coming from the departments 
and the public. In addition, coalition partner VVD openly expressed a dis-
like of the LCA . On the whole, the establishment of the LCA can be criti-
cized for neglecting the desires of a substantial part of the people. Whereas 
the 2001 life course discourse coalition could have been a starting point for a 
further development of ideas in dialogue with the people, following the dis-
solution of the discourse coalition the LCA was elaborated without much fur-
ther external consultations, except for the relatively strong involvement of 
insurance companies.
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Fourthly, my proposal regarding a basic income system combined with 
a genuine access to health insurance illuminated some other points of cri-
tique. First of all, whereas both the LCA and my proposal aim to anticipate a 
plurality of desires, for the LCA this concern with a plurality of life forms 
etc. is aimed at advancing the governmental objective of increased labor 
participation. Instead, in my proposal the plurality of identities and cul-
tural forms are valued on their own merit. Secondly, unlike the LCA my 
proposal seeks to overcome dominant truth concepts, such as the concepts 
of ‘internal’ and ‘external risks ’. Thus, the proposal serves first and fore-
most as a genuine access to freedom practices that enable people to speak 
for themselves and care for themselves and others. This proposal can be 
contrasted with the LCA , which actively seeks to construct a self responsi-
ble life planner as a new governable subject. The next section addresses this 
issue in a more comprehensive way.
11.3 The Life Course Arrangement as a new governmental 
technology in the perspective of (neoliberal) 
governmentality
This section answers the last sub question, i.e. how the LCA functions as a 
new governmental technology in the perspective of (neoliberal) govern-
mentality. This question was addressed in chapter 10, which presents a 
comparison between the 19th century poor law discourse and the life course 
discourse .
The comparison of these discourses demonstrated that both the ‘poor 
law discourse’ and the ‘life course discourse ’ express uncertainty regarding 
the existence of the homo economicus . There were doubts if the general 
interest would be served automatically by the creation of spaces and free-
dom – and the functioning of the invisible hand. Both discourses therefore 
endorse forms of liberal government that entail certain configurations of 
both freedom and security. That is, they both tend to colonize the now by 
the future: saving behavior and long-term thinking, possibly encouraged 
by schooling and education, are important elements to secure the citizen’s 
optimum economic participation in both discourses. The LCA , then, is to 
be understood as a new instrument of government that, instead of presup-
posing the homo economicus , is primarily designed to stimulate the citizen 
to act as a manager of her own life course, in particular with regard to fam-
ily planning. Thus, the LCA must not only be viewed as a governmental 
instrument that is informed by the value of freedom of choice , but must 
first and foremost be considered an elaboration of a liberal configuration of 
both freedom and security.
It was also argued that, insofar as the axis of freedom is foregrounded, 
the LCA can be considered an encouragement of the technologies of the self 
that are integrated into structures of coercion and domination. These tech-
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nologies of the self are to be distinguished from the practice of autonomous 
attitudes outside existing truth systems and can, therefore, be criticized 
from the perspective of a democratic ethos of engagement.
11.4 Conclusion
The study largely confirms the hypothesis that the establishment of the 
idea of individual savings schemes in the traditional collective Dutch social 
security system can be explained by the rise of new hegemonic discourses 
that increasingly compel citizens to behave themselves as self responsible 
life planners . Yet, because of the methodological framework that was elab-
orated in chapter 2 we are now able to answer the main question more in 
detail.
First of all, the study clearly showed that the LCA , which can be char-
acterized by the values of individual responsibility and voluntariness, 
forms a sharp contrast with the Dutch social security system, which is still 
dominated by solidarity based systems of rights and obligations, despite an 
increasing influence of the logics of the market. Yet, the rhetorical and politi-
cal logics that accompanied the introduction of the LCA did have an impact 
on the logics of the current social security system. First of all, compared to 
the social security system’s former logics, the current social security logics 
tend to be based more strongly on family needs.28 Secondly, and in the con-
text of this study more importantly, after the introduction of the LCA the 
idea of more comprehensive individual savings systems in the field of 
social security law is still present in the social security discourse. Social secu-
rity logics are penetrated increasingly by the logics of the ‘self responsible 
life planner ’ that, as argued in chapter 8, have facilitated the acceptance of 
a new individual savings scheme for risks that have been covered tradi-
tionally by collective insurance, such as unemployment.
How can we explain these changed logics? Chapter 8 summarized the 
main factors that contributed to the growing acceptance of individual sav-
ings systems in the following way. First of all, the cathacretic act of naming 
the desired policy ‘life course policy’ enabled a ‘new way of seeing’. Social 
security was now perceived in terms of individual life courses, which 
opened up the possibility of introducing individual savings schemes in the 
traditionally collective system of social insurance. Secondly, the working of 
the logics of equivalence and difference secured the support of the labor unions 
for the introduction of an individual life course arrangement, despite the 
fact that the LCA did not facilitate collective savings. Thirdly, due to a 
strong fantasmatic aging society narrative that continued to nourish the urge 
for social reforms, different forms of (silent) opposition were effectively 
28 See section 5.7.4.
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resisted. This interaction of rhetorical and political logics thus paved the way 
for a future social security system that, despite a long-term emphasis on 
collective rights and responsibilities, is increasingly informed by the logics 
of the ‘self responsible life planner ’.
The second issue that we must address in this section is the question of 
how to be critical regarding these changed social logics . From the perspec-
tive of a democratic ethos of engagement, the idea of the establishment of 
individual savings systems in social security law can be criticized in a simi-
lar way as the establishment of the LCA in section 11.2.2. This does not 
mean, however, that this study disavows the introduction of individual 
savings arrangements. To repeat the argument that was put forth in this 
section with respect to future social law designs, a democratic ethos of 
engagement implies first and foremost an openness to other repressed 
voices that can appear in various forms. This involves a genuine openness 
to all kinds of questioning, responses, negotiations, challenges and disrup-
tions that go beyond simply following the rules within existing democratic 
institutions. Hence new social law, including proposals for an individual 
savings scheme, should not be dictated but emanate from the people them-
selves and remain open to alteration.
Finally, I want to raise some points of concern with respect to the logics 
of the ‘self-responsible planner ’. It was argued in chapter 10 that rather 
than presupposing the individual to be a self responsible life planner the 
LCA stimulates or guides the citizen to act as a manager of her own life 
course. In doing so, the LCA constructs this ‘self responsible life planner ’. 
In chapter 9 the point was made that the emergence of this new subject also 
depends upon wider social transformations that actually sustain these sub-
ject constructions. That is, future individual savings schemes covering 
social risks will only be successful to the extent that the average worker 
comes to experience herself as an active responsible life planner. However, 
as has been pointed out in governmentality literature, these new logics 
may also induce new forms of suppression, because citizens who are not 
able to conform to this new ethos of the self responsible life planners may 
be subjected to the classical exercise of governmental power . As a result, 
the population will be divided along new lines: the independent, self 
improving, rational life planners, and the excluded ones who lack these 
abilities to a greater or lesser extent (M. Dean 1999: 131-148; Dean 2007: 76, 
102-129; Rose 1999: 265, 270). These latter persons may be increasingly sub-
jected to disciplinary measures such as Work First programs that were 
examined in chapter 2. Thus, even if the introduction of a system of indi-
vidual savings accounts in public social security law reforms emanate from 
the people themselves, we must remain open to the voices of those people 
who do not see themselves as self responsible life planners.
216 Chapter 11
11.5 Outlook
This last section discusses some implications of this study for a further 
development of a poststructuralist based critical explanation of policy 
change and law reform. In addition, some methodological and theoretical 
points of discussion will be raised. Finally, it is considered to what extent 
this study contains transcending elements that allows us to formulate more 
general questions and hypotheses for comparative research.
I hope that this study has shown that it is possible to provide a critical 
explanation of policy change that is rooted in poststructuralist discourse 
theory . Nonetheless, the study also faced some important problems. One of 
the problems I encountered in the operationalization of the research ques-
tion concerned the lack of developed research methods within discourse 
theory. Using methods derived from Discourse Historical Analysis (DHA) 
this study aimed to contribute to a further methodological development of 
discourse theory. Yet, more methodological tools are needed to conduct 
thorough empirical research based on poststructuralist discourse theory 
with respect to the relationship between affect and policy change in partic-
ular. This study, therefore, encourages scholars to engage in poststructural-
ist empirical studies for the further development of empirical research 
methods.
The study also touched upon some methodological difficulties. One 
issue that was mentioned in chapter 8 concerns the way in which Glynos 
and Howarth conceptualize the notion of agency. According to them, the 
subject only emerges in response to a fantasmatic demand for a new full-
ness. Yet, whereas the subject is constantly looking for new fullness, she 
seems to be present at all times. This raises the question as to how their con-
cept of agency differs from concepts of the individual that we can encoun-
ter in post-positivist approaches to policy change . Moreover, this concept 
of human agency also seems to be responsible for the paradox that was 
observed in chapter 5 and further elaborated upon in section 11.3.2, namely 
that the identification with new signifiers may on the one hand cover up 
social contingencies and on the other hand facilitate us to see contingen-
cies. Thus, identification with new signifiers may at the same time foster 
ideological critique and be welcomed because of its ethical implications. 
This research therefore recommends to rethink the distinction between ide-
ological and ethical action. 
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Another issue concerned the relationship between the meaning that 
was given to the life course perspective in specific research practices and in 
the social security discourse. In chapter 5 it was recommended to rethink 
the relationship between the meaning of the signifiers in the first sphere 
and the transposed (catachretic) sphere.
Chapter 2 designed a poststructuralists analytical model for the expla-
nation of policy change This model incorporated some concepts that are 
developed within post-positivist policy analysis . Chapters 6 and 8 also 
referred to some new institutionalist concepts. Chapter 6, for example, 
used the concepts of coordinative discourse and communicative discourse 
that Vivian Schmidt (2002, 2008) introduced. The coordinative discourse 
dominates in corporatist and multi-party countries such as the Netherlands 
where close consultations between different (small) parties are imperative 
in the decision-making process. On the other hand, the communicative dis-
course is more important in countries with a single authority, such as 
France and the UK. This discourse operates in the political sphere in which 
various indivdiduals and groups seek to convince the public. Thus these 
concepts help to demarcate the most important area of research. Table 11.1 
shows, that it is also possible to draw some parallels between Schmidt’s 
concepts and the concepts used in poststructuralist discourse theory. 
Whereas the communicative discourse mainly concerns the political 
sphere, notions such as dislocation , empty signifier and logics of equivalence 
become central analytical concepts. The coordinative discourse, on the oth-
er hand, refers to the policy sphere. Consequently, concepts like aspect 
dawning , storylines and discourse coalition become more important.29 This 
implicates that the study of policy change in the Netherlands, where the 
coordinative discourse is important, requires us to analyze the construction 
of storylines, discourse coalitions and the working of aspect dawning and 
aspect change. This study recommends future policy studies that contrib-
ute to a fruitful conceptual exchange.
Table 11.1 Parallels between the concepts used by Schmidt and Poststructuralist 
discourse theory
Communicative discourse Coordinative discourse
Political sphere Policy sphere
Dislocation, resistance Aspect dawning, aspect change , small blockages
Empty signifier Storylines 
Logics of equivalence and difference Discourse coalition
29 See also section 6.7.
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Since this study focused on explaining the emergence of the LCA , the atten-
tion was somewhat drawn away from the question why the first ideas on a 
‘life course based social system’ were not further developed. Chapter 5 
suggested that the 'life course perspective storyline' in fact covered up 
diverging views on the future social security system. In addition, in chapter 
8 it was argued, that the ‘life course discourse coalition ’ dissolved because 
the establishment of new chains of equivalences cut across the former life 
course discourse coalition . The chapter further suggested that the conflicts in 
the SER between labor unions and employers’ organizations definitely 
blocked the design of a new ‘life course based system’. These explanations 
seem to confirm the new institutionalist claim that social security systems 
tend to remain stable during long periods of time, in particular in countries 
with strong corporatist structures such as the Netherlands. I would, how-
ever, like to add a discourse theoretical explanation. As we saw in chapter 
4, discussing the work of Norval , change is not only preconditioned upon a 
first moment of surprise in which things are seen in a different way (aspect 
dawning ), change is also in need of a (repetitive) rediscovery of this initial 
moment of surprise (aspect change ). The name ‘life course perspective ’, how-
ever, only seems to have contributed to aspect dawning. That is, whereas the 
new name functioned as an exemplar that provided inspiration for some-
thing new, a way out of deadlocked discursive positions, the exemplar failed 
to constitute new practices in which a new perspective on social security 
could be iterated. An example of practices such as these would concern the 
establishment of a working group consisting of specialists, policymakers, 
politicians and citizens where new life course based perspectives on the 
social security system could be further discussed and elaborated upon. 
This chapter imagined an alternative social law design that enables an 
ethos of engagement that is open to alteration. The proposed basic income 
system seems to be the only design that practically might sustain this ethos 
of engagement to some extent. A less ambitious goal would be to propose 
an alternative savings scheme, which, more than the LCA, responds to the 
different narratives that were told within the 'life course discourse coalition'. 
In addition, as was argued in chapter 9, this savings scheme should be 
more embedded in the current social security system, which, like Stuart 
White's proposal involves a savings scheme that is, at least partly, financed 
on a collective basis.30 Notice, however, that this savings scheme does not 
neccessarily resonate with a democratic ethos of engagement.
Finally, the question could be raised to what extent this study contains 
context transcending elements. Is it, for example, possible to formulate 
more general questions and hypotheses for comparative research? In chap-
ter 2 it was argued that political, fantasmatic and rhetorical logics are formal 
30 See in this respect also the proposal by Eleveld and Heeger-Hertter (2012). 
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constructs that can account for a variety of historical contexts. Social logics , 
in contrast, are context dependent constructions that can only move to oth-
er contexts on the condition that the analyst explicitly creates new links 
between the contexts. This study has shown how the cathacretic act of nam-
ing contributed to the formation of a discourse coalition that induced a new 
way of seeing and ultimately laid the groundwork for the establishment of 
the idea of an individual savings scheme in social security law. Based on 
this outcome, in comparable (multiparty and corporatist ) countries where 
the coordinative discourse dominates (instead of the communicative dis-
course) the hypothesis may be tested that policy change or at least discur-
sive change is dependent upon the introduction of new signifiers (exem-
plars ) that make people ‘see things’ in a new perspective. If this hypothesis 
is confirmed in a specific situation, further research should focus on the 
extent to which the new name has been integrated in certain practices. A last 
proposal for further comparative study concerns the impact of the aging 
society narrative on policy change. It was argued in this study that propos-
als on individual savings systems were sustained by the aging society nar-
rative. Since the dominance of this narrative is not confined to the Nether-
lands but is spread across Europe, the relationship between the aging 
society narrative and proposals for individual savings schemes in the field 
of social security could be further investigated in a comparative study.

Samenvatting
Een kritisch perspectief op de hervorming 
van het Nederlandse socialezekerheidsrecht 
De casus van de levensloopregeling
Inleiding
Het Nederlandse socialezekerheidsrecht is veranderd in de loop der jaren. 
Na een proces van opbouw na de Tweede Wereldoorlog lijkt het systeem 
van sociale zekerheid zijn voltooiing te bereiken in het midden van de jaren 
70. Precies op dit hoogtepunt zien we dat het systeem geleidelijk aan wordt 
afgebouwd en hervormd. Collectieve verantwoordelijkheden verschuiven 
steeds meer in de richting van het individu. En mede door de Europese 
gelijke behandelingsrichtlijnen wordt het zogenaamde kostwinnermodel 
in het socialezekerheidsrecht geleidelijk afgeschaft ten gunste van indivi-
duele regelingen. Na de verschijning van het rapport-Buurmeijer uit 1993 
wordt de uitvoering van de sociale zekerheid ingrijpend op de schop geno-
men. Zo verschuift de verantwoordelijkheid voor arbeidsongeschiktheid 
naar de werkgevers en werknemers. Tegelijkertijd wordt in het socialeze-
kerheidsdiscours het belang van economische prikkels in de vormgeving 
van het socialezekerheidsrecht steeds meer benadrukt. Burgers worden in 
dit discours niet meer zozeer gezien als passieve consumenten van over-
heidsbeleid, maar als calculerende burgers die zorgvuldig afwegen welke 
strategie hen het meeste voordeel oplevert. 
Deze verschuiving van waarden als gelijkheid en solidariteit naar waar-
den als keuzevrijheid en individuele verantwoordelijkheid wordt in feite 
belichaamd door de levensloopregeling die in 2006 wordt geïntroduceerd. 
De levensloopregeling is een individuele spaarregeling waarmee werkne-
mers in staat worden gesteld om op een fiscaal voordelige manier te sparen 
voor de financiering van arbeidsverlof. De levensloopregeling verschilt in 
belangrijk opzicht van het traditionele socialezekerheidsrecht. In de eerste 
plaats vindt er niet zozeer een herverdeling van middelen plaats tussen rij-
ke en arme werknemers, maar profiteren de werknemers met hogere inko-
mens meer van deze regeling dan de werknemers met de laagste inkomens. 
In de tweede plaats ziet deze regeling met name op zogenaamde ‘nieuwe 
risico’s’ zoals het risico van het combineren van arbeid en zorg en het risico 
onvoldoende geschoold te zijn voor de eisen van de huidige arbeidsmarkt 
(employability). In de derde plaats is de levensloopregeling niet alleen gere-
lateerd aan sociale risico’s; de regeling faciliteert net zo goed bepaalde ‘life-
style keuzes’, zoals de keuze om een wereldreis te maken. 
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De eerste voorstellen voor uitbreiding van de levensloopregeling die in 
2007 en 2008 verschijnen, wijken in een nog grotere mate af van het 
bestaande collectieve socialezekerheidsrecht. Deze voorstellen zijn voor 
een belangrijk deel geïmplementeerd in de vitaliteitsregeling die in 2013 de 
levensloopregeling vervangt. Aan de vitaliteitsreging mogen ook niet-
werknemers, zoals zelfstandigen en ZZP’ers deelnemen. Een implicatie 
van deze uitbreiding van de persoonlijke werkingssfeer is dat de regeling 
ook gebruikt kan worden ter financiering van de periode tussen twee 
banen in en de start van een bedrijf. Met de vitaliteitsregeling lijkt het idee 
van individueel sparen niet meer weg te denken uit het traditionele collec-
tieve socialezekerheidsrecht. 
Hoofdvraag
De vraag die dit proefschrift tracht te beantwoorden is hoe de inbedding 
van het idee van individueel sparen in het traditionele Nederlandse collec-
tieve socialezekerheidsrecht op een kritische wijze kan worden verklaard. 
Enerzijds gaat het hierbij om de empirische vraag naar de totstandkoming 
van een belangrijke wijziging in het socialezekerheidsrecht. Hoe kon bij-
voorbeeld een dergelijke wijziging tot stand komen, terwijl institutionele 
theorieën betogen dat juist verzorgingsstaatinstituties slechts geleidelijk 
veranderen. Anderzijds gaat het om een normatieve beoordeling van deze 
verandering. Wat vinden we er eigenlijk van dat in het socialezekerheids-
recht een verschuiving plaats vindt van collectieve naar individuele ver-
antwoordelijkheid? Is dit bijvoorbeeld, zoals Anthony Giddens meent, een 
onvermijdbaar gevolg van de moderne samenleving waarin de klemmen-
de banden van de traditionele samenleving zijn vervangen door het vrij-
heidszoekende, zelfreflectieve individu? Of moeten we met Michel Fou-
cault concluderen dat burgers tegenwoordig meer beperkt worden in hun 
vrijheid dan voorheen, omdat ze in toenemende mate worden gedwongen 
om zich te gedragen als een rationele verantwoordelijke levensplanner? In 
deze studie is er voor gekozen om de hoofdvraag te beantwoorden vanuit 
een poststructuralistisch discourstheoretische ontologie, op grond waarvan 
onze werkelijkheid wordt geconstitueerd door machtsrelaties. De gevolgen 
van deze keuze voor de methodologische en theoretische aspecten van het 
onderzoek komen hieronder verder aan de orde. 
Methodologische en theoretische aspecten van het onderzoek
De hoofdvraag wordt beantwoord in een negental hoofdstukken. Hoofd-
stukken 2, 3 en 4 zijn daarbij van theoretische en methodologische aard. In 
hoofdstuk 2 wordt een overzicht gegeven van een aantal poststructuralisti-
sche en postpositivistische benaderingen in de beleidsanalyse. Het uit-
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gangspunt in dit hoofdstuk wordt gevormd door Jason Glynos en David 
Howarth ontwikkelde model ‘Logics of Critical Explanation’. Dit kritische 
en verklarende onderzoeksmodel is tot nu toe het meest uitgewerkte 
onderzoeksmodel dat gebaseerd is op de poststructuralistische discours-
theorie. Kenmerkend van dit model is dat er, in navolging van Martin 
Heidegger, een onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen het ontologische en het 
ontische. Het ontologische vormt als het ware de bestaansvoorwaarde voor 
de fenomenen en praktijken zoals we die ervaren. Volgens de discourstheo-
rie kunnen fenomenen en praktijken veranderen als gevolg van een ‘dislo-
catie’ waardoor de werkelijkheid plotseling anders wordt ervaren. Anders 
gezegd, tijdens de ervaring van een dislocatie verkrijgt men zicht op de 
ontologische bestaansvoorwaarden: men ontwaart de radicale contingentie 
van gesedimenteerde praktijken. Voorbeelden van dergelijke ‘dislocaties’ 
zijn economische crises en verregaande bureaucratisering. Verandering 
kan evenwel pas ontstaan indien deze gewaarwording een politieke 
dimensie krijgt. Een belangrijke voorwaarde voor verandering is dus dat 
het zicht op de radicale contingentie van sociale praktijken mensen 
beweegt om tot actie over te gaan.
Inzichten in veranderingsprocessen kunnen ook gegenereerd worden 
door een analyse van retorische patronen. Volgens de discourstheoretische 
benadering geeft retoriek immers vorm aan de ontologische voorwaarden 
van de ontische fenomenen en praktijken. Je zou ook kunnen zeggen dat 
binnen het discourstheoretische perspectief retoriek constitutief is voor 
onze fenomenen en praktijken. Psychoanalytische inzichten vormen daar-
naast een belangrijk verklarende factor in discourstheorie. Uitgaande van 
het idee dat het subject zich op onbewust niveau incompleet voelt, wordt 
betoogd dat het subject door (ideologische) identificatie met nieuwe prak-
tijken, ideeën, of betekenaars (retoriek) deze incompleetheid of dit gemis 
tracht te overwinnen. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt het poststructuralistisch discourstheoretische 
verklaringsmodel voor sociale verandering aangevuld met een aantal con-
cepten die zijn ontleend aan onder andere het werk van Michel Foucault en 
de postpositivistische of interpretatieve beleidsanalyse, zoals ‘beleidsver-
halen’ en ‘discourscoalities’. Het model bestaat uit de volgende eenheden 
van onderzoek: ‘social logics’ (karakterisering van bestaande discoursen en 
praktijken), ‘political logics’(karakterisering van politieke praktijken die 
ontstaan na een dislocatie) en ‘rhetorical logics’ (karakterisering van 
gebruikte retoriek en verhalen waarmee de snelheid en richting van veran-
deringsprocessen verklaard kan worden). In dit proefschrift zijn deze een-
heden van onderzoek leidend voor de verklaring van verandering. 
Het kritische aspect van het verklaringsmodel wordt uitgewerkt in de 
hoofdstukken 3 en 4. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt betoogd dat in de Nederlandse 
sociaalrechtelijke literatuur weliswaar veelvuldig een normatieve term 
als rechtvaardigheid wordt gebruikt, maar dat niet helder is wat nu maat-
staven van rechtvaardigheid zijn. Voorgesteld wordt daarom om ten rade 
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te gaan bij de politieke filosofie en, nog preciezer, bij de egalitair liberale 
politieke filosofie die de in de sociaalrechtelijke literatuur genoemde basis-
waarden als ‘ongelijkheidscompensatie’ en ‘bescherming van de werkne-
mer’ nog het meest lijkt te steunen. Vervolgens wordt aan de hand van het 
egalitair liberale wederkerigheidsconcept de (rechts)vraag beoordeeld of 
aan uitkeringsgerechtigden een werkverplichting mag worden opgelegd. 
In het hoofdstuk wordt geconcludeerd dat het antwoord afhangt van het 
toegepaste egalitair liberaal wederkerigheidsbegrip. Als we afgaan op 
John Rawls’ concept van wederkerigheid, dan zal een dergelijke werkver-
lichting verworpen moeten worden. Stuart White’s opvatting van weder-
kerigheid laat aan de andere kant zien dat een arbeidsverplichting wel 
is toegestaan op voorwaarde dat de basisinstituties van de samenleving 
rechtvaardig zijn. Aangezien dit nooit (perfect) het geval kan zijn, zullen 
er regelingen getroffen moeten worden die in ieder geval kwetsbare bur-
gers beschermen. White stelt voor om een gedeeltelijk basisinkomen in te 
voeren, waarmee burgers in ieder geval tijdelijk kunnen ontsnappen aan 
slechte arbeids omstandigheden en waarmee ze wellicht zelfs in staat zijn 
om betere omstandigheden af te dwingen. Een voorbeeld van een derge-
lijke regeling zou de levensloopregeling zijn, op voorwaarde dat deze rege-
ling op collectieve wijze wordt gefinancierd. 
Terwijl hoofdstuk 3 laat zien hoe met behulp van de politieke filosofie 
de normatieve argumentatie in de juridische literatuur sterk kan worden 
verbeterd, wijst hoofdstuk 4 op een aantal tekortkomingen van dergelijke 
argumentaties. In de eerste plaats zien we dat rechtvaardigheidstheorieën 
zich vaak op een (te) hoog abstractieniveau bevinden voor de bepaling van 
concrete evaluatieve maatstaven. Daarnaast wordt betoogd dat het moreel 
pluralisme een probleem vormt voor algemeen geaccepteerde rechtvaar-
digheidstheorieën. De voorkeur zou daarom moeten worden gegeven aan 
democratische rechtvaardigheidstheorieën waarin moreel pluralisme juist 
het uitgangspunt vormt. In aansluiting daarop wordt in dit hoofdstuk 
onderzocht in hoeverre op grond van Jürgen Habermas’ deliberatieve 
democratische theorie evaluatieve criteria ter beoordeling van hervormin-
gen in het socialezekerheidsrecht kunnen worden geformuleerd. Een theo-
retische beschouwing laat zien dat Habermas net als Rawls zijn theorie 
baseert op een Kantiaans mensbegrip, waardoor in feite bepaalde (niet rati-
onele) communicatievormen van het deliberatieve proces worden uitgeslo-
ten. De relatie tussen macht en het rationele mensbeeld wordt daardoor 
onvoldoende belicht. 
Het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 3 laat zien hoe dit thema wordt 
geadresseerd in het werk van Michel Foucault, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal 
Mouffe, William Connolly, Aletta Norval, Jason Glynos en David Howarth. 
Deze poststructuralistische denkers hebben met elkaar gemeen dat ze het 
(niet bewust ervaren) ‘politieke’ moment (‘the political’) onder de aandacht 
brengen als gevolg waarvan nieuwe praktijken kunnen worden geïnstal-
leerd. De onderkenning van het belang van het ‘politieke’ voor de door ons 
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ervaren werkelijkheid, wil overigens nog niet direct zeggen dat het een the-
orie van rechtvaardigheid zoals die van Rawls onbruikbaar is. Integendeel, 
zoals Mouffe aangeeft, kan zijn theorie worden ingebracht in de strijd tus-
sen verschillende interpretaties van rechtvaardigheid en deze van een taal 
voorzien waarmee verschillende interpretaties van het gelijkheids- en vrij-
heidsideaal tot uitdrukking kunnen worden gebracht. Echter uitgaande 
van ‘een democratisch ethos van engagement’, dat in dit hoofdstuk wordt 
geformuleerd op basis van het poststructuralistische werk van Foucault, 
Connolly, Norval, Glynos en Howarth, wordt geconcludeerd dat dit recht-
vaardigheidsconcept moet worden verworpen. Het democratisch ethos 
van engagement bevat de volgende elementen:
– Een erkenning van de radicale contingentie van sociale relaties.
– Een ontvankelijkheid voor onrechtvaardigheid en praktijken van ver-
zet en strijd.
– Een op vrijheid gebaseerd ethos waarin wordt getracht om te ontsnap-
pen aan dominante waarheidsconcepties. 
Binnen dit democratische ethos van engagement krijgen theorieën van 
rechtvaardigheid de betekenis van een imaginair construct, waarmee het 
subject tracht zijn interne incompleetheid te overwinnen. Het recht krijgt 
daarnaast enerzijds de betekenis van een praktijk dat gericht is op de reali-
sering van bepaalde waarden of idealen (het pragmatische gezichtspunt). 
Anderzijds is het recht een vorm van macht die om die reden ook wordt 
bestreden. Dit betekent ook dat het recht net als macht nooit ‘totaal’ wordt. 
Als het gevolg van strijd en verzet, is het recht voortdurend aan verande-
ring onderhevig. Het komt daarom ook nooit helemaal in de greep van de 
normaliserende macht dat, volgens een bepaalde lezing van Foucault’s 
werk, zo karakteristiek is voor het sociaal recht. Integendeel. In het proef-
schrift wordt daarentegen betoogd dat op grond van Foucault’s werk de 
stelling verdedigd kan worden dat het sociaal recht de ontwikkeling van 
een ‘gede-individualiseerde’ veranderlijke ethiek kan en zou moeten 
bevorderen.
Aan het eind van hoofdstuk 4 wordt op grond van de methodologische 
en theoretische bespreking een aantal vragen geformuleerd die richting 
geven aan het onderzoek. Deze vragen zijn gebaseerd op een viertal analy-
tische stappen die zijn geformuleerd in het tweede hoofdstuk: problemati-
sering, retroductie, overtuiging en kritiek. Daarnaast worden de gehanteer-
de onderzoeksmethoden geïntroduceerd. Ten behoeve van het onderzoek 
zijn allereerst bijna 40 sleutelactoren geïnterviewd die betrokken waren bij 
de totstandkoming van de levensloopregeling en de plannen tot de uitbrei-
ding van de regeling. De geïnterviewden betreffen onder andere (toenma-
lige) ministers van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid en Financiën, verte-
genwoordigers van de belangrijkste politieke partijen, adviseurs van deze 
partijen, vertegenwoordigers van de belangrijkste werkgevers- en werkne-
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mersbonden, vertegenwoordigers van andere relevante belangengroepen 
(particuliere verzekeraars en de gezinsraad) en ambtenaren. Daarnaast zijn 
op basis van deze interviews 11 sleuteldocumenten geanalyseerd die van 
belang waren bij de ontwikkeling van het levensloopidee. Deze documen-
ten zijn geanalyseerd met behulp van methoden die zijn ontleend aan de 
Historische Discours Analyse. Andere relevante documenten zijn geanaly-
seerd met behulp van frame analyse. In twee gevallen is de methode van 
vergelijking gehanteerd. In hoofdstuk 9 wordt de Nederlandse levensloop-
regeling vergeleken met het Belgische Tijdskrediet. En in hoofdstuk 10 
wordt het levensloopdiscours vergeleken met het negentiende-eeuwse dis-
cours dat vooraf ging aan de Armenwet. 
De resultaten van het onderzoek
Nadat in de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 4 een aantal theoretische en metho-
dologische aspecten van de centrale vraag aan de orde zijn geweest, con-
centreren hoofdstukken 5 tot en met 10 zich op de empirische beantwoor-
ding van de hoofdvraag. De nadruk ligt daarbij op de ontstaanswijze van 
de levensloopregeling in het Nederlandse socialezekerheidsrecht. Op basis 
van deze hoofdstukken wordt de centrale vraag beantwoord. 
Hoofdstuk 9 laat zien hoe in de levensloopregeling de waarden van 
individuele verantwoordelijkheid en vrijwilligheid zijn omgezet in speci-
fieke wettelijke voorschriften. Daarmee onderscheidt de levenslooprege-
ling zich van het overige socialezekerheidsrecht. Toch hebben de ‘rhetorical 
logics’ en de ‘political logics’ die de introductie van de levensloopregeling 
vergezelden ook haar sporen nagelaten in de logica die ten grondslag ligt 
aan het huidige socialezekerheidsrecht. Zo blijkt uit de voorstellen tot uit-
breiding van de levensloopregeling dat het idee van individuele spaar-
systemen ten behoeve van traditioneel collectief gedekte sociale risico’s, 
zoals werkloosheid, steeds meer wordt geaccepteerd in het socialezeker-
heidsrecht. 
Hoe kan deze groeiende acceptatie worden verklaard? Hoofdstuk 5 
laat zien hoe, door het gewenste beleid ‘levensloopbeleid’ te noemen, een 
nieuwe blik op de werkelijkheid kon worden gecreëerd. Zoals eerder ver-
meld kan in discourstheorie het gebruik van nieuwe retoriek een belang-
rijke rol spelen in veranderingsprocessen. Indien bestaande woorden wor-
den (her)gebruikt in een nieuwe context om iets te duiden waar tot dan toe 
geen naam voor bestond, spreekt men ook wel van catachrese. Dit was in 
feite wat er gebeurde in de het socialezekerheidsdiscours rond de eeuw-
wisseling. Door de introductie van de woorden ‘levensloop’ en ‘levens-
loopperspectief’ in een nieuw discours veranderde de betekenis van ande-
re woorden en daarmee het zicht op de werkelijkheid. Je zou ook kunnen 
zeggen dat de nieuwe woorden de uitwerking hadden van een dislocatie: 
als gevolg van de introductie van de nieuwe woorden kregen de betrokken 
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actoren zicht op de contingentie van gesedimenteerde praktijken. Een bij-
komend effect was dat het woord ‘sociale zekerheid’ nu betekenis kreeg 
tegen de achtergrond van het ‘levensloopperspectief’. 
Het succes van het levensloopverhaal kan ook verklaard worden aan 
de hand van de uiteenlopende denkframes waarin het woord ‘levensloop-
perspectief’ betekenis kreeg. Doordat het ‘levensloopperspectief’ op een 
steeds andere wijze kon worden uitgelegd, kon het op een relatief breed 
draagvlak rekenen (hoofdstuk 6). Als gevolg hiervan werd in het socialeze-
kerheidsdiscours, meer dan voorheen, de nadruk gelegd op individuele 
capaciteiten om te anticiperen op toekomstige gebeurtenissen. Van belang 
was verder dat het levensloopverhaal en de daarin gebruikte nieuwe woor-
den ‘levensloop’ en ‘levensloopperspectief’ appelleerden aan een onbe-
wuste wens tot compleetheid. Het leek nu mogelijk dat tegengestelde 
waarden, zoals efficiency en solidariteit, verenigd konden worden in een 
systeem gebaseerd op een balans tussen (betaald) werk en privéleven, 
waarin de wensen van een verhoogde arbeidsmarktparticipatie en meer 
tijd voor zorg elkaar niet uitsluiten. In hoofdstuk 7 wordt daarnaast 
betoogd dat het aantrekkelijke levensloopverhaal werd versterkt door een 
bepaald gebruik van data in beleid. In die zin kunnen data, net als verhaal-
lijnen en beleidsframes, worden opgevat als een interpretatief product. 
Een tweede verklaring voor de groeiende acceptatie van individuele 
spaarsystemen in het socialezekerheidsrecht betreft de werking van de 
‘political logics’. Hoofdstuk 8 laat in dit verband zien hoe steun voor een 
individuele levensloopregeling, die voorbij ging aan de door de bonden en 
linkse oppositie gewenste collectieve spaarvormen, kon worden gewaar-
borgd. Terwijl de vakbonden en hun bondgenoten in 2004 gezamenlijk 
optrokken tegen de door regering Balkenende II voorgestelde neoliberale 
hervormingen in het socialezekerheidsrecht, doorbrak de regering het 
oppositionele blok door op sommige punten toe te geven aan de vakbon-
den. De corporatistische verhoudingen waren hersteld, waardoor een klei-
ne institutionele hervorming, namelijk de introductie van een individuele 
levensloopregeling, kon worden gerealiseerd. 
Het vergrijzingsverhaal, dat met name in de periode na 2002 in belang 
toenam bleef vervolgens voeding geven aan een gevoelde noodzaak tot 
verdergaande sociale hervormingen. Een individuele spaarregeling zou 
bijvoorbeeld beter in staat zijn om de nieuwe risico’s op een vroegtijdig 
verlaten van de arbeidsmarkt (zorg en veroudering van kennis en vaardig-
heden) dan het bestaande systeem van collectieve verzekeringen Hiermee 
komen we op een derde verklaring voor de groeiende acceptatie van indi-
viduele spaarsystemen in het socialezekerheidsrecht. Het vergrijzingsver-
haal bleek krachtiger te zijn dan de weerstand tegen een individuele spaar-
regeling in de sociale zekerheid.
Samengevat verklaart dit onderzoek de inbedding van het idee van 
individuele spaarregelingen in het socialezekerheidsrecht aan de hand van 
drie factoren: de introductie van nieuwe namen in het socialezekerheids-
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recht waardoor een nieuwe blik op de werkelijkheid kon worden gecreëerd 
(‘rhetorical logics’), de werking van corporatistsche mechanismen (‘politi-
cal logics’) en de kracht van het vergrijzingsverhaal (‘rhetorical logics’). 
Voor een kritische verklaring van de inbedding van het idee van indivi-
duele spaarregelingen in het socialezekerheidsrecht reflecteert het proef-
schrift op het ‘democratisch ethos van engagement’ dat werd geïntrodu-
ceerd in hoofdstuk 4. Het onderzoek laat op dit vlak in de eerste plaats een 
paradox zien. Terwijl de woorden ‘levensloop’ en ‘levensloopperspectief’ 
en het ideologische levensloopverhaal waarin deze woorden betekenis kre-
gen, het zicht op sociale contingentie vertroebelden, laat het onderzoek aan 
de andere kant zien dat deze nieuwe namen de actoren ook juist in staat 
stelden om de contingentie van het bestaande socialezekerheidsrecht te 
ontwaren. Identificatie met deze nieuwe namen illustreren aldus twee kan-
ten van dezelfde munt. Aan de ene kant faciliteerde de retoriek over levens-
lopen een nieuwe manier van kijken naar het socialezekerheidsrecht, en 
bevorderde het een discursieve interactie tussen bestaande dominante dis-
coursen en counter discoursen; aan de andere kant, werd door de retoriek 
gelijktijdig de nieuwe ruimte toedekten die ze zojuist had gecreëerd. Dit 
gebeurde onder andere door een ideologische subjectconstructie. Het 
levensloopdiscours construeerde een autonoom subject dat voortdurend 
eigen keuzes maakt en wil maken.Vanuit het perspectief van een democra-
tisch ethos van engagement kan het gebruik van levensloopretoriek dus 
zowel worden toegejuicht als verworpen. 
In de tweede plaats wordt het ontstaan van de levensloopregeling 
bekritiseerd, omdat de discursieve posities die deel uitmaakten van de dis-
courscoalitie in het latere politieke proces niet of nauwelijks meer een rol 
speelden. Het gaat hierbij met name om het diversiteitsverhaal en in min-
dere mate om het gezinslevenverhaal en het emancipatieverhaal. Nu in 2005 
het levensloopbeleid hoofdzakelijk werd begrepen in de context van het 
verhaal over het menselijk kapitaal verhaal en de nieuwe risico’s, konden 
andere geluiden niet meer gehoord worden. Immers degenen die aandacht 
vroegen voor meer tijd voor niet-betaald werk zoals zorgactiviteiten, spra-
ken in een andere taal dan de taal van het hegemonische discours. Het mis-
kennen van deze geluiden laat een gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid achter. 
Een derde punt van kritiek verwijst naar de diverse vormen van verzet. 
Zo kan de demonstratie uit 2004 worden opgevat als een verzet tegen alle 
sociale hervormingen van de regering-Balkenende waarin de waarde van 
solidariteit werd vervangen door de waarde van individuele verantwoor-
delijkheid, inclusief de introductie van de individuele levensloopregeling. 
De lage deelname aan de levensloopregeling en de houding van de betrok-
ken ambtenaren wijzen daarnaast op vormen van (stil) verzet tegen de (uit-
breiding van) de levensloopregeling. In zijn algemeenheid kan de totstand-
koming van de levensloopregeling worden bekritiseerd, omdat de wensen 
van een belangrijk deel van de burgers werd veronachtzaamd. Terwijl in 
2001 de levensloopdiscourscoalitie het startpunt had kunnen zijn voor een 
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verdere ontwikkeling van ideeën in dialoog met de burgers, werd de 
levensloopregeling nadat de discourscoalitie uit elkaar was gevallen, uitge-
voerd met een sterk verminderd draagvlak
In de vierde plaats is een betoog voor een individuele spaarregeling in 
het socialezekerheidsrecht waarin de aandacht voor diverse levensvormen 
ten dienste wordt gesteld van een verhoging van de arbeidsparticipatie, 
iets wezenlijk anders dan een regeling waarin de diversiteit aan leefvor-
men als zodanig de grondslag vormt voor het socialezekerheidsrecht. 
Alleen in het laatste geval kan in beginsel gesproken worden over een 
democratisch ethos van engagement. Het sociaal recht moet immers niet 
alleen worden opgevat als een machtsvorm, maar kan ook toegang bieden 
tot vrijheidspraktijken. Dit betekent dat het sociaal recht ook ten dienste 
kan staan van de formatie van het ethische subject dat boven al moet wor-
den opgevat als een veranderlijk en niet-eindig subject. In dit licht dient 
mijn voorstel van een basisinkomen in combinatie met een algehele toe-
gang tot een ziektekostenverzekering begrepen te worden: een sociaalrech-
telijke regeling die algehele toegang biedt tot vrijheidspraktijken waardoor 
mensen in staat worden gesteld om voor zichzelf en voor anderen te zor-
gen en voor zichzelf te spreken. Een dergelijke regeling moet worden 
onderscheiden van een levensloopregeling dat ziet op een zelfverantwoor-
delijke levensplanner, zoals wordt beargumenteerd in hoofdstuk 10. 
Slotbeschouwing en toekomstig onderzoek
Empirisch onderzoek gebaseerd op een poststructuralistisch discourstheo-
retische ontologie staat in feite nog in de kinderschoenen. Discourstheorie 
beschikt nog altijd over onvoldoende ontwikkelde onderzoeksmethoden. 
Dit onderzoek heeft evenwel laten zien dat methodes ontleend aan de his-
torische discoursanalyse dat is ontwikkeld door Ruth Wodak goed bruik-
baar zijn voor dergelijk onderzoek. Hiermee hoop ik een aanzet te hebben 
gegeven voor toekomstig discourstheoretisch onderzoek waarin het 
gebruik van de Historische Discours Analyse verder wordt ontwikkeld. 
Op een meer theoretisch niveau geeft het onderzoek aanleiding tot het 
verder doordenken van het handelende subject binnen discourstheorie. 
Volgens de inzichten van de discourstheorie verschijnt het subject slechts 
wanneer ze wordt gedreven door een onbewuste wens tot compleetheid. 
Nu subjecten evenwel voortdurend bezig zijn om interne compleetheid te 
bereiken, rijst de vraag in hoeverre in praktische zin dit discourstheoreti-
sche subject concept nog afwijkt van het subjectconcept van postpositivisti-
sche benaderingen. In beide opvattingen kan verandering immers tot stand 
worden gebracht door het handelende subject. Het verschil tussen beide 
opvattingen lijkt met name af te hangen van het antwoord op de vraag of 
de beslissing om te handelen wordt gemaakt op een bewust of een onbe-
wust niveau. 
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In het verlengde van deze beschouwing van het subjectconcept kan de 
vraag gesteld worden in hoeverre het ideologische en het ethische hande-
len van elkaar kunnen worden onderscheiden. Uit het onderzoek blijkt 
namelijk dat identificatie met nieuwe betekenaars niet alleen kan leiden tot 
het afdekken van sociale contingentie (ideologisch handelen), maar ook 
juist het zicht op sociale contingentie (ethisch handelen) bevordert. Dus 
zowel het discourstheoretische subjectconcept als het door Glynos and 
Howarth gemaakte onderscheid tussen het ideologische en het ethische 
handelen verdient nadere theoretische verdieping. 
Het onderzoek laat verder zien dat concepten die gebruikt worden in 
de postpositivistische beleidsanalyse behulpzaam kunnen zijn bij een post-
structuralistisch discourstheoretisch onderzoek naar beleidsverandering. 
In toekomstig onderzoek zal het gebruik van deze postpositivistische con-
cepten verder kunnen worden uitgewerkt voor poststructuralistisch dis-
courstheoretisch onderzoek. Hierbij kan gedacht worden aan de toepassing 
van het begrip discourscoalitie in de discourstheorie. 
In het onderzoek is de nadruk gelegd op de verklaring van het ontstaan 
van de levensloopregeling. Dit had tot gevolg dat er minder aandacht was 
voor de vraag waarom de eerste ideeën over een levensloopbestendig sys-
teem van sociale zekerheid niet verder zijn ontwikkeld. Hoofdstuk 6 liet 
zien dat deze ideeën breed werden gedragen doordat het levensloop-
verhaal verschillende interpretaties toeliet. Bij meer concrete uitwerkingen 
kwamen evenwel de onderlinge geschillen naar boven. Op grond van de 
analyse van hoofdstuk 8 kan in aanvulling hierop worden betoogd dat de 
corporatistische structuur van het Nederlandse sociale systeem de ontwik-
keling van een levensloopbestendig systeem sterk heeft vertraagd. Een 
hieraan gerelateerde verklaring kan ontleend worden aan het werk van 
Aletta Norval. Met de termen ‘aspect dawning’ en ‘aspect change’ geeft zij 
aan dat verandering niet alleen afhankelijk is van een eerste moment van 
‘verrassing’, waarin de normale gang van zaken ineens op een andere wijze 
wordt beschouwd (‘aspect dawning’). Voor verandering is meer nodig. 
Bovenal moet dit initiële moment van verrassing telkens worden herhaald 
om daadwerkelijke verandering te initiëren (‘aspect change’). In de casus 
gaf de term ‘levensloopperspectief’ weliswaar inspiratie tot verandering en 
tot het creëren van iets nieuws, waarmee een uitweg kon worden gevon-
den uit vastgelopen discussies, het nieuwe woord constitueerde echter 
geen nieuwe praktijken waarin een nieuw perspectief op sociale zekerheid 
kon worden herhaald en daarmee daadwerkelijk verandering bestendigen. 
Tot slot kan de vraag gesteld worden in hoeverre dit onderzoek contex-
toverstijgende elementen bevat. Kunnen we bijvoorbeeld op basis van dit 
onderzoek meer algemene vragen en hypotheses formuleren ten behoeve 
van vergelijkend onderzoek? In hoofdstuk 2 werd gesteld dat contextover-
stijgende elementen met name te vinden zijn in de formulering van ‘politi-
cal logics’ en ‘rhetorical logics’. Naar aanleiding van de casestudie zou de 
hypothese getest kunnen worden dat de introductie van nieuwe namen die 
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worden herhaald in door die namen geconstitueerde praktijken, met name 
verandering veroorzaakt in landen waar de ‘coordinative discourse’ over-
heerst (hoofdstuk 6). Dergelijke landen zijn corporatistische staten en meer-
partijenstaten waar het beleidsdiscours wordt gedomineerd door ambtena-
ren, gekozen politici, experts en georganiseerde belangengroepen. Daar 
tegenover staan landen waar juist het politieke discours op de voorgrond 
staat waarin het gaat om het overtuigen van het brede publiek (‘communi-
cative discours’). Het onderzoek suggereert dat in deze landen de introduc-
tie van nieuwe betekenaars in het socialezekerheidsdiscours minder effect 
zal sorteren. Daarnaast is het zinvol om, in het verlengde van dit onder-
zoek na te gaan in hoeverre het vergrijzingsverhaal van invloed is op de 
ontwikkeling van ideeën en de daadwerkelijke introductie van individuele 
spaarsystemen in het socialezekerheidsrecht van andere Europese staten.

All most all interviews were conducted face to face. In some cases the inter-
views were conducted over the telephone (t) and in one case the interview-
ee responded via the e-mail (e). The names of the interviewees are followed 
with a description of the relevant occupation(s) during the emergence of 
the LCA and the discussions on the extension of the LCA. The occupation(s) 
are followed by the place and date of the interview.
E.J. van Asselt – Member of the research institute for the CDA . Den Haag, 
12 December 2007.
J. Becking – Policy official FNV . Amsterdam, 19 March 2009.
A.L. Bovenberg – Crown-appointed member of the SER; advisor of the 
CDA ; scientific Director of Netspar (economic research). Den Haag, 20 
March 2009.
JL.W. Bijleveld – Policy official FNV ; member of the SER. Amsterdam, 31 
March 2009.
S.A. Blok – Member of the Second Chamber VVD . Den Haag, 18 May 2009.
P. Cuyvers – Staff member of the Dutch National Family Council; advisor 
of the CDA . Leiden, 21 December 2007.
I. Dollen – Policy officer Department of Finances. Den Haag, 13 March 
2009.
F.C.A.M. De Leeuw – Director commercial services Aegon (insurance com-
pany); chairman sector life, Insurer Unions (Verbond van Verzekeraars), 
Utrecht 6 July 2009.
L. De Bruyn – Policy advisor Insurers Union (Verbond van Verzekeraars) 
Den Haag, 17 March 2009.
A.J. De Geus – Minister of Employment and Docial Affairs CDA . Paris, 
France, 28 April 2009.
L.J. De Waal – Chairman of FNV . Amsterdam, 10 January 2008.
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G. Dolsma – Teamleader VNO-NCW ; member of the SER; advisor of the 
CDA . Den Haag, 10 March 2009.
C.C.H.J. Driessen – Senior policy advisor FNV ; member of the SER. Amster-
dam, 20 February 2009.
C.H.S. Evenhuis – member of Temporary Expert Commission Emancipa-
tion (TECENA); Member of working group ‘life course’ D’66. Den Haag, 
14 April 2009.
K.P. Goudswaard – Crown-appointed member of the SER; professor 
applied economics. Leiden December 20, 2007 and April 9, 2009.
H.J. Groenendijk – Policy official Department of Employment and Social 
Affairs. Den Haag, 9 February 2009.
A.J.M. Heerts – member of the board of CNV ; Vice chairman FNV ; partici-
pant Baliegroep I; member of the Second Chamber PvdA (since 2006). 
Den Haag, 22 March 2010.
A.J. Jaunusch – Policy official Department of Employment and Social 
Affairs. Den Haag, 5 February 2009.
A. Jongbloed – Director-general FNV bondgenoten. Leiden, 30 June 2009 
(t).
M. Kastelein – Senior policy advisor CNV ; Member of the SER; Advisor of 
the CDA . Gouda, 26 June 2009.
H.M. Kapelle – Director Aegon adfis (insurance company), professor of fis-
cal pension law. Amsterdam, 28 May 2009.
T.W. Langejan – Director General Department of Employment and Social 
Affairs; Leading negotiator in the Labor Foundation deliberations in 
2004; Director General for Fiscal Policy (since 2008). Utrecht, 26 February 
2010.
F. Leynse – Crown-appointed member of the SER; person charged with 
forming a new government (2003); member of the First Chamber PvdA . 
Utrecht, 5 March 2009.
G. Maas – Chief savings Rabobank Netherlands; chairman working group 
‘credit finances’ Dutch Banking Union (Nederlandse Vereniging van 
Banken) Eindhoven, 6 June 2009.
J. Pijpen – Vice-chairman abvakabo FNV . Amsterdam, 20 December 2007.
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L. Rigter – Policy official FNV . 3 June 2009 (e).
K. Roozenmond – Vice-chairman FNV . Den Haag, 15 June 2009.
J. Sap – Policy official Department of Employment and Social Affairs; mem-
ber of Second Chamber Groen Links (since 2008). Leiden, 12 March 2009 
(t).
J.J. Schippers – Member of the Temporary Expert Commission Emancipa-
tion (TECENA); Professor emancipation and labor economics. Leiden, 2 
June 2009 (t).
E.J. Slootweg – Senior policy advisor CNV ; member of the SER. Utrecht, 6 
March 2009.
M.C.A. Smilde – Member of the Second Chamber CDA . Den Haag, 2 Feb-
ruary 2009.
D. Terpstra – Chairman of CNV . Leiden, 12 December 2007 (t).
J. Timmerman – Policy official Department of Employment and Social 
Affairs; Policy official Department of finances Den Haag, 13 February 
2009.
J. Thunnissen – Director-General Tax Authorities. Den Haag, 19 June 2009.
W. Van der Braak – Director Social Affairs VNO-NCW ; member of the SER; 
negotiator in the Labor Foundation deliberations in 2004. Den Haag, 12 
March, 2010.
L.B.J. Van Geest – Director Financial Economic Politics Department of 
Finances; involved in the Labor Foundation deliberations in 2004; Gen-
eral Director national budget department of finances (since 2008). Den 
Haag, 11 February 2010.
R.A. Vermey – Member of the Second Chamber PvdA . Den Haag, 6 July 
2009.
J. Visser – policy official FNV ; member SER. Amsterdam, 20 February 2009.
J. Van der Werf – General director Aegon (Insurance company). Amster-
dam, 23 April 2009.
E. Wierda – Policy official Sector Emancipation. Amsterdam, 12 July 2011.
G. Zalm – Minister of finances VVD . Amsterdam, 15 July 2009.

The answers of the interviewees were summarized according the following 
themes:
Political process
1. Meaning of the ‘life course perspective’ in the social security discourse.
2. Strategic use of the ‘life course perspective’ in the social security dis-
course.
3. Discursive changes within CDA with respect to ‘life course policy’ (mid 
1990s-2004).
4. Discursive changes within FNV with respect to the individual respon-
sibility of employees (1990s – 2008).
5. Influence of VVD on the development of life course policy during the 
governmental coalitions with CDA (2002-2007).
6. Influence of the aging society discourse on the negotiations on the new 
governmental coalition in 2003 (Balkenende II).
7. Discursive changes with within SER with respect to ‘life course policy’.
8. Conflict between SER members during negotiations on life course poli-
cy 2003.
9. Reactions on governmental plans with respect to the abolition of the 
fiscal facilitation of early retirement.
10. Proceedings with respect to negotiations within the Labor Foundation 
in 2004.
11. Formation of chains of equivalence between different parties preceding 
the 2004 demonstration.
12. Disagreement within FNV with respect to the abolition of the fiscal fa-
cilitation of early retirement and the introduction of the Life Course 
Arrangement.
13. Framing of the 2004 demonstration.
14. Implications of the assassination of Theo van Gogh for the November 
2004 agreement.
15. Framing of the November 2004 agreement.
16. Restoration of the ‘poldermodel’ after the November 2004 agreement.
Policy process
17. Translation of a policy concept to a concrete arrangement.
18. Proceedings with respect to the Verlofknip (2002).
19. Believers and non-believers within the LCA policy discourse.
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20. Debating the design of the LCA: an individual or a collective savingss-
cheme.
21. Debating the design of the LCA: wage tax or income tax.
22. Influence of other stakeholders (other than the social partners) on the 
design of the LCA.
23. Attempts to promote the LCA.
24. Attempts to extend the LCA after the 2007 coalition.
25. Ideas with respect to a savings arrangement for the risk of unemploy-
ment.
26. Proceedings and opinions with respect to the Labor participation com-
mittee 2008.
Opinion on the LCA
27. Opinion on the failure of the LCA.
28. Positive aspects of the LCA.
29. The future of the LCA.
Table 1 Argumentation strategy SER (2001)
Categories Main claims in the text
Social 
trends
– during the life course people desire to have more choices regarding 
work, care, education and spare time;
– personal preferences change during the life course;
– the position of labor has changed in the life course of people, in partic-
ular with respect to the classical pattern of a fulltime working bread-
winner;
– during a life course people, alternate fulltime work and part-time work 
and periods of shorter or longer breaks; this is true for women in partic-
ular;
– education is a question of life long learning, this implies that the 
demand for education is spread over a whole life course in a knowl-
edge society;
– varied life patterns come into existence where periods of paid labor 
are alternated with periods of leave, education and care;
– main social trends: internationalization, computerization; demographic 
changes, individualization; wealth and ethnic diversity;
– the influence of trends on lives of people should not be exaggerated 
(myths); for instance, most people still live in families;
– freedom of choice in the sphere of labor conditions has increased; work 
becomes a consumption good;
– workers increasingly prefer entrepreneurship;
– the labor market is tense;
– women increasingly participate on the labor market;
– people increasingly prefer individual social security provisions;
– social risks increasingly become manufactured risks; 
Problemati-
zation of 
social 
trends
– due to changed life courses tensions may emerge between the demand 
for workers and the realization of personal desires;
– a lot of people experience a deficit in education during their life course;
– in the period of family life, labor market participation is not attractive;
– workers are confronted with a period in life in which they earn little, 
because they spend much of their time taking care of their children;
– lifetime labor productivity lags behind potential labor productivity;
– increased diversity of work patterns and flexibility of labor organiza-
tions may affect the productivity of the organization negatively; 
– combination of work, care, education and spare time often results in 
‘combination stress’;
– temporally leaves and a decrease of the workweek has negative reper-
cussions for the career of women;
– abolition of bread winner facilities without creating new care facilities 
may endanger social cohesion;
– the worker experiences a pressure of work;
– workers who leave the labor market experience difficulties reentering 
the labor market; 
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Categories Main claims in the text
Undesired 
reality
– during the life course the demand (of workers) and supply (of institu-
tions) is unbalanced, because the institutions are tailored to the 
sequence of education, work, and free time;
– the system of social security (and the fiscal system) is built upon the 
standard worker, the standard life course of men and the standard life 
course of women; as a result, elderly people are not stimulated to 
engage in paid work; the possibilities of entrepreneurship cannot be 
exploited fully, individual choices are not enough facilitated and welfare 
recipients are not stimulated to get themselves educated;
– viewed from a life course perspective, the institutions of the labor mar-
ket do not pay sufficient attention to the life time labor productivity;
– labor market institutions are not tailored to counsel self-employed 
workers
– workers and employers are insufficiently stimulated to engage in edu-
cation activities;
– labor market policy does not pay enough attention to qualitative work 
aspects;
Desired 
realities
– labor patterns are viewed from the perspective of the (work) life 
course;
– viewed from a life course perspective, education policy should be put 
in a perspective of ‘life long learning’, ‘employability’ and an ‘orienta-
tion on the demand site’ instead of the supply site;
– labor patterns are situated in a life course perspective; therefore they 
are strongly related to time;
– careers should be spread over entire life courses;
– viewed from the perspective of changed life courses obstacles for the 
development of individual life courses should be removed;
– social law should be tailored to the diversity of labor patterns during 
the life course;
– current choices should not inhibit future choices;
– incentive structures should be enhanced to encourage labor market 
participation;
– social interests and company interests should be balanced;
– early investments in human capital are necessary, such as preschool 
and childcare. 
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Table 2 Argumentation strategy purple government (Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment, 2002)
Categories Main claims in the text
Social 
trends
– last decades Dutch citizens have had more possibilities to flesh out their 
individual life courses;
– modern life course can be characterized by five periods;
– in modern life course people combine activities in all periods;
– in modern life course transitions are made between different areas;
– in last 25 years the standard life course has changed into a varied life 
course;
– due to changed life courses the social need for knowledge and a life 
long learning has become more important;
– main social trends: individualization; acceptation of contraception; higher 
life expectation aging; knowledge economy; multicultural society;
– people want to make their own choices and they also want to take 
responsibility for their choices;
– women are better educated than before and they increasingly partici-
pate in the labor market;
– men want to extend there activities beyond paid labor;
– people leave the labor market earlier;
– investments in human capital have become more important;
– despite changes, there is also stability: most people are still willing to 
pay collective premiums for social security and health and most people 
prefer stable contracts; 
Problemati-
zation of 
social 
trends
– modern life course carries some challenges: people work less, as a 
result of which investments in human capital have become less attrac-
tive; and it becomes increasingly difficult find support for collective 
provisions and facilities;
– the bridge of one sphere of life to another sphere of life does not 
always allow for a two-way traffic;
– in the third period of life, ‘the rush hour of life’, financial and time 
pressure are high in families with children; this can affect their health;
– transitions are increasingly expensive regarding the earning potentials 
and the loss of social security rights;
– for a lot of people the care for sick family is a heavy burden;
– some groups are not well enough educated;
– students complain that education programs are exclusively focused on 
knowledge;
Undesired 
reality
– citizens feel themselves trapped within the arrangements of the welfare 
state, which are based upon the standard life course;
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Categories Main claims in the text
Desired 
realities
– the life course is not so much a new policy area, it is rather a perspec-
tive to see how social problems are connected;
– the challenge is how, from a life course perspective, citizens can be 
offered more possibilities to flesh out their individual lives;
– people must be enabled to uphold their employability during their 
entire life course;
– during the entire life course people are economic independent;
– labor participation should be enhanced during the entire life course;
– the collective safety net should be tailored to the modern life course;
– time and money should be spread during life as a result of which peo-
ple are enabled to combine work, education and care activities in all 
periods of life;
– the transition to the fifth period of life must be prolonged;
– the quality of life should be enhanced;
– life long learning is necessary for full participation in the labor market 
and society;
– people must be stimulated to become self employed;
– people should be enabled to combine paid labor with care activities, 
whilst time for care activities must be slightly protected;
– the government should provide coherent facilities for children.
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Table 3 Argumentation strategy ‘family life narrative’ (Cuyvers 1996)
Categories Main claims in the text
Social 
trends
– in individual life courses a new pattern emerges according to which 
stages succeed each other and alternate;
– individual life courses are dominated by the family;
– modal citizens increasingly adhere to the principles of emancipation, 
freedom of choice and individualization;
– family relations are increasingly modernized;
Problemati-
zation of 
social 
trends
– in modern life course stages with and without children are increasingly 
separated;
– modern life course the ‘family gap’ increases;
– the distribution between labor time and money is out of balance;
– the desires of the majority of the population to combine tasks is not ful-
filled;
– the problem of the peek load affects entire society;
– due to the traditional systems, modal families increasingly encounter 
problems;
Undesired 
reality
– current social system is still based on traditional family relations;
– current representations of the family is not in line with the actual situa-
tion;
– influential groups prevent the establishment of family policy;
– cutbacks and individualization measures affect families with children 
negatively; 
Desired 
realities
– distribution of care and labor between family members during different 
stages of the life course should be revised;
– modern social system should improve the distribution of the burdens 
during the life course;
– the modal citizen in his modern life course still needs the classical pro-
tection of the 1950s;
– modernization of relationships should not focus on the creation of new 
standard patterns, but on freedom of choice in which investments in the 
family are equally valued as labor market participation;
– the modern family integrates the roles of the individual, the partner and 
the parent. 
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Table 4 Argumentation strategy ‘diversity narrative’ (Evenhuis 1999b)
Categories Main claims in the text
Social 
trends
– life courses are becoming increasingly diverse;
– next to the standard life course, a life course with a double loyalty has 
been developed;
– within the life course with a double loyalty the availability for paid 
labor is weighed against other aspects of life, this is also true for an 
increasing number of men;
– nowadays well educated women also follow the standard life course;
– life quality becomes increasingly important;
– nowadays it is taken for granted that every individual must combine 
paid labor with care activities;
– labor market is tight;
Problemati-
zation of 
social 
trends
– women who do not pursue a work career at a young age and a growing 
group of young workers question the over-full life that the standard life 
course imposes, which, amongst others things, causes stress and burn 
out;
Undesired 
reality
– the standard life course is still based on paid labor and male lives;
– the standard life course is anchored in social norms and values under-
pinning diverse institutions;
– women are faced with problems that are caused by many implicit or 
explicit age limits and strict uniformity in life courses;
– social policy that is not tailored towards the growing diversity in life 
courses could easily cause a split between, on one hand, low educated 
women and, on the other hand, men and the group of ambitious, well 
educated women;
– persons who leave the standard life course face unpredictability in 
terms of social protection, career opportunities and pensions as a result 
of which inequalities between men and women continue; 
– new policy measures rather look like emergency solutions whereby 
financial and company interests outweigh individual preferences;
Desired 
realities
– a number of life course models can be constructed as an art of ‘new 
diversity standards’;
– future bills should consider diverse life courses;
– The concept of a diversity of life courses nonetheless implies that avail-
ability for the labor market remains important;
– a diversity of life courses means that individuals gain more freedom to 
decide how to balance their availability for paid labor and care;
– life courses should be treated equally in labor law, social security and 
in the fiscal system;
– labor market policy should not be directed at elderly people but at the 
ones who must leave the labor market to perform care tasks;
– the social security position of people who reenter the labor market 
should be improved.
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Table 5 Argumentation strategy ‘emancipation narrative’ (Schippers 2001)
Categories Main claims in texts
Social 
trends
– because of the ‘destandardization’ of life courses, individuals increas-
ingly desire to make transitions to other spheres;
– labor market is tight;
– last decennia the differentiation of labor participation of women has 
increased;
– labor market participation has become more important in individual 
lives;
Problemati-
zation of 
social 
trends
– transitions between different domains and between different segments 
of the labor market is often a ‘one way traffic’ and/or only opened up 
for a limited amount of groups;
– from the viewpoint of welfare theory it is worrisome that a lot of indi-
viduals and households are not able to realize their preferred amount of 
working hours;
– women do not sufficiently participate on the labor market;
– differentiation of women is a problem for emancipation policy that thus 
far only considered one type of woman;
Undesired 
reality
– in respect to current policy every transition from and to the labor mar-
ket is attached to a separate policy area
– the arrangements of the welfare state confirm the pattern that women 
are responsible for care;
– (in regard of tight labor markets) the distribution of paid labor and care 
cannot be considered as just a private problem anymore;
– current activation policies do not consider the combination of paid labor 
and care
– employers and men believe they must be constantly available for work
– the image exists that women are primarily (potentially) mother;
– the uneven distribution between unpaid care between women and men 
is due to the fact that men do not perform care functions
Desired 
realities
– social policy should depart from a life course perspective of transitions;
– social policy should consider the diversity of roles that men and women 
can, must and want to play during their life courses;
– a two way traffic of transitions on the labor market should be created;
– a life course perspective of transitions also means that all individuals 
transit towards the labor market;
– Emancipation policies should be directed at men, because they are the 
main problem.
246 Appendix to chapters 5 and 6 Argumentation strategies 
Table 6 Argumentation strategy ‘human capital narrative’ (Bovenberg 2003)
Categories Main claims in texts
Social 
trends
– life courses have changed;
– the life course has been extended with two new stages;
– human capital lasts longer, because health improvements has length-
ened the life course;
– workers engage in other activities outside paid work during their life;
– investments in human capital (of children) have become more important;
– human capital ages quickly;
– the supply of women capital has grown;
– the responsibility for inactivity has increased;
Problemati-
zation of 
social 
trends
– in the stage of family life the income falls (family gap);
– for working parents the stage of family life presents the ‘rush hour of 
life;
– a longer life expectancy has not yet been translated into a longer life 
span of human capital income risks; 
– people are insufficiently educated;
– involuntarily unemployment has become less well verifiable, as a result 
it is increasingly difficult to insure this risk;
– the poverty among children increases;
– because of the increased labor market participation of women, there are 
less people available to take care of the elderly people;
Undesired 
reality
– imperfections on the capital market prevent young parents from distrib-
uting their time during the life course in an optimal way;
– pension systems are not tailored towards modern life courses
– the social security system is not able to address new risks in the middle 
stage of life;
– the labor market is not sufficient flexible for elderly people;
– social security systems insures old risks too well;
– people without (productive) children profit from those who raise children;
– people are not encouraged to invest in human capital;
Desired 
realities
– in modern life course parenthood demands public support;
– the worker bears primarily responsibility for the distribution of income 
during the life course
– the employer should encourage the sustenance of human capital and 
he/she should facilitate the workers to gear their work hours to other 
activities in specific stages of life;
– life long learning during the life course should be stimulated;
– collective insurances should be transformed to an individual savings 
scheme in the form of a life course arrangement;
– young people should be allowed to use pension savings for the finance 
of parental leaves, this also contributes to labor market transitions in 
the modern life course;
– young people are encouraged to prepare themselves for the period of 
family life;
– time for leisure and finances are being transferred from the senior peri-
od in life to the busy and expensive period in life; 
– most people are able to bear individual responsibility for temporarily 
income reductions and for the investments in human capital;
– human capital should be maintained in order to avoid workers leaving 
the labor market;
– savings elements in the social security system encourages the incentives 
for middle and higher incomes to participate in the labor market;
– social security arrangements which insure human capital, such as pen-
sions, parental leave, care leave and education should be integrated 
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Table 7 Argumentation strategy ‘new risk narrative’ (Leynse 2001-1)
Categories Main claims in texts
Social 
trends
– we make more combinations and transitions between different ways of 
spending time: labor, housework, care, educations and other activities;
– life long learning, employability, variation of work have become more 
important;
– new social trends: the emergence of the knowledge economy; computer-
ization; individualization; internationalization; demographic changes;
– nowadays we encounter risks and responsibilities in a different way: 
whereas in the early days we conceived of risks as exogenous events; 
nowadays we also view the endogenous elements;
– demand for both low skilled and high skilled labor grows;
– individualization has not resulted in a complete mix of activities;
– paid work has changed;
– the new worker must increasingly behave himself as an entrepreneur;
– social skills have become more important for the new worker;
– paid work should be fun, and it should fit with our character;
– secondary labor conditions have become more important;
Problemati-
zation of 
social 
trends
– the stage of life in which children are not yet able to learn work and 
play on their own is correctly called the ‘rush hour of life’;
– as a result of increased combinations of activities, the boundaries 
between work and private have become blurred. This gives rise to more 
stress, one of the most important risks of the moment;
– this intensity of combining activities can result to sickness and an inabil-
ity to work: an enormous depreciation on human capital;
– flexibility can result in job insecurity;
Undesired 
reality
– institutions of social security labor relations, care and education follow 
the standard life course model, have standard production schemes, are 
based on standard types, and follow the traditional male-female pat-
terns in labor and care;
– the fiscal system is modeled on the standard life course model
– the old social contract induces inactivity and eliminates free choice;
– institutions of social security results in welfare dependency and discour-
age investments in ones own human capital;
– current institutions do not produce right incentives;
– institutions do not fit with current economy that is based on human 
capital;
– institutions are related to either the worker or the entrepreneur; hybrid 
possibilities are not acknowledged;
– institutions do not encourage job rotation nor entrepreneurship;
– people aged 50 years and up are not encouraged to invest in their 
human capital;
Desired 
realities
– get rid of standard life course patterns within institutions;
– social security and capital fundings should be independent of the stage 
of life;
– households should be accommodated in the ‘rush hour of life’;
– the new social contract should reckon with the concurrence of risk and 
free choice;
– social policy should cherish our human capital;
– institutions should take the desires of the new worker into account;
– classical distinctions between worker and entrepreneur should be loos-
ened;
– institutions should maintain social cohesion and solidarity within society;
– social institutions should encourage the elderly to work longer;
– The social security system should enable or empower workers.
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Table 8 ‘Life course perspective’ and citations
we do not want: ‘a new standard pattern’
but: ‘accommodate the desires of the modern family that values an adequate distribution 
of time over the life course’ (Cuyvers 1996)
we do not want: ‘standard life course patterns within the institutions’
but: “accommodate the desires of the ‘new worker’, which means that the system of 
social security should be made independent of the stage of life” (Leynse 2001-1)
we do not want: ‘a standard life course that is based on the average male life course’
but: ‘a diversity of life courses, meaning that more attention should be paid to the quali-
ty of life and the life course with a double loyalty’ (Evenhuis 1999b)
we do not want: ‘a standard life course that entails a waste of human capital and the 
insurance of old risks’
but: ‘the accommodation of the modern, flexible economy that invests in human capital, 
endorses a spirit of enterprise and in which the worker is primarily responsible for the 
distribution of income during the life course’(Bovenberg 2001, 2003)
we do not want: ‘to offer ‘black Fords’
but: ‘a life course perspective on transitions, meaning that individuals are empowered 
to actually make transitions in their lives’ (Schippers 2001)
Table 1 Discursive shifts in the writings of Balkenende (2001-2005)
‘Groen over Paars (2001) Bilderberg conference (2005)
Trends – negative consequences of seven 
years purple government:
* introduction of market 
processes
* individualization
* sole focus on labor market par-
ticipation and reduction in tax 
burdens;
– we have got more and better 
facilities, and more spare time;
– industrial society has been trans-
formed into a network society;
Problemati-
zation of 
social 
trends
– the policy of the purple govern-
ment has resulted in the over-
heating over the economy, result-
ing in shortages on the labor 
market;
– Trust in the working of the mar-
ket has decreased;
– the purple government has 
wrongly emphasized ‘maximum 
labor participation’ instead of an 
‘optimal labor participation’, 
which also addresses unpaid 
activities and spare time;
– the economy is still slow;
– whereas in 1960 the Dutch work-
er made the most working hours 
in Europe, nowadays, the 
Netherlands scores the number 
one position on the list of the 
countries with the shortest work 
hours; 
Justification 
for a 
desired 
reality
– people think there has been too 
much individualization; they care 
for basic values, the quality of 
society and security, recognition, 
respect and protection in an inse-
cure world; they care for 
moments of rest in the domestic 
sphere;
– people experience stress in their 
private lives; it has become 
increasingly difficult to combine 
work, care and spare time;
– the danger of the economization 
of social life that everything is 
measured in economic terms and 
that values also get economized
– due to the aging process, an 
increased labor market participa-
tion has become essential for our 
economy;
– the main problem will be a limit-
ed supply of good educated and 
trained workers;
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‘Groen over Paars (2001) Bilderberg conference (2005)
Desired 
reality 
– a communitarian society;
– the form of family policy;
– humanity and quality of society;
– addressing problems caused by 
stress and the issue that people 
have to spend more time and pay 
more attention to each other;
– optimum labor participation 
instead of maximum labor partic-
ipation: volunteer labor for socie-
ty also counts
– everybody who can work, has to 
work;
– workers have to engage in life 
long learning;
– workers must be flexible;
– prioritization of entrepreneur-
ship: reduction in tax burdens;
– market parties will be involved 
with respect to public insurance;
Life course
perspective
– life course policy: people should 
be able to make more choices in 
their lives that fit with the specif-
ic period of life.
– in order to work more hours the 
distribution of time between paid 
work and other activities (care 
and study) should be enhanced;
– this means a new social economic 
system should be based upon the 
individual life course;
– we have to go from early retire-
ment schemes to life course 
(implying that people have to 
become more active).
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Table 2 Discursive shifts in the reports of the research institute for the CDA 
(2001-2004)
Druk van de ketel (2001) Zekerheid op maat (2004)
Trends with 
respect to 
changed life 
courses
– people combine more activities in 
the modern life course and the 
roles of men and women have 
become less clear;
– regarding the period of parent-
hood, the modern life course has 
become standard as well;
– individual life courses are 
increasingly diverged and it is 
increasingly difficult to demar-
cate the stages of life in the net-
work society
Problemati-
zation of 
social 
trends
– new life courses cause pressure to 
achieve, a pressure of work and 
insecurity;
– families can be perceived as the 
losers within the life course;
– our prosperity is in danger, 
because of the worsened eco-
nomic position of Europe and 
aging society;
– individuals must constantly 
invest in themselves: a social 
divide emerges between low 
and high educated citizens;
Undesired 
reality with 
respect to 
the life 
course 
perspective
– current social security system is 
still tailored to the traditional life 
course as a result of which it is 
difficult to combine diverse activi-
ties;
– people are insufficiently protected;
– labor market policy does not con-
jure up with developments in the 
life course: transitions, life long 
learning, etc.; 
The social institutions are still 
based on the classical life course 
perspective of industrial society 
of last century which covers 
risks instead of preventing those 
risks from arising in the first 
place;
Desired 
reality with 
respect to 
the life 
course 
perspective
– institutions should become more 
tailored to the increase of the 
diversity of labor participation 
during the life course without 
dispersing the realm of income, 
career perspective and family. 
– the institutions must endorse a 
life course perspective which 
means that the they should 
encourage precautionary mea-
sures and labor participation. 

The labor unions loudly celebrated the outcomes of the November 2004 
agreement. Yet, tables 1a and 1b show that it is doubtful if the outcome of 
the November agreement really improved the position of the workers com-
pared to the last compromise proposal in May 2004 which induced the 
social demonstration in October 2004.
Table 1a Most important differences between last compromise proposal 
(Star deliberations May 2004) and the agreement of November 2004
Last proposal 18th of May 2004 Agreement 5th of November 2004
Fiscal facilitation of pre-pensions starting 
at the age of 62,5 on the condition of the 
possibility of opting out.
Abolition of fiscal facilitation of pensions 
before the age of 65;
Savings in the life course arrangement up 
to 150% of last wage. The government is 
prepared to negotiate further on a higher 
maximum.
Savings in the life course arrangement up 
to 210% of last wage;
Extra possibilities to make collective agree-
ments on the transfers of pensions-savings 
to finance leave before the age of 65; 
An extra fiscal reduction in the life course 
arrangement (yearly €183).
Table 1b Opinion on the outcome of the November agreement 2004 for the labor 
unions
The November agreement 
was better than the earlier 
compromise proposal
The November agreement 
was comparable to the 
earlier compromise 
proposal
The November agreement 
was worse than the earlier 
compromise proposal
2 staff members of FNV
1 Key-official
1 staff member of FNV
1 staff member of CNV
1 staff member of VNO-
NCW
1 key-official
1 representative of CDA
1 staff member of CNV
1 staff member of VNO-
NCW
1 staff members of the 
union for private insur-
ances
2 ministers
3 5 5
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Table 2 Factors inhibiting a successful LCA according to the respondents
Technical aspects
– anti-accumulation regulation between the life course and the wage savings arrange-
ment;
– employers who agreed to contribute to the life course arrangement as part of terms of 
employment, were obliged to pay the same to all workers, whether they participated 
or not in the arrangement;
– the administrative burdens were put on the shoulders of the employers;
– workers had the right to save in the LCA, but did not have the right to take a leave;
– workers with low income profit less from the LCA than workers with high income;
non-believers
– the life course arrangement is not the right instrument to solve the problem of the 
‘rush hour of life’;
– the LCA does not contribute to an increased labor participation;
– politicians are not convinced that the LCA is a good arrangement;
– people do not feel that the arrangement brings them something;
Representation and promotion
– the representation in the media of the LCA had become negative;
– the government has not promoted the LCA enough;
– people distrust the government, they are not sure that the LCA will stay.
Table 1 Argumentation strategies used in Balimanifest 1 (2005) and 
Balimanifest 2 (2009)
Baliemanifest 1 
(Leenders, et al 2005)
Baliemanifest 2 
(Beukema, et all 2009)
Undesired 
developments 
The Balkenende government has 
curtailed the social security sys-
tem.
Current social security arrange-
ments offer neither self employed 
nor employees on a fixed term 
contract sufficient protection.
New trends The modern life discourse is more 
diverse compared with the tradi-
tional life course. 
The differences between the 
employee and the self employed 
decrease rapidly.
Relationship 
between new 
risks and the 
public interest
Whereas for society choices with 
respect to education and care 
have become very important, they 
cannot be perceived anymore as 
exclusive private affairs. The gov-
ernment should therefore extend 
current public social security with 
an insurance for care and educa-
tion. 
New risks accumulate at the bot-
tom of the labor market where 
mostly low educated people are 
in need of more protection; the 
government should guarantee the 
protection of these workers. 
Key concept Life course: paid work has now a 
central place in the life course of 
the people.
Emancipation: at this moment 
workers and employers are being 
patronized by the government 
which does not provide sufficient 
security;
Desired reality The social security system should 
enable people to alternate 
between different roles in decisive 
stages in their lives.
Workers should emancipate and 
become more autonomous.
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